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Over the last half century Australia has experienced palpable declines in political 
party satisfaction, identification, confidence and participation. Evidence suggests that the 
trend toward party disengagement undermines representative democracy by eroding the 
ability of party organisations to act as conduits between majority will and government. 
Although there is substantial analysis available into how value orientations, social capital 
and interpersonal trust influence confidence and involvement in political institutions, 
relatively little research exists on the network homogenising causes of declining party 
involvement, something this thesis seeks to address by conducting a close study of this 
phenomenon in the Australian context.  
 
It is argued in this thesis that the decline in party engagement can largely be 
attributed to rising levels of ‘social modularity’, by which is meant the flexibility to both 
forge and discontinue social connections. This raised degree of social modularity is found to 
be facilitating a replacement of ‘bridging’ social capital with ‘bonding’ social capital thereby 
altering skills and experiences and social and political tolerance and expectations. Increased 
social autonomy is associated with the post-industrial stage of development; consequently, 
the findings of this investigation into political sociological trends in Australia are likely to be 
applicable to most other post-industrial democracies. 
This thesis draws on my own survey findings as well as raw data from Australian 
World Values Survey (WVS) waves. The latter were analysed to produce age stratified 
frequency and correlation statistics. WVS waves provide an invaluable source of data from 
which trends in values, interpersonal trust, institutional confidence, generosity and 
community and civic involvement can be analysed. These statistics are supplemented by 
Pearson correlations collated from responses to the questions posed in my own detailed 
‘Political Participation & Conflict Avoidance Survey’, in which 36 subjects participated.   
Social network homogenisation is found to be linked to a post-industrial generational 
attitudinal shift from an emphasis on conformity and hierarchical survival values to 
autonomy and egalitarian self-expression values. That is, statistics reveal that a Self-
Expression Values Homogenous Social Network (SEVHSN) Complex now exists. The statistics 
also show that, and suggest reasons why party confidence, identification and engagement 
are negatively correlated with immersion in the Complex. Additionally, statistics presented 
indicate that an increasing proportion of the Australian population is becoming more heavily 
embedded in the Complex (largely through generational replacement). They also reveal that 
Complex-immersion is mainly being driven by trends associated with greater social 
modularity and empowerment (brought about by post-industrialisation). These trends relate 
to technology use, economic development/financial security, education attainment and 
news/information dissemination. The statistical analysis present in this thesis suggests that 
my Homogenisation arguments may have better explanatory power than the two dominant 
rival sociological engagement theories: Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel’s 
‘Modernisation’ and Robert Putnam’s ‘Lamentation’ theories, both of which are critically 
evaluated. 
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AISNDS  Average Ideological Social Network Difference Score: The 
average degree of ideological difference that participants 
believe to exist between them and members of their close 
social network. 
ASSNDS  Average Structural Social Network Difference Score: The 
average degree of structural difference that participants 
believe to exist between them and members of their close 
social network. 
AVSNDS  Average Values Social Network Difference Score: The 
average degree of difference that participants believe 
exists between the emphasis they place on values and the 
emphasis placed on those same values by members of 
their close social network. 
ISNDS  Ideological Social Network Difference Score: The degree of 
ideological difference that participants believe to exist 
between them and members of their close social network. 
(SEVHSN) Complex / the Complex Self-Expression Values Homogenous Social Network 
Complex: a sociological nexus in which an increasing 
emphasis on self-expression values is linked to 
homogenising social networks within advanced post-
industrial societies. 
SNHPE Chart  Social Network Homogenisation and Political Engagement 
Chart. 
SNH - Social Network Homogenisation A trend toward more bonding and less bridging social 
capital. 
SID - Societal Ideological Diversification  A trend toward a more ideologically heterogenous society. 
WVS      World Values Survey 
 
Generational Definitions according to theorists Neil Howe and William Strauss 
Generation G.I. Birthyears 1901 – 1924 
Generation Silent Birthyears 1925 – 1942 
Generation Boomer Birthyears 1943 – 1960 
Generation X Birthyears 1961 – 1981 





Generation Millennial / Y Birthyears 1982 – 20041 
 
Other Thesis Term 
Bonding social capital/connections That between people with similar life experiences, views 
and priorities. According to Putnam it is “inward looking 
and tend[s] to reinforce exclusive identities and 
homogenous groups” and it “is good for under girding 
specific reciprocity and mobilising solidarity”.2 
Bridging social capital/connections That between people with different backgrounds, 
attitudes and interests. According to Putnam it is 
“outward looking and encompass[es] people across 
diverse social cleavages” and it is “better [than ‘bonding’ 
social capital] for linkage to external assets and for 
information diffusion”.3 
Close social networks  Friends, work colleagues, family members and others with 
whom one feels comfortable talking to about serious and 
private matters and whom one can call on for help. 
Complex-immersion / Complex-embeddedness Being immersed or embedded in the Self-Expression 
Values Homogenous Social Network (SEVHSN) Complex. 
Conventional participation Activities that are expected of good citizens such as 
voting, active involvement in political parties and 
campaigns, making campaign donations and serving in 
public office. 
Cross-cutting cleavages Groups on one cleavage overlapping among groups on 
another cleavage. Cleavages may include those related to 
education, socio-eco status, profession, ethnic heritage, 
religious beliefs and cultural and political values. 
Egalitarian decision-making  Procedures and processes that allow rank and file 
members to influence group/organisational decisions. 
Egalitarian leadership-selection Procedures and processes that allow rank and file 
members to influence the selection of 
group/organisational leaders. 
External political efficacy The belief that government will respond to one’s 
demands. 
                                                          
1 Howe, Neil and Strauss, William. (1991) Generations: The History of America’s Future, 1584 to 2069, Harper 
Perennial, New York, p.32 & 42 
2 Putnam, Robert D. (2000), Bowling Alone: The Collapse and revival of American Community, Simon & 
Schuster, New York, p.22 
3 Putnam, Bowling Alone, p.22 





Formal organisations/groups Groups with fixed (often codified) sets of rules, structures 
and procedures that seemingly leave little discretion for 
interpretation. 
Formal Organisational Engagement Score The degree to which participants in my ‘Political 
Participation and Conflict Avoidance Survey’ were 
engaged in, and actively involved in the decision-making 
of, formal groups/organisations. 
Formal social capital Social capital derived from participation in formal 
groups/organisations. 
Formal social connections Interpersonal relationships that are forged and exist 
because of mutual participation in formal 
groups/organisations. 
Formal social networks Social networks that are forged from and rely on 
participation in formal groups/organisations. 
Homogenisation hypothesis/theory/thesis This thesis’ argument that ideologically bridging is being 
replaced over decades by ideologically bonding social 
capital and that this trend has eroded 
conventional/electoral/party political involvement. 
Human capital Knowledge, skills and creativity that enables greater 
production of economic value. 
Human flourishing A context in which the individuals of a community can 
realise and fulfil their talents and potentialities. 
Ideologically homogenous/reinforcing networks Social networks in which members have very similar 
political views and emphasise political values in a similar 
way. 
Ideological Network Homogenisation A trend toward greater ideological homogeneity within 
social networks. 
Informal social capital Social capital that exists between family, friends and 
others outside the context of formal organisations. 
Informal social connections Interpersonal relationships that exist outside of (and are 
typically not forged in) formal groups/organisations. 
Informal social networks Friendship, familial and other networks that exist outside 
of (and are typically not forged from) formal 
groups/organisations. 
Internal political efficacy Belief that one can understand, and therefore participate 
in politics. 
Lamentation theory/thesis The theory that modern technology and societal trends 
have had a negative impact on social capital. 
Lamentationists hold that both informal and formal 
structural social capital are in decline. These trends, they 





contend, are resulting in falling community and civic 
oriented interests and values by reducing social and 
political trust, empathy and efficacy. This in turn, they 
reason, has profoundly contributed to a reduction in both 
conventional/electoral and unconventional/non-electoral 
political engagement. This position is most 
comprehensively articulated by Robert Putnam’s “Bowling 
Alone” thesis. 
Modernisation theory/thesis Most notably espoused by Ronald Inglehart and Christian 
Welzel, Modernisation theories allege that technological 
and economic development raise levels of education, 
labour productivity, occupational specialisation and 
personal income. Modernisationists assert that this 
process of development, increases individual autonomy 
and sense of personal security by expanding people’s 
material, cognitive and social resources. These trends 
produce cultural changes including greater emphasis on 
“rational/secular” and “self-expression” (autonomy) 
values and “more critical and less easily led publics.”4 
According to Modernisationists, these cultural changes 
then alter social capital and political engagement from 
forms which are formal, and elite led (both political and 
non-political), to those which are egalitarian, elite 
challenging and informal.  
Political conflict aversion/avoidance Avoidance of discussion-topics and situations which may 
precipitate arguments over conflicting political views. 
Political Participation & Conflict Avoidance Survey My survey gauging participants’ social network 
homogeneity as well as measures of social capital and 
political confidence and engagement. 
Post-material values Greater emphasis on autonomy and self-expression over 
physical security and economic wellbeing. 
Prime Circuit Three variables (1. conventional/conflict prone 
engagement, 2. representativeness/responsiveness of the 
political parties and system, and 3. satisfaction with the 
political parties and system) that feed into each other; 
each amplifying the effect of Social Network 
Homogenisation on the other two either directly or 
indirectly. 
Self-Expression values Greater emphasis on autonomy and 
egalitarianism/equality over conformity and hierarchy. 
Social atomisation A process resulting in the social ties binding individuals 
together becoming weaker or more easily severed. 
                                                          
4 Inglehart, and Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy, p.5, 6 & 19 





Social capital “The social networks between individuals as well as the 
trust, shared norms and reciprocities that underpin and in 
turn arise from such connections.”5 
Social connections    Interpersonal relationships. 
Social Connectivity The quality and number of familial, friendship and other 
social connections between individuals. 
Social modularity Flexibility to forge and discontinue social connections. 
Societal Diversification A trend toward a more structurally and/or ideologically 
heterogenous society. 
Structural heterogeneity/difference The degree to which members of groups (e.g. nations or 
social networks) have different structural characteristics 
and/or traits such as age, religion, neighbourhood, 
ethnicity, gender, occupation, educational 
background/level and income/wealth. 
Structural homogeneity/similarity The degree to which members of groups (e.g. nations or 
social networks) share structural characteristics and/or 
traits such as age, religion, neighbourhood, ethnicity, 
gender, occupation, educational background/level and 
income/wealth. 
Structurally homogenous networks Social networks whose members share structural 
characteristics/traits to a significant degree. 
Structural social capital The network of people who an individual knows and upon 
whom they can draw for information and/or assistance. It 
is distinct from cognitive (shared values, attitudes and 
beliefs) and relational (trust, trustworthiness, norms, 
sanctions, obligations, expectations, identity and 
identification) social capital.6 
Survival Values Greater emphasis on conformity and elite authority (over 
autonomy and egalitarianism/equality) when survival is 
more precarious. 
Unconventional political participation Activities that are legal but often considered inappropriate 
such as signing petitions, supporting boycotts, and staging 
demonstrations and protests. 
  
                                                          
5 Henn, Matt., Hodgkinson, Sarah and Weinstein, Mark. (2007) ‘Social capital and political participation: 
Understanding the dynamics of young people’s political disengagement in contemporary Britain’, Social Policy 
and Society, vol:6(4), p.467 
6 Claridge, Tristan. (2018) ‘What is Structural Social Capital’, Social Capital: Research & Training, viewed 7 
March 2018, https://www.socialcapitalresearch.com/structural-social-capital/  







                                                          
7 Top. Putnam, Robert. The John Adams Institute: American Culture in the Netherlands, viewed 10 February 
2018, https://www.john-adams.nl/robert-putnam-interview-in-fd/; Middle-Left. Welzel, Christian. Wikipedia, 
viewed 10 February 2018, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Christian_Welzel; Middle-Right. Inglehart, Ronald. 
Georgetown University: Berkley Center for Religion, Peace & World Affairs, viewed 10 February 2018, 
https://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/people/ronald-inglehart 






“I was so excited about tonight ... every indication was that this was going to 
be a great night. An historic night, for women, for America and it’s just not the 
case.”9  
- Meredith Baker, 9th of November 2016, Washington D.C 
 
“Shocked actually. I cannot believe it’s going the way it is ... there was a 
shadow vote of people who were afraid to admit that they were going to vote 
for Trump and apparently, they came out en masse. That’s the only thing that 
makes any sense.”10 
- Ann Flynn, 9th of November 2016, New York City 
 
When asked to comment by New York Times journalists these were the responses of 
Clinton supporters Meredith Baker and Ann Flynn on the night of the 2016 US Presidential 
Election. The election had been perhaps the most polarising in living memory. The victor was 
seen by many as a boorish populist with no prior experience holding political office: 
- offering trade protection,11 immigration restrictions12 and an isolationist 
foreign policy;13 and 
- stoking and channelling fear, prejudice, and economic resentment with 
incendiary tirades against “corrupt” elites and “dangerous” minorities.14 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
8 WorldNews. (2018) ‘Bursting social-class bubbles’, viewed 10 February 2018, 
http://www.worldnews.easybranches.com/regions/singapore/Bursting-social-class-bubbles-620329  
9 Baker, Meredith. 9th of November 2016, speaking in Washington D.C. ‘Women Express Surprise at Trump 
Win: The New York Times’, YouTube, viewed 1 February 2018, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r4dxwdlfmhc  
10 Flynn, Ann. 9th of November 2016, speaking in New York City ‘Women Express Surprise at Trump Win: The 
New York Times’, YouTube, viewed 1 February 2018, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r4dxwdlfmhc  
11 The Guardian: Australia, (2016) ‘Trump economic policies: protectionism, low taxes and coal mines’, viewed 
14 February 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/nov/09/trumps-economic-policies-
protectionism-low-taxes-and-coal-mines 
12 Preston, Julia. (2016) ‘Many What-Ifs in Donald Trumps Plan for Migrants’, The New York Times, viewed 14 
February 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/19/us/politics/donald-trump-immigration.html  
13 Hirsh, Michael. (2016) ‘Why George Washington Would Have Agreed With Donald Trump’, POLITICO 
MAGAZINE, viewed 14 February 2018, https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/05/founding-fathers-
2016-donald-trump-america-first-foreign-policy-isolationist-213873  
14 McElwee, Sean and McDaniel, Jason. (2017) ‘Fear of Diversity Made People More Likely to Vote Trump’, The 
Nation, viewed 14 February 2018, https://www.thenation.com/article/fear-of-diversity-made-people-more-
likely-to-vote-trump/; Beauchamp, Zack. (2016) ‘Donald Trump’s victory is part of a global white backlash’, 
Vox, viewed 14 February 2018, https://www.vox.com/world/2016/11/9/13572174/president-elect-donald-





The defeated candidate was a polished member of the establishment and former First Lady, 
Senator and Secretary of State: 
- espousing continued globalisation,15 multiculturalism16 and an active world 
leadership role for the United States;17 but 
- failing to submit, or even acknowledge the need for, a compelling 
comprehensive tax, welfare, health care, education, industrial relations, 
campaign finance and electoral reform agenda to assist the losers of trade 
liberalisation and automation and restore faith in American democracy. 
The reflections of Baker and Flynn convey not only disappointment but more significantly 
astonishment. From these typical citizens through to celebrities, television personalities and 
talk show hosts most Americans of a left, liberal or establishment persuasion had become 
convinced that their political views were accepted by an overwhelming majority of their 
countrymen-and-women. Embedded in social/ideological bubbles they had been 
disconnected from reality. 
Post-industrial Political Distrust & Electoral and Party Disengagement 
 
Since the mid-twentieth century many western post-industrial countries, whose 
citizens enjoy remarkable physical security and financial and technological empowerment, 
have experienced a marked rise in political distrust as well as striking declines in electoral and 
political party engagement. Between 1986 and 2013 the proportion of the UK population 
surveyed reporting that they ‘almost never’ trust government grew from 10% to 30%.18 The 
proportion of Canadians surveyed who reported trusting the government in Ottawa to do 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
trump-2016-victory-racism-xenophobia; Wallis, Claudia. (2016) ‘Trump’s Victory and the Politics of 
Resentment’, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN, viewed 14 February 2018, 
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/trump-s-victory-and-the-politics-of-resentment/  
15 Chon, Gina. (2016) ‘Clinton and Kaine become globalization’s defenders’, REUTERS, viewed 23 March 2018, 
http://blogs.reuters.com/breakingviews/2016/07/23/clinton-and-kaine-become-globalizations-defenders/ 
16 Reilly, Katie. (2016) ‘Read Hillary Clinton’s Speech on Donald Trump and the GOP’s Radical Fringe’, TIME, 
viewed 23 March 2018, http://time.com/4466706/hillary-clinton-donald-trump-radical-fringe-hate-transcript/ 
17 C-SPAN, (2016) ‘NOVEMBER 19, 2015: CLIP OF PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE HILLARY CLINTON NATIONAL 
SECURITY ADDRESS’, viewed 23 March 2018, https://www.c-span.org/video/?c4609071/clinton-american-
leadership 
18 Houses of Parliament: Parliamentary Office of Science & Technology, (June 2015) ‘Trends in Political 
Participation’, POSTNOTE Number 498, p.2 





what is right most or all of the time eroded from 60% in the late 1960s to just 28% in 2013.19 
Trust in government has also been declining in the United States and many continental 
European countries.20 Moreover, since the 1970s rates of voter turnout have been declining 
in the western world.21 In the 1972 German General Election 91.1% of eligible electors turned 
out to vote. In 2017 only 76.2% participated.22 In the French First-Round Legislative Elections 
of the 1970s voter turnout was above 80%. By 2017 it had eroded to below 50%.23 The 
official turnout rate in the Canadian Federal General Election of 1963 was 79%.24 By 2015 it 
was just 68%.25 Furthermore, since the early 1950s the number of UK citizens who are 
political party members has fallen dramatically from four million to less than one million,26 
despite the population of the UK increasing from 50 million to over 60 million during the 
same period.27 Between 1988 and 2008 the proportion of the Canadian electorate that were 
political party members declined among each age group: from 5 to 2% among 18-29-year-
olds; from 8 to 4% among 30-59-year-olds and from 13 to 8% among those aged 60 and 
over.28 In the early 1960s nearly 10% of eligible voters in the Netherlands belonged to a 
                                                          
19 Graves, Frank. (2013) ‘THE TRUST DEFICIT: WHAT DOES IT MEAN’, EKOS:POLITICS, p.1 
20 Ceka, Besir. (2013) ‘The EU may have a democratic deficit, but national governments are facing an even 
greater legitimacy crisis’, The London School of Economics and Political Science, viewed 17 March 2018, 
http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2013/10/29/the-eu-may-have-a-democratic-deficit-but-national-
governments-are-facing-an-even-greater-legitimacy-crisis/; Pew Research Center, (2015) ‘1. Trust in 
government: 1958-2015’, BEYOND DISTRUST: HOW AMERICANS VIEW THEIR GOVERNMENT, viewed 17 March 
2018, http://www.people-press.org/2015/11/23/1-trust-in-government-1958-2015/  
21 Ferrini, Luca. (2012) ‘Why is Turnout at Elections Declining Across the Democratic World?’, E-
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS STUDENTS, viewed 23 March 2018, http://www.e-ir.info/2012/09/27/why-is-
turnout-at-elections-declining-across-the-democratic-world/ 
22 Statista, (2018) ‘Voter turnout a general elections in Germany from 1949 to 2017’, viewed 23 March 2018, 
https://www.statista.com/statistics/753732/german-elections-voter-turnout/ 
23 Kostelka, Filip. (2017) ‘The 2017 French Legislative Elections: Why Was Voter Turnout So Low and What Can 
Be Done About It?’, MAKING ELECTORAL DEMOCRACY WORK, viewed 23 March 2018, 
http://electoraldemocracy.com/2017-french-legislative-election-voter-turnout-2405 
24 Elections Canada, (2017) ‘Estimation of Voter Turnout by Age Group and Gender at the 2011 Federal General 
Election’, 
http://www.elections.ca/content.aspx?section=res&dir=rec/part/estim/41ge&document=report41&lang=e 
25 Elections Canada, (2016) ‘Voter Turnout by Age Group’, viewed 23 March 2018, 
http://www.elections.ca/content.aspx?section=res&dir=rec/eval/pes2015/vtsa&document=table1&lang=e 
26 Keen, Richard and Jackson, Lydia. (2018) ‘Membership of UK Political Parties’, HOUSE of COMMONS: 
LIBRARY, Briefing Paper Number SNO5125, p.7 
27 Lahmeyer, Jan. (2015) ‘The United Kingdom: historical demographical data of the whole country’, 
POPULATION STATISTICS, viewed 17 March 2018, http://www.populstat.info/Europe/unkingdc.htm 
28 Martin, Aaron. (2012) Young people and political engagement: Comparing Anglo-American democracies, 
Routledge, Florence Kentucky USA, p.78 





political party. By 2010 only 3% were members.29 Significant declines in rates of party 
membership have also occurred over the last several decades in New Zealand, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Finland, Ireland, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Portugal and Austria.30  
Thesis Argument, Scope & Data Sources 
 
Katz and Mair (1995) and Whiteley (2009a) reason that party disengagement renders 
the representativeness and responsiveness of democratic institutions susceptible to erosion 
by sectional and elite/monied interests.31 This thesis argues that:  
1) technological and economic development in post-industrial societies have 
precipitated a generational values shift; and  
2) these patterns have paradoxically both reduced the ideological diversity within, 
and raised the ideological difference between, social networks in turn:  
a) diminishing involvement in, and confidence and satisfaction with, 
conventional/conflict-prone political organisations (including parties), thereby  
b) undermining representative democracy. 
This thesis argues that these ‘social capital’32 and political engagement trends can 
largely be attributed to rising levels of ‘social modularity’, by which is meant the flexibility to 
both forge and discontinue social connections. This raised social modularity is facilitating a 
replacement of ‘bridging social capital’ (between people with different backgrounds, 
                                                          
29 Tall, Stephen. (2012) ‘The Lib Dem membership slump: how it compares and how we can respond’, Liberal 
Democrat Voice, viewed 17 March 2018, https://www.libdemvoice.org/lib-dem-party-membership-figures-
2011-29703.html 
30 Edwards, Bryce. (2008) ‘Party membership 4: Electoral-Professional party’, Liberation, viewed 17 March 
2018, http://liberation.typepad.com/liberation/2008/06/party-members-4.html; Biezen, Ingrid. (2013) ‘The 
decline in party membership across Europe means that political parties need to reconsider how they engage 
with the electorate’, EUROPP: European Politics and Policy, viewed 17 March 2018, 
http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2013/05/06/decline-in-party-membership-europe-ingrid-van-biezen/; 
Scarrow, Susan, E and Gezgor, Burcu. (2010) ‘Declining memberships, changing members? European political 
party members in a new era’, PARTY POLITICS, p.1-21 
31 Katz, Richard, S and Mair, Peter. (1995) ‘Changing Models of Party Organisation and Party Democracy: The 
Emergence of the Cartel Party’, Party Politics, vol:1(1), p.15, 16 & 21-23; Whiteley, Paul. (2009) ‘Party 
membership and activism in comparative perspective’, in DeBardeleben, Joan and Pammett, Jon, H, Activating 
the citizen: Dilemmas of participation in Europe and Canada, Palgrave macmillan, England, p.131 
32 Henn, Hodgkinson and Weinstein define social capital as “[t]he social networks between individuals as well 
as the trust, shared norms and reciprocities that underpin and in turn arise from such connections.” Henn, 
Hodgkinson and Weinstein, ‘Social capital and political participation’, p.467 





attitudes and interests) with ‘bonding social capital’ (between people with similar life 
experiences, views and priorities), thereby altering skills and experiences and social and 
political tolerance and expectations. By conducting a close study of this phenomenon in the 
Australian context, this thesis uncovers the network homogenising causes of declining party 
participation (a gap in the scholarly literature). Raised social modularity and autonomy is 
linked to the post-industrial stage of development; therefore, the findings of this enquiry into 
political sociological trends in Australia are likely to be applicable to most other post-
industrial democracies. 
This thesis draws on my own survey findings as well as raw data from Australian 
World Values Survey (WVS) waves. The latter are analysed to produce age stratified 
frequency and correlation statistics. WVS waves provide an invaluable source of data from 
which trends in values, interpersonal trust, institutional confidence, generosity and 
community and civic involvement can be analysed. These statistics are supplemented by 
Pearson correlations collated from responses to the questions posed in my own detailed 
‘Political Participation & Conflict Avoidance Survey.’ Data from my survey is used to assess 
the degree to which the views and value emphases of participants reflect those of the 
participants’ close friends, work colleagues and family members. These evaluations are found 
to be significantly correlated with survey responses pertaining to measures of, and possible 
factors influencing social capital and political confidence and engagement. The survey was 
thorough and complex, requiring at least 2 hours for each of the 36 participants to complete. 
Participants were found using snowball sampling techniques in which existing survey 
participants recruit future participants from among their acquaintances. Participants were 
asked to recruit a diverse range of subjects (if possible) and each participant was offered an 
honorarium of $25 for their involvement. 
Social network homogenisation is found to be linked to a post-industrial generational 
attitudinal shift from an emphasis on conformity and hierarchical survival values to autonomy 
and egalitarian self-expression values. That is, my statistics reveal that a Self-Expression 
Values Homogenous Social Network (SEVHSN) Complex now exists.33 The statistics also show 
that, and suggest reasons why party confidence, identification and engagement are 
                                                          
33 See Chapter Six 





negatively correlated with immersion in the Complex. Additionally, statistics presented 
indicate that an increasing proportion of the Australian population is becoming more heavily 
embedded in the Complex (largely through generational replacement). They also reveal that 
Complex-immersion is mainly being driven by trends associated with greater social 
modularity and empowerment (brought about by post-industrialisation). These trends relate 
to technology use, economic development/financial security, education attainment and 
news/information dissemination.34 The statistical analysis present in this thesis suggests that 
my Homogenisation arguments may have better explanatory power than the two dominant 
rival sociological engagement theories: Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel’s 
‘Modernisation’ and Robert Putnam’s ‘Lamentation’ theories, both of which are critically 
evaluated. I have personally coined the term Lamentationists to describe theorists 
contending that modern technology and societal trends have eroded all (or most forms of) 
social capital (formal and informal, bonding and bridging), trust, civic oriented values and 
political engagement. 
Why an ‘Australian’ Case Study? 
 
Due to nineteenth and twentieth century settlement and migration patterns Australia 
is relatively ethnically, philosophically and ideologically homogenous compared to other 
Western developed nations such as the Netherlands, France, Canada, the United States and 
the United Kingdom. Australian societal homogeneity may somewhat mitigate the growing 
political intolerance,35 distrust36 and dissatisfaction37 as well as electoral and party 
disengagement38 induced by network homogenisation. The difference between the 
experiences, values, beliefs and expectations of people embedded in social bubbles, and 
those who more frequently interact with people unlike themselves, are not as great when 
there is less variance between bubbles. Though the consequences of contemporary Social 
Network Homogenisation (SNH) may not be as severe in Australia relative to many other 
post-industrial nations, Australia’s ideological network homogenisation and societal 
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diversification are, compared to similar trends in other countries, less of an amplification of 
philosophical purity/divergence within/between ethnicities and regions. Therefore, Australian 
sociological trends cannot be dismissed as simply a legacy of the cultural evolution, trauma 
and demographic shifts of a bygone era. For this reason, Australia is a worthy case study for 
how social capital patterns associated with the post-industrial stage of development 
influence political involvement. 
Ideological Diversification and Political Polarisation 
 
Network homogenisation and societal diversification exacerbate policy cleavages and 
the degree to which individuals overestimate the prevalence of their own political beliefs 
within, and the ideological homogeneity of, society.39 This is widening the gap between 
electoral/policy expectations and outcomes, and augmenting distrust of, intolerance toward 
and dissatisfaction with party organisations and politicians.40 In recent years there has been a 
spate of particularly polarising referenda and national elections across the Western world in 
which a large proportion of citizens were astounded by the level of support received by 
campaigns and politicians previously deemed far removed from mainstream politics. From 
the rising popularity of the Alternative für Deutschland, the French National front, Pauline 
Hanson’s One Nation, Lega Nord, the Five-Star Movement and the Austrian and Dutch 
Freedom parties, through to Brexit and the Trump election, many nationals have not just 
been disheartened but bewildered by these developments.41 Without reforms guided by a 
full appreciation of the post-industrial factors and trends (network homogenisation and 
societal diversification) driving party disengagement and greater political division, intolerance 
and dissatisfaction, representative democracy and social cohesion are likely to come under 
greater pressure and threat. Through an Australian investigation, I endeavour to demonstrate 
how, contrary to conventional wisdom, sociological trends linked to post-industrial 
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development have a twin-pronged effect: they erode bridging while at the same time 
strengthen bonding connections. These patterns, in turn, undermine party and electoral 
involvement and erode confidence in our democratic institutions. 
Thesis Structure 
 
The first two chapters identify and scrutinise sociological participation theories that 
could potentially explain diminished rates of Australian party and electoral involvement. 
Chapter One presents a summary of declining rates of Australian party and electoral 
engagement and evaluates how these patterns are inimical to an inclusive and flourishing 
democracy. The number of Australian major party members has fallen from approximately 
350,000 members in the mid-twentieth century to 100,000 members in 2010;42 despite the 
population of Australia almost trebling in that same period.43 Indeed, the proportion of 
Australians who are political party members has shrunk by 75% since the 1960s.44 Lisa Hill 
and Serrin Rutledge-Prior have found that intentional informal voting among Australian youth 
is on the rise.45 Their research also reveals that between 1983 and 2013 levels of informal 
voting in Australian House of Representatives elections rose by 180%.46 Additionally, Aaron 
Martin has found that party identification in Australia is in generational decline. In 1990 only 
5% of Australian young people did not identify with a party. By 2010 that figure had grown to 
24%.47 The chapter also discerns two pre-eminent sociological participation theories: Ronald 
Inglehart and Christian Welzel’s ‘Modernisation’ and Robert Putnam’s Bowling Alone 
‘Lamentation’ theses. Additionally, it discusses evidence for why my third, ‘Homogenisation’ 
theory, deserves exploration.  
The second chapter reveals that both Modernisation and Lamentation theses have 
weaknesses as well as potency. Evidence is shown to corroborate the Modernisation 
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argument that social atomisation, induced by economic and technological advance, enables 
human liberation and autonomy by reshaping rather than diminishing social connections, 
cultural expectations and civil and political governing structures and processes. Yet, Inglehart 
and Welzel’s contention that ‘bonding’ is being replaced by ‘bridging’ social capital is found 
to overlook data and research indicating that the Modernisation theorists’ identified 
instigators of social modularity may also be homogenising networks and diversifying societal 
beliefs and ideals. Similarly, not all the trends Putnam argues as having an eroding effect on 
social capital and political participation are validated by other, and my own data analysis. 
Moreover, Putnam’s position that almost all forms of social capital are (or were) in secular 
decline is judged unduly bleak: largely because it concentrates excessively on traditional 
community and political involvement patterns and neglects trends in newer and more 
informal modes of engagement. 
Chapter Three assesses the extent to which Australian value, social capital and 
political involvement trends are consistent with Modernisation, Lamentation and 
Homogenisation theses by exploring age-and-generation-stratified frequency statistics from 
the 1981, 1995, 2005 and 2012 World Values Surveys (WVS). Overall this WVS evidence 
undermines Modernisation and Lamentation theses and shapes my more compelling 
Homogenisationist explanation. Trends regarding changing education, employment and 
familial demographics, levels of subjectively sensed autonomy, value orientations and 
informal/unconventional political engagement are found to be consistent with Modernisation 
and Homogenisation theories. In contrast, data concerning shifting value orientations and 
unconventional political participation are shown to weaken Putnam’s Lamentation 
arguments, at least in the Australian context. Patterns discordant with Modernisation and 
Lamentation theories are uncovered by subsequent examination of trends in political interest 
levels as well as involvement and confidence in formal organisations and institutions. 
Nevertheless, a sociological context of ideologically and recreationally homogenising 
networks is demonstrated to be congruent with this evidence. Finally, changing levels of 
interpersonal trust, happiness and financial and life satisfaction are found not to provide 
potent support for, but to be compatible with my Homogenisation theory. 





Chapters Four and Five analyse Australian age-stratified WVS correlation, and other 
statistics to gauge the veracity of Lamentationist, Modernisationist and my 
Homogenisationist views regarding factors ostensibly influencing political and social values, 
capital and engagement. These factors include:  
- a subjective sense of autonomy; 
- economic variables potentially affecting actual autonomy levels (Chapter 
Four); 
- familial compositions; 
- sex and female employment status; 
- TV viewing; 
- religious service attendance; and 
- town/city size (Chapter Five). 
The fundamental difference between Modernisation and Homogenisation theories are their 
opposing positions regarding the direction of generational shifts between bonding and 
bridging social capital. WVS questions do not enquire about the degree of ideological/political 
commonality between participants and their social network members (friends, work 
colleagues and family members). Therefore, findings in these chapters tend to support both 
Modernisation and Homogenisation theories but weaken Putnam’s Lamentation thesis. The 
data indicates that many of the variables Putnam considers to be significant factors, have 
little or no influence on, or relationship with, value orientations, social capital and political 
engagement. Furthermore, Putnam’s Lamentation arguments regarding the role of labour 
market deregulation are revealed to be irrelevant in the Australian context. Contrastingly, 
higher incomes and financial satisfaction, education and the extent to which one’s vocation 
demands creativity are found to markedly influence social and political values, capital and 
involvement in ways largely consistent with Modernisation and Homogenisation theories. 
Additionally, the impact of inequality is shown to be fairly consistent with my 
Homogenisation thesis. 
Having enfeebled Putnam’s Lamentation thesis in previous chapters (at least in the 
Australian context), Chapters Six and Seven focus on the divergence between my 





Homogenisation and Inglehart and Welzel’s Modernisation theses. Where there is difference, 
most statistics drawn from my own Political Participation and Conflict Avoidance Survey 
support my argument. Statistics discussed in Chapter Six indicate that:  
1) a Self-Expression Values Homogenous Social Network (SEVHSN) Complex exists;   
2) a generationally growing proportion of Australians are immersed in it, and  
3) it is linked to: 
a)  more informal structural social capital;  
b) more general interpersonal trust;  
c) more trust/confidence in decentralise local/state government, and 
d) less trust/confidence in the centralised federal government; and 
4) it is undermining: 
a) exposure to ideological diversity; and 
b) willingness to debate, compromise and participate in conflict prone forms of 
engagement. 
I argue that many of these trends will have (and are having) an undesirable impact on the 
strength and functionality of, and confidence in, Australian politics.  
Chapter Seven investigates the validity of theorised drivers of SEVHSN Complex-
immersion, including:  
- use of technologies (such as online communication and audio and screen 
entertainment);  
- financial security/economic development;  
- education attainment; and  
- news/information dissemination.  
The extent to which my Homogenisation arguments are supported by correlations between 
these variables and indicators of Complex-embeddedness is reviewed. I reason that these 
variables drive network homogenisation and societal diversification by enhancing individual 
empowerment. 





The final chapter evaluates the ways in which SNH influences political engagement. 
Pernicious patterns and factors linked to SNH are explored. My statistics uncover many 
correlations between patterns/trends symptomatic of, and theoretically associated with 
Complex-immersion and social network homogeneity. These strengthen my Homogenisation 
argument. To conclude, Chapter Eight speculates ways in which reform of Australian electoral 
regimes and intraparty decision-making procedures may alleviate the extent to which SNH 
suppresses party membership and involvement. 
In sum, this thesis contends that the significant declines in party membership and 
engagement experienced in Australia, and numerous other post-industrial societies, since the 
mid-twentieth century is connected to a dramatic rise in levels of individual empowerment. 
Increased personal autonomy enables greater social modularity that can produce ideological, 
philosophical and recreational network homogenisation and paradoxically, societal 
diversification. These trends can erode engagement in, and identification with, diverse and 
conflict prone organisations (such as political parties) by precipitating reductions in 
preparedness to compromise and inefficacy in debate, deliberation and negotiation: 
exacerbating political mistrust and dissatisfaction. Australian levels of political trust and 
satisfaction as well as party identification, membership and involvement have fallen 
remarkably during the last half century. These patterns potentially undermine the 
representativeness, responsiveness, resilience and effectiveness of our democratic 
institutions and procedures. Subjecting Australian social capital and civic involvement 
patterns to thorough evaluation will help raise awareness of the key causes of political 
intolerance and conflict aversion. This is necessary for elites to initiate electoral and internal 
party reforms aimed at adapting to generational shifts in values and expectations. 
  






--PARTY POLITICAL DISENGAGEMENT-- 
A Literature Review 
 
“I liked the idea of carving out a new kind of role in politics, one that didn’t 
involve deceit and nastiness … or the destruction of decent people’s efforts to 
build up the Party. But it was a vision of the future that I rapidly decided I 
could not make into a reality. … The factions that exist in the [party] 
organisation have served literally no productive purpose. What they have 
done is deterred hundreds of talented, worthwhile people from a participation 
in politics.”48 
 
These despairing words written by John Hyde Page, former youth member of the 
Australian Liberal party and current Sydney barrister, were published in his 2006 memoir The 
Education of a Young Liberal. Page’s bitter insights are reflective of significant, broad and 
consequential generational trends in Australian political attitudes and behaviour and are 
particularly applicable to youth. These patterns appear to be widespread and may even 
extend to the populations of most developed countries. Page’s views both encapsulate a 
sense of distrust and inefficacy that has increasingly come to epitomise the sentiments of 
many Australians toward traditional political institutions and organisations49 and indicate a 
reluctance to engage in conflict prone political activity. 
Australian Party and Electoral Disengagement 
 
Electoral democracy is gradually being undermined by youth disengagement from 
electoral and party politics (discussed in the introduction and below). Using Australia as a 
case study, this thesis, an exercise in political sociology, focuses on the reasons behind post-
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industrial generational changes in political attitudes and behaviour. Today’s youth generally 
profess a desire for consensus and are more politically disillusioned and conflict averse than 
previous generations.50 Evidence discussed later in this chapter suggests they are also less 
willing than previous generations to compromise and participate in the kinds of debate, 
deliberation and negotiation necessary to arrive at widely accepted political decisions, such 
as those encountered when participating in a political party. Additionally, they are more 
inclined to cast informal votes at State and Federal elections. Indeed, Lisa Hill and Serrin 
Rutledge-Prior have found that intentional informal voting among Australian youth is on the 
rise.51 Hill has also reported that around 20 or more percent of 18 to 25 year old Australians 
are not enrolled to vote and that the voting rate of young Australians 18 to 25 is regularly 10 
percentage points below that of the all-age population.52  
The number of Australian major party members has also fallen from approximately 
350,000 members in the mid-twentieth century to 100,000 members in 2010;53 despite the 
population of Australia almost trebling during the same period.54 Indeed, the proportion of 
Australians who are political party members has shrunk by 75% since the 1960s.55 Aaron 
Martin has found that only 3% of Australians aged between 18 and 29 are political party 
members, whereas 10% of Australians aged 60 and over are party members.56 Martin was 
unable to find data on whether Australian party membership within particular age brackets 
have been declining over time. However, he has found that party membership across each of 
the age groups 18 to 29, 30 to 59 and 60+ has been declining in both Canada and the UK and 
that this is partly due to generational declines.57 In his words: “The generational decline in 
party membership also suggests that membership levels will reach even lower levels in the 
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future.”58 These findings, combined with the fact that party identification in Australia is in 
generational decline (see below), suggests that Australian party membership has been 
declining in a similar fashion across generational cohorts and time periods. Indeed, we know 
that in 1990 only 5% of Australian young people did not identify with a party. By 2010 that 
figure had grown to 24%.59  
Paradoxically, interest in politics (as opposed to party/electoral engagement) has 
trended upwards across all age brackets (including the young) over the last 40 years 
rendering the politically apathetic Gen Y stereotype unfounded.60 Indeed young people are 
increasingly willing to participate in single issue public demonstrations, petition signing, 
online forums and political consumerism.61 However, this shift from conventional/electoral 
participatory forms such as party membership and voting, toward unconventional/non-
electoral engagement represents a potential threat to the inclusiveness, integrity and efficacy 
of our democratic institutions. 
The Significance of Mass Participation: 
Schumpeter, Value Pluralism & the Classical Doctrine of Democracy 
 
To properly locate my research within the relevant literature, its premise, that 
declining electoral and party engagement is detrimental to an inclusive and thriving 
democracy, must first be defended. While some scholars like Joseph Schumpeter would look 
favourably upon these trends, believing in an extremely limited decision-making role in public 
affairs for what they consider is a largely ignorant, superficial and irrational public, their 
beliefs are based on questionable premises. Schumpeter describes the Classical Doctrine of 
Democracy as the view that democracy is an “institutional arrangement for arriving at 
political decisions which will [realise] the common good by making … [the public] itself decide 
issues through the election of individuals who are to assemble in order to carry out its will.”62 
He assumes that those who believe in what he describes as the Classical Doctrine of 
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Democracy, necessarily hold that most people are rational and “there exists a Common Good 
… which is always simple to define and which every normal person can be made to see by 
means of rational [utilitarian] argument.”63 However, Schumpeter fails to grasp that not all 
believers in the classical school are “utilitarian”64 value monists. Although those who support 
the Classical Doctrine do necessarily believe that most people are rational, it does not follow 
that they hold that people will always be able to arrive at consensus on government policy 
issues through deliberation. As ultimate values are incommensurable when devoid of 
context, there are often multiple rational ways to balance these frequently conflicting values 
within particular contexts.65 Accordant with this value pluralist view, highly representative 
democracy (as advocated by adherents of the Classical Doctrine of Democracy) is therefore, 
the only legitimate way to overcome disputes over equally rational policy positions 
advocated by rational individuals of equal moral worth.  
Thus, declining party membership is genuinely concerning as it threatens the ability of 
political parties to effectively represent constituencies and supporters by delegating the 
selection of candidates and adoption of policies to an increasingly narrow and 
unrepresentative sample. This may place democracy itself in jeopardy by encouraging 
emaciated party organisations to seek state assistance and sponsorship in lieu of grassroots 
support. This would encourage major party elites to become increasingly detached from, and 
unrepresentative of, their constituencies without suffering significant financial or electoral 
consequences.66  Hence research into the causes of declining party membership and 
electoral participation across time periods and generational cohorts is warranted. Scholars 
seem to be exposing, and developing theories founded on fragmented reasons for these 
phenomena without investigating whether the pieces are connected and can be 
amalgamated into a single, more complete argument. 
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Declines in party and electoral participation are often attributed to changes in the 
number, significance and types of associations in which people are involved (that is structural 
social capital) and the perceived failings of the political and electoral systems.67 However, no 
comprehensive study has yet been conducted into the relationships between social network 
homogeneity, political conflict avoidance and ‘declining’ party membership and participation. 
Instead, some researchers have assumed that conflict avoidance is an inherent characteristic 
within certain individuals rather than a generational or period trend: thus focusing their 
investigations on the effects of this characteristic rather than its origins.68 Other analysts 
have studied the connection between political participation and generational and period 
trends. However, they have yet to fully and adequately explore the links between economic, 
social and technological modernisation and social atomisation, declining engagement in 
traditional and formal non-political associations, and social network homogenisation. 
Furthermore, they have not sufficiently evaluated how these patterns might have an adverse 
impact on dependent variables. These include efficacy in, and tolerance for, political debate, 
deliberation and negotiation; preparedness to compromise; conflict avoidance; electoral and 
party participation and political, electoral and party structures, systems and processes. 
Instead, they have focused on the relationships between some of these trends and factors 
while neglecting the role of others.69 In the following paragraphs I consider the arguments of 
                                                          
67 Fahmy, Eldin. (2006) Young Citizens: Young people’s involvement in Politics and Decision Making, Ashgate 
Publishing Ltd, England, p.13; Klingemann, H, D. (1999) ‘Mapping Political Support in the 1990s: A Global 
Analysis’, in Norris, P, Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Government, Oxford University Press, 
New York, p.32; Amna, Erik and Zetterberg, Par. (2010) ‘A political science perspective on socialization 
research: young Nordic citizens in a comparative light’, in Flanagan, Constance., Sherrod, Lonnie, R., and 
Torney-Purta, Judith, Handbook of Research on Civic Engagement in Youth, John Wiley & sons Inc, New Jersey, 
p.48; McVey, Andrew and Vowles, Jack. (2005) ‘Virtuous circle or cul de sac? Social capital and political 
participation in New Zealand’, Social Science, vol:57(5), p.5; Whiteley, ‘Party membership and activism in 
comparative perspective’, p.131; Cross, William and Crysler, John. (2009) ‘Grassroots Participation and party 
leadership selection: Examining the British and Canadian Cases’, in Deburdeleben, Joan and Pammett, Jon, H. 
Activating the Citizen: Dilemmas of Participation in Europe and Canada, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, p.174 
& 175 
68 Ulbig, Stacy, G and Funk, Carolyn, L (1999) ‘Conflict avoidance and political participation’, Political Behavior, 
vol:21(3), p.268-270 
69 Boase and Ikeda, ‘Multiple discussion networks and their consequence for political participation’, p.660; 
Putnam, Robert D. (2000), Bowling Alone: The Collapse and revival of American Community, Simon & Schuster, 
New York; Inglehart, R and Welzel, C. (2005) Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy: The Human 
Development Sequence, Cambridge University Press, New York, p.4,19,25 & 118 





some of these key thinkers before summarising and citing evidence supporting my own line 
of investigation. 
Lamentation & Modernisation 
 
Participation theories are based on theorists’ conception of social capital and 
technological, economic, cultural and political development as well as how these forces have 
and/or are likely to affect citizen engagement with certain institutional and organisational 
structures and processes. Social capital has been defined as “the social networks between 
individuals as well as the trust, shared norms and reciprocities that underpin and in turn arise 
from such connections.”70 Many and varied theories in political sociology exist through which 
academics rate and analyse the engagement, functionality and health of democracies. The 
two most comprehensive and compelling participation theories are Robert Putnam’s 
Lamentation theory and Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel’s Modernisation theory. 
Recognition of the underlying assumptions behind these theoretical perspectives is necessary 
before making a proper evaluation of their adherents’ arguments and comparing their 
performance to the alternative theory developed within this thesis (my own Homogenisation 
theory).  
Social capital Lamentationists, such as Robert Putnam author of the often-cited 
Bowling Alone thesis, allege that modern technology and certain societal trends have had a 
negative impact on social capital. Such technological advances comprise the invention and 
widespread use of television, the internet and social media.71 Pernicious social patterns 
include globalisation/delocalisation, labour market deregulation, secularisation, and a higher 
portion of people living in the suburbs of large cities rather than in small towns.72 Declining 
rates of marriage and fertility, rising rates of divorce and two career families, more lifestyle 
enclaves and longer times spent commuting are also deemed insidious and destructive.73 
Lamentationists hold that both informal and formal structural social capital are in 
decline. These comprise informal get-togethers among friends and acquaintances as well as 
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involvement in traditional and formal associations such as church congregations, sports clubs, 
charities, volunteer organisations, trade unions and political parties. Youth, Putnam argues, 
have been disproportionally affected by the erosion of social capital as young people have 
had more intense exposure to various technologies and social changes in their formative 
years.74 These trends, Lamentationists contend, are resulting in falling community and civic 
oriented interests and values by reducing empathy, interpersonal trust and political 
confidence and efficacy,75 both internal and external.76 That is, they maintain that empathy, 
trust and political efficacy are strengthened by social embeddedness and interaction and 
that:  
- empathy motivates compassion, generosity and political interest;  
- interpersonal and political trust raise confidence in cooperation and collective 
decision-making; and  
- political efficacy induces a belief among citizens that they have the individual 
competence and ability to have their views and ideals (that are guided by their 
compassion, generosity and interest) realised through cooperation and collective 
action.  
Lamentationists reason that declines community and civic oriented interests and values have 
profoundly contributed to a reduction in both conventional/electoral and 
unconventional/non-electoral political engagement.77 Indeed Neilson and Paxton (2010) and 
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Henn, Hodgkinson and Weinstein (2007) found a positive link between participation in 
voluntary associations and political interest and activity.78  
According to Putnam ‘bonding’ social capital is that which is “inward looking and 
tend[s] to reinforce exclusive identities and homogenous groups”.79 He argues that it “is good 
for under girding specific reciprocity and mobilising solidarity”,80 by which is meant 
strengthening mutual support and consensus between persons with common (economic, 
ethnic, religious, lifestyle and/or political) interests. Conversely, Putnam defines ‘bridging’ 
social capital as that which is “outward looking and encompass[es] people across diverse 
social cleavages”.81 He maintains that it is “better [than ‘bonding’ social capital] for linkage to 
external assets and for information diffusion”,82 by which is meant access to skills and 
knowledge scarce among members of one’s own interest/identity group(s). Lamentationists 
maintain that ‘bonding’ and ‘bridging’ social capital are in decline83 and technological, social, 
and economic trends that have contributed to these reductions are not inevitable 
consequences of modernisation. Therefore, governments and communities should seek to 
reinvigorate society by encouraging individuals to, and implementing policies which would, 
raise and facilitate the formation of social capital thereby lifting political engagement. 
Contrastingly, Modernisationists hold that technological, economic and human capital 
development and changing social and political values, trust, engagement, structures, 
institutions and processes are inextricably linked in a sliding scale of modernisation.84 These 
views are most notably espoused by Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel. 
Figure 1.1 
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Modernisationists argue that technological and economic development raise levels of 
education, labour productivity, occupational specialisation and personal income. This process 
of development, they assert, increases individual autonomy and sense of personal security by 
expanding people’s material, cognitive and social resources.86 These trends produce cultural 
changes including greater emphasis on “rational/secular” and “self-expression” (autonomy) 
values and “more critical and less easily led publics.”87 Evidence presented by Henn, 
Hodgkinson, and Weinstein (2007) is consistent with Inglehart and Welzel’s Modernisation 
theory. Their study of young people’s social capital and political participation in Britain found 
that youth with qualifications were far more critical of political actors than those without 
qualifications.88 This would seem to suggest that formal education may be an individual-
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empowering influence: encouraging young people to think more independently and question 
political authority.  
According to Modernisationists, these cultural changes then alter social capital and 
political engagement from forms which are formal, and elite led (both political and 
nonpolitical), to those which are egalitarian, elite challenging and informal. That is, 
engagement in party organisations and electoral processes, church congregations, volunteer 
organisations, trade unions, professional associations and sports, music, recreational and 
ethnic clubs and societies is in decline. Modernisationists contend that these forms of 
involvement are being replaced by online networking on specific issue forums, sites and 
webpages, attending demonstrations, signing (often online) petitions and political 
consumerism.89 In the words of Inglehart and Welzel: “Elite led forms of participation are 
dwindling. Mass loyalties to long-established hierarchical political parties are weakening. No 
longer content to be disciplined troops, the public has become increasingly autonomous and 
elite challenging.”90 It is further argued by Modernisationists that these trends are conducive 
to democracy because they place pressure on elites to reform social and political structures, 
institutions and processes to better reflect society’s egalitarian, post-materialist and self-
expression values.91 The reasons for, rather than the consequences of, changes in political 
engagement are the foci of this thesis, however, this last and contentious92 Modernisationist 
view has been presented to illustrate the full divergence between the major participation 
theories. 
Putnam also finds that “cooperative” civic behaviour, has been declining more rapidly 
than “expressive” behaviour. The former requires more intensive group collaboration (which 
is often hierarchical), whereas the latter involves more fluid and temporary single-issue 
collaborations, as well as activities which can be undertaken individually.93 However, Putnam 
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alleges (in his Lamentation thesis) that these behavioural trends undermine political efficacy 
by hindering the aggregation of interests and the development of inclusive policy solutions.94 
The changing pattern of civic participation in American communities over the last two 
decades has shifted the balance in the larger society between the articulation of 
grievances and the aggregation of coalitions to address those grievances. In this sense, this 
disjunctive pattern of decline - cooperation falling more rapidly than self-expression - may 
well have encouraged the single issue blare and declining civility of contemporary political 
discourse.95 
Modernisationists contend that the forms of structural social capital that are in 
decline tend to be bonding, while those that are bridging are becoming more widespread. 
That is, membership of, and participation in, diminishing traditional/hierarchical forms of 
structural social capital tend to facilitate bonding ties between people of similar faith, class, 
profession, ethnicity and interests. Conversely, unconventional, informal and bridging ties 
connecting people of different religious beliefs, traditions, socio-economic strata, ethnic 
heritage and lifestyles (often for shared social and political causes) are growing.96 In the 
words of Harris, Wyn and Younes (2007): 
Social change has resulted in the fragmentation of older collective identifications and 
resulted in the increased significance of individual choice and action…young people are not 
“bowling alone”, but they tend to prefer to be engaged in informal activities that are not 
structured through organisations or by adults. … As traditional forms of associational life 
are no longer available or of interest to young people, less formal social bonds … are taking 
their place and keeping them connected.97 
 
Hence, rather than deteriorating, Modernisationists contend that the essence of 
social capital is evolving: becoming more inclusive and accepting of difference.98 They hold 
that technological, economic and educational development and trends in social and political 
values, trust and engagement are cause for celebration. Far from wanting to reverse what 
they consider to be societal progress, Modernisationists favour accommodation of these 
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patterns through changes to how social and political institutions and organisations are 
structured and the processes by which they operate. In fact, Modernisationists believe that 
such societal trends including their institutional/organisational accommodation are 
inextricably linked in a sliding scale of modernisation. Societies can move both up and down 
the scale but a society’s economic, cultural and political development must (to a large extent) 
reflect the same stage on the modernisation scale at any one time.99 
While substantially divergent, Putnam’s Lamentation and Inglehart and Welzel’s 
Modernisation theories also share noteworthy similarities. As previously elucidated, both 
theories maintain that changing values (whether driven by pernicious social patterns or post-
industrial modernisation) have precipitated declines in conventional political engagement. 
Likewise, both theses hold that bonding social capital, formal group involvement and political 
trust are dwindling. Still, more theoretical congruence is yet to be discussed. Both Putnam’s 
Lamentation and Inglehart and Welzel’s Modernisation theories maintain that changes in 
social and political trust, values and engagement tend to occur primarily through 
generational replacement. Inglehart and Welzel are particularly thorough in their description 
of generational values adaptation. They insist that the fundamental value orientations of 
individuals (which determine their social capital and political engagement patterns) are 
developed in youth and remain largely constant throughout their lives.100 A person’s value 
orientations are developed by both their socialisation into their society’s cultural norms and 
their first-hand experience of economic and environmental conditions present during their 
pre-adult years. In the words of Inglehart and Welzel: 
the older generations in each society tend to transmit their values to their children; this 
cultural heritage is not easily dispelled, but if it is inconsistent with one’s first-hand 
experience, it can gradually erode.101 
if the original reason behind a given norm vanishes, it … open[s] the way for that norm to 
weaken gradually. People begin to experiment with new ideas and norms, creating new 
life-styles. New generations then face a confrontation between old and new norms and 
life-styles, which offer them alternative role models among which they can choose. Insofar 
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as the new worldview fits the new generations’ first-hand formative experiences, they tend 
to adopt it. Thus, new values, life-styles, and role models can replace older ones in a 
gradual process of generational replacement.102 
However, Inglehart and Welzel also acknowledge that feelings of stability and security 
can be eroded by short-term period effects and catastrophic events such as economic 
collapse or an all-out military conflict. These, they argue, can have a strong impact on an 
adult individual’s values but are temporary in nature: not enduring like generational value 
patterns precipitated by relatively longer-term trends in economic and environmental 
conditions.103 
A Third Theoretical Explanation 
 
My own thesis ‘Social Network Homogenisation’ (SNH) is a third theoretical 
explanation for generational declines in electoral and party engagement. Some academics 
have claimed that in the United States (a post-industrial Anglosphere country with which 
Australia has strong linguistic, historical and cultural similarities) social networks have 
become increasingly homogenous, polarising political perspectives.104 As articulated by 
Fischer and Mattson (2009) “the number of new discrete, and separated social worlds 
increased between 1970 and 2005.”105 Research conducted by Gillani et al., (2018) later 
supported this finding. “Americans are increasingly sorting themselves according to their 
ideological stances on political issues and allegiances to political parties. … these forces, 
among others, have contributed to an increase in levels of affective polarization”.106  
Many scholars and journalists have attributed these phenomena almost entirely to 
online filter and social media bubbles.107 Evidence from Dahlberg (2007), Pariser (2011), 
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Brossard and Scheufele (2013) and Bakshy, Messing and Adamic (2015) reveal that the 
algorithms internet companies (such as Google and Facebook) use to adjust our search 
results and filter our news streams make it easier in the online, than in the offline, world to 
avoid political ideas and positions with which we disagree.108 According to Halberstam and 
Knight (2016) “Social media may be a force for increasing exposure to like-minded 
information for all groups. To the extent that such information is influential, this could lead to 
a further increase in political polarization within the electorate.”109 Their research reveals 
that 91% of retweets of tweets by Democratic party candidates in the United States are 
spread by left of centre voters, and 99% of retweets of tweets by Republican party 
candidates are shared by conservative voters.110 Other studies have also revealed that social 
media sites intensify “ideological cocooning” by providing easily found and accessible spaces 
where people with similar political ideas and perspectives can convene to discuss particular 
topics.111 In the words of Batorski and Grzywinska (2018) “The architecture of … [social media 
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sites] allows people to quickly find other users and communities that have similar views and 
opinions. … People avoid information that contradicts their pre-existing beliefs and seek and 
engage with information that confirms it.”112  
Huber and Malhotra’s research indicates that the internet maybe intensifying political 
congruence between romantic partners. Their 2016 experimental study of online dating 
behaviour demonstrates that people respond far more positively to profiles that reflect their 
own political ideology and interest level than to those that do not.113 This research suggests 
that relative to traditional institutions (such as school, work, family-connections, clubs and 
bars), online dating provides individuals with the means to more effectively find potential 
romantic partners who share their political proclivities. Consequently, Huber and Malhotra 
posit that the increasing use of online dating sites could be acting to reduce political 
disagreement within households by creating political enclaves that may in turn “increase 
polarization and decrease political tolerance”.114 
No published work has thoroughly linked network homogenisation and ideological 
diversification/polarisation to:  
- declining party membership/involvement, and  
- raised social modularity brought about by value shifts and numerous social trends 
associated with post-industrialisation.  
My Homogenisation theory developed within this thesis fills this void in the literature. By 
insisting that social capital is evolving, not diminishing; it is like the Modernisation, and unlike 
the Lamentation, theories. However, in contrast to Modernisation theory, it holds that 
dwindling bridging is giving way to ascendant bonding social capital. [As mentioned bridging 
connections exist between people with different backgrounds, attitudes and interests. 
Contrastingly, bonding connections are those between people with similar life experiences, 
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views and priorities.] At the same time, Homogenisation theory is congruous with 
Lamentation arguments in alleging that contemporary changes in social capital within 
advanced post-industrial societies are having an adverse impact on effective democracy.  
The relationship between societal levels of network homogeneity (the extent to which 
individual social networks have homogenous memberships) and generational trends in 
political activity has been largely unexplored. Some research has positively correlated 
politically heterogeneous discussion networks (described further into this section) with 
political participation.115 Though, this relationship is contested. Mutz’s investigation drawing 
on two American surveys indicates that ideologically heterogenous networks dampen 
political engagement by increasing conflict aversion and weakening policy and partisan 
conviction.116 However, Mutz acknowledges that prior research suggests her findings may 
strictly apply to the United States because interpersonal disagreements seem particularly 
difficult for Americans relative to citizens of other countries.117  
No study has yet explored the possible connections between these conflicting 
conclusions and those findings which link participation in particular political activities to 
involvement in formal non-political associations.118 By comprehensively investigating these 
relationships in ensuing chapters, I endeavour to uncover the reasons for declines in 
Australian electoral engagement and party membership across both time periods and 
generational cohorts. This first chapter continues with a review of preliminary evidence 
consistent with Homogenisation theory; justifying the decision to undertake this thesis 
investigation. Unless otherwise stated Strauss and Howe’s birthyear definitions of living adult 
generational cohorts are used when referring to specific generations in this thesis. 
Table 1.1 
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Birthyears of Generations 
GENERATION BIRTHYEARS 
G.I. 1901 – 1924 
Silent 1925 – 1942 
Boomer 1943 – 1960 
X 1961 – 1981 
Millennial / Y 1982 – 2004 
119 
Considerable evidence has already accumulated indicating that homogenous social 
networks are inimical to conventional political engagement120 and suggesting (but not 
proving) that levels of social network homogeneity are rising in advanced post-industrial 
societies like Australia.121 In the Japanese context, Jeffrey Boase and Ken’ichi Ikeda (2011) 
have found that discussing politics both as the main topic of conversation and as a by-
product of conversation about other matters was positively correlated with greater political 
participation.122 They established this using bivariate and multivariate analyses of data from 
the 2003 Japanese General Social Survey.123 They also revealed that discussing politics in 
‘politically heterogeneous discussion networks’ has a stronger correlation with political 
participation than discussing politics in ‘politically homogenous discussion networks’.124 The 
exception was in work related discussion networks which seems to suggest that the 
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workplace is a much too sensitive setting for politically conflictual discussion to lead to 
greater political participation, at least in Japan.125 These results possibly suggest that 
discussions in politically heterogenous networks tend to stimulate deeper political thought 
(consideration of political issues from multiple perspectives) than political discussion in 
networks in which members largely agree. Still, there are other possible interpretations for 
this data. Those who are more politically interested may be both more inclined to become 
politically involved and more willing to discuss politics in heterogenous networks, than those 
less politically interested, less willing to have their political ideas tested and less motivated to 
win over others. 
In political science, as in all social sciences, causation is often extremely difficult to 
prove. Currently there is much debate about the role and effectiveness of contemporary big 
data sources and computational programs in proving causal relationships.126 Until recently 
researchers have relied heavily on experimentation to demonstrate these connections.127 
Unfortunately, such experiments would not have been appropriate for my thesis 
investigation. Furthermore, the degree to which the philosophical and ideological views and 
beliefs of individual Australians differ from those of their social network members cannot be 
adequately ascertained from existing big data sources. Moreover, correlation statistics are 
often drawn from survey data provided by participants whose recollections, self-assessments 
and motives are not always conducive to accurate research. Even when respondents are 
dependable and significant third variables are controlled there are almost always multiple 
interpretations of correlation statistics. Therefore, social scientists should consider collated 
data holistically and be guided by what would logically appear to be the most likely 
explanation for those statistics. Indeed, Boase and Ikeda’s research considered in conjunction 
with other findings presented in later chapters of this thesis seem to indicate that changing 
degrees of social network homogeneity within society can influence levels of, and trends in, 
political engagement. These conclusions are consistent with my Homogenisation theory.  
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Additionally, the theory that changing levels of social network homogeneity within 
society can affect rates of, and patterns in, political participation may also be supported by 
the works of La Due Lake (1998), Putnam (2000), Henn, Hodgkinson and Weinstein (2007) 
and Neilson and Paxton (2010). These contributions identify a positive correlation between 
involvement in traditional formal non-political associations and political interest, knowledge, 
engagement and party identification.128 Homogenisationists might argue that due to a 
greater presence of unavoidable cross-cutting cleavages, traditional/formal non-political 
associations are likely to be relatively more ideologically heterogeneous than informal 
networks based on individual preferences. Such unavoidable cross-cutting cleavages may 
include those in education, socio-economic status, profession, ethnic heritage, religious 
beliefs and cultural and political values. Consequently, declining engagement in 
traditional/formal non-political associations may instigate a homogenisation of social 
networks which, according to Boase and Ikeda, could lower political engagement. This is 
fervently denied by Modernisationists who insist that declining involvement in 
traditional/formal associations is precipitating the formation of more heterogeneous social 
networks. They maintain that, by reducing the number and strength of bonds between 
people who share (and join groups based on) common identities, these trends empower 
individuals to forge alternative bridging connections with people unlike themselves.129  
Group Engagement, Social Modularity  
& Generational Values Transition 
 
Transforming compositions of, and engagement with, formal and informal groups will 
be more thoroughly explored in later chapters. It will be argued that while involvement in 
both political and non-political formal organisations declined rapidly in the last third of the 
twentieth century, rates of participation in many types of ‘non-political’ formal groups have 
been slowly rising in the early twenty-first. Despite this rise in formal engagement, it will be 
argued that SNH continues unabated due to a proliferation of contemporary formal groups 
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producing a dynamic and agile market of relatively more homogenous organisations than had 
existed in previous decades.  
No study has yet delved into how changes in levels of social network homogeneity 
across time periods and generational cohorts may affect societal trends in political 
participation, hence this thesis topic. Such research is well justified as there is general 
academic agreement that atomising social trends since the 1960s as well as technological 
modernisation have reshaped structural social capital. That is, these social and technological 
developments have both eroded participation in, and the significance of, traditional and 
formal associations while empowering people to form new and informal networks based on 
individual preferences.130 My Homogenisation theory regarding the likely outcomes of these 
trends is supported by the works of Huber and Malhotra (2016), Centola et al. (2007), Knoke 
(1990), Berschied (1985) and Byrne (1971), which reveal that people present greater liking 
for those who possess similar attitudes and values to their own.131 This would indicate that 
individuals are now sufficiently free from traditional ties and responsibilities, and enabled by 
modern technology, to more effectively pursue an apparently near universal, desire for 
homogenous social networks than were persons more socially bound in the past.  
Therefore, it is highly likely that social networks have been ideologically homogenising 
for some decades due to rising levels of homophily (the tendency of people to surround 
themselves with others who share their views, traits and/or characteristics).132 That is, the 
nature of social capital in advanced liberal democracies may indeed be transforming from 
intra-network diversity, inclusion and learning toward uniformity, exclusion and 
reinforcement: fragmenting society by increasing the ideological and characteristic 
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differences between networks. Evans and Fu (2018) have already observed similar patterns in 
the United States. Their research indicates a rise in the salience of homophily in American 
politics that has resulted in greater partisanship and polarization. In their words “If this trend 
continues, we are likely to see only greater political division in the future rather than a return 
towards greater cohesion.”133 
My Homogenisation thesis maintains that ideological network homogenisation stems 
from a rise in social modularity brought about by technological, economic and human capital 
development and increasing emphasis on self-expression values within post-industrial 
societies. Post-industrial technological, economic and human capital advance precipitate a 
generational shift from survival to self-expression values. These technological, material and 
cognitive resources also empower individuals to pursue, forge, maintain and sever social 
connections in accordance with these values. Self-expression values place greater emphasis 
on personal preference and less on obligation, than do survival values. Consequently, the 
values shift in advancing post-industrial societies is necessarily linked to increased 
ideological/political homophily. That is, there exists a Self-Expression Values / ‘ideologically’ 
Homogenous Social Network (SEVHSN) Complex. Ideological homophily, liberal views and a 
preference for egalitarian social/organisational structures and processes are measures of 
immersion in this Complex. The ways in which Complex-embeddedness can influence ideas, 
opinions and levels of political tolerance, satisfaction and engagement are discussed in 
Chapters Six, Seven and Eight. Some of these patterns are summarised later in this chapter.  
The degree to which people are immersed in the SEVHSN Complex is largely 
dependent on value emphases crystallised in youth. Specifically, my Homogenisation theory 
is consistent with Inglehart and Welzel’s Modernisationist arguments that the value 
orientations of children and youth become increasingly less malleable during and following 
their late pre-adult years. These value orientations are moulded by both parental/community 
socialisation and the extent to which children are technologically and financially empowered 
and intellectually stimulated. Consequently, a full values adaptation to a dramatic rise in a 
society’s level of personal empowerment and security may not be complete for several 
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generations.134 That is, transmitted value emphases established in, and suited to the 
circumstances of a precarious and restricted past are diluted and ultimately replaced over 
numerous generations by value orientations relevant to the present. 
Over the three decades following the Second World War there was a dramatic rise in 
living standards, personal empowerment and security in western industrialised societies. 
Arguably some of these countries have since experienced a stagnation in, or even (in more 
recent years) a slight erosion of levels of economic empowerment,135 particularly among 
young people.136 Still, the levels of intellectual, technological and financial empowerment 
experienced by Millennials in the late-twentieth and early-twenty-first centuries in post-
industrial societies were/are far higher than the levels experience by the Silent generation in 
those same countries during the 1930s, 1940s and 1950s.137 Thus, the unabated generational 
shift from survival to self-expression values orientation in Australia, since the early Boomers 
reached adulthood in the 1960s (discussed in following chapters), is consistent with both 
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Modernisation theory and my Homogenisation thesis. However, Inglehart cautions that this 
shift toward autonomy and egalitarian self-expression values may be reversed over the next 
several decades if the transition to, and the displacement caused by automation is not well 
managed.138 
Structural versus Ideological Homogenisation 
 
I am not hypothesising or arguing that social networks are becoming increasingly 
ethnically or geographically homogenous. Our country has experienced a profound 
demographic shift since the mass immigration of continental European refugees, post World 
War II, and the dismantlement of the White Australia Policy in the 1960s and 70s. Our new-
found diversity has enhanced opportunities to forge cross-cultural connections by simply 
raising the level and likelihood of cross-cultural encounters. Over the last several decades 
there has been a shift toward greater trade liberalisation, international collaboration, labour-
market mobility, internet access and social-media engagement.139 These patterns have also 
provided the tools and context for more geographically spread social connections and 
networks to develop than what there were prior to contemporary globalisation.  
While conceding that Australian social networks have become structurally (ethnically, 
linguistically, religiously, and geographically) more diverse over the last half century this 
thesis argues that they are homogenising ideologically. I reason that this homogenisation of 
moral, social and political values and attitudes within networks is having significant effects on 
how citizens engage politically. The Complex-immersed tend to have more ‘structurally’ 
homogenous networks than those relatively less embedded, despite social networks having 
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become more structurally diverse over recent decades. To explain, structural characteristics 
(such as socio-economic status, education, occupation, religion and ethnicity) often have an 
enormous bearing on personal values, beliefs, and interests. Consequently, when controlling 
for other variables, deeper immersion in the Complex is associated with both more 
ideologically and structurally homogenous social networks.140 Thus, any future slowing of 
globalisation, demographic shifts and technological advances in long-distance communication 
may foreshadow a reversion of certain social capital trends in advanced post-industrial 
societies like Australia. That is, social connections may become increasingly bonding along, 
rather than bridging across, structural cleavages. 
The Impact of SNH on Political Engagement;  
(according to Homogenisation theory) 
From here, this first chapter summarises the ways in which Social Network 
Homogenisation or SNH (a core component of the SEVHSN Complex) influences political 
participation according to my Homogenisation thesis. This is done by referring to the Social 
Network Homogenisation and Political Engagement (SNHPE) Chart on the next page.  
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SNHPE Chart  





The reader is encouraged to refer to the Social Network Homogenisation and Political 
Engagement (SNHPE) Chart on the previous page while contemplating the following summary 
of the ways in which political involvement is shaped by SNH. This summary is supported by 
statistics presented in Chapter Eight. Consider the three Red Arrows in the Chart. Together, 
they constitute what I describe as a “Prime Circuit” comprising three variables: 
1. conventional/conflict-prone engagement,  
2. representativeness/responsiveness of the political parties and system, and  
3. satisfaction with the political parties and system.  
These variables are tied by causal relationships. A decline in conventional/conflict-
prone engagement (which includes political party involvement) is likely to erode the 
representativeness and responsiveness of the political system and parties. That is, as party 
memberships wane (particularly among certain demographics)141, their organisations 
become more heavily reliant on, and responsive to sectional and often affluent/elite 
interests.142 Reductions in representativeness and responsiveness, in turn, diminishes 
satisfaction with, the political system and parties.143 Arguably, these trends mean fewer 
citizens can identify with major/parliamentary parties. Consequently, more are inclined to 
believe that conventional (party and electoral) participation is ineffective and that the 
political system has become corrupted by a few big interests. Declining satisfaction and 
identification with political parties and a more widely held view that conventional political 
engagement is ineffective then acts to further lessen conventional involvement;144 
completing the Circuit. Per my Homogenisation thesis, SNH indirectly diminishes each of the 
Prime Circuit variables separately; an effect that is amplified by their feeding into each other. 
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Network Homogenisation and Societal Diversification 
 
From here the ways in which SNH undermines variables of the Prime Circuit, 
according to my Homogenisation theory, are discussed. Focus first on the Grey Arrows of the 
SNHPE Chart. Through this thesis, perhaps counter-intuitively, I argue that ideological SNH 
tends to precipitate a greater diversification of ideological, philosophical and political 
preferences within a society. That is, homogenous networks may be reinforcing the views of 
their members and encouraging these beliefs to drift further away from those held by the 
median or average citizen. The diversification of the Australian electorate’s political 
preferences is demonstrated by the significant rise of non-major party voting since 1975. In 
1975 non-major parties received 4% of valid votes cast in the House of Representatives 
election and 7.5% of those cast in the Senate election. In 2016 non-major parties received 
23.2% of the valid votes cast in the House of Representatives election and 35.0% of those 
cast in the Senate election.145 These trends are possibly indicative of rising levels of 
ideological, philosophical and political social network homogeneity within Australia, 
instigating corresponding increases in the diversity of Australia’s ideological, philosophical 
and political preferences.  
This process of Societal Ideological Diversification (SID) undermines the extent to 
which parliamentary parties are representative of, and responsive to the political views, ideas 
and concerns of the electorate. This is because Australian electoral regimes (particularly the 
majoritarian single membered district Alternative Vote system) severely restrict the 
ideological diversity of parliamentarians such that many voters are without true 
representation of their political beliefs, ideas and interests. This situation is 
compounded/exacerbated when society becomes more ideologically heterogeneous. 
Consequently, a growing proportion of the electorate is inclined to believe that the political 
system and parties are unrepresentative, unresponsive and possibly corrupt and that 
conventional (party and electoral) political participation is ineffective and not worthwhile. 
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The relationships between Complex-embeddedness and trust/confidence in 
government/politicians are explored in Chapter Six. Correlations between Complex-
immersion and both external political inefficacy and dissatisfaction with the way democracy 
works in Australia are examined in Chapter Eight. Furthermore, these patterns reduce the 
proportion of citizens who identify with a political party. Dissatisfaction with the political 
system and parties, disbelief in the efficacy of conventional (party and electoral) engagement 
and lower party identification then act to diminish conventional/conflict-prone political 
involvement. 
However, it is also possible that the ideological spread of Australia’s political values, 
views and attitudes has not grown significantly over the last 40 years. Instead, Australia’s 
major parties may have drifted relatively further from the views and political attitudes of 
contemporary mainstream Australians. The major parties could also have converged 
ideologically leaving relatively more voters dissatisfied with both Labor and the Coalition. This 
trend may have been encouraged by the Alternative Vote (AV) system employed in Australian 
House of Representatives elections since 1918.146 AV tends to encourage catch-all parties to 
aggregate at the political centre.147 Still, given the consistency and persistence of declining 
major party support these two ‘representation’-focused explanations appear to be relatively 
less plausible than the ‘sociological’ interpretation of diversifying Australian political views, 
attitudes and values emphases. Had the major parties been drifting from the Australian 
mainstream, they probably would have changed course long ago to reap electoral advantage 
and prevent further hemorrhaging of support. Likewise, it is doubtful that centripetal forces 
have enjoyed a continuous ascendency for forty years. In major political parties, there are 
balances between forces pushing and pulling these organisations toward and from the 
political centre.  
Some may argue that growing minor party support is a cyclical phenomenon. 
Australia’s early twentieth century history provides precedence for diverse Australian 
electoral preferences. Indeed, the first three Australian federal elections produced hung 
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parliaments.148 However, these initial electoral results were more likely the product of our 
modern party system’s nascent stage of development. Others may deem declining major 
party support to be a natural stage of a country’s political evolution. The share of votes 
received by our major parties far exceeds major party voting in other western countries. That 
is, the Australian electorate and party system may simply be maturing to resemble a 
continental European political landscape. This too is unconvincing as Australia is one of the 
world’s oldest democracies. Unlike most European countries, Australia does not have a 
proportional system of electing its house of government. Instead, the relative success of 
Australian major parties is primarily due to Australian minor parties having been placed at a 
distinct disadvantage. They have not been granted the same opportunities afforded 
equivalent parties in Europe to garner greater recognition, trust and respect from the voting 
public by participating more directly and meaningfully in parliamentary politics. Hence, social 
network homogenisation (a sociological rather than a representational, cyclical, institutional 
or procedural explanation) seems the most compelling account for the near secular decline in 
major party voting over the last forty years. 
Contrastingly Lamentationists, like Putnam, allege that such diversification and 
polarisation of electoral preferences are primarily due to disproportionally high rates of 
decline in electoral participation among median voters. This enables those with more 
extreme and unusual views to gain undue influence.149 While declining turnout is of some 
concern this thesis is primarily focused on decreasing party membership and engagement. 
Additionally, Putnam’s arguments are rendered unconvincing when applied to Australia. 
Although there have been modest generational increases in the rate of informal voting (with 
a growing proportion of Australians assumed to cast intentionally informal votes)150 
compulsory voting and registration has maintained stable and high Australian electoral 
participation.151 Therefore, the diversification of Australian electoral preferences is more 
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likely indicative of parallel divergences of ideological and policy based preferences: consistent 
with the Homogenisation thesis. 
Intolerance, Inefficacy, Intransigence & Conflict Aversion 
 
This chapter continues with the articulation of the relationships between 
homogenous social networks and political engagement illustrated by the SNHPE Chart arrows 
before discussing preliminary evidence justifying this thesis’ examination of these 
Homogenisation arguments. The second way in which SNH influences the Prime Circuit is 
illustrated by the Green Arrows of the SNHPE Chart. According to my Homogenisation theory 
those embedded in the SEVHSN Complex (and hence those tending to have highly 
homogenous social networks) have less exposure to alternative political views and 
perspectives than those who are less Complex-immersed. Consequently, those heavily 
immersed tend to more severely over-estimate the prevalence of their own political beliefs 
within, and the ideological homogeneity of, their society than do those less embedded. 
Therefore, they may be less inclined to recognise the necessity for, or to accept political 
compromise or even to hear alternative political positions. This includes compromise 
between their own views and those of a political party. That is, they are probably less willing 
to have their views and beliefs moulded for them by a party. Thus, I hypothesise that rising 
and intensifying Complex-embeddedness precipitates a decline in party identification. 
Furthermore, the heavily Complex-immersed may be disposed to underestimate the 
degree to which policies espoused by governments and major parties truly reflect those of 
the population at large. This is because they tend to severely overestimate the prevalence of 
their own political views within, and the ideological homogeneity of, their society. This may 
encourage them to view the political system and parties as unrepresentative, unresponsive 
and possibly even corrupt; leading to the belief that conventional (party and electoral) 
participation is ineffective and not worthwhile. For these reasons, those with more 
ideologically homogenous social networks maybe less inclined to engage in party and 
electoral politics than those with relatively diverse networks.  





Now consider the Brown Arrows on the SNHPE Chart. These relationships exacerbate 
the extent to which SNH hinders conventional/conflict-prone forms of involvement, including 
party participation. Those who have ideologically/politically homogenous social networks are 
more inclined than those with relatively heterogeneous networks to: 
1. severely overestimate the ideological homogeneity of society and the degree 
to which their own views are reflected by those of other citizens, 
2. be intolerant of persons/parties holding different political views from their 
own, and 
3. think that debating people with whom they politically disagree is pointless. 
These corollaries can (per my theory/hypothesis) intensify/induce political-conflict-
aversion and exacerbate avoidance of political debate and discussion with those with whom 
one disagrees. Conflict aversion can discourage conventional/conflict-prone political 
engagement and perpetuate inexperience encountering/debating people with whom one 
politically/philosophically disagrees. This relative lack of encountering and engaging with 
alternative perspectives and ideas seems to be the underlying reason for why SNH diminishes 
conventional/conflict-prone political involvement. Factors undermining 
conventional/conflict-prone participation (which includes party engagement) stem from (or 
can be retraced to) this one influence which is inextricably tied to SNH. Thus, (per my 
Homogenisation theory) the causal relationships indicated by the Brown Arrows exacerbate 
the extent to which SNH impedes party (a form of conventional and conflict-prone) 
engagement. 
Cast your eyes to the Blue Arrows (which refer to statistics presented in Chapter 
Eight). Those with ideologically homogenous social networks tend to have less experience 
debating those with political views different from their own than do persons with relatively 
more diverse networks. Therefore, they tend to have underdeveloped skills in, and less 
confidence debating. This inefficacy and under-confidence debating political matters can 
render people politically-conflict-avoidant: less inclined to believe that the possible benefits 
(they consider unlikely) of political debate and discussion outweigh their potential social and 
emotional costs (they deem probable). Per my Homogenisation theory, this is the third way in 





which SNH has a negative effect on a variable of (which is then amplified by) the Prime 
Circuit.  
Like the Brown Arrows, the Pink Arrow represents an amplification of SNH’s eroding 
impacts on Prime Circuit variables, including conventional/conflict prone political 
engagement. Per my Homogenisation theory, a decline in conventional/conflict prone 
political involvement is likely to contribute to a reduction in the frequency of encounters and 
debates between those with opposing and contrasting political views, ideas and concerns. 
This lack of experience encountering and debating ideological and political opponents is the 
core explanation for the impact of SNH on party participation. All influences diminishing 
forms of party and other conventional/conflict-prone involvement stem from (or can be 
retraced to) this one factor, which is inextricably linked to SNH. 
Finally, my theory maintains that those more SEVHSN Complex-immersed are 
disposed to compensate for their dis-inclination to participate in conventional/conflict-prone 
political activities by engaging more heavily in unconventional and relatively conflict-free 
forms of involvement. This Homogenisation argument is supported by evidence presented in 
later chapters. 
Other scholars have already found evidence consistent with and justifying, the 
investigation of this Homogenisation thesis summary of the ways in which SNH influences 
political participation. Boase and Ikeda (2011) have determined that citizens with particularly 
homogenous social networks are inclined to overestimate the level of public support for their 
own political views and opinions. Furthermore, they reveal that these citizens are disposed to 
underestimate the degree to which politicians and political institutions represent the 
attitudes of the polity.152 Schyns and Koop (2010) found that those who participated in non-
political formal associations were significantly more likely to feel politically efficacious than 
those who did not.153 Arguably, formal associations were previously more likely to be 
heterogeneous than other groups due to relatively harder to avoid cross-cutting cleavages. 
Therefore probable, but unproven, Australian SNH trends may be facilitating declines in 
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personal tolerance for political disagreement, reductions in preparedness to politically 
compromise, and inefficacy in political debate, deliberation and negotiation. Alternatively, 
intolerance, intransigence and/or inefficacy may be inhibiting participation in both political 
and non-political organisations. This thesis aims to test for and understand these 
relationships.  
The research of Harris, Wyn, and Younes (2007), Martin (2012), and Hill and Rutledge-
Prior (2014) support Homogenisation theory. These studies suggest that today’s youth feel 
less efficacious engaging in traditional electoral and party politics and are less inclined to 
identify with political parties than older generations were at a similar age.154 Party 
identification is an act of compromise between one’s own views and opinions and that of a 
party. Evidence from Whiteley (2009a) also denotes homogenisation trends by revealing that 
party members and activists (who are dwindling in number) are more tolerant, than are ex-
members and non-members of both:  
- individuals/groups holding different views from their own, and  
- unpopular minorities.155 
There is considerable debate within the political participation literature over the 
primary causes of party disengagement. Some scholars, like Thomas Poguntke, emphasise a 
growing disconnect between elite and mass opinion regarding the “role, function and 
performance” of political parties as a factor independent of “underlying social changes.”156 
Contrastingly, other researchers, such as Peter Mair, have attempted to explain party 
demobilisation by stressing the decline of traditional (e.g. labour and religious) movements 
and organisations which had heavily supported and were reinforced by political parties 
during the mid-twentieth century.157 The author of this thesis will argue that long-term 
declines in party identification and involvement are partly due to a growing dissatisfaction 
                                                          
154 Martin, Young people and political engagement, p.17, 71, 75, 76, 77 & 85; Harris, Wyn, and Younes, ‘Young 
people and citizenship’, p.24; Hill, Lisa and Rutledge-Prior, Serrin, (2014). ‘Intentional Informality and Young 
People: Trends in Behaviour and Attitudes’, Paper prepared for the Australian Election Study Workshop, ANU, 
Canberra, 21-22 Feb., 2014 
155 Whiteley, ‘Party membership and activism in comparative perspective’, p.137 
156 Poguntke, Thomas. (1996) ‘Anti-party sentiment – Conceptual thoughts and empirical evidence: 
Explorations into a minefield’, European Journal of Political Research, vol:29, p.323 & 324 
157 Mair, Peter. (1984). ‘Party politics in contemporary Europe: A challenge to party?’, West European Politics, 
vol:7(4), p.174 & 180 





with (particularly major) political parties. However, much of this disapproval stems from 
sociological trends rather than being a reaction to either decisions taken by party elites, or 
the personalities of their leaders.  
Party identification and engagement require a compromise between one’s own views 
and opinions and party policy. Those whose ideas have been spared from challenge in 
ideologically homogenous networks are probably less prepared than those with relatively 
more diverse networks to tolerate political disagreement or accept political compromise. This 
includes the compromise necessary to identify with, and join, a political party. Indeed, later 
chapters reveal that immersion in ideologically homogenous networks is positively correlated 
with believing society is ideologically homogenous, and negatively correlated with:  
- being willing to accept political compromise and  
- supporting political checks and balances.  
Believing that society is ideologically homogenous is also found to be negatively correlated 
with being willing to accept political compromise. Hence, sociological trends which raise 
levels of social network homogeneity may be contributing to generational declines in 
personal tolerance for political disagreement, reductions in preparedness to politically 
compromise and inefficacy in political debate, deliberation and negotiation. This, in turn, 
could be responsible for rising levels of conflict aversion and subsequent party 
disengagement, patterns I test for in this thesis. 
Additionally, Ariadne Vromen’s research has revealed that while “the Internet 
reinforces existing ‘real world’ participation” it “is not used by the general population of 
young people as an alternative forum for community and political discussion.”158 That is, the 
Internet and social media are not replacing, but supplementing, traditional and party 
participation. Sociological trends (SNH) raising conflict avoidance is the most compelling 
explanation for declines in party engagement. To interpret these declines as simply a 
disconnect between mass opinion and recent generations of party leaders and their public 
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policy decisions (as argued by Poguntke)159 or a response to new online networks and 
strategies is unsound. 
Social scientists have found that most people consider political discussion stressful 
and avoid political activity because it threatens interpersonal harmony.160 In their 1999 
article on Conflict Avoidance and Political Participation Ulbig and Funk state that “discussion 
[of politics] clearly entails an open expression of beliefs and, as such, provides an opportunity 
for interpersonal conflict with those of differing views.”161 Their study demonstrates that 
conflict avoidant individuals are less inclined to politically participate in conflict prone 
environments, such as those one encounters when actively engaging in a political party, than 
those who are relatively more conflict tolerant.162  
This research using Pearson correlations and multivariate analysis to collate data from 
the United States’ Citizen Participation Study (CPS) indicates that conflict avoidance is 
ultimately about costs and benefits. Some people are less accustomed to, and are less 
tolerant of, social and political disagreement and are less prepared to politically compromise 
than are others. They are likely to consider the psychological, emotional and other costs of 
engaging in conflict prone settings and organisations higher than are those who have greater 
experience in, and tolerance for, social and political argument. Those who have not 
developed proficient skills in debating, negotiation and compromise are less likely to be 
effective and thus less likely to benefit from political debate in conflict settings than those 
who have developed these skills in heterogeneous social networks. Ulbig and Funk reveal 
that less formal education and lower incomes are linked to political conflict aversion. They 
suggest that this is due to the role of education and many high-status professions in training 
individuals to expect intellectual disagreement. In their words: 
The strongest social correlates with conflict avoidance suggest that those with less 
education and lower income are more likely to avoid interpersonal conflict. Education and 
income are two of the strongest and most reliable correlates of participation. Higher social 
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status (especially higher education) is thought to provide a wide variety of resources that 
facilitate participation, ranging from wider social networks to experience in writing letters 
and making decisions in group settings. ... In some sense, college education may train 
people to tolerate and expect intellectual disagreement. Many of the more lucrative 
professional roles would be likely to have a similar effect. Lawyers and politicians, for 
example, engage in a good deal of conflict in their professional roles.163 
 
Putnam contends that generational declines in political efficacy are indeed linked to 
waning participation in non-political associations.164 Contrastingly, Inglehart and Welzel are 
convinced that while trust in political institutions and organisations has declined 
generationally, people are more politically empowered (have greater influence over 
government decision making) now than ever before. They hold that this raised 
empowerment stems from increased participation in unconventional elite-challenging 
political activities, such as protests.165 These activities more effectively draw the attention of 
voters to specific issues and grievances than do conventional elite-led activities such as party 
membership. Generational declines in party identification and engagement are consistent 
with both Putnam’s Lamentation and Inglehart and Welzel’s Modernisation theories.166 
However, the finding that party members are more tolerant than non-members contradicts 
the Modernisationists’ claim that members of traditional/hierarchical associations (such as 
political parties) are relatively more inclined than non-members to emphasise survival 
(conformity) over self-expression (autonomy) values.167 Conversely this evidence supports 
the Lamentationist position that social and civic engagement is positively correlated with 
liberal tolerance. In the words of Putnam: 
Social joiners and civic activists are as a rule more tolerant of dissent and unconventional 
behaviour than social isolates are … Except for the very common finding that religious 
involvement, especially involvement in fundamentalist church, is linked to intolerance, I 
have not found a single empirical study that confirms that supposed link between 
community involvement and intolerance. … Far from being incompatible, liberty and 
fraternity are mutually supportive, and this remains true when we control for other factors 
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like education, income, urbanism, and so on. The most tolerant communities in America 
are precisely the places with the greatest civic involvement. Conversely, communities 
whose residents bowl alone are the least tolerant places in America168 
 
Later chapters of this thesis investigate whether the effects of SNH on political 
tolerance and efficacy are raising levels of Australian political conflict avoidance. Correlation 
statistics drawn from ‘World Values Survey’ data and responses to my own ‘Political 
Participation and Conflict Avoidance Survey’ will to a great extent support the 
Homogenisationist argument. That is, the influence of SNH is found to be largely responsible 
for declining membership and involvement within multi-issue conflict prone party 
organisations and increased participation in single issue political groups and activities.169  My 
research suggests that these trends have occurred both across time periods and generational 
cohorts. As political party membership and affiliation is a known correlate of propensity to 




This chapter has presented an overview of Australia’s waning rates of party and 
electoral participation and identified two main sociological engagement theories. It has also 
provided evidence for why a third theory warrants further investigation. The next chapter will 
more comprehensively describe and interpret both Modernisation and Lamentation theories 
while using other research to evaluate their merits and reveal their shortcomings. Chapter 
Three will consider the extent to which Australian value, social capital and political 
participation patterns are consistent with Modernisation, Lamentation and Homogenisation 
theories by evaluating World Values Survey percentage statistics. 
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--MODERNISATION & LAMENTATION-- 
An Evaluation 
 
This chapter compares conflicting Modernisationist and Lamentationist conceptions 
of social atomisation in post-industrial democracies. By examining these theories in detail, 
the chapter reveals strengths that should be incorporated into, and weaknesses that should 
be disregarded by my Homogenisation thesis. According to Inglehart and Welzel social 
atomisation facilitates human liberation and autonomy by transforming social connections, 
cultural expectations and civil and political governing institutions and procedures. The 
Modernisationist view that these social, cultural and political patterns are linked to stages of 
economic and technological development is largely supported. Putnam’s Lamentationist 
contention is also convincing. He argues that by embracing certain atomising developments, 
individuals have unwittingly sacrificed the long-term integrity, functionality and 
responsiveness of democratic institutions and organisations for more tangible and immediate 
autonomy and convenience. Hence, Inglehart and Welzel’s optimistic conviction that 
contemporary social capital trends are uniformly empowering individuals (including 
politically) is deemed wanting. However, Putnam’s thesis that almost all forms of social 
capital are (or were) in decline I reason to be overly pessimistic: focusing too heavily on 
traditional community and civic participation patterns and neglecting trends in more recent 
and informal modes of involvement. 
Differences in the definition and perceived effects of social atomisation can be 
identified across the works of social capital and values theorists including those of Putnam, 
Inglehart and Welzel. However, most agree that social atomisation loosely defined is a 
process resulting in the social ties binding individuals together becoming weaker or more 
easily severed. For Inglehart and Welzel social atomisation is a key facet of human liberation 
and autonomy. They argue that as individuals have become materially and intellectually 
empowered, social connections have become increasingly a matter of choice rather than 





obligation or necessity. For them, social atomisation means a transformation, not a net 
decline, in interpersonal relationships. That is, connections maintained by hierarchal 
traditional institutions/organisations and cultural expectations are purportedly being 
replaced by those willingly cultivated on an egalitarian basis between individuals with 
greater, and more realistic, exit options.171  
Contrastingly, Putnam’s understanding of social atomisation is pessimistic. He 
contends that this phenomenon degrades overall social connectivity and actually 
limits/contracts life options and opportunities. He holds that these trends are brought about 
principally by a myriad of technological, cultural and political/legal developments. Putnam 
maintains that these developments have allowed and encouraged the willing acceptance by 
individuals and society of some transparent opportunity costs in exchange for greater 
autonomy and/or other benefits in particular contexts. However, these relatively small and 
conspicuous opportunity costs are often positively correlated to those which are more 
significant and yet unnoticed. For example, television and other electronic technologies have 
empowered individuals with greater choice over how and when they consume knowledge 
and entertainment. However, Putnam maintains that they have also eroded the time and 
energy invested in social connections, thereby weakening channels of assistance and 
diminishing local community information dissemination.172 According to Putnam, people are 
making decisions about how to invest their time without fully appreciating the costs 
associated with their choices. These include the unwitting sacrifice of overall levels of 
autonomy, happiness, social justice, life satisfaction/meaning, political engagement and the 
integrity, functionality and responsiveness of our democratic institutions and 
organisations.173 
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Individual Empowerment & Social Modularity 
Technological, Economic & Welfare-State Development 
Inglehart and Welzel have identified three main sets of interrelated atomising trends 
that have empowered individuals in post-industrial societies with enhanced social modularity, 
by which is meant flexibility to both forge and discontinue social connections. The first is the 
reduction of poverty and want through economic growth, technological innovation and 
welfare state development. These advances raise existential security, life expectancy and 
living standards by providing greater opportunities to accumulate wealth as well as access to 
food, clothing, shelter, housing, education and health services for those in need.174 When life 
was more precarious rigid/obligatory familial and community bonds were deemed essential. 
Acting as a safety net, inferior and imperfect though they were, they significantly raised 
chances of survival and life expectancy beyond what was possible at lower stages of 
development had individuals been more independent.175 According to Inglehart and Welzel, 
the welfare state has empowered individuals with alternatives to, and exit options from 
interdependencies that had traditionally existed between parents and children. In their 
words: 
Formerly, children’s survival largely depended on whether their parents provided for them, 
and children took care of their parents when they reached old age. Although the role of 
the family is still important, the life-or-death nature of this relationship has been eroded by 
the welfare state. Maintaining family relations is nowadays a matter of choice, not of 
necessity. One-parent families and childless old people are far more viable under 
contemporary conditions then they once were. … This makes people more independent, 
diminishing social constraints on human choice.176 
Other scholars have uncovered supporting trends. Troth and Kemmelmeier (2009) 
found that people in wealthier nations tend to be considerably more accepting of divorce 
than people in less developed countries.177 Merz and Liefbroer (2012) establish that people in 
more economically advanced northern and western European countries tend to have more 
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accepting attitudes toward voluntary childlessness than people in relatively less developed 
southern and eastern European nations.178 
Macro differences in the attitude toward voluntary childlessness were strongly related to 
the extent to which countries have advanced … In well advanced regions, such as 
Scandinavia ... more emphasis is put on individual autonomy, emancipation and 
modernisation, leading to higher approval of voluntary childlessness. [In] Eastern European 
countries, however, … traditional family norms and values may still be dominant because 
the process of individualisation just started.179 
These studies support the Modernisationist proposition that economic and 
technological development induce cultural and value adaptations to enhance personal 
choice.180  
Interestingly, Putnam does not consider the welfare state to be a socially atomising 
development. According to Putnam the welfare state has no identifiable bearing on the level 
of community and civic engagement within society. Although Putnam finds a correlation 
between welfare spending and social capital he cannot determine a causal link.  
Social capital appears to be highest of all in the big-spending welfare states of Scandinavia. 
This simple analysis, of course cannot tell us whether social connectedness encourages 
welfare spending, whether the welfare state fosters civic engagement, or whether both 
are the result of some other unmeasured factor(s).181 
America has epitomized market capitalism for several centuries, during which our stocks of 
social capital and civic engagement have been through great swings. A constant can’t 
explain a variable.182 
Conversely Inglehart and Welzel deem the development of state provided safety nets 
within advanced market economies as an important factor affording individuals with realistic 
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exit options from traditional social bonds.183 This supposed point of contention between 
Putnam’s Lamentation and Inglehart and Welzel’s Modernisation theories may be due to a 
difference in their conceptions of social atomisation. Inglehart and Welzel do not argue that 
people in welfare states are less socially connected. Instead, they contend that citizens of 
advanced welfare states have more power to choose which connections they forge, maintain 
and terminate.184 This enhanced autonomy over, rather than a decline in the number and 
intensity of, interpersonal relationships (i.e. social modularity) is the type of social 
atomisation which constitutes the focus of Inglehart and Welzel’s investigation. 
Factors which have contributed to the rise of existential security in contemporary 
developed societies have also afforded even relatively under-privileged persons with new 
means to connect with those sharing similar interests and concerns.185 These factors include 
increased affluence and accessibility of modern inventions such as the Internet and 
smartphone technologies. These economic and technological advances in conjunction with 
the values shifts revealed by Modernisationists may precipitate social network 
homogenisation thereby reducing exposure to political disagreement. According to 
Homogenisationists this would raise political conflict avoidance (decreasing party 
identification and involvement) by negatively impacting efficacy in, and tolerance for, political 
debate, deliberation and negotiation, and preparedness to compromise. Indeed, statistics 
drawn from my own survey data reveal positive correlations between the degree to which 
the political values of participants tended to be reinforced by the members of their close 
social networks and the time participants spent both looking at screens and communicating 
online for non-work-related purposes.186 This link is consistent with Social Network 
Homogenisation and is discussed in greater depth in Chapter Seven. 
Knowledge & Intellectual Empowerment 
The second class of post-industrial atomising trends identified by Inglehart and Welzel 
are those which mobilise our cognitive abilities fuelling intellectual independence. According 
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to this reasoning, the expansion of modern tertiary (services) sector professions requiring 
greater autonomy and cognitive skills has ignited the demand for a more educated workforce 
prompting workers to seek, and governments to provide, greater access to advanced formal 
education.187 Knowledge itself including news and current affairs information has also 
become more accessible with the proliferation of modern communications technology such 
as television, radio, the Internet and social media.188 These developments have empowered 
individuals to research and to think critically about their consumer options, rather than just 
rely on and accept information provided by traditional contextual sources of authority such 
as GPs, teachers, even mechanics and tradespeople. The salience of such tight hierarchical 
relationships between consumers/civilians and professionals/specialists has dwindled as 
increased availability of knowledge and enhanced cognitive abilities have enabled more 
informal/autonomous choices to be made. Furthermore, these trends have induced greater 
competition between market suppliers. In the words of Inglehart and Welzel: “rising levels of 
education, increasing cognitive and informal requirements in economic activities, and 
increasing proliferation of knowledge via mass media make people intellectually more 
independent, diminishing cognitive constraints on human choice.”189  
Knowledge and education certainly empower and liberate individuals from an 
overreliance on others (particularly traditional authority figures) and have become more 
widely accessible and disseminated because of economic necessity. This is consistent with 
Modernisation theory.190 However, Inglehart and Welzel’s thesis is contradicted by a raft of 
academic research concluding that formal education raises formal community and civic 
engagement; likely to include elite led political party involvement.191 In fact, education is 
                                                          
187 Inglehart, and Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy, p.28 
188 Inglehart, and Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy, p.29 
189 Inglehart, and Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy, p.29 
190 Berger, Noah and Fisher, Peter. (22 August 2013), ‘A Well-Educated Workforce Is Key to State Prosperity’, 
Economic Policy Institute, viewed 8 December 2016, http://www.epi.org/publication/states-education-
productivity-growth-foundations/; Sharrock, Geoff. ‘OECD figures are not what they seem in higher education’, 
THE CONVERSATION, viewed 8 December 2016, http://theconversation.com/oecd-figures-are-not-what-they-
seem-in-higher-education-60786; Barns, Angela., Jefferson, Therese., and Preston, Alison. (April 2009), 
‘Women’s employment in the context of the economic downturn’, Australian Human Rights Commission, 
viewed 8 December 2016, https://www.humanrights.gov.au/publications/women-s-employment-context-
economic-downturn-2009; OECD Better Life Index: Australia, viewed 8 December 2016, 
http://www.oecdbetterlifeindex.org/countries/australia/ 
191 Vromen, Ariadne. (2012) ‘New forms of participation and social movements’, in Smith, Rodney., Vromen, 
Ariadne., and Cook, Ian., Contemporary Politics in Australia: Theories, Practices and Issues, Cambridge 





perhaps the most significant-catalyst for political activity. Verb, Schlozman and Brady (1995), 
Lake and Huckfeldt (1998), Downs (1957), Rosenberg (1988) and Becker (1964) each found 
that higher education provides knowledge and intellectual and cognitive skills that increase 
the accessibility of political participation.192  
Yet, despite an enormous growth in education levels ‘traditional’ forms of political 
engagement have declined over the last half century in advanced post-industrial countries.193 
In Putnam’s words “education boosts civic engagement sharply, and education levels have 
risen massively. … If anything, the growth of education should have increased civic 
engagement.”194 Nevertheless, Putnam found that in absolute terms declines in traditional 
civic involvement have been greatest among the better educated.195 Therefore, the extent to 
which education positively effects levels of conventional political participation may be being 
increasingly eroded, inhibited or mitigated by recent/contemporary sociological trends.  
Indeed, there is some evidence that higher education reduces party identification by 
enabling/promoting independent thought, including political ideas unguided by major parties 
and party elites.196 Party identification is almost always a precondition for party membership 
and involvement. Hence, this finding certainly supports Inglehart and Welzel’s thesis 
regarding the intellectually liberating power of education and the influence of this 
empowerment on traditional elite-led forms of political engagement.197 However, this on its 
own does not explain why the influence of education on party identification has become 
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stronger relative to the effect of education in raising the accessibility of party engagement. 
That is, there may be contextual reasons why the role of higher education in reducing party 
identification is strengthening relative to the role of higher education in providing the 
knowledge and skills necessary for party involvement. 
Occupation Specialisation & Social Complexity 
The third category of contemporary atomising developments identified by Inglehart 
and Welzel may provide some insight into why the influence of higher education on party 
engagement is changing. These trends heighten occupational specialisation and social 
complexity. Post-industrialisation, Inglehart and Welzel contend, diversifies economic activity 
and in turn knowledge and interests. This social complexity, they argue, provides individuals 
with a more diverse set of available persons with whom they can make connections. In their 
words “post-industrialisation de-standardizes economic activities and social life.”198 
“Diversification ... frees people from prefixed social roles and social ties, making them 
autonomous in defining their social roles themselves and in shaping their social ties with 
other people.”199 Individuals may be using their enhanced social/relationship choices to forge 
and maintain more ideologically homogenous networks based on personal preferences.  
Lack of intra-network ideological and political diversity to check and balance extreme 
views may allow networks to drift further from what was a more concentrated political 
centre. These trends could have been accelerated by the expansion of higher education. 
First, higher education provides greater intellectual independence from traditional sources of 
authority (including political parties). Second, a more diverse set of internally homogenous 
networks may be granting these educated and intellectually independent persons more, and 
more extreme, ideological choices. Where once parties (particularly major parties) could 
appeal to a large proportion of the electorate clumped more tightly around a common 
political centre, now those same parties struggle to maintain their core constituencies: a 
decline in party identification.200 Hence, the capacity of education to raise party and formal 
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political engagement may be losing ground to the role of that education in reducing party 
identification: usually a prerequisite for party involvement.  
However, Inglehart and Welzel maintain that along with heightened material security, 
education attainment, occupational specialisation and social complexity post-industrialisation 
has brought about a values shift which, among other things, has made people more open to 
bridging connections.201 They argue that as post-industrial societies have grown increasingly 
complex, social networks have become more heterogeneous.202 Such views do not 
adequately explain why (despite being intellectually “liberated”) evidence suggests that the 
growing educated and occupationally specialised class are still more inclined to participate in 
traditional/formal political organisations and parties than are the relatively uneducated and 
unskilled.203 Neither does it explain why this disposition among the educated class has been 
in decline.204 If, as Inglehart and Welzel contend, declining bonding is being replaced by rising 
bridging social capital in post-industrial societies205 then presumably individuals should have 
greater exposure to a range of political attitudes. This should have increased opportunities to 
discuss and debate different political views. The exchange and melding of these ideas should 
bind a higher proportion of people more tightly around an ideological centre. Indeed, Bello 
and Rolfe’s research suggests that people who encounter greater political disagreement 
within their social networks are more inclined to switch their party support even once their 
(the primary respondent’s) political interest and identity strength is controlled.206 This 
indicates that the respondents’ views were influenced, and probably moderated, by their 
politically dissimilar discussants. In the words of Bello and Rolfe: 
On average across both decided and leaning voters, respondents who report high levels of 
disagreement with their discussants are significantly more likely to switch party choice in 
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the following period than respondents who report no disagreement with their discussants. 
… [R]espondents with politically diverse discussion networks are more likely to change 
their vote choice … even after controlling for the primary respondent’s political interest 
and political identity strength... [A]lthough committed partisans are far less likely to switch 
their vote choice than respondents who are only leaning towards a particular party.207 
Accordingly, Inglehart and Welzel’s argument that declining bonding is being replaced by 
rising bridging social capital is called into question. If social networks were ideologically 
diversifying political party platforms would probably be appealing to an increasing proportion 
of the electorate. Instead, evidence suggests that party identification and engagement has 
been eroding for decades.208 
Inglehart and Welzel’s Modernisationist arguments regarding the role of education in 
intellectually liberating people from traditional sources of authority, and consequently 
eroding party identification, have significant merit. Equally compelling is their contention that 
expanding accessibility and dissemination of education is a necessary consequence of 
economic development. However, their claim that widening educational attainment is an 
atomising trend contributing to a reduction in elite-led traditional and party engagement is 
found wanting. A myriad of academics, including Putnam, have found that across all forms 
the educated continue to engage politically at higher rates than the uneducated.209 However, 
Putnam did not explain why declines in traditional forms of political engagement have been 
greatest among the educated.210 Inglehart and Welzel’s third identified category of atomising 
trends “occupation specialisation and social complexity” may provide the foundation for a 
Homogenisationist answer. Yet, their view that bonding is being replaced by bridging social 
capital precludes their development of this interpretation.211 Both Putnam’s Lamentationist 
and Inglehart and Welzel’s Modernisationist views regarding the effects of higher education 
on political involvement have merits and shortcomings. Neither argument -- in describing the 
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role of education expansion in political engagement patterns -- is adequate, comprehensive 
enough or entirely compelling. 
The Lure of Atomisation? 
Unlike Inglehart and Welzel, Putnam considers social atomisation a trend toward less, 
not more, overall autonomy, social justice, happiness, life satisfaction/meaning, political 
engagement and government integrity, functionality and responsiveness.212 Putnam 
associates atomisation with a myriad of developments diminishing all types of, rather than 
transforming, community and civic engagement.213 Putnam admits that some of the 
atomising trends he identifies do enable greater autonomy in particular contexts. However, 
he is adamant that each acts to restrict overall levels of personal independence and 
empowerment by reducing the number of life opportunities one encounters and choices one 
has available.214  
Putnam argues that socially atomising trends are eroding overall levels of social 
connectedness to the detriment, not empowerment, of individuals. According to Putnam’s 
Lamentation theory greater access to, and changing usage of, television and other 
technologies have most severely and deleteriously effected community involvement.215 
Similarly, the evolution of society’s religious demographics and decline in religiosity has 
harmed overall levels of structural social capital.216 Economic changes such as industrial 
relations deregulation and corporate delocalisation have dampened social connectivity and 
community spirit and involvement.217 Putnam holds that new patterns in where people live, 
with whom and the length of average commutes are eroding altruism, trust, trustworthiness 
and community engagement.218 He also argues that declining marriage and fertility rates as 
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well as changing gender roles and a rise in two career families are affecting the number and 
strength of social bonds forged.219 
Technology 
Putnam describes television watching as the activity most lethal to community 
involvement as it, along with CDs, DVDs, the Internet, smartphones and ipods, has allowed 
for greater private consumption of entertainment.220 He finds that, other factors being equal, 
each additional hour of television watching per day means roughly a 10% reduction in most 
forms of political engagement.221 Putnam reports that although television viewing increases 
with age (particularly upon retirement), each successive generation since the introduction of 
television has begun the life-cycle at a higher point of viewing than their parents.222 Studies 
suggest a causal link between television viewing and declining civic engagement rather than 
the already civically disengaged turning to television for substitute entertainment.223 
Other concerning developments in the usage of television include the rise in the 
number of televisions per home during the second half of the twentieth century indicating 
that people are watching more television alone rather than in the company of 
family/others.224 Putnam also reveals that people have become less selective about what 
they watch. They are more likely to turn on the television without knowing what they want to 
see in advance and to leave it on in the background when they are no longer watching.225 He 
has found these trends to be largely generational.226 A shift in ‘what’ is viewed is also 
worrying. Putnam reveals that controlling for other factors like education, income, sex, age, 
race, employment and marital status the more time spent watching news, the more likely 
one is to be active in the community. Contrastingly, the more time spent watching television 
series, soap operas, gameshows, and talk shows the less involved one is likely to be in the 
community.227 He also reveals that the program types most closely associated with civic 
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isolation constitute an enormous and expanding share of television programming, indicating 
a growing demand for entertainment at the expense of news and informative programs.228 In 
fact Putnam found that only 7% of Americans watched television primarily for information 
while 41% watched it primarily for entertainment.229  
These results are largely supported by other research. Hoffman and Thomson’s survey 
of 201 American public high school students established that the watching of both traditional 
news programming and political information from satire and comedy shows raise feelings of 
political efficacy among adolescents which in turn stimulates civic engagement.230 Bankston’s 
analysis of American ‘General Social Survey’ data also corroborates Putnam’s findings by 
revealing negative correlations between the ‘overall’ hours spent watching television per 
week and both ‘recreational activeness’ and ‘organisational membership.’ These were 
maintained even after controlling for salient characteristics such as race, marital status and 
education.231 Furthermore, Bankston found evidence that television watching may erode 
informal sociability.232 Like Putnam, he argues that television viewing is most likely 
diminishing levels of social capital and civic engagement, rather than providing substitute 
entertainment for the already socially atomized, isolated and disengaged. In his words 
“Television may detract from civic participation not simply by privatizing leisure but by 
making leisure inactive and sapping the participatory ethos of everyday life.”233 
Television (which now includes cable television and internet streaming services), 
DVDs, radio, ipods and smartphones have in one sense empowered individuals to consume 
entertainment and knowledge when they please without the organisational and time costs of 
more collective activities. However, Putnam contends they have also had enormously 
damaging effects on the connectivity between people: reducing opportunities and options 
which are tied to strong networks underpinned by trust and reciprocities. Australia and 
America are both economically developed and have similar individualistic, anglosphere 
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western cultures. It is arguable that, Australian television viewing trends over the last half 
century have probably mirrored those of the US. Though, there is some evidence suggesting 
that ‘overall’ rates of television watching per week (including broadcast, cable and internet 
subscription television) may have declined very slightly in recent years.234 Still, Putnam’s 
views regarding the effects of television and other technologies on social connectivity over 
the longer term appear to be sound. 
Religion & Religiosity 
Putnam identifies changing religious demographics and religiosity as a similar sacrifice 
in overall levels of social connectivity (and the opportunities and empowerment which flow 
from such bonds) for greater autonomy within a particular facet of one’s life. He finds that 
churchgoers tend to:  
- have stronger and larger networks (both formal and informal),  
- be more politically active and engaged in secular non-political 
organisations/groups (especially volunteering/philanthropy),  
- know and interact with more people, and 
- have greater life satisfaction.235  
Indeed Putnam found that those who attended church regularly reported talking with 40% 
more people in the course of a day than those who do not attend church.236 By analysing 
data from the first wave of the Portraits of American Life Study Lewis, MacGregor and 
Putnam (2012) demonstrated that “religious attendance is positively associated with 
volunteering, charitable giving, attending public meetings, and political engagement, as well 
as informal pro-social activities such as helping, giving money, and giving advice to family, 
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friends, and neighbors.”237 Putnam holds that “religiosity rivals education as a powerful 
correlate of most forms of civic engagement.”238 These results are supported by the 
investigations of Wilson (2000), Lam (2002), Park and Smith (2000), and Uslaner (2002) 
indicating that religiosity is associated with charitable giving and community and civic 
involvement.239 They are also consistent with research conducted in central Queensland by 
Lauder, Mummery and Sharkey in 2006 revealing that “strong religious feelings are linked to 
less loneliness.”240  
Lim and Putnam’s (2010) analysis of data collected from the same participants in both 
2006 and 2007 waves of the Faith Matters Study suggests that by facilitating the building of 
friendship networks religious service attendance positively effects life satisfaction.241 This 
research controlled for age, sex, race, income, education attainment and marital status.242 It 
also indicates that a strong sense of religious belonging, or identification, can amplify the 
positive influence that congregational social networks have on life satisfaction.243 
Furthermore, Lim and Putnam find that once religious service attendance and congregational 
friendship are controlled for, private and subjective dimensions of religiosity are unlikely to 
have a significant impact on life satisfaction.244 Regarding life satisfaction they state that 
“praying together seems to be better than either bowling together or praying alone.”245 
These conclusions are supported by Witter et al. (1985) and Ellison, Gay and Glass (1989) 
who reveal that when compared with other positive correlates of subjective wellbeing, 
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religious involvement is stronger than either marital status or income.246 Additionally, 
Krueger et al. (2009) found that those participating in a time-diary survey reported being 
most emotionally positive when they were involved in religious activities.247  
Putnam presents statistics indicating declining church attendance and an increase in 
non-religious people: largely generational trends.248 Beginning with the Baby Boomers, 
Americans began to increasingly privatise religion: deeming faith less as a catalyst for building 
community and more as an expression of autonomous moral judgement.249 Campbell and 
Putnam find that the proportion of Americans who report no religious affiliation has been 
rising rapidly since the early 1990s and that this trend is heavily concentrated among 
Millennials.250 Similar trends have been observed in Australia. According to census data, over 
the last half century there has been a sharp rise in the proportion of Australians who report 
having no religion: 0.8% in 1966 compared to 30.1% in 2016.251 Data from the National 
Church Life Survey indicate that the proportion of Australians who frequently attend church 
services (i.e. at least once a month) has declined by more than 60% since the mid-twentieth 
century.252 Declines in religiosity and church attendance in the western world is well 
established. In fact, research by Robert Barro and Rachel McCleary indicates that economic 
development is precipitating a decline in religiosity.253 This would support Inglehart and 
Welzel’s Modernisation theory. Although this is a trend toward enhanced autonomy over one 
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aspect of life, it is perhaps an unwitting sacrifice of more significant autonomous choice and 
life opportunities as well as higher levels of life satisfaction associated with larger stronger 
networks. Thus, Putnam’s ideas regarding the impact of waning religiosity on social capital 
have merit. 
Industrial Relations & Workplace Practices 
The abandonment of certain industrial relations regulations for greater workplace 
flexibility, productivity and in many instances autonomy, Putnam holds, has had analogous 
negative outcomes for levels of social connectivity and associated life choices and 
opportunities. Putnam admits industrial relations deregulation has economically benefited 
certain societies including America in terms of reducing unemployment (in particular youth 
unemployment), raising productivity and granting employers, and often employees, greater 
workplace flexibility.254 However, Putnam is at pains to stress that these benefits have come 
at social costs. He argues that industrial relations deregulation has had negative 
consequences for trust, social connectedness and a team mindset between work colleagues. 
As non-standard, performance-based employment and pay have risen and the labour market 
has become increasingly competitive employees have come to view their co-workers more as 
threats to their job security and livelihood rather than teammates.255 Michael O’Donnell of 
the School of Industrial Relations and Organisational Behaviour at the University of New 
South Wales conducted an examination of performance based pay in the Australian public 
service between 1992 and 1996. He found that “[l]inking pay to individual performance 
undermined teamwork and increased friction between those eligible for performance 
bonuses.”256 This, Putnam posits, has in some instances reduced job satisfaction, 
performance and productivity as well as eroded social bonds at the workplace.257 Consistent 
with this position O’Donnell’s research reveals that “a strong performance culture [had] ... 
not emerged within the APS in response to the introduction of performance-based pay.”258 
Putnam also highlights the coordination problems faced by many employees with irregular 
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work hours in organising social and community events with others.259 Declining regular 9 to 
5, Monday to Friday jobs have exacerbated these difficulties over the last several decades. 
Not only has social connectivity within the workplace reduced because of industrial relations 
deregulation so too have opportunities for network building in non-work hours. In a Belgian 
1999 study analysing how irregular work schedules affect mental and physical health, 
Martens, Nijhuis, Boxtel and Knottnerus found that nonstandard/irregular working hours and 
participation in group leisure activities were negatively correlated. They established that this 
was having a detrimental impact on health and wellbeing.260 
As industrial relations deregulation has raised the financial anxiety felt by many of 
those in contingent employment, social and political engagement has been further 
undermined. Putnam finds that those feeling financial anxiety regardless of their income, 
education, gender and similar factors become more socially and politically withdrawn.261 
Putnam argues that once the influence of financial anxiety is removed income levels and 
affluence have little effect on social connectivity.262 He also finds that declines in engagement 
and social bonds are almost as great among the affluent as among those on middle incomes 
and the poor.263 In fact, Lake and Huchfeldt (1998) established that “Income, when 
controlling for other personal characteristics such as education and age, does not produce a 
discernible effect [on one’s structural social capital or level of formal organisational 
engagement].”264 
Like Putnam, Eldin Fahmy (another Lamentationist) believes that social/political 
engagement is declining partly due to changes in the workplace. He contends that reductions 
in the demand for unskilled labour in manufacturing in England coupled with fragmentation 
of the apprenticeship system have decreased opportunities for those without tertiary 
education: forcing them into poorly paid and insecure service sector occupations.265 This, 
Fahmy theorises, delays young people’s exposure to the political climate of the workplace 
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until later in the life-cycle when they enter stable employment. Therefore, labour market 
changes maybe individualising young people’s perceptions of the social world: failing to 
encourage them to engage in collective civic action either conventional or unconventional.266  
Putnam’s position that industrial relations deregulation and certain workplace 
practices are diminishing social connectivity, by raising financial stress, eroding workplace 
comradery and inflicting coordination difficulties on employees’ social lives has been largely 
supported by other researchers. Hence, there is merit to the argument that social 
connectivity and associated life choices and opportunities have been sacrificed for more 
tangible and immediate workplace flexibility.  
Moving to the Metropolis 
Another socially atomising trend identified by Putnam is the decline in the proportion 
of Americans living in small towns and the increase in the proportion living in large 
metropolitan areas. Putnam presents statistics demonstrating that over the second half of 
the twentieth century there was: 
- a massive reduction in the proportion of the American population who lived in 
small towns and rural areas,  
- a slight decline in the proportion who lived in city centres, and  
- an enormous increase in the proportion that lived in metropolitan areas outside 
city centres (the suburbs).267  
The following graph from a report published by the Regional Institute indicates that similar 
demographic shifts have taken place in Australia. 
Figure 2.1 
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 Putnam contends that altruism, trust and trustworthiness are much more common in 
American small towns than in cities and that residents of large American metropolitan areas 
are less involved than other Americans in community affairs. Furthermore, these 
comparisons hold even when other factors such as age, gender, education, race, financial 
circumstances, home ownership, region and parental, marital, and job status are held 
constant.268 Putnam also finds that civic engagement is not correlated with whether one 
would prefer living in a big city, a suburb, or a small town. That is, “living in a major 
metropolitan agglomeration somehow weakens civic engagement and social capital.”269 
Similarly, in a study employing data from a telephone survey with 1,402 urban and 611 rural 
South Australian respondents Ziersch, Baum, Darmawan, Kavanagh and Bentley revealed that 
in the Australian setting people in rural areas possessed greater structural social capital than 
urban residents. In their words “respondents from rural areas reported significantly higher 
                                                          
268 Putnam, Bowling Alone, p.138, 205 & 206 
269 Putnam, Bowling Alone, p.206 





levels of several elements of social capital, with higher levels of social networks, greater civic 
participation and more social cohesion.”270 
However, the study found no statistically significant differences between urban and 
rural residents regarding levels of generalised trust, size of support networks or a belief in 
reciprocity (that “by helping others you help yourself in the long run”).271 Support network 
size was defined by the number of people willing to help you at personal cost to themselves if 
you were in serious need.272 Positive correlations were found between income and general 
trust and between educational attainment and a belief in reciprocity.273 These findings 
support Inglehart and Welzel’s position that social/general trust and civic values are linked to 
levels of existential security and individual empowering atomising factors such as wealth and 
education rather than the degree to which individuals are socially isolated.  
Similarly, my own analysis of Australian WVS data, when controlling for other 
variables, reveals no clear significant correlations between town size and:  
- interpersonal trust,  
- trustworthiness,  
- formal organisational involvement,  
- unconventional political activity,  
- political discussion,  
- generosity,  
- belief in the utility of government decision-making, or  
- confidence in most significant civic and community institutions and 
organisations.274  
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Where clear and significant correlations were found between town size and measures of 
social capital larger cities/towns were associated with higher levels of social capital than small 
towns and rural communities. Larger cities were positively correlated with political interest 
and confidence in parliament, the civil service, political parties and the legal system.275 My 
statistical analysis also suggests that rising incomes may aid interpersonal trust both 
independently and by supporting financial satisfaction which in turn also promotes 
interpersonal trust.276 These findings, discussed in later chapters, largely support those 
articulated by Ziersch et al. and provide further evidence that interpersonal trust and civic 
values are tied to levels of existential security and individual empowering, rather than 
individual isolating, atomising factors. The ostensibly universal (not just American) 
applicability (and perhaps even validity) of Putnam’s argument regarding the influence of 
declining rural and increasing metropolitan populations on measures of social connectivity, 
generalised trust and civic values conflicts with other research and my own analysis of 
Australian WVS data. This certainly weakens the suitability of Putnam’s Lamentation thesis as 
an explanation for social capital and civic engagement trends in post-industrial democracies. 
Putnam argues that the connection he found between residential mobility and civic 
disengagement could not have contributed to the decline in American community and 
political involvement between 1960 and 1996. This is because Americans became more, not 
less, residentially stable in that time.277 Indeed Putnam writes that at the close of the 
twentieth century residential stability was higher than it was in the 1950s and possibly higher 
than it had been at any time in America’s history.278 Australians have also become less 
residentially mobile.279  This trend has been primarily driven by greater residential stability 
among those in their late teens and early twenties since 1976.280 
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Gender Roles & Modern Families 
Changing gender roles and the rise in the proportion of two career families may have 
also affected the number and strength of social bonds forged. Putnam finds that women are 
better social capitalists than men when their employment status is held constant.281 
However, he also argues that employment can significantly and substantially enable or hinder 
these deft network builders. As more women have entered the workforce they have been 
presented with greater opportunities for making connections and involving themselves in the 
community. These women also have less time to explore these opportunities.282 When he 
compared women of the same age, education, financial security and marital/parental status 
Putnam found that full-time employment reduces the involvement of both the women 
themselves and their husbands. When a woman works full-time she and her partner (if she 
has one) are likely to spend more time zoning out on movies and television or else 
shopping.283 Putnam also reveals that the degree to which a woman ‘chooses’ to work (rather 
than must work due to financial or other circumstances) is closely associated with community 
engagement. The greatest community participation is found among women who work part-
time by choice.284  
My analysis of Australian WVS data largely contradicts Putnam’s view that women are 
defter social capitalists than are men. When controlling for other variables no significant 
correlations were found between sex and formal organisational involvement, interpersonal 
trust, political discussion or generosity. The data provides no overwhelming evidence that 
women are intrinsically more disposed than men to unconventional forms of political 
engagement or being confident in society’s institutions and organisations. The only social 
capital marker in which women resoundingly outperform men is trustworthiness. The data 
also indicates that young and middle-aged men tend to be more politically interested than 
women of the same age. However, the gender disparity in political interest appears non-
existent among older Australians. These statistical findings are discussed in more detail in 
Chapter Five. 
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Using data from the 2000/2001 Social Capital Module of the British General 
Household Survey, Vivien Lowndes, also refutes Putnam’s research. She concludes 
differences between levels of male and female social capital are, in fact, quite small.285 
However, she identifies greater gender differences in the forms of social capital building in 
which men and women are engaged. She argues that women are somewhat more involved in 
informal social capital building than are men and cites evidence indicating that gender 
differences in volunteering also exist. Men are more inclined to participate in those types of 
volunteering related to sports and recreation and women are more active in those associated 
with health, education and welfare. 
While gender differences in the survey responses are undoubtedly small, the GHS findings 
do reveal a tendency for men and women to have different social capital profiles. Women 
are slightly more likely than men to know and trust their neighbours, have more contact 
with friends and relatives, and have access to informal sources of social support. Women’s 
social capital appears to be more strongly embedded in neighbourhood-specific networks 
of informal sociability. … more than twice as many men than women undertake activity 
related to sports and recreation (29 per cent compared with 13 per cent), while women 
are more active in the fields of health, education and social services. As for the specific 
roles undertaken, men are more likely to occupy committee posts, while women dominate 
in visiting and befriending activities286 
This finding is supported by Hall (1999) who established that the focus of informal 
sociability is highly gendered with men spending three times as many hours as women in 
sports clubs, and twice as many in social clubs. Conversely women spend three times as many 
hours visiting friends than do men.287 However Lowndes’ research supports Putnam’s 
evidence that women who work part-time have greater social capital than those who work 
full time or not at all. In Lowndes’ words: 
part-time workers are more likely than full-time workers to see and speak to friends and 
relatives, and to have more close friends living nearby... part-time workers are richer in 
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social capital than full-time workers, being more likely to have multiple sources of informal 
help288 
Yet, this argument that part-time employment is more conducive to female social 
capital building than full-time employment appears to be contradicted by my own analysis of 
Australian WVS data. Neither does the data provide substantial support for Putnam’s 
contention that part-time paid employment, as opposed to being a full-time homemaker, 
encourages women to become more socially involved and bonded. [These correlation 
statistics are discussed in detail in Chapter Five.] Hence, Putnam’s views regarding the 
influence of sex and employment status on social capital measures are uncompelling. 
Putnam examined patterns in the levels of divorce, female employment and 
community/civic involvement over the twentieth century. He found that generational 
declines in civic engagement cannot be attributed to whether a person’s parents divorced 
during their childhood or whether their mother worked.289 However, Putnam concludes that 
increased female full-time employment (brought about often by economic necessity) has 
contributed to declining community and civic engagement both among women themselves 
and their families in the more immediate term. Putnam also holds that the amount of free 
time people have on average has not decreased over the last 50 years, instead the 
distribution of free time between various demographics has changed. Women and well-
educated professionals have less free time than they used to, while men and those less 
educated and less skilled have more.290 This redistribution of free time Putnam argues has 
had socially atomising consequences. 
the working class has less work and leisure class less leisure. … dual-career families are 
more common and are spending more time at work than they used to: married couples 
average fourteen more hours at work each week in 1998 than 1969 … for that segment of 
society – well-educated middle-class parents - whose energies historically provided a 
disproportionate share of the community infrastructure, the time bind is real. Perhaps 
we’ve witnessed a redistribution of free time from people (mostly younger, more educated 
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women) who would have invested it in community engagement, toward people (mostly 
older, less educated men) more likely to consume it privately.291 
However, my own analysis of WVS data reveals that sex and employment status has 
little bearing on most measures of social capital in Australia.292 This severely weakens the 
applicability of Putnam’s argument to non-American post-industrial societies. Gershuny and 
Fisher’s research also contradicts Putnam’s findings. They reveal that the time spent by both 
British women and men on leisure activities outside the home actually increased between 
the years 1961 and 1995 (approx. 20mins more per day).293 Their study also shows that in 
1995 men still had 50 minutes more leisure time a day than women and that on average 
women spent nearly four times longer than men on housework and childcare (about 5 hours 
a day).294 Although Putnam may be right in arguing that changes in leisure time have 
occurred on a class basis, the evidence supporting a reduction in female leisure time is less 
convincing. 
Both men and women have been empowered by changing gender roles and the rise 
in the proportion of two career families. Both sexes can pursue certain kinds of goals and 
aspirations previously less accepted by society. These include women aspiring to have 
careers and be leaders and more men opting to be stay at home dads. However, based on 
the evidence presented in the previous paragraphs Putnam’s argument that these social 
changes have greatly contributed to a reduction in the number and strength of social ties is 
found wanting (at least when applied universally across post-industrial democracies). These 
social changes have probably not underwritten a process of individual isolating atomisation 
to the extent assumed by Putnam. 
Conversely, individuals are gaining certain kinds of independence and autonomy at 
the expense of connections facilitated by marriage/family formation and the empowerment 
that those connections provide. These trends are due to falling fertility rates and fewer 
people entering into lasting marriages and long-term partnerships. Potential ties between 
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parents of children who attend the same school and those forged between one’s self and 
one’s partner’s/spouse’s friends and family are left unforged.295 Also, Putnam reveals that 
Americans who are married with children are more likely to be involved in religious activities 
and church related social engagements. As church and youth activities are the two most 
important forms of volunteering, parents are more likely to volunteer than people of the 
same age and social status who are single and childless.296 Likewise, evidence from Friesen 
(2013) indicates a positive correlation between family size and religiosity. However, Friesen’s 
study reveals that political participation (the form of social capital with which this thesis is 
most concerned) is negatively affected by the number of children in the home.  
Women with strong religious identities purposefully tend to have more children than their 
peers and may also be reaping the benefits of congregational as well as child-induced 
social networking.”297 “[Nevertheless] even when accounting for the powerful relationships 
between forms of political participation and age, income, education, and marital status, … 
the number of children in the home had consistent, negative effects on individuals’ 
political engagement; and though this relationship held for men and women, women were 
slightly more affected.298 
When controlling for other variables my analysis of Australian WVS data reveals a 
negative correlation exists, at least in the Australian context, between having more children 
and both political interest and joining in boycotts. Yet the results of my examination 
(discussed further in Chapter Five) suggests that, at least in Australia, having more children 
and being married has little impact on overall levels of social capital or political engagement. 
Again, this verdict undermines the applicability of Putnam’s conclusions to non-American 
post-industrial democracies. 
Suburbanisation 
Putnam contends that although suburbanisation has enabled people to choose a 
home among a wider variety of residential areas this choice has produced more homogenous 
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“lifestyle enclaves” so as people with different views and interests live apart.299 This position 
is supported by the works of Bishop (2009) and Sussell (2013) that demonstrated, using party 
registration and electoral data, that partisan preferences are becoming significantly more 
homogenous at county and microgeographic levels.300 Galston and Nivola attribute this 
geographic partisan polarization to younger and more educated people moving to places that 
offer them the greatest career and financial opportunities, thereby amplifying the divide 
between the tastes and preferences of affluent and rural/struggling areas. 
[P]olitical polarization has become akin to political segregation. You are less likely 
to live near someone whose politics differ from your own. … young people have deserted 
rural and older manufacturing areas for cities like Austin and Portland. Places with higher 
densities of college graduates attract even more, so that the gap between such 
communities and less-educated areas widens further. Zones of higher education, in turn, 
produce more innovation and enjoy higher incomes, generating communities dominated 
by upper-middle-class tastes. Lower-educated regions, by contrast, tend to be more 
family-oriented and more faithful to traditional authority.301 
Likewise, a tendency for politically right-of-centre persons to geographically self-sort has 
been uncovered. Schnieder (1992) and Walks (2006) argue that politically conservative 
people favouring small government tend to prefer localism, space and privacy, and are 
consequently more inclined, than are left-liberals, to move out of inner-city locations to the 
suburbs.302 
Numerous scholars maintain this these trends have negative repercussions for the 
foundations of liberal democacy. Gimpel et al. argue in Cultivating Democracy that this 
“balkanization of neighborhoods” exacerbates political intolerance and polarization.303 
Putnam cites the research of political scientist Eric Oliver who believes geographic clustering 
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of like-minded individuals has probably diminished interaction between different types of 
people and consequently is likely to have contributed to a reduction in civic participation. 
This is because fewer stimulating/mobilising, and more reinforcing, conversations are being 
had between neighbours.304 This conclusion is consistent with the research of David 
Campbell who finds that neighbourhood diversity raises political participation while also 
reducing social network building, trust and reciprocity.305 Campbell argues that these 
seemingly contradictory patterns of social capital are due to different motivations than those 
identified by Putnam. Political heterogeneity increases awareness of possible political 
cleavages in the community and the importance of participation for securing self-interest 
outcomes.306 Yet diversity also inhibits the development of cultural norms which underpin 
the trust and reciprocity which facilitate greater and stronger network formation.307  
In contrast to Putnam’s argument this is a somewhat more cynical interpretation as to 
why people who live in more heterogeneous areas (economically, socially, culturally and 
politically) tend to politically participate at higher rates. However, it is possible that both 
arguments are valid. Residents of more heterogeneous areas may have more bridging 
connections within their networks than residents of relatively homogenous neighbourhoods. 
Furthermore, these bridging connections may encourage them to think about political issues 
from multiple perspectives and in turn stimulate greater mental focus on, and engagement 
in, political matters. Still, residents of heterogenous areas with diverse networks may have 
greater concerns about the political ramifications of people like themselves not participating 
at rates matching others with antithetical interests. Therefore, evidence suggests that if 
Australian suburbs are becoming more homogenous (as Putnam claims is occurring across 
American metropolises) this would almost certainly be having negative consequences for 
political involvement. This is despite the effects of these patterns on other aspects of social 
capital. 
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Putnam argues that suburbanisation has also increased people’s time commuting to 
and from work. Putnam finds that between 1983 and 1995 the average American commuting 
trip travel time increased by 14%.308 He reveals that each additional 10 minutes of 
commuting time cuts community involvement by 10% and has an even stronger negative 
effect on informal social interaction.309 Commuting time is more important than most other 
influences on civic involvement and the more time spent commuting among the residents of 
a community the lower the average levels of civic involvement even among the non-
commuters.310 These correlations are supported by political scientist Thad Williamson. Using 
data from the 2000 Social Capital Community Benchmark Survey he finds that time spent 
commuting (particularly solo commutes) have a serious negative impact on group 
membership, civic involvement and social trust.311 He suggests that community design should 
be focused on reducing commute times to raise levels of civic engagement and, like Putnam, 
finds that communities with higher proportions of commuters have lower levels of 
community and political engagement even among non-commuters.312  
Fewer solo commuters in one’s zip code is a statistically significant predictor of 
membership in a political organisation, membership of a local reform organisation, 
attending a partisan political meeting, signing a petition, and attendance at public 
meetings – even when controlling for other community characteristics with which reduced 
auto dependence is highly correlated. In most cases, these relationships remain statistically 
significant after controlling for individual interest in politics. 
This preliminary analysis thus suggests that there is good reason, from a civic point of view, 
to encourage forms of community design that reduce commuting time and to encourage 
the preservation and increased liveability of both our older neighbourhoods and our 
central cities.313 
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This supports Putnam’s view that societal trends (including sprawl and longer 
commutes) are gradually and somewhat deceptively reducing our overall level of autonomy, 
by eroding society’s social bonds, while providing individuals more easily identifiable 
advances in particular kinds of empowerment. The proportion of Australians commuting 
more than 90 minutes a day has increased substantially. Between 2002 and 2007 alone this 
proportion grew from 12.7 to 17.8% of the population.314 The distance travelled by Sydney 
commuters has also increased particularly for those using public transport.315 This would 
suggest that Putnam’s concern regarding suburban sprawl, longer commutes and their 
impact on social activity and community involvement are also relevant to Australia. 
Corporate Delocalisation 
Finally, Putnam identifies ‘corporate delocalisation’ as an atomising trend. He posits 
that the replacement of local businesses with multinational empires often means a decline in 
civic and community spirit and involvement by business leaders.316 In an article for the 
American Behavioral Scientist, Heying reports that these concerns have merit. Researching 
trends in the social networks of business leaders in Atlanta Georgia in the period 1931 to 
1991, Heying found that: 
Delocalized corporations ... reduce their civic commitment and philanthropic largess … 
[and] direct it elsewhere, resulting in the demise of the local civic structure. The distancing 
of corporate elites from localities is likely to have a cascading effect on the ability of place-
based and donation-dependent nonprofit organizations to carry out their philanthropic 
missions.317  
Given how markedly globalisation and multinational corporations have affected the 
Australian economy over the last 30 years delocalisation has probably had a similar impact on 
levels of non-profit organisational and philanthropic engagement among corporate elites 
here.  
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This chapter has demonstrated that both Modernisation and Lamentation theories 
have merits and shortcomings. Inglehart and Welzel’s Modernisation thesis is largely 
supported by other research and by my own analysis of Australian WVS data. They argue that 
social atomisation, precipitated by economic and technological development, facilitates 
human liberation and autonomy by transforming, rather than diminishing, social connections, 
cultural expectations and civil and political governing institutions and procedures. Thus, 
Putnam’s thesis that almost all forms of social capital are (or were) in secular decline is 
reasoned overly pessimistic: focusing too heavily on traditional community and civic 
participation patterns and neglecting trends in more recent and informal modes of 
involvement. Still, Inglehart and Welzel fail to properly consider evidence suggesting that 
their identified instigators of modernisation and social atomisation maybe homogenising 
social networks and diversifying society’s political ideas and preferences. These instigators 
include economic and technological development, higher levels of educational attainment 
and greater occupational specialisation and social complexity. Indeed, Inglehart and Welzel 
contend both that higher education attainment reduces traditional and formal political 
engagement (such as party involvement), and that bonding is being replaced by bridging 
social connections. The validity of these views has been contradicted by other research and 
my own analysis of Australian WVS data.  
Putnam’s Lamentation theory argues that, by embracing certain individual isolating 
atomising developments, people have unwittingly sacrificed the long-term integrity, 
functionality and responsiveness of democratic institutions and organisations for more 
tangible and immediate autonomy and convenience. Evidence supports Putnam’s view that 
certain trends (applicable to many post-industrial democracies, including the United States 
and Australia) are having negative effects on measures of social capital including community 
and civic involvement. Putnam holds that these patterns (pertaining to television/other 
technology usage, religiosity, industrial relations deregulation, workplace practices, 
neighbourhood homogenisation, time spent commuting and corporate delocalisation) in turn 
harm democracy. Hence, Inglehart and Welzel’s optimistic conviction that contemporary 
social capital trends are uniformly empowering individuals (including politically) has been 
deemed wanting. However, Putnam’s contention regarding the contribution of particular 





trends to the deterioration of social capital and community and political participation is 
refuted by other, and my own, research. These trends comprise a rise in the proportion of 
people living in metropolitan areas, changing gender roles (including an increase in the 
proportion of two full time career families), and declining marital and fertility rates. Chapter 
Three will investigate the degree to which Australian value, social capital and political 
engagement trends are accordant with Modernisation, Lamentation and Homogenisation 
theories by examining WVS percentage statistics. 
  






--SOCIAL CAPITAL TRENDS-- 
Engagement, Trust, Interest, Values & Satisfaction 
 
Chapters One and Two identified and examined sociological engagement theories 
that could potentially explain declines in rates of Australian party and electoral participation. 
Chapter Three considers the degree to which Australian value, social capital and political 
engagement trends are consistent with these theories. Statistics from the 1981, 1995, 2005 
and 2012 World Values Surveys are presented and discussed. I have divided the survey 
statistics from each wave both into age groups/demographics 18 to 34, 35 to 49, 50 to 64 
and 65+ and into generations/cohorts Greatest, Silent, Boomer, X and Millennial. Initial 
analysis focuses on changing education, employment and familial demographics, levels of 
subjectively sensed autonomy, value orientations and informal/unconventional political 
participation; areas of agreement between Modernisation and Homogenisation arguments. 
These trends are found to be consistent with Inglehart and Welzel’s Modernisation (and 
therefore my Homogenisation) thesis. Contrastingly, statistics related to shifting value 
orientations and unconventional political involvement run counter to Putnam’s Lamentation 
arguments, at least in the Australian context.  
Subsequent exploration of trends in political interest levels as well as participation 
and confidence in formal organisations and institutions reveal patterns incongruous with 
Modernisation and Lamentation theses. However, a sociological context of ideologically and 
recreationally homogenising networks is shown to be compatible with this evidence. Finally, 
shifting levels of interpersonal trust, happiness and financial and life satisfaction are 
investigated. While these findings do not provide strong support for, they are reconcilable 
with my Homogenisation thesis. Combined, the statistics presented in this chapter weaken 
Modernisation and Lamentation theories necessitating a third explanation for historic and 
contemporary shifts in social capital, engagement and institutional/organisational 
confidence. The evidence instructs/informs my Homogenisationist interpretation. 






 The below table describes when, how and by whom Australian WVS data was 
collected as well as the sample sizes and response rates. Data from respondents who 
returned incomplete surveys (i.e. surveys with missing data) was not used. Some questions 
were not asked in every survey wave, either because they were no longer deemed very 
useful or because new questions were added in later waves after consultation with 
researchers. Therefore, some of the charts and tables drawn from Australian WVS data 
within this thesis do not use all four waves. 
Table 3.1 
Data Description for Australian World Value Survey Waves 
 1981 Wave 1995 Wave 2005 Wave 2012 Wave 
Collection 
months 
























Personal face to 
face interviews 
Personal face to 
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Self-completion, 
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mailed to, 
mailed back by 
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Sample Size / 
Completed 
Surveys received 
1,228 2,048 1,421 1,477 
Completed 
Response Rate 
N/A N/A 40.6% 29.5% 
Missing Data N/A N/A The data from 
respondents 
The data from 
respondents 











surveys was not 
used 
Weighting Data N/A N/A A rim weighting 
approach was 
used to adjust 
the data for 
differential 
survey response 
rate across age 
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Spheres of Agreement 
The Australian WVS statistics discussed in this section relate to facets of 
Modernisation theory accordant with my Homogenisation arguments. Here, evidence 
corroborating Inglehart and Welzel’s thesis also strengthened my own. Australian WVS 
statistical findings of rising feelings of autonomy (as shown in Figures 3.1 and 3.2) and rates 
of university degree attainment (as demonstrated by Figures 3.3 and 3.4) as well as declines 
in manual, as opposed to cognitive, employment (as illustrated by Figure 3.5), are consistent 
with Modernisation thesis. Inglehart and Welzel deem feelings of autonomy to be the 
primary driving force behind the survival-to-self-expression values transformation in post-
industrial societies.318 As a society’s economy develops from industrial to post-industrial 
there are increased demands for a more skilled and educated workforce suitable for thinking 
professions, rather than manual jobs which become automated. Consequently, government 
and communities encourage individuals, particularly youth, to undergo higher education.319 
People with more economic opportunities, and stimulating/creative careers, and who have 
had longer formal education exposure, are likely to feel greater autonomy over their lives 
than those with fewer opportunities, blue-collar jobs and no university qualifications. 
Therefore, structural changes in the economy and rising levels of tertiary education 
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attainment have probably contributed to a rise in self-expression values. This will be tested 
and discussed in Chapters Four and Five.  
[Responses to the following question were used to produce the graphs below.  
“Some people feel they have completely free choice and control over their lives, while other 
people feel that what they do has no real effect on what happens to them. Please use this scale 
where 1 means "none at all" and 10 means "a great deal" to indicate how much freedom of 
choice and control you feel you have over the way your life turns out.”] 
 
Figure 3.1 
% of Australian WVS participants within different age groups who rated their "feelings of 




% of adult Australian WVS participants within different generational cohorts who rated their 
"feelings of autonomy" between 1 and 7 out of 10 i.e. feeling less autonomous. The X-axis 




















[Responses to the following question were used to produce the graphs below.  
What is the highest educational level that you have attained?  
(use functional equivalent of the following, in given society;  
IF STUDENT, CODE HIGHEST LEVEL HE/SHE EXPECTS TO COMPLETE):  
1. No formal education  
2. Incomplete primary school  
3. Complete primary school  
4. Incomplete secondary school: technical/vocational type  
5. Complete secondary school: technical/vocational type  
6. Incomplete secondary: university-preparatory type  
7. Complete secondary: university-preparatory type  
8. Some university-level education, without degree  
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% of Australian WVS participants within different generational cohorts who did not have a 
university degree. The X-axis indicates the average age of Australian WVS participants within 




[Responses to the following questions were used to produce the graphs below.  
2005 Wave - Are the tasks you perform at work mostly manual or mostly cognitive? If you do 
not work currently, characterize your major work in the past. Use this scale where 1 means 
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2012 Wave - Are the tasks you do at work mostly manual or mostly intellectual? If you do not 
work currently, 
characterize your major work in the past. Use this scale where 1 means “mostly manual tasks” 
and 10 means “mostly intellectual tasks” 
Answers of between 1 and 5 were deemed mainly manual.] 
 
Figure 3.5 
% of Australian WVS participants within different age groups whose work required undertaking 
mainly manual (as opposed to cognitive/intellectual) type tasks. 
 
 
Inglehart and Welzel argue that as post-industrial societies modernise they 
experience generational increases in liberal/autonomy and egalitarian “self-expression” 
values and a reduction in conservative, hierarchical, intolerant, tribal, conformity “survival” 
attitudes.320 That is, preindustrial and industrial societies typically have rejected divorce, 
homosexuality and contraception and taken a pro-life stance on abortion, euthanasia and 
suicide.321 They also tend to place greater emphasis on religion, the nation-state and respect 
for authority.322 This is often manifested through intolerance towards other religious and 
national communities, an isolationist worldview, trade protectionism and unquestioning 
obedience to authority figures.323 This is because conformity, hierarchy and the traditional 
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family is deemed crucial to survival in the early stages of modernisation.324 Early stages are 
less conducive than later stages to ‘human flourishing’ which usually requires physical 
security, material well-being, intellectual stimulation and career and social opportunities.325 
Those born into contexts more conducive to human flourishing than were their 
elders, will be keen to devote relatively more time and economic, intellectual and social 
resources to improving aspects of life not directly related to survival.326 Thus, they will, 
relative to their elders, place greater emphasis on science, learning, egalitarianism and 
autonomy over theology, hierarchy and conformity.327 They will tend to celebrate and 
embrace, rather than fear and reject, difference and individuality.328 Still, Inglehart and 
Welzel maintain that major events that reduce living standards and raise uncertainty (such as 
war and economic recession) can induce modest temporary increases in the emphasis placed 
on survival (as opposed to self-expression) values.329  
Contrastingly, Putnam holds that generational shifts toward greater liberalism, 
tolerance and egalitarianism have not occurred in the post-Baby Boomer generations. 
However, Putnam does not question that social attitudes have become more liberal since the 
post-war period. According to Putnam’s thesis, the proportion of Americans with more liberal 
and egalitarian views has increased, as the more socially conservative pre-Boomer (Greatest 
and Silent) generations have become a smaller proportion of the public. He contends that 
where post-Boomer generational changes have occurred they have been modest and 
frequently in the direction of less tolerant and accepting social attitudes due to declines in 
overall levels of social capital.330 In Putnam’s words:  
Something in the first half of the twentieth century made successive cohorts of 
Americans more tolerant, but that generational engine failed to produce further increases 
in tolerance among those born in the second half of the century. The late X’ers are no 
more tolerant than the early boomers … By contrast, something happened in America in 
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the second half of the twentieth century to make people less civically engaged. The late 
X’ers are a lot less engaged than the early boomers.331 
[Responses to the following question were used to produce the graphs below.  
How proud are you to be Australian?  
1 Very proud  
2 Quite proud  
3 Not very proud  
4 Not at all proud  
5 Don't know] 
 
Figure 3.6 
% of Australian WVS participants within different generational cohorts who indicated 
being "very proud" of their nationality (as opposed to "quite proud", "not very proud", 
"not proud at all" and N/A). The X-axis indicates the average age of Australian WVS 




% of Australian WVS participants within different age groups who indicated being "very 
proud" of their nationality (as opposed to "quite proud", "not very proud", "not proud 
at all" and N/A). 
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Participant responses regarding tolerance, national pride and attitudes on social 
issues, tend to support Modernisation thesis over Lamentation theory. Figure 3.6 shows that 
(except for Millennials in their mid-20s) every generational cohort since the Greatest 
generation has expressed less national pride (which Inglehart and Welzel link to survival 
values)332 than had the previous generation at the same age. Furthermore, Figure 3.7 
indicates that in the waves between 1981 and 2005 there were consistent reductions in 
levels of national pride among all age groups. However, between 2005 and 2012 modest 
increases in levels of national pride were revealed among all age demographics. There are 
period specific reasons, unrelated to general shifts between survival and self-expression 
values, that may possibly explain this apparent anomaly. For example, the 2012 WVS wave 
was conducted in Australia between the months of August and October. That is, during and 
immediately following the summer Olympics. Given how integral sport is to Australian culture 
and identity it is plausible that the Olympics amplified Australian national consciousness 
during the period in which data was collected.  
Likewise, period specific reasons that are unrelated to overall shifts between survival 
and self-expression values may account for a spike in anti-foreign worker sentiment between 
2005 and 2012. The question assessing attitudes toward the employment of “local,” rather 
than “foreign,” workers when jobs are scarce was asked in all but the 1981 wave. Still, Figure 
                                                          


















3.8 indicates liberal and egalitarian attitude shifts among all but the 18 to 34 age 
demographic between 1995 and 2005. The rise of anti-foreign worker sentiment among 
youth during this period was very slim; only 1.3 percentage points. However, between 2005 
and 2012 significant increases occurred in antiforeign worker sentiment among each age 
group: between 5.4 and 11 percentage points.  
Australian unemployment and underemployment were higher in 2012 than they were 
in 2005.333 In the twelve years prior to 2005 the Australian unemployment rate declined from 
11% to 5% while the underemployment rate remained stable at 7%. However, since 2008 
these rates have been trending upwards.334 Youth have been severely affected by these 
patterns. Between 2008 and 2012 youth unemployment grew from 9% to 12% and youth 
underemployment increased from 12% to 16%.335 Furthermore, the number of temporary 
foreign workers in Australia (on 457 visas) more than doubled between 2005 and 2012.336 It 
is possible that trends in rates of unemployment and underemployment combined with more 
temporary foreign workers heightened levels of anti-foreign worker sentiment among 
Australian citizens who either were, or knew significant others, struggling to find enough 
work. Thus, despite an increase in national pride and anti-foreign worker sentiment between 
2005 and 2012, these statistics may not reflect a general shift from self-expression to survival 
values. Consequently, they may be consistent with Modernisation theory. 
[Responses to the following question were used to produce the graphs below.  
When jobs are scarce, employers should give priority to Australian people over immigrants. 
1 Agree 
2 Neither agree or disagree 
3 Disagree] 
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Putnam’s Lamentation thesis, in which generations are assumed to have been no 
more liberal than the early Boomers, is also supported by data relating to anti-foreign worker 
sentiment. As Figure 3.9 demonstrates Boomers have the greatest tolerance toward foreign 
workers, while Millennials are the least tolerant generation. However, the relative 
intolerance of Millennials may have more to do with their relative bargaining power in the 
workplace. The jobs, pay and conditions of younger workers in relatively unskilled 
employment are perhaps at greater risk from foreign workers than those of older people with 
more established careers.  
Similarly, in 1995, 2005 and 2012, questions were asked assessing people’s attitudes 
toward the right of women to work relative to men when jobs are scarce. Responses 
illustrated by Figures 3.10 and 3.11 demonstrate clear generational attitude shifts. That is, 
the older the age group/generation and the earlier the survey wave the more inclined 
participants were to believe women have less right to work, than men, when jobs are scarce. 
The one exception being that Millennials were slightly less egalitarian regarding this issue 
than were Xers in 2005. However, they became more egalitarian than Xers in 2012. 
Therefore, both generational replacement and intra-generational change appear to be 
significant drivers of more egalitarian gender workplace attitudes. These generational and 
period trends are stark with 56.5% of the Greatest Generation in 1995 believing that men 
had more right to work than women when jobs are scarce, compared to only 2.5% of 
Millennials in 2012. However, the inter-generational gap narrowed significantly between 
2005 and 2012 due to rapid change in attitudes among older generations.  
[Responses to the following question were used to produce the graphs below.  
When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women. 
1 Agree 




% of Australian WVS participants within different age groups who agreed that when 
jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women. 








% of Australian WVS participants within different generational cohorts who agreed that 





These Australian-based statistics are consistent with Modernisation theory. That is, as 
people become increasingly educated and physically/financially secure during the post-
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emphasis on self-expression (as opposed to survival) values. Self-expression values include 
autonomy and egalitarianism whereas survival values require the fulfilment of familial and 
community obligations, procreation within an enduring nuclear family unit, as well as 
conformity to traditional gender roles and one’s place within the social hierarchy. These 
statistics are at odds with Putnam’s argument that generational value shifts toward greater 
liberalism, tolerance and egalitarianism have not taken place since the early Boomers. 
Further evidence supporting Modernisation, but contradicting Lamentation, theses 
was found in the attitudes of Australians concerning, the traditional family, gender roles, and 
the justifiability of homosexuality and euthanasia. Views pertaining to ‘whether children 
require both a mother and a father to grow up happy’ and ‘whether women need children to 
be fulfilled’ were employed to assess attitudes regarding the ‘traditional family’ and ‘gender 
roles’. The responses of younger age groups and generations tended to be more liberal and 
egalitarian than older age demographics and cohorts within each wave, and the responses 
within each age group and generation tended to become more liberal and egalitarian with 
each successive wave.  
However, Figure 3.13 shows that between 1995 and 2005 there appears to have been 
little to no intra-generational change in attitudes toward children being raised without both a 
mother and father. This question was not asked in the 2012 wave. Also, Figure 3.19 indicates 
that Generation X tended to be more conservative regarding the issue of voluntary 
euthanasia than both the Silent generation in 1980 and Boomer generation in 1980 and 
1995. Furthermore, this graph shows that in 2005 the Silent generation was more 
conservative than the Greatest generation, and Millennials were more conservative than 
Boomers and Xers. Still, these anomalies may be explained by life-cycle factors. Younger 
people are less likely than older persons to have been exposed to the harsh realities of aging 
and terminal illness. Being confronted by these realities and their own mortality may 
encourage persons previously opposed to voluntary euthanasia to reconsider their beliefs on 
this matter as they age.  
Therefore, it is possible that an inter-generational shift toward more liberal attitudes 
on euthanasia may have occurred despite some younger cohorts being more conservative 





than their elders at given points in time.  Indeed, Figure 3.20 clearly shows that every cohort 
since the Greatest generation has expressed more liberal attitudes toward euthanasia than 
had the previous generation at a similar age. These results support the Modernisation thesis 
that as post-industrial societies technologically and economically advance there is a 
generational shift in emphasis from conservative survival to liberal and egalitarian self-
expression values. Contrastingly, these statistics run counter to Putnam’s Lamentation thesis 
which holds that Boomers are at least as liberal as successive generational cohorts. 
[Responses to the following question were used to produce the graphs below.  
If someone says children need a home with both a father and a mother to grow up happily, 
would you tend to agree or disagree?  
1 Tend to agree  
2 Tend to disagree  
V Don't know] 
 
Figure 3.12 
% of Australian WVS participants within different age groups who tended to agree that 




% of Australian WVS participants within different generational cohorts who tended to 





















[Responses to the following question were used to produce the graphs below.  
Do you think that a woman has to have children in order to be fulfilled or is this not necessary?  
1 Needs children  
2 Not necessary  
V Don't know] 
 
Figure 3.14 
% of Australian WVS participants within different age groups who believed women 
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% of Australian WVS participants within different generational cohorts who believed 




[Responses to the following question were used to produce the graphs below.  
Please tell me for each of the following statements whether you think it can always be justified, 
never be justified or something in between, where 1 is never justified and 10 is always justified. 
- Claiming government benefits to which you are not entitled 
- Avoiding a fare on public transport 
- Stealing property 
- Cheating on taxes if you have the chance 





- Sex before marriage 
- Suicide 
- Euthanasia (terminating the life of the incurably sick) 
- For a man to beat his wife 
- Parents beating children 
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% of Australian WVS participants within different age groups who tended to believe 




% of Australian WVS participants within different generational cohorts who tended to 
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% of Australian WVS participants within different age groups who tended to believe 





% of Australian WVS participants within different generational cohorts who tended to 
believe that voluntary euthanasia is unjustifiable (providing a justifiability rating of 1-5 
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% of Australian WVS participants within different age groups who tended to believe 
that voluntary euthanasia is unjustifiable (providing a justifiability rating  of 1-5 out of 





Similar, but not entirely identical generational and period patterns can be found in 
attitudes toward abortion, divorce, and sex before marriage. However, the Silent generation 
was more conservative than the Greatest generation regarding the issues of abortion and 
divorce in the 2005 and 2012 waves. Additionally, Millennials were more conservative than 
Boomers and Xers in 2005 and became more conservative than all other generations tested 
in 2012 on the issue of Divorce. Figure 3.21 suggests that every generation except Millennials 
became slightly more conservative regarding abortion between 2005 and 2012 and Figure 
3.23 indicates that the Greatest and Millennial generations became more conservative on the 
issue of divorce during that same period. Despite these anomalies generational value shifts 
toward greater liberalism have undoubtedly occurred before and since the Boomers. Indeed, 
Figures 3.21 and 3.23 show that not only have the Silent and Greatest generations been 
consistently more conservative regarding the issues of abortion and divorce than the 
Boomers, the Boomers have been consistently more conservative than Xers. Furthermore, 
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abortion and divorce than was the previous generation at a similar age. This is relevant 
because abortion and divorce are largely undertaken by certain age demographics. 
Figure 3.21 
% of Australian WVS participants within different generational cohorts who tended to 




% of Australian WVS participants within different generational cohorts who tended to 
believe that abortion is unjustifiable (providing a justifiability rating of 1-5 out of 10). 
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% of Australian WVS participants within different generational cohorts who tended to 




% of Australian WVS participants within different generational cohorts who tended to 
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Although participants were asked about the justifiability of sex before marriage only 
in the 2012 wave, younger people and generations tended to be more liberal on this issue 
than older people and cohorts. However, there was no significant difference between the 
attitudes of the 18 to 34 and 35 to 49 demographics, nor between the X and Millennial 
generations. Still, both Millennials and Xers, located predominantly in the 18 to 34 and 35 to 
49 demographics respectively, reported more liberal attitudes on the issue of sex before 
marriage than the Boomers: mainly in the 50 to 64 age group. This may be due to either age 
or generational effects. However, it is consistent with other previously discussed statistics 
indicating that generational value shifts toward greater liberalism have occurred in the 
generations following the Boomers, thereby undermining Putnam’s Lamentation theory. 
Figure 3.25 
% of Australian WVS participants within different age groups who tended to believe 
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% of Australian WVS participants within different generational cohorts who tended to 
believe that sex before marriage is unjustifiable (providing a justifiability rating of 1-5 




The values participants thought most important for children to learn also largely 
support Modernisation theory. Statistics drawn from the Australian WVS data indicate that 
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and respect for others, rose within each age demographic and generational cohort both 
between the 1981 and 1995, and between 1995 and 2005 waves. However, the graphs below 
demonstrate that there was a slowing or slight reversal of this shift in value emphases 
between the 2005 and 2012 waves within both age demographics and generational cohorts. 
Additionally, Figures 3.28, 3.30 and 3.32 clearly show that each generation has tended to 
place greater importance on children learning independence, imagination and tolerance and 
respect for others than had previous cohorts at a similar age; indicating a possible 
generational shift in value emphases. Controlling for age is salient because the degree of 
importance that a person places on children learning specific lessons and values may be 
significantly influenced by life-cycle factors such as parenthood and grandparenthood. 
[Responses to the following questions were used to produce the graphs below.  
Here is a list of qualities which children can be encouraged to learn at home. Which, if any, do 
you consider to be especially important? Please choose up to five.  
- Independence 
- Hard work 
- Feeling of responsibility 
- Imagination 
- Tolerance and respect for other people 
- Thrift, saving money and things 
- Determination, perseverance 






% of Australian WVS participants within different age groups who believed it was 
important for children to learn independence. 








% of Australian WVS participants within different generational cohorts who believed it 
was important for children to learn independence. The X-axis indicates the average age 




% of Australian WVS participants within different age groups who believed it was 
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% of Australian WVS participants within different generational cohorts who believed it 
was important for children to learn imagination. The X-axis indicates the average age of 




% of Australian WVS participants within different age groups who believed it was 
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% of Australian WVS participants within different generational cohorts who believed it 
was important for children to learn tolerance and respect for others. The X-axis 
indicates the average age of Australian WVS participants within generational cohorts. 
 
 
Emphasis on the importance of children learning independence, imagination and 
tolerance and respect for others is associated with self-expression values. Familial and 
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human flourishing than they are in relatively harsh technological, physical, political, social and 
economic environments. Consequently, Modernisation theory contends that when 
conditions become more conducive to human flourishing societies experience a shift away 
from survival and toward self-expression values. These self-expression values emphasise:  
- independence over obligations and inter-dependence,  
- imagination over intolerance and conformity, and  
- tolerance and respect for members of out-groups over strict loyalty to, and 
enforcement of, gender, religious, ethnic and national norms and customs.  
Hence, the statistics described in the previous paragraph are consistent with the 
Modernisation thesis. They suggest that between 1981 and 2005, during a period of rising 
living standards and educational attainment, the emphasis on instilling self-expression values 
in children (and thus on self-expression values) increased dramatically. However, (as 
previously mentioned) between 2008 and when Australian 2012 WVS data was collected 
general and youth unemployment and underemployment rose significantly.337 This may 
explain the rise in emphasis placed on certain survival values between the 2005 and 2012 
Australian WVS waves. This rise in certain survival values was particularly acute among the 
young. These results are consistent with the Modernisation thesis. That is, while generally 
self-expression values rise and survival values fall in advancing post-industrial societies, 
adverse changes in social, political and economic context can precipitate a temporary 
increase/spike in survival values.  
These statistics also support the Modernisationist argument that the value 
orientations of young people, are particularly sensitive to changing contextual environments, 
and that value orientations solidify during, and remained relatively constant post, one’s 
formative years. Indeed, the statistics assessing the level of importance placed on children 
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learning imagination are evidence of generational replacement playing a particularly 
significant role in value change.  
Figure 3.33 
% of Australian WVS participants within different age groups who believed it was 




% of Australian WVS participants within different generational cohorts who believed it 
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The question assessing the level of importance placed by participants on children 
learning self-expression was asked only in the 2012 wave. Still, the statistics generated from 
responses to this question reveal that participants within younger age groups and 
generations tended to place more importance on children learning self-expression than did 
those in older age demographics and cohorts. This is consistent with, but not necessarily 
indicative of, survival-to-self-expression value change through generational replacement. 
Furthermore, Figure 3.32 showing that each generation has placed greater importance on 
children learning tolerance and respect for others than has the previous cohort at a similar 
age conflicts with Putnam’s Lamentation theory, in which he maintains that there have been 
no post-Baby Boomer generational increases in liberal and egalitarian attitudes. 
Statistics revealing levels of importance placed by participants on children learning 
religious faith across the five generational cohorts and four survey waves, also indicate 
generational declines. While these results do not weaken any, they are consistent with each 
of the three theories being critically examined and assessed in this work. Consequently, they 
help erode the argument that a fourth yet to be articulated thesis is necessary.  
Within waves younger generations placed less importance on children learning 
religious faith than did older demographics with one exception. Millennials in 2005 tended to 
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3.35 indicates that intra-generational change has not been a factor driving Australian 
secularisation. Instead, these statistics suggest that declining religiosity in Australia is a 
generational rather than period trend. Although Figures 3.35 and 3.36 may initially appear to 
suggest that religiosity among Millennials is in decline, these statistics can be explained by 
the survey responses of younger Millennials (who were not yet 18 in 2005) being used from 
the 2012 wave. Only Reponses from persons 18 years and older were considered. 
Additionally, Figure 3.36 reveals that the importance place on children learning religious faith 
among each generation was significantly less than that placed by the previous cohort at a 
similar age. Therefore, the common finding that people become more religious as they age338 
cannot explain the generational variation in survey responses regarding this matter. These 
statistics suggest that, every generational cohort surveyed has placed less importance on 
children learning religious faith and therefore probably less importance on religious faith, 
than did the cohort immediately preceding them.  
Figure 3.35 
% of Australian WVS participants within different generational cohorts who believed it 
was important for children to learn religious faith. 
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% of Australian WVS participants within different generational cohorts who believed it 
was important for children to learn religious faith. The X-axis indicates the average age 
of Australian WVS participants within generational cohorts. 
 
 
Inglehart and Welzel argue that when living standards, life expectancy and access to 
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particularly through generational replacement.339 Consequently, people are less concerned 
with having children and large families to care for them in old age, and are less inclined to 
view marriage as a necessary agreement entered primarily for mutual support and 
protection. Instead, family structures are increasingly considered a matter of choice, and 
marriage is deemed an expression of personal sentiment. Hence, declining fertility rates and 
a rise in the average age at which people are married are consistent with Modernisation 
theory.  
These patterns are revealed in statistics drawn from Australian WVS data. When 
controlling for age these statistics indicate that since the Silent generation there have been 
generational increases in both the proportion of Australians who had two or fewer children 
and the proportion of Australians under 60 who were childless. Additionally, there was a 
continual rise in the proportion of childless people across each wave among all but the 65+ 
age demographic. There was a decline among this age group between 1981 and 1995 and 
between the 1995 and 2005 waves.  
[Responses to the following question were used to produce the graphs below.  
Have you had any children?  
0 No children 
1 One child 
2 Two children 
3 Three children 
4 Four children 
5 Five children 
6 Six children 
7 Seven children 
8 Eight or more children] 
 
Figure 3.37 
% of Australian WVS participants within different generational cohorts who indicated 
having two or fewer children. The X-axis indicates the average age of Australian WVS 
participants within generational cohorts. 
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% of Australian WVS participants within different generational cohorts who indicated 
having no children. The X-axis indicates the average age of Australian WVS participants 
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These statistics would suggest that the Silent generation tended to have more 
children (the Baby Boomers) than did their parents and descendants. The harsh economic 
and physical reality and insecurity of the years following the great depression and during the 
Second World War would have left an indelible mark on this cohort in youth. According to 
Modernisation theory, these events would have inflated the emphasis on survival values 
during the Silent generation’s formative years. As survival values are associated with having 
larger families Australian WVS statistics are consistent with the arguments of Inglehart and 
Welzel. Each successive generation born during the near continuous rise in Australian living 
standards since World War II, have probably placed greater emphasis on self-expression, and 
less on survival values than the previous cohort. These trends are reflected in changing 
fertility rates. 
Similar trends are evident in secular declines in the proportion of 18 to 34-year-olds 
married or living together in a defacto marriage, since the young Boomers in the 1981 wave. 
However, young Australians are merely delaying, not abandoning, the institution of marriage. 
Figure 3.40 illustrates that the proportion of 35 to 49-year-olds married or in de facto 
relationships rose by 5.5 percentage points between the 2005 and 2012 waves from 73.9 to 
79.4%. Figure 3.41 shows that every cohort since the Silent generation has been delaying the 
age at which they marry. However, by their early to mid-40s slightly more Gen Xers were 




















3.41 reveals that since the Greatest generation there have been generational increases in the 
proportion of older Australians (past the age of 55) who are married or in defacto marriages. 
This suggests that marriages are lasting further into old age as the proportion of widows and 
widowers has shrunk due to increases in health and life expectancy. These statistics are 
consistent with the Modernisation argument that social and familial connections are 
becoming increasingly driven by choice, not necessity and obligation. That is, young people 
today have more time to search for ‘true love’ than did young people decades ago who 
tended to face greater pressure by family, community and economic circumstance to commit 
to a life partner at a younger age. 
[Responses to the following question were used to produce the graphs below.  
Are you currently: 
1 Married 







% of Australian WVS participants within different age groups who indicated being either 





















% of Australian WVS participants within different generational cohorts who indicated 
being either "married" or "living together as married". The X-axis indicates the average 
age of Australian WVS participants within generational cohorts. 
 
 
Inglehart and Welzel contend that rates of informal/unconventional political 
engagement are rising, whereas Putnam holds that all forms of involvement (including 
atomised activity such as participating in boycotts,340 petition signing and writing letters to 
politicians) are in secular decline.341 The Australian WVS statistics consistently uncover rising 
rates of unconventional political activity between 2005 and 2012. These include petition 
signing, joining boycotts and attending peaceful/lawful demonstrations in the previous five 
years. Unfortunately, these questions concerning recent unconventional political activity 
were not asked in the 1981 and 1995 waves. This places limitations on what informal political 
engagement trends can be surmised. However, the results clearly disprove Putnam’s 
argument that rates of informal political activity are in secular decline.  
Rates of participation in boycotts in the previous five years grew from 13.4% to 90.3% 
among 18 to 34-year-olds, 15.9% to 47.4% among 35 to 49-year-olds, 10.2% to 49.4% among 
                                                          
340 Smith, Mark, K. (2001, 2007) ‘Robert Putnam, social capital and civic community’, the encyclopaedia of 
informal education, viewed 21 September 2018, http://infed.org/mobi/robert-putnam-social-capital-and-civic-
community/  
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50 to 64-year-olds, and 7.3% to 60.0% among the 65+ age demographic. They also rose 
among each generational cohort, from 8.5% to 100% among the Greatest generation, 7.1% 
to 76.5% among the Silent generation, 12.3% to 47.3% among Boomers, 15.2% to 52.6% 
among Xers and 11% to 91.3% among Millennials. The rates of those who attended peaceful 
lawful demonstrations grew from 17.8% to 62.1% among 18 to 34-year-olds, 17.1% to 48.5% 
among 35 to 49-year-olds, 14.3% to 52.6% among 50 to 64-year-olds and 11.3% to 51.6% 
among those aged 65+. They also rose from 14.9% to 50% among the Greatest generation, 
10.9% to 51.4% among the Silent generation, 15.8% to 53.6% among Boomers, 16.9% to 
45.6% among Xers and 17.6% to 73.9% among Millennials. The rise in rates of petition signing 
were less dramatic but still significant. They increased from 74.7% to 89.3% among 18 to 34-
year-olds, 75.4% to 76.4% among both 35 to 49 and 50 to 64-year-olds and 62.6% to 75.2% 
among those 65+. They also rose from 47.1% to 66.7% among the Greatest generation, 
65.5% to 74.8% among the Silent generation, 74.2% to 77.9% among Xers and 72.5% to 
92.9% among Millennials. However, rates of petition signing among Boomers fell slightly 
between 2005 and 2012 from 77.7% to 75.7%. 
[Responses to the following question were used to produce the graphs below.  
Have you or have you not done any of these activities in the last five years? 
Signing a petition 
Joining in boycotts 
Attending peaceful demonstrations] 
 
Figure 3.42 
% of Australian WVS participants within different age groups who had joined in a 
boycott in previous 5 years. 








% of Australian WVS participants within different generational cohorts who had joined 




% of Australian WVS participants within different age groups who had attended a 
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% of Australian WVS participants within different generational cohorts who had 




% of Australian WVS participants within different age groups who had signed a petition 
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% of Australian WVS participants within different generational cohorts who had signed 




Significantly, rates of informal political engagement grew more sharply among the 
young than other demographics. This indicates that these trends may be in part generational: 
consistent with Modernisation theory. The results also reveal that unconventional political 
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Although the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq were more politically charged in 2005 than 
they were in 2012, there were several period specific reasons why individuals engaged more 
in unconventional political activity in the years prior to 2012 than prior to 2005. In the five 
years prior to 2012 Australians faced massive declines in their retirement savings, unpopular 
Mining Tax policies and unkept promises from what many considered to be an unstable 
Rudd/Gillard/Rudd government.342 Notably, the promise to forgo introducing a carbon tax 
was abandoned.343 These and other events and threats may have motivated unconventional 
political action among those previously politically passive and disengaged. Furthermore, 
evidence suggests that increased social media and internet usage across all age 
demographics, may have contributed to the dramatic rise in political consumerism and 
demonstrations by enabling faster dissemination of news content and easier coordination of 
activities.344 
Divergence from Modernization 
Australian WVS data pertaining to components of Modernisation theory that are 
harmonious with my Homogenisation arguments were examined in the previous section. 
These included shifting education, employment and familial demographics, levels of 
subjectively sensed autonomy, value orientations and informal/unconventional political 
engagement. This evidence bolstered both theses. Additionally, the statistics concerning 
shifting value orientations and unconventional political participation weakened Lamentation 
arguments, at least in the Australian context.  
                                                          
342 Financial Services Council (2009), Superannuation in the context of the global financial crises: 
Superannuation Stakeholder Joint Communique 3rd February 2009, viewed 9 February 2017, 
http://www.fsc.org.au/downloads/uploaded/2009_0119_SuperannuationStakeholder_CommuniqueFINAL_93
ad.pdf; Shanahan, Dennis. (2010) ‘Kevin Rudd to backflip on mining tax rate’, The Australian, viewed 9 
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343 Alexander, Cathey. (2014) ‘Porkies: the biggest broken promises in Australian politics’, Crikey, viewed 9 
February 2017, https://www.crikey.com.au/2014/05/21/porkies-the-biggest-broken-promises-in-australian-
politics/  
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Johnsen, Kari and Wollebaek, Dag. (2012) ‘Social media and mobilization to offline 
demonstrations:Transcending participatory divides?’, New Media & Society, vol:15(6), p.890-908; Sensis (2017) 
‘Sensis Social Media Report 2017: Chapter 1 – Australians and social media’, viewed 11 March 2018, 
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This next portion of Chapter Three investigates trends in levels of political interest as 
well as participation and confidence in formal organisations and institutions. Patterns 
incompatible with Modernisation and Lamentation theses are unearthed. They indicate the 
existence of a sociological context of ideologically and recreationally homogenising networks; 
supporting my Homogenisation theory. 
Both Modernisationists and Lamentationists argue that confidence in society’s major 
institutions and organisations is in decline. Modernisationists suggest that these trends may 
place pressure on elites to govern in ways more representative of the people they serve, and 
are hence conducive to democracy.345 Conversely, Lamentationists argue that these declines 
in confidence have a negative impact on rates of political participation and accountability.346 
Neither theoretical position is supported by the Australian WVS data. Indeed, the only 
institutions that have suffered consistent declines in confidence since 1981 across all age 
demographics were churches and religious institutions. The statistics also indicate that 
confidence in political parties may have declined generationally. However, these statistics 
(drawn from Australian WVS data) suggest no other secular or ongoing generational declines 
in formal group/organisational/institutional confidence.347 
Figure 3.48 indicates that churches and religious organisations experienced secular 
declines in confidence among each of the four age groups over the four waves. Within each 
wave younger age groups tended to have less confidence in churches/religious organisations 
than older age demographics. The exceptions were the 18 to 34 and 35 to 49 age groups 
which had near identical levels of confidence in religious organisations in both the 2005 and 
2012 waves. Figure 3.49 shows that within each wave younger generations have tended to 
have less confidence in churches and religious organisations than their more senior cohorts. 
Furthermore, Figure 3.50 illustrates how each successive generation has had less confidence 
in churches and religious organisations than the previous cohort had at a similar age. This is 
salient because attitudes toward religion are affected by life-cycle factors.348 These statistics 
                                                          
345 Inglehart, and Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy, p.44, 116-118, 157, 158, 223, 251-
253, 271 & 294 
346 Putnam, Bowling Alone, p.22, 47, 136, 137 & 347 
347 See Appendices 1-15 
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suggest that generational replacement has played a significant role in declining confidence in 
churches and religious organisations. 
[Responses to the following question were used to produce the graphs below.  
For each type of organisation, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a 
great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all? 
- Churches 
- The armed forces 
- The press 
- Television 
- Labour unions 
- The police 
- The courts 
- The government in Canberra 
- Political parties 
- Parliament 




% of Australian WVS participants within different age groups who indicated having "a 
great deal" or "quite a lot" of confidence in churches/religious organisations. 
 
Figure 3.49 
% of Australian WVS participants within different generational cohorts who indicated 





















% of Australian WVS participants within different generational cohorts who indicated 
having "a great deal" or "quite a lot" of confidence in churches/religious organisations. 




Likewise, changes in levels of public confidence in political parties may well be 
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asked in 1981. Figure 3.51 shows that in 2005 and 2012 Millennials had greater confidence in 
political parties than other cohorts. However, this does not mean that confidence in political 
parties has increased generationally. Figure 3.52 suggests that the initial confidence exhibited 
by Millennials in 2005 may be explained by their youth and lack of political knowledge. 
Indeed, by 2012 Millennials had the same level of confidence in political parties that Xers had 
at a similar age. However, Figure 3.52 does indicate that confidence in political parties may 
have declined generationally between the Greatest and Boomer generations. Furthermore, 
Boomers and Xers have a similar level of confidence in political parties that has remained low 
and relatively stable. Contrastingly, significant declines have occurred among the Greatest 
and Silent generations suggesting that declining confidence in political parties among older 
Australians is both an inter-and-intra-generational trend. Overall the statistics drawn from 
Australian WVS data suggest that the only major formal institutions/organisations to have 
suffered generational declines in confidence were religious institutions/organisations and 
political parties.  
Figure 3.51 
% of Australian WVS participants within different generational cohorts who indicated 
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% of Australian WVS participants within different generational cohorts who indicated 
having "a great deal" or "quite a lot" of confidence in political parties. The X-axis 
indicates the average age of Australian WVS participants within generational cohorts. 
 
 
This evidence conflicts with Putnam’s Lamentation and Inglehart and Welzel’s 
Modernisation theories which contend that confidence in all, or most, formal 
groups/organisations should be in generational decline.349 However, these survey findings 
may indicate a sociological context of ideologically and recreationally homogenising 
networks. Inglehart and Welzel identified a trend toward greater social modularity brought 
about by individual-empowering patterns. These include technological and economic 
advance, welfare-state development, rising levels of tertiary education attainment and a 
generational shift from survival to self-expression values orientation.350 Consequently, people 
are at greater liberty to forge, maintain and sever interpersonal connections now, than in the 
past.351 I argued in Chapter One, that these developments may be precipitating an 
homogenisation of social networks by enabling individuals to more easily find and connect 
with those with whom they share salient ideas, interests and attitudes. This hypothesis is in 
stark contrast to Modernisation theory and is based on research revealing that people are 
                                                          
349 Inglehart, and Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy, p.117 & 118; Putnam, Bowling 
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inclined to seek familiarity when establishing interpersonal relationships/friendships.352 A 
generational trend toward greater homogeneity of views and interests within social networks 
may induce distrust of, and frustration and disillusionment with institutions and organisations 
that have diverse memberships or attempt to appeal to a heterogeneous population. This is 
because:  
- the interests, views and beliefs held by members of these institutions and 
organisations often conflict, and  
- younger people (with more ideologically homogenous networks) would tend to be 
less experienced in, and adverse to conflict, debate, negotiation and compromise 
than were their seniors at a similar age.  
Furthermore, I concur with Inglehart and Welzel that younger generations are more 
disposed to distrusting, resenting and being suspicious of controlling and hierarchal/elite led 
institutions and organisations than are their elders.353 This is due to younger generations in 
advancing post-industrial societies placing greater emphasis on self-expression and less 
weight on survival values than do their elders.354 Though, I add that, groups with 
heterogeneous memberships probably tend to require more overt controls and management 
to maintain their functionality than do those with members sharing more (backgrounds, 
thoughts, concerns and priorities) in common. 
These hypotheses would explain why the only institutions and organisations to suffer 
generational declines in confidence without recovery, according to the Australian WVS 
evidence, were churches/religious groups and political parties. This is because secular and 
non-political community, charitable and recreational formal organisations can more easily 
adapt their governing structure and membership compositions than can religious 
congregations/organisations or political parties. That is, they may have accommodated 
younger generations’ self-expression (egalitarian and autonomy) value orientations and 
conflict, debate, negotiation and compromise aversion: a product of Social Network 
Homogenisation. This they may have achieved by multiplying into more groups with perhaps 
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smaller but relatively more homogenous memberships and democratising their leadership 
selection and decision-making processes. I believe such adaptations can at least act as a 
tourniquet against further organisational confidence haemorrhaging, and may aid in the 
recovery of this formal group trust. 
Conversely, religious organisations and political parties have greater difficulty making 
such reforms. The beliefs and practices and the leadership selection and decision-making 
processes of religious organisations, are usually steeped in traditions which many 
parishioners and clergy vigourously defend.355 Consequently, most religious groups are 
resistant to democratisation and are unwilling to adapt to the modern liberal self-expression 
values held by a large and growing proportion of Australians and other post-industrial 
populations.356 This disconnect between the teachings and governing practices of established 
religions and the values emphasised in post-industrial societies, has probably contributed to 
the escalating rise in distrust of religious institutions and organisations evidenced by 
Australian WVS data.  
Leaders and governing bodies of political parties, fearing a loss of power and 
influence, are also resistant to democratisation of their party organisations.357 However, 
unlike religious organisations, political parties are frequently willing to change, and adapt 
their policy positions, to maintain or secure office.358 In contexts in which majoritarian rather 
                                                          
355 Stewart, Cynthia. ‘Leadership’ in Religion Library: Roman Catholicism, on the Patheos Library Website, 
viewed 19 February 2017, http://www.patheos.com/Library/Roman-Catholicism/Ethics-Morality-
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19 February 2017, 
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Albrechtsen, Janet. (2016) ‘NSW Liberal Party membership lags world on democratisation’, The Weekend 
Australian website, viewed 19 February 2017, http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/inquirer/nsw-liberal-
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than proportional electoral regimes are employed (such as Australian House of 
Representatives elections), this means attempting to appeal to a broad coalition of voters. In 
a societal context which is becoming both increasingly ideologically diverse (as argued in 
Chapter One) and more inexperienced with, and averse to, conflict and compromise (in large 
part due to generational network homogenisation), this is extraordinarily difficult. 
Consequently, confidence and willingness to identify with (much less join) political parties are 
waning generationally. These trends pertain particularly to traditional major parties which 
many believe are not sufficiently aligned with their own political views/persuasions to 
warrant their support.359 Hence, my Homogenisation thesis holds that trust and confidence in 
religious organisations and political parties (rather than in formal organisations more 
generally) have greatly and generationally eroded without recovery. 
Similar patterns to those influencing formal group ‘confidence’ have arguably affected 
rates of religious, political, recreational and other formal group ‘involvement’. According to 
Homogenisation theory, rates of active engagement in all, or most, formal group types likely 
experienced an initial decline during the mid to late twentieth century. This was due to 
younger generations encountering pre-existing organisations that had not yet adapted to 
their desires and expectations. However, eventually these newer generations became a 
critical proportion of the adult population. In response secular and non-political formal 
organisations began to multiply into groups with perhaps smaller but relatively more 
homogenous memberships, and democratise their leadership selection and decision-making 
processes. These organisations included those focused on volunteering and recreational 
activities: sports, literature, music, art, drama and card, board, and computer games.  
Numerous studies have indicated that in the United States (a post-industrial 
anglosphere democracy with which Australia shares many similarities) people have become 
less likely to encounter and interact with those whose ideological dispositions are 
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substantially different from their own.360 Dellaposta, Shi and Macy argue that Americans with 
similar political persuasions are increasingly inclined to engage in the same groups, attend 
the same events and frequent the same establishments. They maintain that Americans are 
also less willing to engage in, attend and frequent groups, events and establishments at, and 
in which they are likely to meet and mingle with persons who have different/opposing 
political perspectives.361 Research suggests that these group and network homogenising 
trends have been compounded by the internet and social media.362 Furthermore, since at 
least 2003, annual growth rates in the number of Australian Not-for-Profit organisations 
(which include charitable, sports, cultural, health, educational and religious groups) have 
tended to exceed Australian population growth rates. 2008 and 2009 were the only 
exceptions.363 This evidence supports my theory that organisations are splintering into more 
groups with relatively homogenous memberships. 
Likewise, research conducted by Gregory Saxton in his previous role as an Assistant 
Professor of Public Administration at the State University of New York, supports my 
Homogenisation thesis by revealing that organisations in the United States are becoming 
increasingly democratic. That is, organisations are allowing members and stakeholders a 
greater say in decision-making.364 Saxton argues that this democratisation has been 
precipitated by “expanding education,” the spread and increased use of advanced 
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communications technology and “intergenerational value shifts”.365 He holds that these 
trends have motivated and empowered group members and individuals to demand greater 
influence and to form new groups that have more egalitarian structures and processes.366 In 
his words: 
Organizational structures have flattened; and … [these developments] point to a 
generalized surge in participatory practices and values throughout society. Thanks to an 
array of ongoing large-scale social changes, stakeholders now increasing possess the 
capacity, interest, and opportunity to play a key role in decision making at the individual, 
organizational, and community levels alike. This growing propensity for participation has, in 
turn, begun to change prevailing non-profit structures and management practices. … 
[These changes include] the widening and deepening of the organizational “selectorate,” 
or the set of people who have the right to participate in strategic decisions.367 
 
Consumers flock to those organizations that allow them to assume a greater role in making 
strategic decisions. Organizations and venues without satisfactory, genuine, participatory 
processes … see their market share, participation rates, and customer satisfaction levels 
decline. … Participatory segments of society … [form new organizations when existing ones 
do] not adequately respond to their desire for input or whenever they want complete 
control over strategic decision making.368 
 
Governing structures adapted to reflect self-expression (egalitarian and autonomy) 
value orientations. Membership compositions changed to accommodate inexperience with, 
and aversion to, conflict, debate, negotiation and compromise; a consequence of Social 
Network Homogenisation. This multiplication and democratisation, I maintain, has 
precipitated a slow, early twenty-first century, generational recovery in secular and non-
political active formal group engagement. [Evidence of this recovery is presented after the 
next paragraph.] Arguably, this recovery occurs as more young adults discover pre-existing 
organisations with both governing structures and memberships that reflect and suit their 
values, skills and preferences.  
                                                          
365 Saxton, ‘The Participatory Revolution in Nonprofit Management’, p.35 
366 Saxton, ‘The Participatory Revolution in Nonprofit Management’, p.38 
367 Saxton, ‘The Participatory Revolution in Nonprofit Management’, p.34 & 35 
368 Saxton, ‘The Participatory Revolution in Nonprofit Management’, p.38 





Contrastingly, (for reasons also discussed earlier) political parties and religious 
congregations have greater difficulty adapting to accommodate the value orientations and 
conflict and compromise aversion of younger generations. Additionally, religiosity continues 
to wane in post-industrial societies, albeit at a slower rate than during the industrial stage of 
Modernisation.369 Consequently, consistent with my Homogenisation thesis, political party 
involvement and religious congregation attendance have not experienced any recovery.  
Australian statistics published by official sources, as well as those drawn from WVS 
data, relating to formal group engagement indicate the relative superiority of my 
Homogenisation, over Inglehart and Welzel’s Modernisation and Putnam’s Lamentation 
arguments. Modernisation and Lamentation theories contend that involvement in all, or 
most, formal group types have experienced, or are in secular, decline without foreseeable 
recovery.370 However, statistics drawn from Australian WVS data indicate few consistent 
patterns in rates of active participation in secular and non-political formal organisations 
between 1981 and 2012.371 Additionally, early 21st century statistics published by the 
Australian Sports Commission, Volunteering Australia and the Australian Council of the Arts 
suggest that far from being in secular decline, engagement in non-religious and non-political 
formal organisations is rising. This trend is particularly acute among the young;372 consistent 
with my Homogenisationist arguments regarding generational recovery. Together, these 
statistics contradict both Modernisation and Lamentation theories. Both theses contend that 
active involvement in most, or all, formal voluntary organisations (including those that are 
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secular and non-political) should be, or at least should have been (between 1981 and the 
early 2000s), in secular decline.373 
Australian WVS statistics do reveal a secular decline among the 65+ demographic in 
rates of active political party engagement. The rate fell from 8.1% in 1981, to 4.5% in 1995, to 
3.5% in 2005 and to 3.4% in 2012. Among other age demographics there were no consistent 
trends in rates of active political party engagement between waves. All rates of active 
political party participation across the four waves among the 18 to 34, 35 to 49 and 50 to 64 
demographics were below 3% and varied by little more than 2 percentage points (statistically 
insignificant). 
Life-cycle factors mean that those of retirement age invest more time in political 
activity (including political party engagement) than younger age groups.374 However, a 
narrowing of this gap in participation rates due to declining active involvement among those 
of retirement age (particularly between the first and second waves of an ongoing survey) 
would suggest that a generational reduction in active engagement has occurred. WVS 
statistics would indicate that those who were aged 65 and over in 1981, and were therefore 
born in, or prior to, 1916, were significantly more involved in political parties than later 
generations. 
[Responses to the following question were used to produce the graph below.  
For each organization, could you tell me whether you are an active member, an inactive 
member or not a member of that type of organization? 
- Church and religious organisation 
- Sport and recreational organisation 
- Art, music and educational organisation 
- Labour union 
- Political party 
- Environmental organisation 
- Professional association 
- Humanitarian and charitable organisation 
- Consumer organisation 
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- Self-help group, mutual aid group 
- Other organisation] 
 
Figure 3.53 
% of Australian WVS participants within different age groups who indicated being active 
members of political parties. 
 
 
According to Modernisation and Homogenisation theories, a generational transition 
in emphasis from survival to self-expression values began when life started becoming 
significantly more secure. This would have occurred over a century ago. Indeed, Australian 






















LIFE EXPECTANCY AT BIRTH 
375 
These statistics may suggest that those generations born post 1916 tended to place sufficient 
emphasis on self-expression values to raise their suspicion and dislike of, and consequently 
reduce their participation in certain, hierarchical organisational structures; including political 
parties. I argue that because political parties and religious communities have greater 
difficulty adjusting to the value orientations and expectations of more recent cohorts than do 
other formal groups, these lower rates of involvement have continued largely unabated.  
However, the degree of emphasis necessary to reduce rates of involvement in 
hierarchical organisations would most likely differ according to organisation type. Religious 
people probably place more importance on involvement in their religious communities than 
people generally place on participation in many other formal group types, such as those 
focused on politics and recreation: sports, art, literature, music, drama and card, board and 
computer game organisations. There is a balance between the importance placed on the 
subject matter/purpose/meaning of formal groups and the dislike of these groups enduring 
leadership selection and decision-making processes. This balance probably remained 
weighted in favour of continued participation relatively longer for religious communities than 
for active political party membership. This is supported by Australian WVS statistics.  
[Responses to the following question were used to produce the graphs below.  
Apart from weddings and funerals, about how often do you attend religious services these 
days? 
1 More than once a week 
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2 Once a week 
3 Once a month 
4 Only on special holy days 
5 Once a year 
6 Less often 
7 Never, practically never] 
 
Figure 3.55 
% of Australian WVS participants within different age groups who attended 
religious/church services at least once a month. 
 
Figure 3.56 
% of Australian WVS participants within different generational cohorts who attended 





















They indicate that in 1981 a high proportion of each age demographic (35.9% to 
41.4%) attended church services at least once a month. However, the survey waves post 
1981 reveal substantial declines in church attendance; falling particularly rapidly among 
younger age demographics. Between 1981 and 2005 the percentage of survey participants 
who reported attending church services at least once a month fell 29 percentage points 
among the 18 to 34 age demographic but declined only 3 percentage points among the 65 
and over age group. Between 2005 and 2012 the attendance rate:  
- rose slightly from 12.4 to 16.7% among the youngest age demographic,  
- declined by a meagre 0.4 percentage points (from 15 to 14.6%) among the 35 to 
49 age group,  
- continued a sharp decline from 20 to 15.4% among the 50 to 64 demographic, 
and  
- fell from 36.8 to 29.1% among those of retirement age.  
Furthermore, Figure 3.56 shows that in 1981 the Greatest, Silent and Boomer 
generations had similar levels of religious service attendance. Gen X had a significantly higher 
level of religious service attendance, but this can be explained by life cycle factors. Adult Gen 
X Australian WVS participants in 1981 had an average age of 19.04 years. Therefore, it is likely 
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religious and require regular religious service attendance. Therefore, the young Xers were 
possibly no more religious than other cohorts in 1981. Indeed, by 1995 the Silent, Boomer 
and X generations each had lower rates of attendance than the cohort immediately 
preceding them, and this remained so for each successive survey wave. However, adult 
Millennials in 2005 and 2012 had slightly higher rates of religious service attendance than did 
Xers. This may be explained by a significant proportion of 18-year-old Millennials in 2005 and 
2012 attending religious high schools.  
These statistics suggest generational declines in religious service attendance, 
consistent with Lamentation, Modernisation and Homogenisation theories. However, that 
the statistics only reveal generational declines in two varieties of formal group, political 
parties and religious communities, is evidence of my Homogenisation thesis’ relatively higher 
credibility. The results also suggest religious service attendance declined significantly within 
the Boomer and X generational cohorts; not just between them. There are many possible 
reasons for why individuals began to stray from religious congregations, including the on-
going shift from a traditional/religious to secular/rational value orientation and the revealing 
of widespread child-sex-abuse within religious institutions. Still, the patterns of declining 
religious service attendance indicate that generational replacement played a substantial role.  
The slight rise in the rate of religious service attendance among the youngest age 
demographic (Figure 3.55) between 2005 and 2012 maybe at least partly explained by the 
growing proportion of Australian high school students attending private (mostly religious) 
schools.376 These schools often require regular religious service attendance. Thus, rising rates 
of religious service attendance among youth probably does not indicate increasing religiosity 
among this demographic. Hence, these patterns are arguably consistent with both 
Modernisation and Homogenisation theories.  
Interest in politics is a prerequisite for a healthy democracy. Without sufficient 
political interest, citizens are unlikely to consume enough political news and information to 
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make informed electoral decisions.377 Inglehart and Welzel suggest that a generationally 
rising emphasis on self-expression values is precipitating corresponding increases in political 
interest. That is, as greater emphasis is placed on self-expression values such as autonomy 
and egalitarianism, people become more inclined to scrutinise and challenge authority, 
including political authority.378 This scrutiny requires information and knowledge which, in 
turn, galvanises political interest. They imply that this generational rise in political interest 
may be reinforced by bridging connections (those between people of different faith, socio-
economic strata, education, interests, views, political persuasions, culture and lifestyle 
backgrounds) increasing generationally.379 People who have more and stronger relationships 
with those holding different political concerns and priorities to themselves are perhaps, 
relative to those with fewer and weaker bridging ties, more likely to develop deeper political 
interest in government policies not directly affecting them. That is, empathy with those with 
whom one shares bridging connections, motivates more and broader political interest and 
scrutiny.380 
Putnam’s American-focused investigation found that there have been enormous 
generational declines in political knowledge and interest since the late-1960s/early-1970s. 
His research suggests that between 1965 and 1990, daily newspaper readership among 
under 35s dropped from two thirds to one third while television news viewership among the 
same demographic fell from 52% to 41%.381 Putnam revealed that under 30s in the late 
1990s were less knowledgeable and interested in election campaigns than youth several 
decades earlier and that despite improved levels of formal education attainment, Americans 
had become 15 to 20% less interested in politics and public affairs.382 He uses these statistics 
to bolster his argument that political interest, along with civic orientated values, empathy, 
generosity and interpersonal and institutional trust, are in generational decline. He maintains 
that this decline is due mainly to waning formal and informal structural social capital (the 
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degree to which, and intensity with which, people interact and forge/maintain meaningful 
relationships).383 
Statistics drawn from Australian WVS data contradict Modernisation and Lamentation 
theses. Questions regarding political interest were not asked in the 1981 wave, and so the 
statistics presented below begin in 1995. Between 1995 and 2012 the proportion of 18 to 34-
year-olds who reported being either “very interested” or “somewhat interested” in politics 
(not necessarily engaged in party or electoral politics) declined by a meagre 3.2 percentage 
points (hardly statistically significant). This is contrary to both Modernisation and 
Lamentation theories which allege that there has been significant generational change in 
political interest. In 1995 the 65+ demographic were 13.4 percentage points more politically 
interested than the 18 to 34-year-olds surveyed. By 2012 that gap had widened to 28.4 
percentage points. The statistics also reveal that those born around the close of the Second 
World War have been consistently more politically interested than previous and successive 
generations. These statistics are consistent with my Homogenisation theory. 
[Responses to the following question were used to produce the graph below.  
How interested would you say you are in politics? Are you (read out and code one answer): 
1 Very interested 
2 Somewhat interested 
3 Not very interested 
4 Not at all interested] 
 
Figure 3.57 
% of Australian WVS participants within different age groups who indicated being either 
"very interested" or "somewhat interested" in politics. 
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According to both Homogenisation and Modernisation theories, there have been 
generational increases in the emphasis placed on self-expression values, which encourage 
greater political interest and engagement. However, unlike Inglehart and Welzel, I contend 
that ideologically, philosophically and recreationally homogenising social networks may be 
hampering or mitigating higher rates of political interest. [The influence of these opposing 
forces on political interest levels is discussed in the next paragraph.] Indeed, other scholars 
have found that greater diversity within local communities can instigate heightened and 
enduring political interest and efficacy among adolescents.384 People who have fewer and 
weaker bridging connections with those holding different political concerns and priorities to 
themselves are perhaps, relative to those with more and stronger bridging ties, less inclined 
to develop deep political interest in government policies not directly affecting them. I reason 
that declining empathy with those unlike oneself, probably precipitates a reduction and 
narrowing of political interest and scrutiny. 
Arguably, the rise in emphasis placed on self-expression values and declines in 
bridging connections which push political interest in opposing directions, are unlikely to have 
gained pace simultaneously. Baby Boomers’ emphasis on self-expression values most 
                                                          




















profoundly surpassed their parents’ relative to other living generations.385 Yet, they were not 
equipped with the technological resources (such as the Internet and social media) that 
presented successive generations (Xers and Millennials) with greater opportunities to find 
and connect with people who share and reflect their ideas, interests and priorities. 
Additionally, the social capital structures, institutions and organisations established and 
maintained when survival values were dominant had not yet been adapted (in the ways 
previously described) by the Boomers or successive generations who desired more of these 
opportunities. Hence, there was probably a lag between when self-expression values 
generationally spiked with the arrival of adolescent Boomers and when Social Network 
Homogenisation hastened with the coming of Xers and Millennial’s. Consequently, according 
to my Homogenisation theory, there should have been a highly significant generational spike 
in political interest among Boomers followed by either relatively modest generational 
declines in, a halt to, or slower rise in, political interest among Xers and Gen Y. This is 
consistent with the Australian WVS statistics presented. 
Other statistical evidence supports this thesis. Aaron Martin’s comprehensive study of 
the political engagement of young people in Anglo American democracies reveals that 
political interest (rather than electoral and party engagement) among British and Australian 
young people has slowly risen since the 1960s.386 Using data from the American National, 
Canadian, British and Australian Election Studies, Martin finds that the gap in political interest 
between young and old Australians has widened; the result of older generations becoming 
more politically interested as they have aged.387 That is, older people today are more 
politically interested than were older people decades ago. 
In Britain and Australia political interest among the young has actually increased. In the US 
young people today are not particularly less interested than were young people at the 
beginning of the time series. However, in regards to whether young people have become 
less interested in politics as compared to older people over time the answer is yes. We see 
an increased age gap between the young and old in the US, Canada and Australia. … While, 
there is little support for the argument that political interest is in secular decline among 
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the young (as suggested by the likes of Putnam) the young have become less interested in 
politics as compared to their elders over time.388 
Martin’s finding that the gap in political interest between young and old has been 
rising over the last half century, is evidence of a combination of age and generational factors 
supporting my Homogenisation theory. It is possible that older age people have been 
significantly more interested in politics than younger people. However, due to the sudden 
generational spike in self-expression values among the Baby Boomer generation the young 
Boomers may have been almost as interested in politics as their elders at the beginning of 
Martin’s time series. As the Boomers matured, it is possible that age effects further increased 
their political interest. That is, age differences in political interest may have returned to 
historically normal and more significant levels. A compelling explanation for these trends is 
that due to their relatively more philosophically, ideologically and recreationally 
homogenised social networks, Gens X and Y in youth may not continue the young Boomers’ 
sharp generational rise in political interest. 
Reconcilable Findings 
The previous section explored changes in levels of political interest as well as 
confidence and involvement in formal organisations and institutions. Patterns inconsistent 
with Modernisation and Lamentation theses were uncovered. However, they are arguably 
consistent with social networks becoming increasingly ideologically and recreationally 
homogenous. This final portion of Chapter Three examines shifting levels of interpersonal 
trust, happiness and financial and life satisfaction. Although not offering strong evidence for, 
these results are reconcilable with my Homogenisation theory. 
Changes in rates of interpersonal trust over the four waves and among the four age 
groupings were revealed by Australian WVS results. They can be interpreted as consistent 
with Modernisation and Homogenisation, as well as aspects of Putnam’s Lamentation, 
theories; despite these theses apparent radical divergence. WVS statistics show a dramatic 
decline in interpersonal trust among each age group between 1981 and 1995. Subsequently, 
interpersonal trust among each age demographic rose between 1995 and 2005 such that the 
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rates were almost at, and among the 18 to 34 demographic had exceeded, the 1981 levels. 
Between 2005 and 2012, levels of interpersonal trust continued to increase significantly 
among each age group.  
[Responses to the following question were used to produce the graphs below.  
Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very 
careful in dealing with people? 
1 Most people can be trusted. 
2 Need to be very careful.] 
 
Figure 3.58 
% of Australian WVS participants within different age groups who believed that most 
people can be trusted. 
 
 
These findings are consistent with Putnam’s argument that measures of interpersonal 
trust declined in the late twentieth century.389 However, they indicate that interpersonal 
trust rose following the publication of Bowling Alone in 2000. This may suggest that the 
individual isolating atomising trends (causing declines in social and political trust and 
engagement) with which Putnam was concerned (and which were described in preceding 
chapters), may have reversed in the ensuing years. Though, if Putnam correctly identified the 
causes of declining interpersonal trust in the late twentieth century, then interpersonal trust 
would appear to change mainly across time periods rather than between generations. This is 
                                                          


















at odds with Putnam’s contention that social capital and trust change mainly through 
generational replacement.390 When change occurs generationally the young are affected first 
followed by older age groups in latter waves. The Australian WVS results clearly show that 
rates of interpersonal trust across all age demographics declined between 1981 and 1995 
and subsequently rose between 1995 and 2005.  
However, these statistics may still indicate Modernisation and Homogenisation 
(rather than Lamentation) generational trends in interpersonal trust. Inglehart and Welzel 
found that individual empowering technological and economic trends and value shifts are 
associated with generationally rising levels of interpersonal trust in post-industrial 
societies.391 Indeed, Figure 3.59 clearly shows that each successive generation of Australians 
has tended to express greater levels of interpersonal trust than the previous generation had 
when they were a similar age. I reason that this may be explained by those generations who 
tended to experience more secure child-and-young-adult-hoods having greater confidence 
that they will recover relatively unscathed from betrayal, theft or attack. The WVS results 
illustrated in Figure 3.59 could suggest that levels of interpersonal trust in post-industrial 
Australia have tended to rise for reasons consistent with both Modernisation and 
Homogenisation theories. Yet, perhaps due to period specific events (such as the early 1990s 
recession) these levels briefly fell prior to the 1995 wave. These patterns do not rule out the 
possibility of generational change particularly if interpersonal trust had been rising prior to, 
and including, 1981. Unfortunately, this is when WVS data collection began. 
Figure 3.59 
% of Australian WVS participants within different generational cohorts who believed 
that most people can be trusted. 
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Australian WVS statistics reveal trends in financial satisfaction, life satisfaction and 
happiness that initially appear to contradict my Homogenisation argument. Like Inglehart and 
Welzel, I reason that as societies develop technologically, economically, educationally and 
culturally people feel increasingly autonomous (in control of their lives).392 This rise in 
feelings of autonomy precipitates a shift from survival to self-expression values.393 Many, 
including Inglehart and Welzel, maintain that rising happiness, and life and financial 
satisfaction are by-products of increased feelings of autonomy.394 Yet Figures 3.60 and 3.62 
reveal that over the 31 years between 1981 and 2012 the proportion of participants who 
indicated having life and financial satisfaction ratings of between one and seven out of ten 
has grown among each of the four age demographics. Figures 3.61 and 3.63 confirm the 
common finding that older people tend to have greater financial and life satisfaction than 
younger people.395 That is, these graphs show that older cohorts tend to have greater 
financial and life satisfaction than younger cohorts within each wave. The WVS statistics 
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appear to suggest that levels of happiness are more a consequence of periodic events rather 
than systemic or generational rises and falls associated with stages of modernisation.  
[Responses to the following question were used to produce the graphs below.  
On a scale of 1 to 10 where 1 is extremely dissatisfied and 10 is extremely satisfied, how 
satisfied are you with the financial situation of your household?] 
 
Figure 3.60 
% of Australian WVS participants within different age groups who rated their financial 




% of Australian WVS participants within different generational cohorts who rated their 
























[Responses to the following question were used to produce the graphs below.  
On a scale of 1 to 10 where 1 is extremely dissatisfied and 10 is extremely satisfied, all thing 
considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days?] 
 
Figure 3.62 
% of Australian WVS participants within different age groups who rated their life 
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% of Australian WVS participants within different generational cohorts who rated their 




[Responses to the following question were used to produce the graphs below.  
Taking all things together, would you say you are:  
1 Very happy  
2 Quite happy  
3 Not very happy  
4 Not at all happy  
V Don't know] 
 
Figure 3.64 
% of Australian WVS participants within different age groups who indicated feeling 
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% of Australian WVS participants within different generational cohorts who indicated 
feeling "very happy" (as opposed to "quite happy", "not very happy", "not at all happy" 
and "Don't know"). 
 
 
Figures 3.60 and 3.62 reveal that levels of financial and life satisfaction tended to 
decline over the 1981, 1995 and 2005 waves but then rose between 2005 and 2012 among 
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points between 1995 and 2005 followed by a slight decline of 1.9 percentage points between 
2005 and 2012 in financial satisfaction among the 50 to 64 age demographic. These statistics 
may seem curious. If feelings of autonomy really precipitate feelings of happiness and 
satisfaction, then overall these results are the opposite of what would be expected. That is, 
increased happiness, and life and financial satisfaction during the general rise in living 
standards between 1981 and 2005 would have been expected. This would have been 
followed by a slowing in, or slight reversal of, that incline between the 2005 and 2012 waves, 
due to global economic uncertainty, falling share prices and a waning mining boom in the 
wake of the GFC.396 
Research conducted by Harvard professor of psychology, and author of the New York 
Times bestseller Stumbling on Happiness Dan Gilbert may offer an explanation for this 
apparent paradox. It suggests that the impact of seemingly significant and traumatic life 
events on happiness is not as intense, or enduring, as what our prefrontal cortices 
“experience simulators”, have us believe. This is described as the “impact bias.”397 In fact, 
three months following a major life event, such as winning the lottery or becoming 
paraplegic, a person’s level of happiness tends to return to where it was prior to the life 
changing experience. Gilbert distinguishes between two varieties of happiness: “natural 
happiness” (that which we experience when our desires are fulfilled) and “synthetic 
happiness” (satisfaction we create when our desires go unfulfilled). Gilbert reasons that 
humans have a “psychological immune system” that enables us to synthesise happiness, so 
that we feel better about our world and circumstances.398 In his words “synthetic happiness 
is every bit as real and enduring as the happiness you stumble upon and, when you get 
exactly what you were aiming for.”399 He argues that while freedom to choose and change 
one’s mind (autonomy) enables “natural happiness”, it can also harm “synthetic happiness”. 
That is, under conditions of autonomy many allow their experience simulators, which are 
prone to “impact bias,” to weigh their current circumstances against seemingly preferable 
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possibilities. Consequently, many become deeply dissatisfied when empowered with 
choice.400  
This is not an argument for deliberately reducing autonomy, only for consciously 
changing the way in which we consider alternative futures under conditions of autonomy. I 
have reasoned based on correlation statistics presented in Chapter Four, that those with a 
conservative disposition are less susceptible to the erosion of synthetic satisfaction under 
conditions of autonomy, than are ideological progressives. This, I surmise, is because 
conservatives more readily accept the establishment and status quo than do progressives. 
Declining satisfaction among progressives is likely to reduce overall levels of satisfaction 
(both life and financial) during periods of rising autonomy. I do not contend that happiness 
and satisfaction are necessarily by-products of freedom to choose, and therefore my views 
are entirely consistent with the statistics presented. Although feelings of autonomy among 
each age group were higher in 2012 than they were in 2005, people were probably less 
certain about the durability of their autonomy (financial situation) in 2012 than in 2005. 
Consequently, they were possibly less inclined to consider alternative futures and life 
changing decisions, which usually entail significant risk. This may have raised general levels of 
synthetic satisfaction with current life-circumstances. 
Conclusion 
 
This third chapter has examined Australian value, social capital and political 
participation patterns by presenting and discussing age-group percentage statistics from the 
1981, 1995, 2005 and 2012 World Value Surveys. The exploration of these statistics has 
supplemented the previous chapter by uncovering merits and shortcomings of, and 
necessitating an alternative to, Modernisationists and Lamentationist interpretations of 
historic and contemporary trends on social capital, trust, involvement and 
institutional/organisational confidence. Australian WVS statistics indicate post-Boomer 
generational increases in liberal and egalitarian social attitudes as well as rising levels of 
informal/unconventional political engagement. These trends contradict Putnam’s 
Lamentation arguments, at least in the Australian context. Additionally, the statistics reveal 
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Australian trends in political interest as well as confidence and participation in formal 
organisations and institutions that weaken Inglehart and Welzel’s Modernisationist views 
regarding social patterns in post-industrial democracies, like Australia. These and other 
findings discussed in this chapter have informed and instructed my Homogenisationist 
explanation. Chapter Four will present and discuss statistics assessing the degree to which 
feelings of autonomy, financial satisfaction and income are correlated with value 
orientations, levels of social capital and political engagement, to further consolidate my 
Homogenisation theory. 
  






--EMPOWERMENT & SOCIAL CAPITAL-- 
A subjective sense of autonomy, Financial Satisfaction, 
Income & Industrial Relations 
 
The first three chapters of this thesis discussed trends in Australian party 
identification and engagement and their potential for eroding the health of our democracy. 
They also articulated an argument to explain these patterns, that is Homogenisation theory. 
This Homogenisation thesis was compared with the two dominant and most persuasive 
alternative arguments for modern/contemporary engagement trends: Inglehart and Welzel’s 
Modernisation and Putnam’s Lamentation theories. Chapter Three provided an overview of 
Australian value, social capital and political engagement trends by presenting percentage 
statistics collated from 1981, 1995, 2005 and 2012 World Values Survey data. These statistics 
were divided into age groups/demographics 18 to 34, 35 to 49, 50 to 64 and 65+ as well as 
generational cohorts Greatest generation, Silent generation, Boomer generation, Generation 
X and Millennials, and were found to be consistent with my Homogenisation theory. In this, 
and the following, chapter correlation statistics collated from WVS waves are analysed. 
Conflicting positions regarding the direction of generational shifts between bonding and 
bridging social capital are the ultimate differences between Modernisation and 
Homogenisation theories. WVS questions do not enquire about the degree of 
ideological/political commonality between participants and their social network members 
(friends, work colleagues and family members). Therefore, conclusions in these chapters tend 
to buttress both Modernisation and Homogenisation theses but soundly weaken Putnam’s 
Lamentation theory.   
Social scientists cannot definitively prove (and correlation does not necessarily mean), 
causation. However, by controlling for salient variables many otherwise plausible 
explanations of correlation statistics can be discounted, and by employing educated 





reasoning the nature of the relationships between variables can be inferred while 
acknowledging alternative yet less convincing interpretations of statistical data.  
Evidence is accrued to support my Homogenisation theory by examining the degree 
to which value orientations, social capital measures and rates of political engagement are 
correlated with both a subjective sense of autonomy and factors potentially affecting actual 
levels of autonomy. Other variables are controlled using SPSS statistics software. Significant 
positive correlations have previously been found between a subjective sense of autonomy 
and self-expression values. However, there has been uncertainty regarding whether this 
correlation holds when measures of, and factors influencing, autonomy are controlled. My 
statistical analysis suggests that both a subjective sense of autonomy and variables affecting 
actual levels of autonomy have great influence over generational shifts in values and 
social/political engagement patterns. 
This chapter also considers the effect of income, financial satisfaction and economic 
context/policy on social and political values, trust and involvement. I argue that high incomes 
and financial satisfaction (two measures of autonomy), as well as levels of inequality, appear 
to significantly influence social/political values, trust and engagement in ways very consistent 
with my Homogenisation theory. When other variables are held constant inconsistencies can 
reasonably be attributed to those with conservative personality types tending to have both 
greater financial satisfaction and more traditional views than those with personality types 
more accepting of change. Therefore, when income and other factors are controlled 
personality types can arguably have a relatively greater impact on correlations between 
financial satisfaction and certain dependent variables than the effect of financial satisfaction 
as an independent variable. Additionally, Putnam’s Lamentationist arguments concerning the 
role of labour market deregulation in social capital and political involvement patterns (related 
to employee financial ‘security’ and ‘autonomy’) are found not to apply in the Australian 
context. 
Only moderately significant correlations with p values 0.1 or less, highly significant 
correlations with p values of less than 0.05 and extremely significant correlations with p 
values of less than 0.01 are presented. The letter ‘x’ in correlation tables (located in the 





appendices) indicates a p value of more than 0.1. Correlations with r values of -1.0 to -0.5 or 
0.5 to 1.0 are considered strong. Correlations with r values of -0.5 to -0.3 or 0.3 to 0.5 are 
referred to as moderate. Correlations with r values of -0.3 to -0.1 or 0.1 to 0.3 are weak, and 
those with r values between -0.1 and 0.1 are very weak. The control variables for these 
statistics are age, sex, employment status, marital status, satisfaction with the financial 
situation of one’s household, scale of incomes, highest level of education attained (or for the 
1981 wave - the age at which participants completed or were due to complete their full-time 
education),401 frequency of religious service attendance, how many children one has, and the 
size of one’s town/city (the question regarding town size was not asked in the 1981 wave of 
the WVS). Many, if not all, of these variables have a significant bearing on real levels of 
autonomy. Therefore, by controlling for these variables the influence of autonomy on 
correlations between a subjective sense of autonomy and responses to questions assessing 
value orientations and social/political trust and engagement is mitigated. This aids the reader 
in making a reasoned assessment of the impact of a subjective sense of autonomy. 
Through this and the next chapter graphs are presented illustrating the degree to 
which correlations are strong and significant. A ‘Strength and Significance Score’ was 
determined for each correlation using the following method. Correlations with p values 
greater than 0.1 were given significance scores of 0. Correlations with p values of, or less 
than 0.1 were given significance scores of 1. To determine the ‘Strength and Significance 
Score’ of a correlation, the correlation’s r value was multiplied by its significance score and 
then the result was multiplied by 1000. To determine the average strength and significance 
score of a correlation within an age group, the strength and significance scores of that 
correlation for that age group within individual survey waves (in which there was data 
regarding the variables tested) were calculated. These scores were then added together, and 
the result was divided by the relevant number of survey waves. 
                                                          
401 The question regarding participants’ highest level of education attained was not asked in the 1981 wave of 
the WVS. 





Subjective Sense of Autonomy 
The significance of correlations between a subjective sense of autonomy and both 
value orientations, and social/political trust and participation (when controlling for other 
variables) will now be discussed. Consistent with both Inglehart and Welzel’s Modernisation 
and my Homogenisation theories, a greater subjective sense of (as opposed to actual and 
objective) autonomy was positively correlated with more liberal social views and greater 
inclusiveness of women and minorities. As shown in Figure 4.1, there were positive 
correlations between a greater subjective sense of autonomy and the degree to which 
participants thought voluntary euthanasia, abortion, prostitution, homosexuality and sex 
before marriage were justifiable.402 As illustrated by Figure 4.2, a greater subjective sense of 
autonomy was positively correlated with the degree to which participants believed that 
women, older people and immigrants should have just as much right to work when jobs are 
scarce as other employees and job seekers.403 Additionally, negative correlations were found 
between levels of subjectively sensed autonomy, and a belief that traditional families 
(consisting of both a mother and father) are necessary for the well-being of children.404 This 
is demonstrated by Figure 4.3. 
Figure 4.1 
Average strength and significance scores within age demographics of correlations 
collated from 1981, 1995, 2005 and 2012 Australian WVS waves, between a greater 
subjective sense of autonomy and more liberal attitudes regarding voluntary 
euthanasia, abortion, prostitution, homosexuality and sex before marriage (appendices 
26-30). 
                                                          
402 See Appendices 26-30 
403 See Appendices 31-33 
404 See Appendix 34 







Average strength and significance scores within age demographics of correlations 
collated from 1995, 2005 and 2012 Australian WVS waves, between a greater 
subjective sense of autonomy and the degree to which participants believe that 
women, older people and immigrants should have just as much right to work when jobs 
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Average strength and significance scores within age demographics of correlations 
collated from 1981, 1995 and 2005 Australian WVS waves, between a greater 
subjective sense of autonomy and believing that children do ‘not’ need both a mother 
and a father to grow up happily (appendix 34). 
 
These findings tend to support Modernisation and my own Homogenisation 
arguments that those who feel less autonomy are more likely to emphasise survival values 
and therefore:  
- traditional gender roles,  
- conservative positions on subjects related to life and sex, and  
- greater priority on the well-being of one’s own race, kin, or religious, national, 
cultural, or linguistic community over others.405  
These results also indicate that a subjective sense of autonomy, not just actual autonomy, 
plays a significant role in driving the survival to self-expression values transition. That is, rising 
levels of individual empowerment/autonomy (the possession of the capacity to act upon 
one’s free will) brought about by scientific, technological, economic, social and educational 
advance not only drive cultural change directly (as later evidence suggests) but also 
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indirectly. Empowerment lifts individuals’ subjective sense of autonomy which in turn 
precipitate greater emphasis on self-expression values. 
Perhaps unexpectedly, Figure 4.4 and Table 4.1 demonstrate that a greater subjective 
sense of autonomy was positively correlated with a greater sense of national pride, particularly 
among the 18 to 34 age group. No significant correlations were found between these 
variables amongst the 65+ demographic.406 This peculiar finding does not support the 
Modernisationist contention that greater autonomy is positively correlated with a more 
cosmopolitan, less nationalistic, world view.407 However, this result may still be consistent 
with my Homogenisation argument that people who are, and/or feel, greater autonomy will 
forge relatively more ‘bonding’ and fewer ‘bridging’ connections than those who are, and/or 
feel, less empowered.408 Although crosscutting cleavages/similarities in values and interests 
exist between different countries, they are mainly found between societies of common 
civilisational origins and socio-economic development. Furthermore, Social Network 
Homogenisation (SNH) driven by a greater subjective sense of, and actual, autonomy 
diminishes both opportunities to encounter, and tolerance for, different political/cultural 
beliefs and interests which are often founded on divergent value emphases. Therefore, while 
modern communications technology can facilitate cross-national connections the clear 
majority of these relationships are probably between members of societies sharing a 
common language as well as similar beliefs, values, interests, norms and traditions (e.g. 
between citizens of Anglosphere nations). Consequently, per my Homogenisation theory SNH 
precipitated by a greater subjective sense of, and actual, autonomy may be reducing people’s 
willingness (and certain social skills necessary) to engage with those of foreign cultural 
heritage. This is despite technological advances enabling long-distance connections. 
Figure 4.4 
Average strength and significance scores within age demographics of correlations 
collated from 1981, 1995, 2005 and 2012 Australian WVS waves, between a greater 
subjective sense of autonomy and being less proud to be Australian (appendix 35). 
                                                          
406 See Appendix 35 
407 Inglehart, and Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy, p.52, 54 & 143 
408 Correlations between objective measures of autonomy (such as income and education attainment) and 
social and political capital and engagement are discussed later in this as well as in the next, chapter. 







Correlations between “A subjective sense of autonomy” and “Being less proud to be 
Australian” 
 Age Groups 
All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 wave r= -.105, p= .021 x r= -.182, p= .045 X x 
1995 wave r= -.086, p= .000 r= -.174, p= .000 x X x 
2005 wave r= -.092, p= .002 r= -.217, p= .001 x X x 
2012 wave r= -.091, p= .005 x r= -.152, p= .022 r= -.116, p= .029 x 
 
Correlations between a greater subjective sense of autonomy and greater national 
pride had higher P values (indicating less significance) among older, than among younger, 
demographics. This may suggest that many of those who feel less autonomous tend to 
become more nationalistic as they age. Indeed, statistics presented in the previous chapter 
show that (regardless of possible generational trends) levels of national pride tend to 
increase within generational cohorts as they age. That is, there may be a narrowing of the 
gap between levels of national pride felt by those who indicate feeling more and less 
autonomy within any cohort as they mature. Still, other correlations between measures of 
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direct and indirect effects of modernisation and individual empowerment (such as rising 
levels of higher education attainment – Figure 4.5)409 act to reduce national pride. 
Figure 4.5 
Average strength and significance scores within age demographics of correlations 
collated from 1981, 1995, 2005 and 2012 Australian WVS waves, between having a 
higher level of formal education and being less proud to be Australian (appendix 526). 
 
A greater subjective sense of autonomy was found to be positively correlated with both 
social trust and measures of trustworthiness.410 These statistics (illustrated by Figures 4.6 and 
4.7) are consistent with both Modernisation and my Homogenisation theories. As are 
crosstabulation statistics shown in Table 4.2 indicating that those who have a greater 
subjective sense of autonomy are more likely to trust others than are persons who deem 
themselves relatively less empowered. According to these theories social trust and 
trustworthiness are associated with self-expression and post material values. As people 
become and/or feel more autonomous they are less concerned about accumulating material 
wealth and financial security. Thus, they can, and/or believe they can, better afford to both 
trust others and prioritise honouring others’ trust over their own immediate needs. 
                                                          
409 See Appendix 526 








18 - 34 35 - 49 50 - 64 65+






Average strength and significance scores within 1981, 1995, 2005 and 2012 Australian 
WVS waves of correlations between a greater subjective sense of autonomy and 
believing that most people ‘cannot’ be trusted (appendix 36). 
 
Figure 4.7 
Average strength and significance scores within age demographics of correlations 
collated from 1981, 1995, 2005 and 2012 Australian WVS waves, between a greater 
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% of people that reported the lowest and highest levels of subjectively sensed autonomy who 
believed that most people can be trusted. 
Year Participants who indicated feeling 
no choice at all over the way their 
lives turn out (i.e. 1 out of 10 on 
the autonomy scale). 
Participants who indicated feeling 
a great deal of choice and control 
over the way their lives turn out 
(i.e. 10 out of 10 on the autonomy 
scale). 
1981 40% 57.9% 
1995 26.3% 41.1% 
2005 18.8% 47.7% 
2012 27.3% 54.9% 
 
Individual empowering atomising trends raise actual (and consequently subjective 
sense of) autonomy. As explained in the previous chapter, according to my Homogenisation 
theory rising actual, and a subjective sense of autonomy probably contributed to a 
generational spike in political interest among Boomers.411 I argued that this rise in (actual and 
a subjective sense of) autonomy and self-expression values enabled greater social modularity 
based on individual preference. However, new (contemporary) patterns of social interaction 
(greater social network homogeneity) have taken a couple of generations to become 
                                                          
411 Boomers placed significantly greater emphasis on self-expression values than did their parents. Yet their 
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established. I reasoned that more homogenous social networks among Gens X and Y 
probably acted to slow, mitigate or reverse the generational increase in political interest. 
Consequently, there should have been positive correlations between a greater subjective 
sense of autonomy and greater political interest in earlier waves, particularly among Boomers, 
followed by waves in which the strength and significance of this relationship waned. WVS 
statistics largely support my hypothesis. They also suggest that the significance of the 
correlation between a subjective sense of autonomy and political interest may have declined 
among Boomers as they aged.412 Boomers who felt particularly autonomous may have 
homogenised their social networks in later life, once they had access to the pre-existing more 
homogenous formal and informal groups which Gen X and Y took for granted. These more 
homogenous social networks may have acted to reduce or mitigate the greater political 
interest of particularly autonomous Boomers. 
A greater subjective sense of autonomy was both:  
- positively correlated with a stronger belief in the importance of children learning to 
“express themselves”,413 and  
- negatively correlated with a stronger belief in the importance of children learning 
“good manners” and “thrift”.414  
Again, these findings are consistent with Modernisation and Homogenisation arguments that 
those who are more autonomous will tend, relative to those who are less autonomous, to 
place:  
- greater emphasis on the importance of individual empowering self-expression 
values,415 and  
- less emphasis on the importance of conformity and individual sacrificing survival 
values.416  
                                                          
412 See Appendix 41 
413 See Appendix 42 
414 See Appendices 43 & 44 
415 Inglehart, and Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy, p.2, 3, 28, 126, 164 & 212 
416 Inglehart, and Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy, p.4, 52, 54, 111, 142 & 143 





Although there was a general negative correlation between subjectively sensed autonomy 
and a belief in the importance of children learning “thrift,” positive correlations were 
observed among the 65+ demographic in the years 2005 and 2012. This may have been 
related to the experiences of those generations during the great depression and World War II 
when rationing was essential for survival. Alternatively, it may indicate that those who place 
greater value on thrift have tended to save more for their retirement and consequently feel a 
greater sense of autonomy than those who do not value thrift, and have not saved, to the 
same extent.  
The negative correlation between a subjective sense of autonomy and the belief in 
the importance of children learning “thrift” may support my Homogenisation theory, but it 
also suggests that the degree to which people ‘feel’ autonomous is not the supreme catalyst 
for value change. While there was near universal and consistent increases in subjectively 
sensed autonomy among each age group across the four waves as shown by Figure 4.8, 
Figure 4.9 demonstrates that the belief in the importance of children learning ‘thrift’ rose 
steadily, and near consistently (among each age group) between 1981 and 2005.417 
Figure 4.8 
% of Australian WVS participants within different age groups who rated their “feelings 
of autonomy” between 1 and 7 out of 10 i.e. feeling less autonomous (appendix 563). 
                                                          
417 See Appendices 563 & 564 







% of Australian WVS participants within different age groups who believed it was 
important for children to learn thrift (appendix 564). 
 
Similarly, WVS correlation statistics seem to support my Homogenisation arguments 
regarding subjectively sensed autonomy and involvement in voluntary organisations. Per 






























modernisation greater subjective sense, and levels of autonomy are associated with 
significantly more emphasis on egalitarian and self-expression values.418 This value shift 
precipitates heightened political interest, and withdrawal from formal organisations with 
hierarchical structures.419 According to Homogenisation theory participation in 
formal/voluntary organisations may experience some recovery. This may occur as the 
governing structures, processes and membership compositions (homogenisation) of these 
groups adapt to the expectations of more autonomous, egalitarian and conflict averse 
generations (see Chapter Three). Still, people who place greater, rather than less, emphasis 
on self-expression values may, even in the contemporary period, be less inclined to engage in 
formal groups. This is because formal organisations still tend to require more rules and 
official decision-making and are probably more ideologically diverse than loose informal 
friendship groups. Self-expression values are driven by a subjective sense of, and actual, 
security and autonomy when controlling for other variables. Consequently, those who feel 
and/or are more autonomous are less disposed to participating in formal organisations than 
those who feel and/or are less autonomous.  
However, in the past greater autonomy may have been associated with heavier 
involvement in formal organisations. This is because those who are and feel greater 
autonomy probably have more time, and feel at liberty, to pursue their interests. These 
interests may precipitate engagement in sport and recreational clubs and societies, 
professional associations, labour unions, political parties and religious, educational, art and 
music organisations. Indeed, Australian WVS statistics indicate that a greater subjective sense 
of autonomy was associated with more (or had no correlation with) involvement in formal 
organisations in the past, but became (and is now) correlated with less engagement in these 
groups.420 This is illustrated by Figure 4.10. An exception was involvement in labour unions 
which has had no discernible pattern of correlation with subjectively sensed autonomy across 
the various survey waves and age demographics.421  
Figure 4.10 
                                                          
418 Inglehart, and Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy, p.1-3, 5 & 6 
419 Inglehart, and Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy, p.44, 116, 117, 126, 293 & 294 
420 See Appendices 45-50 
421 See Appendix 51 





Average strength and significance scores within 1981, 1995, 2005 and 2012 Australian 
WVS waves of correlations between a greater subjective sense of autonomy and being 
less involved in formal organisations. These formal groups include charitable, 
environmental, sport/recreational, church/religious, art, music and educational 
organisations as well as professional associations (appendices 45-50). 
 
These findings have some consistency with the rates of active engagement in formal 
voluntary organisations over time as depicted by Figure 4.11. Australian WVS statistics 
indicate that between 1995 and 2005 there were declines in active engagement in most 
voluntary organisations among the 18 to 34, 35 to 49 and 50 to 64 demographics.422 
However, rates of formal organisational engagement tended to increase between 2005 and 
2012 particularly among younger demographics;423 perhaps due to formal groups adapting to 
the expectations, values and characteristics of younger generations.  
Figure 4.11 
Average rates (as percentages) of active engagement within voluntary organisations by 
Australian WVS participants within different age groups. These organisations include 
church/religious, sports/recreational, political party, environmental, charitable, 
consumer, art, music, educational and other organisations as well as labour unions and 
professional associations (appendices 16-25). 
                                                          
422 See Appendices 16-25 
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Some statistics collated from Australian WVS data may initially appear to contradict 
my Homogenisation theory. However, when considering variables that were, and were not, 
controlled less obvious but perhaps more compelling interpretations of these results, are 
revealed. Per Homogenisation theory those who are and/or feel greater autonomy will tend 
to emphasise self-expression values (autonomy and egalitarianism) more than those who feel 
less autonomous. Consequently, those who are and/or feel greater autonomy will tend to be 
more sceptical of, and therefore have less confidence in, major formal institutions and 
organisations than those who are and/or feel relatively less empowered. Adaptations to and 
by the governing structures and memberships of secular and non-political formal 
organisations (discussed in Chapter Three) may have diminished the effect of people’s 
subjective sense of autonomy in reducing confidence in certain formal groups/institutions. 
However, people’s subjective sense of autonomy should never act to lift 
organisational/institutional confidence according to my Homogenisation theory. Yet, 
Australian WVS statistics reveal positive, not negative, correlations between a greater 
subjective sense of autonomy and confidence in most major public and private institutions and 
organisations (shown in Figure 4.12). These institutions and organisations include the UN, 
parliament, political parties, the national government, the police, the press, the legal system, 






















environmental movement and banks.424 However, a clear and consistent positive relationship 
was not found between confidence in labour unions and a subjective sense of autonomy.425  
Figure 4.12 
Average strength and significance scores within age demographics of correlations 
between a greater subjective sense of autonomy and having less confidence in major 
public and private institutions and organisations collated from 1981, 1995, 2005 and 
2012 Australian WVS waves (appendices 52-63). 
 
These statistics measured correlations between participants’ subjective sense of (as 
opposed to actual) autonomy and organisational/institutional confidence by controlling for 
variables listed earlier in this chapter; many included factors influencing actual levels of 
autonomy. Note that one of the variables that were not, and could not, be controlled for was 
the degree to which participants were already predisposed to being positive and optimistic. 
Therefore, the positive correlations found between a greater subjective sense of autonomy 
and more formal organisational/institutional confidence may not reflect a causal relationship. 
They could potentially be indicative of an uncontrolled factor “personal positivity” influencing 
both these variables being tested, thereby producing this correlation. 
                                                          
424 See Appendices 52-63 




















Many correlations found between levels of subjectively sensed autonomy and social 
capital measures have been revealed as consistent with both Modernisation and 
Homogenisation theories. These correlations include those between subjectively sensed 
autonomy and social attitudes/inclusion, trust, trustworthiness and the degree of importance 
people place on children learning self-expression, good manners and thrift. Additionally, the 
correlations found between subjectively sensed autonomy and national pride, political 
interest and formal group involvement across survey waves and age demographics appear to 
be more consistent with my Homogenisation than Inglehart and Welzel’s Modernisation 
thesis. The correlations found between a greater subjective sense of autonomy and 
confidence in formal organisations/institutions support neither Modernisation nor 
Homogenisation theories. However, these inconsistencies may be explained by an 
uncontrolled factor (the degree to which individuals have positive personalities), inducing 
these results by obscuring the possible causal relationship between the variables tested. 
Together, these findings suggest that a subjective sense of (as opposed to actual), autonomy 
significantly influence shifts in values, levels of trust and trustworthiness and social/political 
engagement patterns. 
Income and Financial Satisfaction 
The next section of this fourth chapter analyses correlation statistics between two 
measures of existential security/autonomy (income and financial satisfaction) and value 
orientations, trust and engagement. These correlations will control for other salient variables 
to assist in the interpretation of these relationships using educated reasoning. These control 
variables are identical to those employed when analysing correlations between levels of 
subjectively sensed autonomy and other measures. Obviously when analysing possible 
relationships between two particular variables, these specific variables cannot be controlled. 
For example, when discussing correlations between greater financial satisfaction and other 
variables, financial satisfaction (although listed as one of the control variables) is not 
controlled, whereas income (also listed as a control variable) is controlled. Even when income 
is controlled financial satisfaction remains a measure of actual autonomy. Those who are 
relatively more financially satisfied at any given income level probably tend to invest more of 
their time and energy pursuing their life goals than those who are relatively less financially 





satisfied and consequently preoccupied with accumulating material wealth. Therefore, 
greater financial satisfaction at any given income level will tend to empower one to fulfil their 
dreams. 
In this section the degree to which financial satisfaction and income are correlated 
with each other, and the degree to which each are correlated with a subjective sense of 
autonomy and social and political trust, values and engagement will be revealed and 
discussed. As illustrated by Figures 4.13 and 4.14 and Tables to 4.3 and 4.4 correlations 
between higher income and greater financial satisfaction and between greater financial 
satisfaction and a greater subjective sense of autonomy are positive, very consistent and 
usually extremely significant regardless of wave or age group.426 However, the correlations 
between a greater subjective sense of autonomy and income are much weaker and are 
inconsistent within waves and among age groups. The significant correlations found between 
these variables were evenly split between those that were positive and negative.427 This 
suggests that income can have an impact on a subjective sense of autonomy only by 
influencing financial satisfaction. Correlations found between income and social and political 
trust, values and engagement can usually be attributed to income alone. However, any 
impact financial satisfaction might have on civic trust, values and involvement may well be 
amplified or reduced by rising or falling income levels. This is because higher incomes have a 
consistent positive correlation (very likely to be causal) with financial satisfaction. A rise in 
incomes is likely to raise financial satisfaction which is in turn likely to influence other 
dependent variables.  
Figure 4.13 
Strength and significance scores within age demographics of correlations between 
higher income and greater financial satisfaction collated from 1981, 1995, 2005 and 
2012 Australian WVS waves (appendix 65). 
                                                          
426 See Appendices 65 & 66 
427 See Appendix 67 







Correlations between “Income” and “Financial Satisfaction” 
 Age groups 
All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 wave r= .256, p= .000 r= .242, p= .000 r= .348, p= .000 r= .190, p= .080 r= .303, p= .041 
1995 wave r= .093, p= .000 r= .077, p= .046 r= .075, p= .084 x x 
2005 wave r= .326, p= .000 r= .453, p= .000 r= .323, p= .000 r= .259, p= .000 r= .325, p= .000 
2012 wave r= .360, p= .000 r= .499, p= .000 r= .315, p= .000 r= .371, p= .000 r= .280, p= .000 
 
Figure 4.14 
Strength and significance scores within age demographics of correlations between 
greater financial satisfaction and a greater subjective sense of autonomy collated from 




















Correlations between “Financial Satisfaction” and “A subjective sense of autonomy” 
 Age groups 
All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 wave r= .209, p= .000 r= .210, p= .002 r= .260, p= .002 x r= .396, p= .008 
1995 wave r= .284, p= .000 r= .257, p= .000 r= .279, p= .000 r= .356, p= .000 r= .226, p= .000 
2005 wave r= .308, p= .000 r= .318, p= .000 r= .300, p= .000 r= .361, p= .000 r= .191, p= .005 
2012 wave r= .312, p= .000 r= .168, p= .024 r= .408, p= .000 r= .243, p= .000 r= .349, p= .000 
 
Clear and significant positive correlations were found between greater financial 
satisfaction and interpersonal trust. This relationship is consistent among the 18 to 34 
demographic across all but the 2012 waves. However, no significant correlations between 
levels of financial satisfaction and interpersonal trust were found among the 35 to 49 age 
group in any wave.428 In the 1981, 2005, and 2012 waves higher incomes and interpersonal 
trust were positively correlated.429 The positive correlations found between interpersonal 
trust and greater financial satisfaction and income are corroborated by crosstabulation 
statistics (demonstrated by Tables 4.5 and 4.6) showing that persons with greater financial 
                                                          
428 See Appendix 68 





















satisfaction and higher incomes tend to be more trusting of others than those with relatively 
less financial satisfaction and lower incomes. Australian real median incomes have risen 
between each wave.430 Thus, rising incomes may act to lift interpersonal trust directly as well 
as indirectly by influencing financial satisfaction which subsequently acts to lift interpersonal 
trust.  
Table 4.5 
% of people that reported the lowest and highest levels of financial satisfaction who believed 
that most people can be trusted. 
Year Lowest level of financial 
satisfaction (i.e. 1 out of 10 on the 
financial satisfaction scale) 
Highest level of financial 
satisfaction (i.e. 10 out of 10 on the 
financial satisfaction scale) 
1981 44.7% 51.1% 
1995 25.6% 32.8% 
2005 16.2% 44.8% 
2012 28.9% 59.1% 
 
Table 4.6 
% of people in the lowest and highest income deciles who believed that most people can be 
trusted. 
Year Lowest income decile. Highest income decile. 
1981 44% 60% 
1995 40% 40.1% 
2005 33.2% 62.9% 
2012 41.9% 62.5% 
 
These relationships are consistent with both Modernisation and Homogenisation 
arguments that greater existential security increases social trust.431 However, among each 
age group financial satisfaction was lower in 1995, 2005 and 2012 than it was in 1981. 
Therefore, modernisation and real incomes may not be the only, or even main, factors 
influencing financial satisfaction. Other such factors will be explored later. These may include 
changing levels of wealth and living standard inequality. Wealth and living standard inequality 
may be influencing the relative strength of certain independent variables (including income 
and financial satisfaction) on social and political values and engagement. 
                                                          
430 Onselen, Leith. (2013) ‘Australian income inequality worsens’, The Australian, viewed 20 October 2015, 
http://www.macrobusiness.com.au/2013/01/australian-income-inequality-worsens/  
431 Inglehart, and Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy, p.52 & 54 





Relationships between greater financial satisfaction and involvement in formal 
voluntary organisations have tended to either weaken or reverse over time. The correlations 
between greater financial satisfaction and participation in sports, art, music, and educational 
organisations were positive and more significant in the past but have weakened or 
disappeared in more recent waves.432 The correlations between greater financial satisfaction 
and involvement in political parties and religious organisations (when religious attendance 
was not controlled) were positive in 1981 and 1995 but became negative in the 2005 and 
2012 waves.433 A similar pattern can be identified in the evolving relationship between 
involvement in some voluntary organisations and income. The significant correlations between 
higher income and engagement in charitable and professional organisations among various 
age groups were positive in the 1981 wave but were negative in 2005 and 2012.434 These 
trends may indicate that existential security has risen to such a point that additional units of 
financial satisfaction and income are now reducing rather than increasing the likelihood that 
people will engage in certain voluntary organisations. Additionally, higher incomes appear to 
be negatively correlated with involvement in sport and recreational organisations (although 
no correlation of this sort was found among the 18 to 34 demographic).435  
Figure 4.15 
Average strength and significance scores within 1981, 1995, 2005 and 2012 Australian 
WVS waves of correlations between greater financial satisfaction and being less 
involved in sports, art, music and educational organisations (appendices 70 & 71). 
                                                          
432 See Appendices 70 & 71 
433 See Appendices 72 & 73 
434 See Appendices 74 & 75 
435 See Appendix 76 






These results are consistent with both Modernisation and Homogenisation arguments 
that greater existential security and autonomy precipitate a rising emphasis on elite-
challenging egalitarian self-expression values. While initially, additional units of security and 
autonomy may act to raise formal group engagement, beyond a certain stage of 
modernisation self-expression values are emphasised to such a degree that additional units 
reduce formal group participation. This is because formal organisations tend to have 
hierarchal structures and consequently people who place greater emphasis on egalitarian 
self-expression values are less inclined to participate in these groups.  
Other correlations between income and formal group involvement initially appear at 
odds with both Modernisation and Homogenisation theses. Higher incomes were positively 
correlated with political party engagement particularly among the 35 to 49 age group.436 
Likewise, when religious attendance was not controlled higher incomes were positively 
correlated with greater involvement in church/religious organisations.437 However, when 
religious attendance was controlled these correlations disappeared.438 This would indicate 
that when other variables (including financial satisfaction) are controlled persons with higher 
incomes are more inclined to be heavily religious than those who have lower incomes. 
                                                          
436 See Appendix 77 
437 See Appendix 78 











1981 1995 2005 2012





According to Modernisation and Homogenisation theses those with greater wealth and 
existential security tend to be relatively less religious than those poorer and with less 
existential security.439 Yet, the strong significant positive correlation between higher income 
and greater financial satisfaction suggests that rising incomes act to lift financial satisfaction. 
As greater financial satisfaction has tended to be negatively correlated with formal group 
engagement in more recent waves, higher income may still have an overall negative impact 
on political party and religious organisation engagement. This would be consistent with both 
Modernisation and Homogenisation theories. 
The relationships between informal/unconventional political engagement and financial 
satisfaction and income were mixed. According to Inglehart and Welzel people with greater 
financial satisfaction and incomes are more inclined to participate in peaceful 
demonstrations, boycotts and petition signing than those less financially satisfied and 
relatively impoverished.440 A positive correlation was indeed found between higher incomes 
and petition signing among the 50 to 64 age group in 2005.441 However, a negative 
correlation was discovered between financial satisfaction and petition signing among the 50 
to 64 age group in 2005.442 Existential security (in the form of higher income and financial 
satisfaction) appears to have contributed little to the significant increases in unconventional 
political action observed between the 2005 and 2012 waves. Other factors (that contribute 
to autonomy) potentially influencing levels of unconventional political action (including the 
effects of rising levels of tertiary education), are explored in the next chapter. 
The ways in which higher income and greater financial satisfaction are correlated with 
levels of political interest and discussion appear to broadly support Modernisation and 
Homogenisation theories despite several inconsistencies. As shown in Figure 4.16 positive 
correlations were found between greater financial satisfaction and more political interest and 
between greater financial satisfaction and frequency of discussing politics with friends and 
work colleagues.443 As demonstrated by Figure 4.17, higher incomes were also positively 
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correlated with political interest in 2005 and 2012; particularly in 2012.444 However, higher 
incomes were negatively correlated with political interest in 1995.445 No consistent significant 
correlations were found between higher income and political discussion.446 Still, the bulk of 
the collated survey statistics support Modernisation and Homogenisation theories. Greater 
existential security, it would seem, tends to encourage more political interest and discussion 
in post-industrial societies.  
Figure 4.16 
Average strength and significance scores within age demographics of correlations 
collated from 1981, 1995, 2005 and 2012 Australian WVS waves, between greater 
financial satisfaction and being uninterested in politics and not discussing politics with 
friends and work colleagues (appendices 84-85). 
 
Figure 4.17 
Strength and significance scores within 1995, 2005 and 2012 Australian WVS waves of 
correlations between higher incomes and being uninterested in politics (appendix 86). 
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The Modernisation and Homogenisation argument that greater financial satisfaction 
and higher income act to reduce confidence in major hierarchal institutions in post-industrial 
societies initially appears inconsistent with Australian WVS statistics. Greater financial 
satisfaction is positively correlated with more confidence in all major institutions tested as 
shown in Figure 4.18. These included the press, major companies, charitable/humanitarian 
organisations, the environmental movement, banks, the UN, the civil service, Parliament, 
political parties, the national government, police, labour unions, the legal system, the Armed 
Forces and churches.447 Greater financial satisfaction was also found to be positively 
correlated with a belief that one’s country was run for the benefit of all people rather than a 
few big interests.448 Conversely, higher incomes were found to be negatively correlated with 
confidence in the UN, the civil service, the police, labour unions, television, the press and 
churches and a belief that one’s country is run for the benefit of all rather than a few big 
interests.449 This is shown in Figure 4.19. 
Figure 4.18 
Average strength and significance scores within age demographics of correlations 
collated from 1981, 1995, 2005 and 2012 Australian WVS waves, between greater 
                                                          
447 See Appendices 88-102 
448 See Appendix 103 
















financial satisfaction and having less confidence in major public and private institutions 
and organisations (appendices 88-102). 
 
Figure 4.19 
Average strength and significance scores within age demographics of correlations 
collated from 1981, 1995, 2005 and 2012 Australian WVS waves, between higher 
incomes and having less confidence in the UN, the civil service, the police, labour 
unions, television, the press and churches and a belief that one’s country is run for the 
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Together, these statistics suggest that the positive correlation between greater 
financial satisfaction and institutional/organisational confidence may not be caused by 
financial satisfaction as an independent variable. Instead, this correlation may be explained 
by those with conservative personality types tending to be both more confident in their 
society’s major institutions and more accepting of their lot in life (including their financial 
situation), than those who are relatively more open minded. This interpretation is consistent 
with Modernisation and Homogenisation theories which argue that measures of security and 
autonomy (such as financial satisfaction and income) act to raise egalitarian self-expression 
values diminishing institutional/organisational confidence. While higher incomes were 
positively correlated with confidence in Parliament, major companies, 
charitable/humanitarian organisations and banks450 (as illustrated by Figure 4.20), evidence 
suggests that higher incomes raise financial satisfaction which may reduce 
institutional/organisational confidence. 
Figure 4.20 
Average strength and significance scores within age demographics of correlations 
collated from 1981, 1995, 2005 and 2012 Australian WVS waves, between higher 
incomes and having less confidence in Parliament, major companies, 
charitable/humanitarian organisations and banks (appendices 112-115). 
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Correlations between income and measures of generosity and trustworthiness appear 
to be weak and inconsistent.451 Conversely, correlations between greater financial satisfaction 
and measures of generosity and trustworthiness are positive and fairly consistent, as depicted 
by Figures 4.21 and 4.22.452 These results are further evidence that financial satisfaction has a 
greater direct influence on more measures of social capital than does income. However, 
income may still have an indirect effect on these dependent variables through its impact on 
financial satisfaction. Therefore, these statistics tend to support both Modernisation and 
Homogenisation theories. Crosstabulation statistics, which do not control for extraneous 
variables, corroborate the relationship between financial satisfaction and generosity. This can 
be observed in Table 4.7. The question assessing participants generosity was only asked in 
the 2005 wave of the WVS. 
Figure 4.21 
Average strength and significance scores within age demographics of correlations 
collated from 1981, 1995, 2005 and 2012 Australian WVS waves, between greater 
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Average strength and significance scores within age demographics of correlations 
collated from 1981, 1995, 2005 and 2012 Australian WVS waves, between greater 
financial satisfaction and measures of untrustworthiness (appendices 123-127). 
 
Table 4.7 
% of people that reported the lowest and highest levels of financial satisfaction who would be 
willing to pay higher taxes to increase foreign aid to poor countries. 
Year Lowest level of financial 
satisfaction (i.e. 1 out of 10 on the 
financial satisfaction scale) 
Highest level of financial 
satisfaction (i.e. 10 out of 10 on the 
financial satisfaction scale) 
2005 25.4% 40.9% 
 
Similarly, Australian WVS statistics reveal that when other variables (including 
financial satisfaction) are controlled, income has no correlation with national pride, happiness 
or life satisfaction.453 However, when other variables (including income) are controlled, 
greater financial satisfaction is positively correlated with greater national pride (particularly 
among younger demographics), and consistently and positively correlated with greater 
happiness and life satisfaction among all age groups and waves.454 This is demonstrated by 
Figures 4.23 through to 4.25 and Tables 4.8 through to 4.10. These statistics may indicate 
that people with more conservative and unimaginative personality types are also happier, 
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more satisfied and proud of their nation than those who are relatively more 
radical/progressive. That is, conservatives are perhaps more inclined to be satisfied with their 
lot in life (including their financial situation) than are progressives who consider preferable 
futures relatively more frequently.  
Figure 4.23 
Strength and significance scores within age demographics of correlations collated from 
1981, 1995, 2005 and 2012 Australian WVS waves, between greater financial 
satisfaction and being less proud to be Australian (appendix 131). 
 
Table 4.8 
Correlations between “Financial Satisfaction” and “Being less proud to be Australian” 
 Age Groups 
All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 wave X x x x x 
1995 wave r= -.076, p= .001 r= -.167, p= .000 x x x 
2005 wave r= -.091, p= .002 x x r= -.105, p= .047 x 
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Strength and significance scores within age demographics of correlations between 
greater financial satisfaction and being less happy collated from 1981, 1995, 2005 and 
2012 Australian WVS waves (appendix 132). 
 
Table 4.9 
Correlations between “Financial Satisfaction” and “Unhappiness” 
 Age Groups 
All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 wave r= -.293, p= .000 r= -.172, p= .012 r= -.328, p= .000 r= -.475, p= .000 r= -.450, p= .002 
1995 wave r= -.245, p= .000 r= -.185, p= .000 r= -.210, p= .000 r= -.310, p= .000 r= -.222, p= .000 
2005 wave r= -.359, p= .000 r= -.314, p= .000 r= -.413, p= .000 r= -.364, p= .000 r= -.200, p= .004 
2012 wave r= -.272, p= .000 r= -.211, p= .004 r= -.320, p= .000 r= -.237, p= .000 r= -.233, p= .001 
 
Figure 4.25 
Strength and significance scores within age demographics of correlations between 
greater financial satisfaction and more life satisfaction collated from 1981, 1995, 2005 
























Correlations between “Financial Satisfaction” and “Life Satisfaction” 
 Age groups 
All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 wave r= .351, p= .000 r= .298, p= .000 r= .344, p= .000 r= .498, p= .000 r= .428, p= .003 
1995 wave r= .470, p= .000 r= .400, p= .000 r= .443, p= .000 r= .576, p= .000 r= .445, p= .000 
2005 wave r= .422, p= .000 r= .388, p= .000 r= .395, p= .000 r= .455, p= .000 r= .346, p= .000 
2012 wave r= .515, p= .000 r= .501, p= .000 r= .582, p= .000 r= .512, p= .000 r= .440, p= .000 
 
Alternatively, these findings may suggest that greater financial satisfaction does 
encourage and help precipitate directly, or indirectly, higher levels of national pride, 
happiness and life satisfaction. The interpretation that greater financial satisfaction (a 
measure of autonomy) acts to raise happiness and life satisfaction is consistent with 
Modernisation and Homogenisation theories. However, the interpretation that greater 
financial satisfaction acts to raise national pride is in total contradiction of Modernisation 
theory. The Modernisation thesis holds that greater existential security, autonomy, and life 



















egalitarian and post material self-expression values.455 Inglehart and Welzel contend that 
these values act to reduce national pride in lieu of a more cosmopolitan worldview.456 
However, this interpretation may be consistent with my Homogenisation theory. As 
was discussed previously, financial satisfaction is a measure of actual autonomy. According to 
my Homogenisation thesis, those who are, and/or feel, greater autonomy will forge relatively 
more bonding and fewer bridging connections than those who are, and/or feel, less 
empowered. Arguably, this SNH (evidence for which is explored in Chapters Six, Seven and 
Eight) is driven by a greater subjective sense of, and/or actual autonomy (measured by 
variables including financial satisfaction) and diminishes both opportunities to encounter, and 
tolerance for, different political and cultural beliefs and interests. Consequently, SNH may be 
reducing people’s willingness (and certain social skills necessary) to engage with those of 
foreign cultural heritage (raising national pride), despite technological advances enabling 
long-distance connections. That is, the clear majority of cross-national connections facilitated 
by greater access to communications technology are likely to be between members of 
societies sharing a common language as well is similar beliefs, values, interests, norms and 
traditions.  This interpretation is reinforced by previously discussed positive correlations 
between a subjective sense of autonomy and national pride. 
Greater financial satisfaction (controlling for other significant variables) is positively 
correlated with more conservative views on issues such as euthanasia, divorce, abortion, 
prostitution, homosexuality and sex before marriage.457 Contrastingly, higher income (when 
controlling for other significant variables) is as equally and positively correlated with more 
liberal attitudes on the same issues.458 These relationships are illustrated by Figures 4.26 
through to 4.28. While rising income may act to lift financial satisfaction, raised financial 
satisfaction is unlikely to instil or encourage conservative attitudes on social and moral issues. 
Rather, the correlation between financial satisfaction and conservatism may be explained by 
those with already conservative personality types also tending to be more financially 
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satisfied, at any given income level, than those with more 
liberal/radical/progressive/imaginative personality types.  
Figure 4.26 
Average strength and significance scores within age demographics of correlations 
collated from 1981, 1995, 2005 and 2012 Australian WVS waves, between greater 
financial satisfaction and more liberal attitudes regarding voluntary euthanasia, divorce, 
abortion, prostitution, homosexuality and sex before marriage (appendices 134-139). 
 
Figure 4.27 
Average strength and significance scores within 1981, 1995, 2005 and 2012 Australian 
WVS waves of correlations between greater financial satisfaction and more liberal 
attitudes regarding voluntary euthanasia, divorce, abortion, prostitution, homosexuality 
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Average strength and significance scores within age demographics of correlations 
collated from 1981, 1995, 2005 and 2012 Australian WVS waves, between higher 
income and more liberal attitudes regarding voluntary euthanasia, divorce, abortion, 
prostitution, homosexuality and sex before marriage (appendices 140-145). 
 
The data may also indicate that people with liberal attitudes are more likely to work in 
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no effect on social attitudes. However, nations with higher median incomes and living 
standards tend to have more liberal attitudes on social issues than nations with lower median 
incomes and living standards.459 Therefore, the correlations presented are more likely to 
indicate that income, or another variable highly correlated with income (such as education 
attainment), is contributing to the rise of liberal attitudes in post-industrial societies, like 
Australia, over time. 
Similarly, negative correlations were found between higher incomes and a belief in the 
importance of children learning obedience and religious faith.460 That is, higher incomes were 
associated with greater self-expression and secular/rational values. Conversely, greater 
financial satisfaction was associated with either religious/survival values across all waves, or 
self-expression values in early waves followed by survival values in latter waves. Positive 
correlations were found between greater financial satisfaction and a belief in the importance 
of children learning religious faith and ‘feelings’ of responsibility.461 Negative correlations 
were found between financial satisfaction and a belief in the importance of children learning 
both self-expression and to be imaginative.462 Prior to 2012 financial satisfaction was 
negatively correlated with a belief in the importance of children learning obedience and 
positively correlated with a belief in the importance of children learning tolerance and 
respect for others. However, in the 2012 wave these correlations were reversed.463 That is, 
only in the 2012 wave was greater financial satisfaction positively correlated with more 
survival/conservative attitudes.  
These findings may be explained by the following developments/hypothesis. In 
advanced welfare state nations like Australia, median wealth, health care, welfare and 
education have risen. Therefore, the disparity between people’s subjective sense of 
existential security may have diminished. This is because living standard (as opposed to 
wealth) inequality has probably decreased. That is, every additional unit of wealth has 
relatively less ‘marginal utility’ (impact on living standards) for the wealthy as compared to 
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the poor.464 As the wealth and existential security of most people, including the poor, has 
risen the disparity between the living standards of the wealthy and poor may have declined, 
while income inequality has actually risen. Consequently, the disparity between where the 
financially satisfied and the financially dissatisfied sit on the survival to self-expression values 
continuum may have also diminished. This could have allowed other influential factors 
including differing personality types to have a relatively greater impact on the relationship 
between financial satisfaction and views regarding what is important for children to learn 
than financial satisfaction’s causal effect on such attitudes. That is, controlling for other 
variables those with more conservative, unimaginative dispositions are perhaps more 
inclined than those who have more creative, liberal personalities to both:  
- hold conservative attitudes regarding what is important for children to learn, and  
- be more satisfied with their lot in life (including their financial situation).  
The influence of financial satisfaction on these attitudes has probably declined due to greater 
equality in living standards/existential security. Therefore, the effect personality types have 
on the correlations between beliefs concerning what is important for children to learn and 
financial satisfaction has possibly become relatively stronger. This may explain why greater 
financial satisfaction was positively correlated with more liberal attitudes prior to 2012 but 
has since become negatively correlated with those same views.  
Contrastingly, higher income has been almost consistently and positively correlated 
with liberal attitudes regarding what is important for children to learn across all waves. This is 
possibly due to personality types having more of an influence on financial satisfaction than on 
income. When correlations between income and certain values are assessed while controlling 
for other variables (including financial satisfaction) the impact personality types (liberal or 
conservative dispositions) have on these relationships is almost eliminated. These 
interpretations of the correlations between attitudes toward the family unit and both 
financial satisfaction and income are consistent with Modernisation and Homogenisation 
theories. 
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However, correlations between financial satisfaction and various views and attitudes 
are probably affected by (conservative versus open-minded) personality types to different 
extents. The correlation (indicating a potential causal relationship) between greater financial 
satisfaction and tolerance/acceptance of foreign workers appears to be little affected by the 
relationship between each of these variables and conservative personality types. 
Contrastingly, the correlations between financial satisfaction and views regarding other social 
and moral issues appear to be relatively more affected by the relationships between these 
variables and conservative personality types. This may be because financial satisfaction has a 
stronger influence on attitudes toward foreign workers than on views regarding other 
social/moral matters. Alternatively, conservative dispositions may have relatively weaker 
influence on attitudes toward foreign workers than on views regarding other social/moral 
matters. 
There were some significant negative correlations between financial satisfaction and 
more protectionist attitudes toward immigrant workers when jobs are scarce, particularly 
among the 18 to 34 demographic.465 This is unsurprising from Modernisationist and 
Homogenisationist perspectives. People who are more financially satisfied feel greater 
existential security and autonomy than those who are relatively financially dissatisfied. They 
are therefore more inclined to emphasise liberal, cosmopolitan, egalitarian, self-expression 
values rather than conformity, nationalistic, survival values. Less financially satisfied younger 
people are more likely to be affected by recessions and joblessness than those with more 
established careers. Hence, younger people are probably inclined to have more protectionist 
attitudes toward foreign workers (particularly if they are filling low/unskilled jobs), than their 
elders.466  
In 2012, the significant negative correlations between financial satisfaction and more 
protectionist attitudes to foreign workers had disappeared in each of the age groups and the 
wave overall.467 This is probably due to a hardening of attitudes toward foreign workers, 
particularly among the financially satisfied. This is supported by the frequency statistics 
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explored in the previous chapter. This hardening of attitudes may be, at least partly, 
explained by Australian unemployment and underemployment increasing in the years 
following the GFC and the number of temporary foreign workers in Australia (on 457 visas) 
more than doubling between 2005 and 2012.468 However, no consistent correlations were 
found between income and attitudes to foreign workers,469 indicating that, once again, when 
controlling for other variables income has much less of an effect on many of the dependent 
variables considered in this thesis than financial satisfaction. However, income may still play a 
significant role in the shaping of outcomes by raising financial satisfaction. 
Industrial Relations 
From here I investigate whether Putnam’s contention that industrial relations 
deregulation has acted to reduce job and existential security, and various indicators of social 
capital and civic engagement, applies in the Australian context.470 I conclude that it does not. 
Putnam holds that the abandonment of certain industrial relations regulations for greater 
workplace flexibility, productivity and in many instances autonomy has had analogous 
negative outcomes for levels of social connectivity and associated life choices and 
opportunities.471 While Putnam concedes that industrial relations deregulation can, in some 
contexts, be economically beneficial he stresses that these benefits come at social costs. He 
argues that performance-based pay has a detrimental effect on bonding between co-
workers.472 Michael O’Donnell has found that performance-based pay negatively impacts 
teamwork and cooperation in the workplace.473 Other studies have revealed that even when 
teamwork is not especially required, performance-based pay can reduce productivity when 
the tasks set require even a basic level of cognitive consideration as opposed to repetitive 
manual labour.474 Putnam also highlights the coordination problems faced by many 
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employees with irregular work hours in organising social and community events with 
others.475 Declining regular 9 to 5, Monday to Friday jobs have been, and are, exacerbating 
these difficulties in many countries.476 Increases in irregular work schedules have been linked 
to reduced participation in group leisure activities and to detrimental effects on mental and 
physical health and well-being.477 Putnam also posits that industrial relations deregulation 
has raised the financial anxiety felt by many of those in contingent employment and that this 
increase in financial anxiety undermines social and political engagement.478 
Other studies into the effects of IR deregulation on employee well-being and 
productivity in developed countries have largely supported Putnam’s arguments. Sparks, 
Faragher and Cooper argue that advances in technology, particularly IT, and increasing 
globalisation have raised the competitiveness of international markets, encouraging many 
organisations to restructure and “de-layer” (cut out middle management) to survive.479 They 
reveal that in many OECD countries there has been a growth in short term contracts “as a 
result, possibly, of the deregulation of fixed term contracts”.480 These trends have 
precipitated a rise in job insecurity in several OECD countries.481 Not only has job insecurity 
been linked to poor physical and mental health but also to greater absenteeism and declines 
in work quality, social/civic engagement and organisational loyalty.482 While younger workers 
(18 to 30) are more accepting of insecure work compared to older workers, this is only short-
term. Long-term non-permanency is considered a major obstacle to engaging in certain 
activities later in the life-cycle such as buying property and starting a family.483 
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However, many of the trends found in other advanced countries do not apply to 
Australia. Casual (as opposed to permanent) employees as a proportion of the workforce 
have remained fairly steady (at approximately 20%) for more than two decades.484 A 
disproportional and growing share of casual employees are young people; those aged 15 to 
24.485 Casual employment reduces the risks of employment undertaken by employers; 
providing young people with greater opportunities to enter the workforce at an age when 
they are less concerned about job permanency.486 Contrastingly, over the last two decades 
the percentage of casual workers aged 25+ has rarely nudged 15%.487 The percentage of 
female workers of prime working age (25 to 54) who are casually employed (although higher 
than that of men) has been declining fairly steadily since 2000.488 Therefore, the argument 
that the casualisation of the Australian workforce is raising job insecurity and financial anxiety 
is simply without any basis. Research by Edelman Berland also suggests that a large 
proportion of casuals are casual by choice for reasons of flexibility and skills development.489  
Other causes of financial anxiety and distress in OECD countries according to Sparks, 
Faragher and Cooper include falling real minimum wages.490 However, Australian real hourly 
average, median and minimum wages have been rising fairly consistently for almost three 
decades despite growing income inequality.491 While rates of underemployment in Australia 
have increased since 1986, from 3.3% of those employed to 8.6% in 2014, rates of 
unemployment have swung dramatically in that time from less than 2% in 1970 to 11% in the 
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early 1990s to 4% in 2007 to 6.2% in July 2015.492 This may indicate that rates of 
underemployment, like unemployment, may be due to short-term period effects such as 
recessions and the end of a resources boom rather than to long-term systemic changes.  
Still, some fundamental restructuring of the workforce has been taking place. Since 
the 1970s the proportion of part-time workers has soared dramatically.493 Equivalently 
dramatic increases in rates of underemployment or discouraged workers are not present in 
the data suggesting that attitudinal changes and greater employment flexibility or both are 
encouraging the growth of more part-time employment by choice, which Putnam has linked 
to higher rates of social and civic engagement particularly among women.494 Indeed the 
percentage of total employed people working between 20 and 39 hours a week rose 
between 2001 and 2014 from 34.5 to 40.9% while the proportion who work less than 20 
hours a week has only declined slightly from 14.4 to 14% and the proportion working 40 
hours plus per week fell considerably from 51 to 45.1%.495  
Inequality and Housing Affordability 
Perhaps somewhat more worrying are rising levels of inequality and dwelling cost to 
income ratios as well as declines in minimum wages relative to average and median wages of 
full-time workers. Australia’s inequality (Gini coefficient) in household incomes (after benefits 
and taxes) has been rising fairly steadily since the early 1980s.496 During this time Australia’s 
minimum wage fell relative to both the average wage (from 59% in 1985 to 44% in 2013) and 
the median wage (65% in 1985 to 54% in 2013) of full time workers.497 Economists often 
argue that in places where there is little elasticity of housing supply (urban and suburban 
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areas where most Australians live) housing affordability usually declines when inequality 
rises. They argue that this is due to wealthier individuals spending a higher proportion of 
their incomes on saving and investment (including property investment) than relatively 
poorer persons.498 Consequently, rising inequality means more money being invested by 
fewer people. This drives up property prices and forces many to forgo their dream of home 
ownership while many others struggle with greater indebtedness and mortgage repayments 
in chasing their dream of home ownership.  
In Australia the mean and median dwelling price to the mean and median household 
income ratios have followed an almost identical pattern to household inequality. Between 
the mid-1980s and the mid-2000s the average dwelling price rose from approximately twice 
to well beyond four times the average annual household income.499 Over the same time 
frame the median dwelling price rose from slightly over three times to about seven times the 
median annual household income.500 Greater inequality and reduced housing affordability 
would certainly affect levels of financial anxiety, despite rising real average, median and 
minimum wages as people (particularly young first home buyers) increasingly stretch their 
budgets to keep up with the Joneses. Indeed other studies have revealed a link between 
areas with greater income inequality and mental health disorders, particularly depression.501 
There is strong evidence to suggest that people who are more financially anxious/dissatisfied 
and those who are depressed are more likely to become socially isolated and less engaged in 
social and civic life.502 Therefore, Putnam’s view that changing economic environments may 
be contributing to a general increase in financial anxiety/dissatisfaction, which may, in turn, 
be contributing to reductions in social capital, are plausible arguments insofar as they apply 
to Australia.  
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Australian Industrial Relations 
However, in Australia, rising financial inequality and house prices are not the product 
of industrial relations deregulation. Australia has been a pioneer of progressive IR 
regulations. In 1904 Australia became the first country to create a court of conciliation and 
arbitration to settle disputes between employees, unions and employers.503 In 1907 the court 
established the principle that all unskilled labourers were entitled to a minimum wage which 
would allow a family of 5 to live in “frugal comfort”.504 Australia was also an early adopter of 
annual leave (1906), sick leave (1907), the standard working week (44 hours 1927, 40 hours 
1947 and 38 hours 1983), equal pay for equal work (1972) and unpaid maternity leave 
(1979).505 In 1993, the Keating government legislated both federal ‘unfair dismissal laws’ and 
the legal right to strike during bargaining for registered enterprise agreements.506 ‘Good faith 
bargaining’ was introduced as part of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Australia). Good faith 
bargaining obligations raised the power and influence of trade unions at the expense of 
employers.507  
Admittedly, there have also been incremental industrial relations reform toward 
greater deregulation, productivity and flexibility. The Howard government’s Workplace 
Relations Act 1996 (Australia) reversed the onus of proof in unfair dismissal claims. Rather 
than employers being required to prove that there were valid reasons for dismissal, 
employees now must prove dismissal was either harsh, unjust or unreasonable.508 The act 
also introduced registered individual agreements (Australian Workplace Agreements), which 
are an addition to registered collective agreements sanctioned in 1993. Both types of 
agreement have acted to raise flexibility and enhance the degree to which workers’ pay and 
                                                          
503 Australian Government: FairWork Ombudsman, ‘Australia’s industrial relations timeline’, viewed 23 
October 2015, https://www.fairwork.gov.au/about-us/the-fair-work-system/australias-industrial-relations-
timeline  
504 Philips, Keri. (2015) ‘The history of industrial relations in Australia’, ABC Radio National (Australian 
Broadcasting Corporation), viewed 23 October 2015, 
http://www.abc.net.au/radionational/programs/rearvision/bosses-and-workers-in-australia/6407092 
505 Australian Government: FairWork Ombudsman, ‘Australia’s industrial relations timeline’ 
506 Philipatos, Alexander. (5th of June 2012). ‘Back to the “Bad Old Days”: IR Reform and the Fair Work Act’ 
Lecture presented for THE CENTRE FOR INDEPENDENT STUDIES, viewed online 6 June 2017, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UH2hXQfbfeg 
507 Philipatos, ‘Back to the “Bad Old Days”: IR Reform and the Fair Work Act’ 
508 Philipatos, ‘Back to the “Bad Old Days”: IR Reform and the Fair Work Act’ 





conditions are subject to market forces.509 Upwards of 80% of workers are now covered by 
agreements while the proportion covered by relatively inflexible awards has decreased from 
45% of workers in 1990 to below 15% (in 2012).510 The 2005 Work Choices reforms outlawed 
pattern bargaining,511 mandated secret ballots for industrial action and formulated a list of 
prohibited content that restricted the grounds on which employees could legally strike. The 
Fair Work Act 2009 maintained the ban on pattern bargaining and the requirement for secret 
ballots as well as most Work Choices restrictions on industrial action.512 These reforms have 
contributed to a significant decline in the strike rate; measured by the number of working 
hours lost per 1,000 employees.513  
However, overall these incremental industrial relations reforms toward greater 
deregulation, productivity and flexibility have not come at the expense of workers’ pay, 
conditions and ability to secure redress for supposedly unfair dismissal. Evidence suggests 
that the move away from awards and toward collective and individual agreements have 
contributed significantly to rising productivity and wages.514 Workers covered by individual 
agreements have higher average weekly earnings than those on collective agreements whose 
average weekly earnings are in turn significantly higher than those on awards.515 While the 
onus of proof now falls on workers to prove the validity of their unfair dismissal claims more 
than 80% of these claims are settled during the conciliation stage in which no evidence can 
be presented and employers are pressured to pay ‘go-away money.’ That is, employers 
(rather than their former employees) must pay the cost of an expensive trial (possibly more 
than $30,000) if the dispute goes to arbitration.516 Therefore, these reforms have not 
amounted to a sweeping attack on workers’ rights and entitlements. They cannot reasonably 
be used to argue that the general trend in Australian IR law history has been anything other 
than toward greater protection and bargaining-power for workers and unions. 
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Indeed, only twice in the nation’s history have governments attempted serious IR 
deregulation and both those centre-right governments were voted out of office in landslide 
election victories for the left (1929 and 2007), bringing an end to their medium to long term 
deregulation agendas.517 Rising inequality in Australia, and the financial anxiety that that may 
directly or indirectly cause, are not the product of governments deregulating employment 
laws. Instead, it is more attributable to globalisation and the dynamic and technologically 
disruptive times in which we live.518 
Non-traditional and flexible Hours 
The workforce being employed part-time nearly doubled from 16% in August 1979 to 
30% in August 2009.519 As previously argued, this has been largely driven by employee 
choice, which is associated with greater social involvement in formal and informal 
group/organisational activities.520 Conversely, trading hour liberalisation and the increase in 
the proportion of people working non-traditional hours has arguably had negative impacts on 
such engagement.521 Not only has the proportion of people working non-traditional hours 
grown, so too has the proportion who work variable days and hours. A study conducted in 
2008 found that  
- “14.7% of employed people worked on days of the week which varied from week 
to week,”  
- 26% “did not usually work the same number of hours each week”, 33.8% usually 
worked on weekends,  
- 25.1% usually were required to be on call or standby, and  
- 36% worked some or all of their hours between 7 PM and 7 AM.522  
                                                          
517 Markey, Raymond. (2013) ‘Tragedy or farce? The repetition of Australian industrial relations history, 1929 
and 2007’, Labor History, vol:54(4), p.355-367 
518 Sparks., Faragher., and Cooper. ‘Well-being and occupational health in the 21st century workplace,’ p.489-
492; Betran, Concha and Pons, Maria, A. (2013) ‘Comparing past and present wage inequality in two 
globalisation periods’, Scandinavian Economic History Review, vol:61(2), p.158 & 159 
519 Australian Bureau of Statistics, ‘Patterns in work’ 
520 Putnam, Bowling Alone, p.90 & 191 
521 Martens., Nijhuis., Boxtel, and Knottnerus. ‘Flexible work schedules and mental and physical health’, p.43 
522 Australian Bureau of Statistics, ‘Patterns in work’  





Therefore, a significant portion of the Australian public face difficulties in coordinating social, 
community and civic organisational involvement. This may preclude more people from 
participation now than in the past when a greater proportion of 9 to 5 Monday to Friday jobs 
were available. 
Despite these negative trends there is a growing fraction of the Australian workforce 
who work flexible/family and community friendly hours. Although realistically there are 
limitations to the forms of work which can reasonably provide this greater autonomy, the 
development of new technologies and the automation of many routine manual jobs are 
raising the share of these types of careers.523 Not only can flexible hours raise productivity by 
increasing workforce participation, female worker retention and recruitment while lowering 
absenteeism, flexible hours can also help to overcome some of the real coordination barriers 
to voluntary formal and informal group engagement. Potentially, the restructuring of the 
modern workforce and work schedules are not purely obstacles to social capital formation 
and maintenance as is emphasised by Putnam (2000) and Martens, Nijhuis, Boxtel and 
Knottnerus (1999). It can also empower individuals to pursue activities requiring, and 
associated with, greater structural social capital. In the Australian context the only near 
certain economic drag on social capital is growing inequality. This has likely raised the 
proportion (relative to the rate it would otherwise have been) of people experiencing mental 
health issues and financial anxiety; in part due to wealth inequality’s significant and strong 
relationship with housing unaffordability. Overall, evidence suggests that Putnam’s 
contention that industrial relations deregulation has acted to reduce job and existential 
security, and various indicators of social and civic engagement, does not apply in the 
Australian context. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has analysed correlation, and other statistics, to weigh the relative 
strengths/weaknesses of Homogenisation, Modernisation and Lamentation theories. It has 
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focused on the relationships between a subjective sense of autonomy as well as economic 
factors possibly influencing actual levels of autonomy, and social capital and political 
engagement measures. This investigation has largely supported my Homogenisation thesis. 
Additionally, Putnam’s Lamentationist arguments concerning the role of labour market 
deregulation in social capital and political involvement patterns (related to employee 
financial security and autonomy) are found not to apply in the Australian context. 
Contrastingly, higher incomes and financial satisfaction (two measures of autonomy) as well 
as levels of inequality appear to significantly influence social/political values, trust and 
engagement in ways fairly consistent with my Homogenisation theory. Inconsistencies can 
reasonably be attributed to the influence of an uncontrolled variable (personality 
types/predispositions) on correlations between financial satisfaction and views on certain 
social/moral matters.  
In the next chapter correlations between other supposed measures of individual 
isolating and empowering atomisation and social/political trust, capital and engagement are 
assessed. Putnam’s argument that delayed marriage, rising divorce and falling fertility rates 
are acting to reduce the formation of certain types of social bonds and community/civic 
involvement is considered.524 This theory is weighed against Inglehart and Welzel’s thesis that 
both familial structures and community and civic participation are affected by the same 
values shift.525 
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Familial Composition, Television, Residence, Religiosity, Sex 
& Occupation 
 
The first two chapters of this thesis explored and compared competing social capital, 
values and engagement theories used by their authors and advocates to explain various 
statistics and research indicating differing value, social capital and political participation 
trends. Chapter Three provided an overview of these trends by presenting percentage 
statistics collated from 1981, 1995, 2005 and 2012 World Values Survey data. Chapter Four 
analysed correlation statistics from these survey waves to infer the likely nature of 
relationships between both feelings of, and economic factors possibly influencing actual, 
autonomy and value orientations, social capital measures and political involvement. These 
correlations controlled for salient variables including age, sex, employment status, marital 
status, financial satisfaction, income, highest level of education attained (or for the 1981 
wave - the age at which participants completed or were due to complete their full-time 
education),526 frequency of religious service attendance, number of children and the size of 
one’s town/city (the question regarding town size was not asked in the 1981 wave of the 
WVS). The SPSS statistics software enabled the author of this thesis to find these correlations 
with relative ease by selecting independent and dependent variables and adding as many 
control variables as desired. 
This chapter assesses correlation statistics from Australian WVS data to infer 
relationships between non-economic variables (that possibly impact on actual levels of 
autonomy) and values, social capital and political engagement patterns. Graphs used to 
illustrate these relationships present Strength and Significance Scores. The method of arriving 
at these scores was discussed in the previous chapter. The correlation statistics presented 
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suggest that many of the variables Putnam deems to be significant factors, actually have little 
to no influence on, or relationship with, value orientations, social capital and political 
engagement. These variables include marital status, how many children one has, sex, female 
employment status, the time one devotes to television watching, frequency of religious 
service attendance and the size of one’s town/city.527 Contrastingly, other correlation WVS 
statistics support both Inglehart and Welzel’s Modernisationist and my Homogenisationist 
position that education, and the degree to which one’s job requires creativity significantly 
impacts on value orientations, social capital and political involvement.528 That is, jobs 
requiring greater autonomy, creativity and critical thinking experience (e.g. formal education) 
can encourage more emphasis on self-expression values which in turn affects social capital 
and political participation. Although Putnam also holds that formal educational attainment is 
a salient factor, he does not attribute values, social capital and engagement measures to 
workplace autonomy and the requirement to work creatively.529 
The controlled variables used in the previous chapter are also applied for this fifth 
chapter’s correlation statistics so that the nature of relationships between tested variables 
can be more accurately inferred. These control variables include economic factors such as 
income and financial satisfaction. Therefore, while the variables tested in this chapter 
probably influence measures of economic empowerment, this impact is effectively mitigated 
by the control variables. Consequently, the statistics presented in this chapter reveal non-
economic relationships including possible causal effects. The variables tested include marital 
status, number of children, sex, female employment status, highest level of education 
attained, the degree to which one’s work requires creativity, hours of television viewing, 
frequency of religious service attendance and town/city size. Employment status may initially 
appear to be an economic variable. However, the statistics control for income and financial 
satisfaction. Therefore, correlation evidence between employment status and value 
orientations, social capital and political participation are more likely to uncover social (rather 
than economic) relationships between employment and other variables tested. For example, 
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the degree to which social interaction and hours spent at the workplace act to raise or inhibit 
social and political capital, trust and engagement during non-work hours. 
Marriage & Fertility 
In Putnam’s Lamentation theory declining marriage and fertility rates are claimed to 
have some individual isolating effects: reducing certain types of social capital. Putnam 
contends that married people with children are more likely to attend religious services and 
participate in religious activities, social engagements and organisations than those who are 
single and childless.530 However, he concedes that being married and having children are also 
negatively correlated with both membership of sports, political and cultural groups and 
spending time informally with friends and neighbours.531 Putnam uses these correlations 
between measures of structural social capital and both marital and parental status to argue 
that marital and parental status are likely to cause certain patterns of engagement which, in 
turn, affects values, trust and interests. However, Inglehart and Welzel believe that such 
correlations between family compositions and measures of structural social capital do not 
indicate causal relationships. Instead, they contend that these correlations are produced by 
both family compositions and structural social capital measures being affected by an identical 
shift in values that is inextricably linked to modernisation.532  
The median and average ages of Australian men and women at first marriage has 
been rising (almost consistently) since 1975.533 Steep declines in Australia’s fertility rate 
occurred earlier. Between 1960 and 1980 Australia’s fertility rate dropped from above 3.4, to 
1.9 children per woman. Since then the fertility rates have largely plateaued, fluctuating 
between only 1.8 and 2 children per woman.534 Thus, since the mid-twentieth century 
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Australian fertility rates and the proportion of married Australians have declined. Therefore, 
the ways in, and extent to which marriage and fertility influence social and political capital 
and engagement, is salient to my thesis. 
Correlations drawn from Australian WVS data reveal that when significant variables 
were controlled marital status was not consistently or significantly correlated with:  
- involvement in political party, environmental, religious (when religious attendance 
is not controlled), labour union, sports/recreational or consumer organisations,535  
- interpersonal trust,536  
- political interest,537  
- political discussion among friends/work colleagues,538  
- unconventional political participation,539 
- believing that one’s country is run for the benefit of all people rather than for the 
benefit of a few big interests,540  or  
- confidence in the legal system, civil service, parliament, political parties, the 
national government, television, the press, the armed forces, 
charitable/humanitarian organisations, the environmental protection movement, 
banks, churches, police and major companies.541  
However, being married appears to be positively correlated with measures of 
trustworthiness.542 Contrastingly, marriage seems to be negatively correlated with:  
- being in favour of greater economic aid for poorer countries even if it means 
paying higher taxes.543   
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These results tend to contradict Lamentation theory. According to Putnam marriage 
should have an overall positive correlation with involvement in religious organisations but 
should be negatively correlated with involvement in political parties and activities.544 Yet, 
Australian WVS statistics reveal that marriage is not consistently and significantly correlated 
with either religious organisational engagement, nor involvement in political parties. 
Marriage has no significant relationship with participation in unconventional political 
activities. Furthermore, marriage was found to be positively correlated with trustworthiness. 
However, rather than the institution of marriage acting to raise trustworthiness, this 
correlation is more compellingly explained by trustworthy people making better life partners 
than untrustworthy people. Arguably trustworthy people can more easily find someone 
willing to marry them and have longer, more successful, marriages than untrustworthy 
individuals.545  
Negative correlations were discovered in the early waves between marriage and 
involvement in art, music and educational organisations, and professional associations. 
However, these relationships became positive in latter waves.546 This may suggest three 
things. First, that marriage has a negative impact on participation in these activities. Second, 
that those with personality types more inclined to marry and stay married may participate in 
these groups and activities at higher rates than other people. Third, as marriage rates have 
declined slightly and marriage has been delayed until later in the life-cycle, those who are 
now marrying early in life and staying married may well possess greater community and civic 
mindedness relative to others, now as compared to decades ago. Consequently, the 
influence of these personality and value traits may now exceed the negative impact marriage 
may potentially have on involvement. Hence, marriage probably has no great bearing on the 
development of social capital, values or trust. Conversely changing values may be 
contributing to the delaying of marriage. These statistics suggest that, Modernisation and 
Homogenisation are more compelling than Lamentation. 
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The causes and effects of fertility rates are also areas of disagreement between 
Putnam, on the one hand and Modernisation and Homogenisation theses, on the other. 
Modernisation and my Homogenisation theory hold that declining fertility rates are caused 
by value emphases within post-industrial societies shifting from survival to self-expression 
values.547 This shift is driven by individual empowering atomising trends in technology, the 
economy, education and occupational specialisation548 and is responsible for reshaping social 
capital, trust, and behaviour.549 Conversely, Putnam maintains that individual isolating 
atomising trends, including changed family structures (delayed marriage and fewer children), 
are responsible for declines in social capital, interpersonal trust and community and civic 
oriented values and behaviours.550 
There appears to be no consistent significant correlations between having more 
children and:  
- interpersonal trust,551  
- involvement in political parties552 
- discussing politics among friends and coworkers,553  
- a belief that one’s country is run for the benefit of all rather than just for a few big 
interests,554 or  
- a willingness to provide poorer countries with greater economic aid even if it 
means paying more tax.555  
However, positive correlations were found between having more children and petition 
signing, and trustworthiness. Additionally, Figure 5.1 illustrates the strength and significance 
of positive correlations between having more children and confidence in police, television, 
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the legal system, the armed forces and churches.556 Negative correlations were revealed 
between having more children and both joining in boycotts (2005) and (as shown in Figure 
5.2) being politically interested.557 Correlations between having more children and 
participation in peaceful demonstrations and environmental organisations were initially 
negative but became positive in latter waves.558 Conversely, correlations found between the 
number of children a person has and involvement in sports/recreational organisations and 
church/religious organisations (both when church attendance is and is not controlled) were 
initially positive but became negative in later waves.559  
Figure 5.1 
Average strength and significance scores within age demographics of correlations 
collated from 1981, 1995, 2005 and 2012 Australian WVS waves, between having more 
children and having less confidence in TV, churches, the police, legal system and armed 
forces (appendices 204-208). 
 
Figure 5.2 
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Average strength and significance scores within age demographics of correlations 
collated from 1995, 2005 and 2012 Australian WVS waves, between having more 
children and being less interested in politics (appendix 210). 
 
These results suggest that the number of children a person has affects their social 
capital little, undermining Putnam’s Lamentation theory. The positive correlations between 
having more children and being trustworthy probably indicates that trustworthy people are 
more likely to have successful romantic relationships that produce children than those who 
are less trustworthy. The mixed and changing correlations found between having more 
children and participation in formal organisations suggest no real systemic or causal 
relationship. Furthermore, the transforming relationship between having more children and 
participation in peaceful lawful demonstrations may not be causal or a product of systemic 
values change. Instead, these correlations may be due to period specific factors that have not 
yet been identified.   
The positive correlations found between having more children and confidence in 
major institutions combined with the lack of any consistent significant correlation between 
having more children and interpersonal trust supports both Modernisation and 
Homogenisation theses. Inglehart, Welzel and I maintain that those who emphasise survival 
over self-expression values tend to have more children and be more prepared to trust 
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values.560 Had there been positive correlations between having more children and 
interpersonal trust, confidence in major institutions may have been deemed an extension of 
generalized trust. That is, the strong correlations between trust and trustworthiness and 
between trustworthiness and having more children, could have been interpreted as 
trusting/trustworthy people having more children than the relatively less trusting and less 
trustworthy. However, as there is no correlation between interpersonal trust and having 
more children, the link between family size and institutional confidence is most probably 
explained by a divergence in values between those who choose to have more, and those who 
decide to have fewer or no children. Perhaps interpersonal trust also positively affects 
fertility, reducing what would otherwise be (according to Modernisation and Homogenisation 
theories) an observable negative correlation between having more children and 
interpersonal trust. That is, Inglehart, Welzel and I argue that an emphasis on self-expression 
values is linked to both greater interpersonal trust, fewer children and less confidence in 
large powerful hierarchal institutions.561  
A positive correlation was revealed between having more children and petition 
signing. Yet, Putnam argues that having children is negatively correlated with political 
participation.562 The correlation found possibly suggests that Australians with larger families 
may be more concerned about particular single issues (which they perceive as impacting, or 
potentially impacting, their families) than those with fewer children/descendants. Hence, a 
greater number of familial bonds may drive people into political activity. There were negative 
correlations between having more children and both joining in boycotts and being politically 
interested.563 These statistics suggest that the raised political concerns of Australians with 
larger families (relative to those with smaller families) tend to focus purely on those issues 
affecting their kin directly. Boycotts tend to focus on ethical concerns or protectionism. 
Boycotters are not usually attempting to better the lives of their families and loved ones in 
any direct or immediate sense. These statistics suggest that people with more children tend 
to have, relative to those with smaller families, more interests besides politics that are 
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meaningful to them. Thus, familial interests may distract from being more politically engaged. 
Alternatively, those who emphasise survival values may tend to have larger families and be 
less politically interested and less engaged in unconventional political activity than those who 
emphasise self-expression values. Hence, family size may affect political interest/engagement 
or different value orientations may affect both familial size and political 
interest/engagement. Either way the statistics presented thus far erode Putnam’s 
Lamentation argument that declining fertility rates have an overall detrimental effect on 
social capital and civic orientated values and behaviours.  
Television Viewing 
Putnam finds that television viewing has a negative impact on most social capital 
indicators. He contends that the rise in both television viewership and hours spent watching 
television (over the last half century or so) has been a major contributing factor to social capital 
decline.564 Contrastingly, Australian WVS statistics indicate time devoted to television 
watching has few negative effects on, social capital measures. The Australian WVS question 
regarding time participants spend watching television was only asked in the 1995 wave. 
Therefore, these statistics between television viewing and social capital indicators are 
perhaps not as reliable as other correlations discussed in this thesis. Still, they are worth 
considering. 
Controlling for other variables there were no compelling relationships565 between 
television viewing and most social capital measures. These measures include:  
- political interest,566  
- measures of trustworthiness,567  
- interpersonal trust,568  
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- involvement in charitable, art, music, educational, sport/recreational 
organisations, labour unions,569 or  
- confidence in the National government, UN, civil service, parliament, political 
parties, labour unions, the press, legal system, Armed Forces, churches, major 
companies, and the way in which the country is run.570   
However, compelling negative relationships were discovered between time devoted to 
television viewing and:  
- generosity,571  
- levels of political discussion with friends and co-workers,572 and  
- involvement in professional associations, political parties, and environmental and 
religious (when church/religious attendance is not a control variable) 
organisations.573  
Conversely, marked positive relationships were revealed between time devoted to television 
viewing and having greater confidence in the police and television.574 
These results would suggest that television viewing may erode generosity, political 
discussion and time spent being involved in ‘some’ formal organisations. However, contrary 
to Putnam’s argument, the results indicate that television viewing may potentially act to raise 
confidence in some societal institutions particularly those related to law enforcement. Still, it 
is possible that television does not have these effects. That is, either these tendencies may 
encourage more television viewing or some other variable (uncontrolled) is influencing both 
patterns of television watching and behaviours and attitudes with which they are correlated. 
Arguably people with fewer friends have fewer political (and other) discussions with friends. 
Consequently, they may have more time to devote to television. Additionally, (as previously 
explained) many significant variables were controlled for in all correlations presented in this 
thesis unless otherwise indicated. These variables were listed earlier. Therefore, it is unlikely 
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that another uncontrolled variable is manipulating the results. Hence, I suspect that 
television viewing is affecting most variables with which it is correlated. Nevertheless, the 
positive correlation between confidence in and time spent viewing television may be 
explained by a kind of positive feedback loop. That is, people with greater confidence in, are 
motivated to view more, television and more hours spent viewing encourages greater 
confidence in, television. Clearly, the relatively few compelling relationships found between 
television viewing and social capital indicators suggests that television is unlikely to be the 
major factor in the erosion of social capital argued by Putnam. Overall, the effects of 
television viewing appear to be quite modest, at least in the Australian context. 
Religious Service Attendance 
Putnam also argued in Bowling Alone that people who more frequently attend 
religious services are more likely both to be engaged in non-religious formal and informal 
associations and to score higher on other measures of social capital such as interpersonal 
trust and generosity.575 However, when controlling for other variables, the Australian WVS 
statistics indicate that religious attendance is not clearly, consistently and significantly 
correlated with:  
- interpersonal trust,576  
- formal organisational involvement,577  
- political discussion or interest,578  
- unconventional political activities,579  
- measures of trustworthiness,580 or  
- confidence in the UN, civil service, labour unions, the press, legal system, Armed 
Forces, the environmental protection movement or the way in which the country 
is run.581  
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The Australian data reflects fairly consistent significant positive relationships between 
religious attendance and generosity (as demonstrated by Figure 5.3) and confidence in 
political parties, the national government, the police, major companies and 
charitable/humanitarian organisations (as shown in Figure 5.4).582 There was also a fairly 
consistent significant negative relationship between religious attendance and television 
viewing.583 Where significant correlations between religious attendance and measures of 
trustworthiness were found they were negative in the 1981 wave but were positive in the 
three subsequent waves.  
Figure 5.3 
Average strength and significance scores within age demographics of correlations 
collated from 1995 and 2005 Australian WVS waves, between attending religious 
services less frequently and not being willing to pay higher taxes to help poorer 
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Average strength and significance scores within age demographics of correlations 
collated from 1981, 1995, 2005 and 2012 Australian WVS waves, between attending 
religious services less frequently and having less confidence in political parties, the 
national government, police, major companies and humanitarian/charitable 
organisations (appendices 276-280). 
 
These results would suggest that Putnam’s arguments regarding the relationships 
between religiosity/religious service attendance and measures of social capital are largely 
incorrect. There were no clear consistent significant relationships between religiosity and 
formal organisational involvement or interpersonal trust. The very consistent significant 
positive relationships found between religious attendance and both generosity and 
confidence in a number of societies major institutions/organisations are not necessarily 
caused by religious attendance; as is implied by Putnam. Instead, people who have particular 
personality types may be both more generous and more inclined to become heavily religious 
than those with other personality traits. Also, people more willing to be led or to turn to 
authority figures for direction are perhaps predisposed to both being more religious and 
having greater confidence in their society’s major institutions and organisations. Town size 
was not controlled for in the 1981 correlations but were for the subsequent waves. This was 
because participants were not asked how large their towns/cities were in the 1981 wave. This 
may explain the negative relationships found between religious attendance and measures of 








18-34 35-49 50-64 65+





effect on other measures of social capital including, as previously discussed, generosity and 
institutional/organisational confidence. This is inconsistent with Putnam’s Lamentation 
theory. 
Town Size 
Putnam maintains that social capital measures have eroded partly because of the 
declining proportion of Americans living in small towns and rural communities and the rising 
proportion residing in large metropolitan areas. These social capital measures include 
altruism, trust, trustworthiness and civic engagement.584 Putnam argues that smaller towns 
are fertile locations for social capital generation and development.585 Conversely, large city 
metropolises tend to produce isolation and alienation.586 America’s twentieth century 
demographic shift in the proportion of people living in small rural towns versus those living in 
metropolitan areas has been mirrored in Australia.587 Consequently, any link between 
Australian town size and social capital would be relevant to my thesis. However, Putnam’s 
arguments regarding the relationship between town size and social capital indicators are 
revealed to be baseless when collating Australian WVS data.  
Where clear and significant correlations were found between social capital and town 
size, larger cities/towns tended to be associated with higher levels of social capital than 
smaller communities. Larger cities were positively correlated with political interest 
(particularly among the 18-34 age demographic), and confidence in parliament, the civil 
service, political parties and the legal system.588 Figure 5.5 illustrates the strength and 
significance scores of the positive correlations between larger cities and political interest in 
each survey wave in which the question regarding town size was asked. However, larger cities 
were negatively correlated with interpersonal trust.589 There were no other clear significant 
relationships found between town size and other social capital measures. But, contrary to 
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Lamentation theory, there were no clear significant correlations revealed between town size 
and:  
- formal organisational involvement (charitable, environmental, art, music, 
educational, sport/recreational, consumer and religious organisations, 
professional associations, political parties and labour unions),590  
- political discussion,591  
- generosity,592  
- trustworthiness,593  
- belief in the utility of government decision-making,594  
- unconventional political activity,595 or  
- confidence in major institutions/organisations (including the UN, national 
government, police, labour unions, television, the press, Armed Forces, churches, 
major companies, charitable/humanitarian organisations, and the environmental 
protection movement).596  
Thus, WVS statistics would suggest that the effect of town size on social capital is quite small 
and that arguably larger towns/cities are conducive to greater political interest and 
confidence in political and state institutions. This evidence contradicts Putnam’s Lamentation 
theory. 
Figure 5.5 
Average strength and significance scores within 1995, 2005 and 2012 Australian WVS 
waves of correlations between town/city size and being less interested in politics 
(appendix 282). 
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Sex & Female Employment Status 
Putnam argues that women are far more proficient social capitalists than men and that 
the rise in the number/proportion of two full-time career families is reducing opportunities for, 
and the motivation of, women to organise and pursue formal and informal social events and 
connections.597 He claims that the husbands of these women are consequently less inclined 
to engage socially than those husbands who have a wife more socially involved.598 Putnam 
contends that the amount of free time available to people has not declined overall but that 
the distribution of this free time has changed. Those who have traditionally been more 
inclined to use their free time to build networks and organise and participate in formal and 
informal social events -- women and the well-educated -- have less free time. Those who are 
less disposed to using free time to engage with others -- men and the less well educated -- 
have more free time available.599 Furthermore, Putnam argues that people, and particularly 
women, who are part-time employed tend to be more socially engaged than either those 
who work full time or those who are unemployed/full-time “housewives”.600 He posits that 
part-timers are both presented with more opportunities to become engaged through 
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networking during work hours than the unemployed, and have relatively more time to act on 
these opportunities than full-time workers.601 
According to Australian WVS statistics, when controlling for other variables602 sex has 
no consistent correlation with involvement in most formal organisations.603 However, the 
significant correlations found between being female and engagement in trade unions (within 
the various age groups within the various waves) were negative.604 This indicates that being 
female (rather than male), particularly in the 1981 and 1995 waves, may have reduced one’s 
inclination to participate in trade unions. Significant correlations found between being female 
and being involved in religious (when church/religious attendance was not a control variable) 
and charitable organisations were positive in 1981 and 1995 but tended to be negative in 
2005 and 2012.605 These correlations would indicate that being female (rather than male) 
perhaps raised the inclination of individuals to participate in these groups in the past but has 
since acted to reduce involvement. WVS statistics reveal few significant correlations between 
sex and involvement in professional associations. However, these indicate that being male 
(rather than female) raise the disposition of individuals to joining.606 The significant 
correlations revealed between being female and involvement in environmental and art, 
music and educational organisations were positive in 1981 and 1995 but were negative in 
2005 and 2012. However, no significant correlations were found in the 2005 wave between 
sex and participation in environmental organisations, nor in the 1981 wave between sex and 
involvement in art, music and educational organisations.607 Of the five significant correlations 
found between sex and political party involvement two were positive and three negative 
indicating no consistent trend.608 The significant correlations between sex and involvement in 
sport/recreational clubs and organisations suggest that being female (rather than male) 
acted to reduce participation in 1995, then acted to raise involvement in 2005. These 
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relationships were particularly significant among the 18-34 and 50-64 demographics.  There 
were no significant correlations of this type found in the 2012 wave.609  
Together this evidence casts considerable doubt on Putnam’s view that women are 
(or are almost) comprehensively better social capitalists than men. My research supports 
other studies finding no significant difference in the extent to which males and females 
engage in formal and civic groups and organisations.610 However, most investigations into the 
effect of sex and gender on social capital measures indicate that females tend to have 
stronger informal social networks than males. A study conducted by Fuhrer and Stansfeld 
(2002) found that:  
- “Women nominate and report having more close persons, [and] report greater 
satisfaction with their personal relationships [than do men]”  
and that  
- “Men report higher levels of practical support from the person they identify as 
closest, while women report higher levels than men from the subsequent close 
persons.”611  
This finding is consistent with other research revealing that men tend to more heavily rely on 
their, and benefit more from having a, spouse (usually their closest person) than do 
women.612 The strong informal social capital assets (support base) that women provide for 
their male partners may act to significantly raise the happiness, life satisfaction and mental 
health of these men.613 As men tend to have relatively smaller and weaker informal networks 
than women their lack of informal social capital assets probably greatly contributes to the 
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unequal distribution of marital benefits between the sexes. Thus, studies indicate that 
women do perform better according to measures assessing informal structural social capital 
than do men. However, WVS statistics do not support Putnam’s argument that women are 
(or are almost) comprehensively (across all or most indicators) better social capitalists than 
men. 
There were no consistent significant correlations between sex and interpersonal trust; 
another indicator of social capital. Five significant correlations were found between these 
variables: two were positive, and three negative.614 The significant correlations that were 
found between sex and political discussion with friends and work colleagues indicate that in 
1981 and 1995 (when controlling for other variables) women were less inclined to discuss 
politics than were men but by 2012 women were more likely to engage in political discussion 
than their male counterparts.615 This is hardly overwhelming support for Putnam’s 
contention that women are (or are almost) comprehensively more adept and proficient social 
capitalists than men. Significant correlations between sex and political interest suggests that 
men are predisposed to being more politically interested than are women. Figures 5.6 and 
5.7 demonstrate that this relationship held for each wave tested and almost all age groups 
within each wave. Exceptions were the 65+ demographic in each wave and the 18 to 34 age 
group in 1995 and the 35-49 age group in 2012 in which there were no significant 
correlations.616 
Figure 5.6 
Average strength and significance scores within age demographics of correlations 
collated from 1995, 2005 and 2012 Australian WVS waves, between being female and 
being less interested in politics (appendix 333). 
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WVS statistics also reveal that women may (when controlling for other variables) be 
less inclined to have confidence in parliament than men,617 but are predisposed to having 
more confidence in the UN, the police, churches, charitable and environmental organisations 
than are men.618 There were no consistent significant trends found between sex and 
confidence in the civil service, national government, television, the legal system, major 
companies or the armed forces.619 Evidence suggests that being female (rather than male) 
acted to raise confidence in political parties in 1995 and 2005 but that this effect disappeared 
by 2012.620 The data also indicates that being female (rather than male) acted to reduce 
confidence in labour unions in 1981 and 1995. However, this situation had reversed in 2005 
with significant positive correlations found among various age demographics between being 
female and having confidence in labour unions.621 There is disagreement concerning whether 
confidence in society’s major institutions and organisations should be deemed an indicator of 
social capital. Putnam contends that it should.622 This is disputed by Inglehart and Welzel.623 
Regardless, Australian WVS data does not provide overwhelming evidence that women are 
predisposed to being more confident in society’s institutions and organisations than are men.  
When other variables are controlled there are few consistent significant correlations 
between sex and social capital indicators. Apart from 2005 WVS correlations suggesting that 
women were more inclined to sign petitions than were men,624 statistics do not indicate any 
significant relationship between sex and unconventional political engagement. The forms of 
unconventional involvement tested were attending demonstrations, joining boycotts and 
strikes and petition signing (2012).625 Sex also appears to have no impact on generosity as 
measured by the willingness to pay higher taxes to help poorer people in underdeveloped 
countries.626 In the 1995 wave participants were asked to what extent they believed the 
country was run for the benefit of all people rather than just for big interests. The results 
indicate that (when controlling for other variables) women, were less inclined to believe 
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Australia was run for the benefit of all than were men.627 This supports the finding that being 
female (rather than male) acts to reduce confidence in parliament. However, this question 
regarding the utility of government decision making and implementation was only asked in 
1995. Hence, the value of these statistics is limited. Still, the evidence seems to suggest that 
being female (rather than male) acts to reduce confidence in the political process. Putnam 
(unlike Inglehart and Welzel) considers confidence, trust and support for society’s institutions 
and organisations a key component of social capital and trust.628 Therefore, these WVS 
statistics conflict with his argument that women are (or are almost) comprehensively more 
active and adept social capitalists than men. 
The only marker of social capital in which women resoundingly outperform men is 
trustworthiness. As shown in Figures 5.8 and 5.9, when controlling for other variables women 
are less inclined to believe in the justifiability of:  
- accepting a bribe in the course of their duties,629  
- buying something one knew was stolen,630  
- cheating on taxes if one had the chance,631  
- avoiding a fare on public transport,632 or 
- claiming government benefits to which one is not entitled.633  
Greater trustworthiness may indicate that women are perhaps more effective at forging 
long-term social connections (which often require trust) than are men. This is consistent with 
other research investigating the relationship between sex and social capital that has found 
women tend to be better informal social capitalists than men.634 Informal social relationships 
are more heavily reliant on trust and trustworthiness than are formal connections which are 
largely maintained by adherence to formal rules and procedures. However, WVS statistics do 
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not support Putnam’s argument that women are all-round more proficient social capitalists 
than men. Thus, the consequences (for levels of social capital) of any redistribution of free 
time between the sexes is unlikely to be as serious as Putnam argues in Bowling Alone.635 
Figure 5.8 
Average strength and significance scores within age demographics of correlations 
collated from 1981, 1995, 2005 and 2012 Australian WVS waves, between being female 
and measures of untrustworthiness (appendices 353-358). 
 
Figure 5.9 
Average strength and significance scores within 1981, 1995, 2005 and 2012 Australian 
WVS waves of correlations between being female and measures of untrustworthiness 
(appendices 353-358). 
                                                          











18-34 35-49 50-64 65+






The effects of part-time as opposed to full-time employment may be more salient in 
the Australian context than a redistribution of time between sexes. Indeed, part time 
employment has become, and is becoming, more common in the workforce and particularly 
in the female workforce.636 However, the number of consistent significant correlations 
between women’s employment status and social capital indicators (when controlling for 
other variables) were surprisingly few. There appears to be no definitive relationship 
between women working part (as opposed to full) time and:  
- interpersonal trust,637  
- involvement in political parties, labour unions, environmental, consumer or 
religious organisations,638  
- participation in unconventional political activity (attending peaceful 
demonstrations, joining boycotts, and signing petitions),639  
- political interest,640  
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- confidence in the UN, civil service, political parties, the police, labour unions, 
television, the press, the legal system, armed forces, churches, 
charitable/humanitarian organisations, banks, the environmental movement, or 
the way in which the country is run,641 or  
- measures of trustworthiness.642  
Part-time female employees may be slightly more inclined to have confidence in 
major companies, the national government and the legal system but less disposed to discuss 
politics with friends/colleagues than full-time female employees.643 The significant 
correlations which were found between part (as opposed to full) time female employment 
and involvement in charitable organisations indicate that younger part-time employed 
women were perhaps less inclined to participate than younger full-time employed women. 
However, older part-time employed women (50-64) may have been more inclined to be 
involved in charitable organisations in the past than were older full-time employed 
women.644 The data also reveal that the relationship between part (as opposed to full) time 
employment status among women and:  
- involvement in professional associations, art, music, educational and 
sport/recreational organisations, and  
- confidence in parliament  
varied between waves without any clear pattern.645 WVS statistics may suggest that part, (as 
opposed to full), time, employment may encourage some young women to be more 
generous.646 Overall, Putnam’s argument that part-time employment is more conducive to 
female social capital building than full-time employment is not borne out of the Australian 
case as shown by WVS statistics.647  
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Similarly, Australian statistics provide little support for Putnam’s contention that part-
time employment, as opposed to being a “housewife”, encourages women to become more 
socially involved and connected.648 Indeed, the only statistics that support this theory are 
correlations between being a “housewife” as opposed to working part-time, and 
interpersonal trust and confidence in certain institutions and organisations. It appears that 
female part-timers are more inclined than “housewives” to be trusting and have confidence 
in the parliament, political parties, the national government, labour unions, the legal system 
and major companies.649 However, no consistent definitive relationship could be discerned 
between being a “housewife” (as opposed to a female part-time employee) and:  
- political interest,650  
- confidence in the UN, civil service, police, television, the press, Armed Forces, 
churches, banks, or the environmental movement, charitable and humanitarian 
organisations, or the way in which one’s country is run,651  
- involvement in charitable, environmental, art, music, educational, 
sport/recreational, church/religious, or consumer organisations, political parties, 
or labour unions,652  
- political discussion,653  
- participation in unconventional political activity (peaceful demonstrations, 
boycotts, strikes or petition signing),654  
- generosity,655 or  
- any indicator of trustworthiness measured.656  
Hence, the WVS statistics presented in this chapter render Putnam’s views regarding the 
influence of sex and employment status on social capital measures less than compelling for 
the Australian case. 
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Occupational Creativity & Education Attainment 
Post-industrial societies, like Australia, have experienced an expansion of tertiary 
sector (services) professions requiring greater autonomy, cognitive skills, higher levels of and 
greater access to communications/information technology.657 Inglehart, Welzel and I argue 
that these economic transformations have mobilised people’s intellectual independence; 
facilitating greater emphasis on self-expression (as opposed to survival) values. According to 
Inglehart and Welzel’s Modernisation and my Homogenisation theories (when controlling for 
other variables) those with:  
- higher formal educational attainment,  
- greater workplace independence, and  
- more creative and skill intensive careers  
are more inclined to exhibit particular characteristics relative to individuals less well 
educated, with jobs that require routine and manual task completion often micromanaged by 
supervisors. These characteristics include greater: generosity, interpersonal trust, 
trustworthiness, political interest/discussion and engagement in unconventional political 
activity.658 They also involve having more liberal views on family and morality and teaching 
children to heavily emphasise self-expression values.659 The ways and/or extents to which 
work creativity and higher formal educational attainment are deemed to influence 
happiness/life satisfaction and confidence and involvement in formal 
institutions/organisations differ somewhat between Modernisation and Homogenisation 
theories. These differences have already been discussed in previous chapters and are 
reiterated later in this chapter. From here I assess the persuasiveness of these positions 
against Australian WVS statistics. 
                                                          
657 Lowe, Philip. (Speech – Address to the Australian Industry Group 12th Annual Economic Forum – Sydney – 7 
March 2012). ‘The Changing Structure of the Australian Economy and Monetary Policy’, RESERVE BANK OF 
AUSTRALIA, viewed 26 June 2017, http://www.rba.gov.au/speeches/2012/sp-dg-070312.html; Inglehart, and 
Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy, p.24, 28, 29 & 138 
658 Inglehart, and Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy, p.7, 8, 24, 25, 28, 29, 33, 37, 44, 
104, 105, 116, 120, 126, 137, 138, 141, 142, 164, 220, 221, 256, 271, 280-283, 293 & 294 
659 Inglehart, and Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy, p.7, 29, 34, 52, 54, 116, 126-130, 
137, 273 & 274-283 





WVS evidence seems to indicate that (when controlling for other variables) people 
who have occupations requiring creative thinking rather than routine task completion are 
happier (as shown in Figure 5.10) and are more, satisfied with their lives, politically interested 
(as illustrated in Figure 5.11), and inclusive of disadvantaged and out groups (as 
demonstrated by Figure 5.12).660 WVS statistics also suggest that these people may place 
greater importance on children learning imagination and self-expression and have more 
modern liberal attitudes regarding morality (as shown in Figure 5.13), than those who 
perform less creative and more routine work.661 Additionally, the statistics indicate that those 
with jobs requiring greater creativity are:  
- less inclined to involve themselves in professional associations and artistic, music, 
educational, charitable and environmental organisations, and are  
- less generous, and  
- less confident in labour unions, major companies, television, the press, Armed 
Forces (particularly among the young), churches and banks,  
than are people with less creative and more routine work.662 Thus, these correlation statistics 
tend to support both Modernisation and Homogenisation theories. Still, the positive 
relationship between the requirement for work creativity and involvement in religious 
organisations is inconsistent with either thesis.663  
Figure 5.10 
Average strength and significance scores within age demographics of correlations 
collated from 2005 and 2012 Australian WVS waves, between having performed or 
having to perform mostly creative (rather than routine) tasks for previous (if currently 
not employed) or current work and unhappiness (appendix 436). 
                                                          
660 See Appendices 436-440 
661 See Appendices 441, 442 & 445-451 
662 See Appendices 452-462 & 488 
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collated from 2005 and 2012 Australian WVS waves, between having performed or 
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Average strength and significance scores within age demographics of correlations 
collated from 2005 and 2012 Australian WVS waves, between having performed or 
having to perform mostly creative (rather than routine) tasks for previous (if currently 
not employed) or current work and disagreeing that when jobs are scarce men and 
Australians should have more right to a job than women and immigrants (appendices 
439 & 440). 
 
Figure 5.13 
Average strength and significance scores within age demographics of correlations 
collated from 2005 and 2012 Australian WVS waves, between having performed or 
having to perform mostly creative (rather than routine) tasks for previous (if currently 
not employed) or current work and more liberal attitudes regarding suicide, voluntary 
euthanasia, divorce, abortion, prostitution, homosexuality and sex before marriage 
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No consistent significant correlations were found between the requirement to work 
creatively and:  
- trustworthiness,664  
- interpersonal trust,665  
- national pride,666  
- unconventional political activity,667  
- attitudes to euthanasia or family unit compositions,668 or  
- involvement in political parties, labour unions or consumer, sport and recreational 
organisations.669  
Similarly, no clear relationships were revealed between the requirement to work creatively 
and:  
                                                          
664 See Appendices 464-468 
665 See Appendix 469 
666 See Appendix 470 
667 See Appendices 471-473 
668 See Appendices 474-476 
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- having confidence in the UN, civil service, parliament, political parties, the 
national government, police, legal system, charitable/humanitarian organisations 
or the environmental protection movement,670 or  
- believing in the importance of children learning obedience, unselfishness, 
religious faith, determination/perseverance, thrift, tolerance, responsibility, hard 
work or independence.671  
Hence, a large proportion of the correlation statistics that tested the possible relationships 
between the extent to which a person’s occupation requires creative work and other 
variables returned mixed or no significant results. However, the clear relationships / 
consistent significant correlations that were uncovered overwhelmingly support 
Modernisation and Homogenisation theses. 
 
Australian WVS statistics support the Modernisationist and Homogenisationist view 
that after controlling for other variables, higher levels of formal education tend to be 
positively correlated with:  
- interpersonal trust (illustrated by Figure 5.14),672  
- political interest and discussion (demonstrated by Figures 5.15 and 5.16),673  
- generosity (shown in Figure 5.17),674  
- more liberal views on family and morality,675  
- acceptance and inclusion of disadvantaged or out groups (illustrated by Figure 
5.18),676  
- belief in egalitarian work procedures (demonstrated by Figure 5.19) and in the 
importance of children learning self-expression (as opposed to survival) values,677 
and  
- less national pride (as shown in Figure 5.20).678  
                                                          
670 See Appendices 481-487 & 489-490 
671 See Appendices 491-499 
672 See Appendix 500 
673 See Appendices 501 & 502 
674 See Appendix 503 
675 See Appendices 504-506 & 509-516 
676 See Appendices 517-519 
677 See Appendices 520-525 
678 See Appendix 526 
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Average strength and significance scores within age demographics of correlations 
collated from 1981, 1995, 2005 and 2012 Australian WVS waves, between having a 
higher level of formal education and having fewer political discussions with friends 
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of formal education and not being willing to pay higher taxes to help poorer 




Average strength and significance scores within age demographics of correlations 
collated from 1995, 2005 and 2012 Australian WVS waves, between having a higher 
level of formal education and disagreeing that when jobs are scarce men, 
Australians and younger people should have more right to a job than women, 
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Average strength and significance scores within age demographics of correlations 
collated from 1995 Australian WVS waves, between having a higher level of formal 
education and believing that one should follow one’s superior’s instructions only 





Average strength and significance scores within 1981, 1995, 2005 and 2012 Australian 
WVS waves of correlations between having a higher level of formal education and being 
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In Chapter Four I argued that greater overall levels of individual autonomy precipitate 
social network homogenisation which can, in turn, raise levels of nationalist sentiment. 
However, education is probably one individual empowering factor likely to both homogenise 
social networks679 and encourage a more cosmopolitan internationalist world view by 
familiarizing individuals with foreign cultures, practices and achievements. 
Mixed/inconsistent relationships were found between formal education attainment and 
trustworthiness, involvement in unconventional political activity and confidence and 
involvement in major institutions and organisations.680 Contrary to what Inglehart and Welzel 
suggest there was no consistently significant relationship between education and happiness 
or life satisfaction.681 However, the correlations between these variables, that were found 
within survey waves and age demographics, support the Modernisationist position that 
people with higher levels of formal education tend to be happier and more satisfied with 
their lives. 
The clear significant relationships revealed between higher formal educational 
attainment and certain values and social capital measures appear to corroborate both 
                                                          
679 Higher formal education attainment is likely to homogenise social networks by measures such as class, 
occupation and political persuasion. 
680 See Appendices 527-560 
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Modernisation and Homogenisation theories. However, the mixed, inconsistent and non-
existent relationships uncovered between formal education attainment and other variables 
tend to provide relatively greater support to my Homogenisation thesis. Like Modernisation 
theory, Homogenisation theory holds that those more empowered (by factors such as higher 
formal education attainment) will tend to place greater emphasis on self-expression values 
than those who are less empowered. Both theories maintain that when other variables are 
controlled, greater emphasis on self-expression values reduces confidence and involvement 
in formal institutions and organisations. However, unlike Modernisation, my Homogenisation 
thesis suggests (as discussed in Chapter Three and summarised in the next paragraph) that 
many formal organisations are likely to have adapted to the values and expectations of an 
increasingly self-expression values oriented public, with more homogenised social networks 
than in decades past. These adaptations may have diminished or mitigated the 
strength/significance of what would have otherwise been a negative relationship between 
higher formal education attainment and involvement and confidence in formal organisations.  
Studies have found that, in advanced post-industrial countries like Australia, greater 
education attainment, advances in communications technology and intergenerational value 
shifts have empowered and motivated organisation members to demand, and individuals to 
form groups with, more egalitarian structures and procedures.682 Furthermore, research 
suggests that Americans (who share many cultural, linguistic, historical and political 
similarities with Australians) are increasingly likely both; to involve themselves in the same 
on-and-offline groups, attend the same events and frequent the same establishments as 
people who hold political beliefs with which they agree, and; to avoid those at, and in which 
they are likely to encounter persons who have different/opposing political views.683 
Additionally, since at least 2003, annual growth rates in the number of Australian Not-for-
                                                          
682 Saxton, ‘The Participatory Revolution in Nonprofit Management’, p.34-39 
683 Evans and Fu, ‘Opinion formation on dynamic networks’, p.9; Dellaposta, Shi, and Macy, ‘Why Do Liberals 
Drink Lattes?’, p.1473-1511; Gillani, Yuan, Saveski, Vosovghi and Roy, ‘Me, My Echo Chamber, and I’, p.1 & 
2; Halbertam and Kight, ‘Homophily, group size and the diffusion of political information in social networks’, 
p.73-88; Sunstein, ‘The Law of Group Polarization’, p.175-195; Batorski, and Grzywinska, ‘Three dimensions of 
the public sphere on Facebook’, p.356-374; Groshek, and Koc-Michalska, ‘Helping populism win?’, p.1389-
1407; Flaxman, Goal and Rao, ‘Filter Bubbles, Echo Chambers, and Online News Consumption’, p.298-320; 
Dahlberg, ‘Rethinking the fragmentation of the cyberpublic’, p.827-847; Pariser, The filter bubble; Brossard, 
and Scheufele, ‘Science, new media, and the public’, p.40 & 41; Bakshy, Messing, and Adamic, ‘Exposure to 
ideologically diverse news and opinion on Facebook’, p.1130-1132; Yardi, and Boyd, ‘Dynamic debates’, p.316-
327; Davis, ‘The Web of Politics’, p.361-364; Hill and Hughes, Cyberpolitics; Wilhelm, ‘Virtual sounding boards’, 
p.313-338; Huber, and Malhotra, ‘Political Homophily in Social Relationships’, p.270, 271 & 282 





Profit organisations (which include charitable, sports, cultural, health, educational and 
religious groups) have tended to exceed Australian population growth rates.684 This evidence 
supports my theory that organisations are both democratising and splintering into more 
groups with relatively homogenous memberships. These adaptations have (as argued in 
Chapter Three) helped to raise confidence and involvement in many types of groups and 
organisations, particularly among the self-expression oriented and conflict averse who, 
according to my Homogenisation theory, are disproportionally well-educated. 
Additionally, Inglehart and Welzel suggest that happiness and life satisfaction are 
raised and strengthened by individual empowerment brought on by factors including higher 
educational attainment. However, I have presented evidence (in the latter part of Chapter 
Three) indicating that such contexts have little or no influence on long-term happiness. 
Synthetic happiness (that which we create for ourselves in our own minds) is far more potent 
and enduring than that received from improvements to the context in which we are 
embedded.685 Furthermore, although there was no consistency in the significant correlations 
found between higher formal education attainment and either trustworthiness or 
unconventional political activity, formal education attainment is only one measure/indicator 
of individual empowerment. Overall levels of autonomy may still be positively correlated with 
both trustworthiness and unconventional political involvement, as is consistent with 
Modernisation and Homogenisation theories. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has assessed correlation statistics from Australian WVS data to infer 
relationships between non-economic variables and values, social capital and political 
engagement. The correlation statistics presented suggest that many of the variables Putnam 
deems to be significant factors, actually have little to no influence on, or relationship with, 
value orientations, social capital and political involvement. These variables include marital 
status, how many children one has, female employment status, the time one devotes to 
                                                          
684 Shulman, ‘IBISWorld Industry Report X0021: Charities & Not-for-Profit Organisations in Australia’, p.32, 
EthicalJobs: Australia, viewed 25 September 2018, http://www.ethicaljobs.com.au/files/2012_NFP_report.pdf; 
THE WORLD BANK, (last updated 2017) ‘Population growth (annual %): Australia’, 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.GROW?locations=AU  
685 Gilbert, ‘The Surprising Science of Happiness’ 





television viewing, frequency of religious service attendance and the size of one’s town/city. 
Contrastingly, other correlation statistics also drawn from Australian WVS data support both 
Inglehart and Welzel’s Modernisation theory and my own Homogenisation thesis. That is, this 
evidence suggests that education and the degree to which one’s occupation requires 
creativity significantly impacts on value orientations, social capital and political participation. 
Additionally, Putnam’s position that women are (or are almost) comprehensively better social 
capitalists than men is contradicted by WVS statistics. While being female seems to raise 
trustworthiness, WVS evidence suggests that sex has little to no impact on overall levels of:  
- involvement in formal organisations,  
- interpersonal trust,  
- political discussion,  
- confidence in society’s major institutions and organisations,  
- unconventional political engagement, or  
- generosity.  
WVS statistics indicate that being male (rather than female) does raise one’s likelihood of 
being politically interested and having greater confidence in Australia’s parliament. However, 
other studies have found that women tend to have larger and stronger informal social 
networks than do men. 
This chapter’s findings are important as they corroborate statistics discussed in the 
previous chapter revealing that variables directly impacting on individual autonomy and 
empowerment686 tend to effect:  
- value orientations,  
- social capital, and  
- political participation  
in ways consistent with both Modernisation and my own Homogenisation theory. They also 
suggest that alternative theoretical explanations for trends in social and political values, trust, 
                                                          
686 Variables directly effecting individual autonomy and empowerment include subjective sense of autonomy, 
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capital and engagement (such as those expressed by Putnam) are relatively uncompelling. 
The next three chapters analyse statistics collated from my own “Political Participation and 
Conflict Avoidance” survey to evaluate the relationships between social network 
homogeneity and other relevant variables. They thereby test the relative credibility of 
Lamentation, but particularly Modernisation and Homogenisation theories. 
  






--MAPPING A SOCIOLOGICAL NEXUS-- 
The Self-Expression Values Homogenous Social Network 
Complex 
 
Chapter One presented an overview of Australia’s waning rates of party and electoral 
participation. It also identified two main sociological engagement theories and provided 
evidence for why a third theory, warrants further investigation. Chapter Two compared 
conflicting Modernisationist and Lamentationist conceptions of social atomisation. After 
examining these theories in detail, both were found to have merits and shortcomings. 
Chapter Three provided an overview of trends in Australian social and political engagement, 
values, and trust/confidence as well as the factors driving them by presenting percentage 
statistics collated from 1981, 1995, 2005 and 2012 World Values Survey data.  
Chapters Four and Five analysed correlation statistics from these survey waves to 
infer likely relationships between both a subjective sense of, and factors possibly influencing 
actual autonomy and value orientations, social capital measures and political involvement. 
These correlations ‘controlled’ for salient variables including age, sex, employment status, 
marital status, financial satisfaction, income, highest level of education attained, frequency of 
religious service attendance, number of children and the size of one’s town/city. The 
correlation statistics presented possibly suggest that many variables Putnam deems to be 
significant factors have little to no influence on, or relationship with, value orientations, social 
capital and political engagement. These ‘independent’ variables include marital status, how 
many children one has, sex, female employment status, the time one devotes to television 
watching, frequency of religious service attendance and the size of one’s town/city. 
Contrastingly, other correlation statistics also drawn from Australian WVS data have 
supported both Inglehart and Welzel’s Modernisationist theory and my Homogenisationist 
thesis. Indeed, WVS statistics suggest that a subjective sense of empowerment as well as 





factors influencing actual autonomy (including income, wealth, education and the degree to 
which one’s job requires creativity) significantly impact on value orientations, social capital 
and political involvement. 
Having crippled Putnam’s Lamentation thesis in previous chapters (at least in the 
Australian context), Chapters Six and Seven focus on the divergence between my 
Homogenisation and Inglehart and Welzel’s Modernisation theories. This thesis has so far 
considered few statistics that can potentially settle matters of disagreement between 
Homogenisation and Modernisation theories. These theories diverge in their account of how 
individual empowerment and social modularity influence structural social capital, and how 
different kinds of political engagement stem from these effects. According to my 
Homogenisation thesis structural social capital in post-industrial countries like Australia 
(where people are increasingly autonomous and socially modular)687 is becoming less 
bridging and more bonding. Conversely, the Modernisationists Inglehart and Welzel hold that 
the opposite is true.688  
Paradoxically, I contend that Social Network Homogenisation (SNH) precipitates 
ideological diversification. That is, as social networks politically/ideologically homogenise, 
their members encounter fewer (and have fewer meaningful interactions with) people 
holding opposing political views and attitudes. Thus, members of homogenised social 
networks have their own preferences and biases reinforced more, and challenged and 
moderated less, frequently. Ergo, homogenised networks (and their members) are inclined to 
drift further away from the ideological centre than are members of relatively more 
politically/ideologically diverse networks. Ideological diversification should not be conflated 
with ideological polarisation. The former is a movement away from the political centre and 
toward many ideological extremes. The latter is the sorting of political beliefs and attitudes 
into two distinct camps.689  
I maintain that SNH and ideological diversification induce greater unwillingness to 
compromise and declines in the political trust, tolerance and efficacy of ordinary citizens. 
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Consequently, people become more conflict-averse and avoid conflict-prone settings in 
which debate and/or compromise are necessary for meaningful involvement i.e. 
party/electoral participation. Lower levels of party membership and engagement erode 
democracy by leaving party policy formation and candidate selection to a narrow and 
unrepresentative sample beholden to sectional interests.690 Contrastingly, Inglehart and 
Welzel maintain more bridging structural social capital is helping to facilitate elite challenging 
action and behaviour. Thus, enabling different groups of people to cooperate in pursuit of 
shared liberal and egalitarian goals renders political and other elites more accountable.691 
The World Values Survey lacks questions regarding the characteristics of participants’ 
social network members. Therefore, the survey does not allow for assessment of 
participants’ social network compositions or the degree to which they reflect/reinforce 
participants’ own characteristics, or social and political values and views. Hence, the 
remaining chapters of this thesis will rely on statistics collated from my own ‘Political 
Participation and Conflict Avoidance Survey’ of 36 participants to support my fundamental 
argument. Subjects were found using snowball sampling techniques in which existing survey 
participants recruit future participants from among their acquaintances. Initial participants 
were chosen from among my friends and family members. These initial participants selected 
had a diverse range of backgrounds. Once each had completed my survey they were 
instructed to ask their acquaintances whether they would be interested in participating. The 
contact information of those who were interested was then provided to me with their 
consent. Participants were asked to recruit a diverse range of subjects (if possible) and each 
participant was offered an honorarium of $25 for their involvement. This sixth chapter will 
establish connections between the extent to which participants’ social networks are 
homogenous and measures of participants’ value orientations, structural social capital (both 
formal and informal) and social and political trust.  
Table 6.1 
Socio-demographic profile of respondents (ignoring missing data) 
Generations 
                                                          
690 Katz and Mair. ‘Changing Models of Party Organisation and Party Democracy’, p.15, 16 & 21-23; Whiteley, 
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691 Inglehart, and Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy, p.43, 44, 142, 116, 223, 229 & 262 





Baby Boomers 8 





Highest education qualification attained 
Year 12 High School 4 
Diploma 1 
Advanced Diploma or Associate Degree 3 
Bachelor’s degree 9 
Bachelor Honours Degree or Graduate Certificate or 
Graduate Diploma 
7 
Master’s Degree 1 
Doctoral Degree 1 
The Survey was extremely long and complex requiring approximately two hours to 
complete. This time requirement limited available participants. Having 36, rather than 
thousands of participants has meant that (unlike WVS statistics presented in the previous 
chapters) statistics drawn from my survey data do not control for extraneous variables. Still, 
my statistics (evaluated over Chapters Six, Seven and Eight) are highly useful in mapping the 
variables linked to a sociological nexus (the Self-Expression Values Homogenous Social 
Network Complex discussed later in this chapter). The most probable relationships 
underpinning these correlations are then surmised using critical thinking and educated 
reasoning. The correlations between the homogeneity of participants social networks and 
other variables were properly considered. Each participant’s responses regarding the degree 
of difference between themselves and members of their close social network were first 
collated such that each participant was given scores indicating: 
1. The degree of ideological difference that participants believe to exist 
between them and members of their close social network (‘Ideological Social Network 
Difference’). This was determined by adding up the number of differences participants 
believe to exist between their political policy positions and those of their close social 
network members. This value for any given policy issue was weighted according to 
the importance placed on this public policy area by the participant. The sum of the 
values recorded for each question then became the participant’s Ideological Social 
Network Difference Score (ISNDS). 





Methodology for calculating participants’ Ideological Social Network Difference Scores 
(ISNDSs). 
Relevant survey questions: 117-146 
- survey questions regarding economic policy issues: 120, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129 & 
134 
- survey questions regarding social policy issues: 117, 119, 121, 122, 131, 132, 133 & 
138 
- survey question regarding environmental issues: 123 
- survey questions regarding national security and foreign affairs issues: 124, 135, 136 
& 137 
- survey questions regarding democracy and civil liberties issues: 118, 130 & 139 
- survey questions regarding emphases placed on policy areas: 140-145 
- survey question regarding party preferences: 146 
Step 1 – counted were the number of members of a participant’s close social network that 
the participant thought would have a different political party preference (question 146) to 
the participant. 
Step 2 - this area of possible political disagreement suggests the likelihood of other areas of 
significant political difference. Additionally, views pertaining to electoral preferences and the 
reasons for them are particularly important because they influence electoral and policy 
outcomes. Consequently, discussion about different electoral preferences with members of 
one’s close social network is likely to prompt more extensive discussion concerning values 
and policy. Hence, the numbers counted in Step 1 were multiplied by four. These numbers 
were added to participants’ ISNDSs. More figures will be added to participants’ ISNDSs in 
subsequent steps. 
Step 3 – counted were the number of members of participants’ close social networks that the 
participant thought would emphasise/prioritise policy areas differently to the participant. 
This was done for each policy area (questions 140-145) and the sums were added to 
participants’ ISNDSs. 
Step 4 – counted were the number of members of participants’ close social network that the 
participant thought would have different views to the participant on economic policy issues. 
This was done for each economic policy issue (questions 120, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129 & 134). 





These numbers were multiplied by the importance participants placed on economic policy 
issues (question 140). That is, if ‘Extremely important’ they were multiplied by three, if ‘Quite 
important’ they were multiplied by two and if ‘Not very important’ they were multiplied by 
one. These figures were added to participants’ ISNDSs. 
Step 5 - Step 4 was repeated for social, environmental, national security and foreign affairs 
and democracy and civil liberties issues (using relevant responses to relevant survey 
questions). 
Below is a table of the Participation Code Numbers (PCNs) as well as the ISNDSs of the 
participants that answered the relevant questions and indicated positions they believed were 
held by members of their close social networks. 
Table 6.2 































2. The average degree of ideological difference that participants believe to 
exist between them and members of their close social network. This was determined 
by dividing the participant’s ISNDS by the number of members of their close social 
network whose supposed public policy positions were being recorded. Some 
participants did not record the policy positions of the same number of members of 
their close social network for each policy issue. Consequently, the number which was 
most frequently used was applied to determine the Average Ideological Social 
Network Difference Score (AISNDS). 
Methodology for calculating participants’ Average Ideological Social Network Difference 
Scores (AISNDSs). 
Participants’ AISNDSs were determined by dividing their ISNDSs (discussed in the previous 
appendix) by the number of close social network members whose positions participants 
indicated in their responses to questions 117-146. Participants were asked to consider the 
same close social network members when responding to each of these questions. If they did 
not know and could not guess the positions of one or more of their close social network 
members regarding an issue they were asked to place them in the ‘Definitely do not know’ 
category. However, not all participants indicated the same number of positions held by their 
close social network members from question to question. This variation was very minor for all 
but one of these participants. Their AISNDSs were determined by dividing their ISNDSs by the 
number of close social network members they considered in a ‘majority’ of the relevant 
questions (questions 117 to 146). The one participant who responded to the relevant 
questions but was extremely inconsistent regarding the number of close social network 
members they considered in each question was not given an AISNDS. Neither were those 





participants who failed to indicate any policy position held by any member of their close 
social network. 
Below is a table of participants’ PCNs,692 ISNDSs,693 AISNDSs and number of close social 
network members. 
Table 6.3 
Participants’ PCNs, ISNDSs, AISNDSs and number of close social network members. 
PCNs ISNDSs Network 
Size 
AISNDSs 
0069 21 26 0.81 
0074 43 17 2.53 
0078 238 14 17 
0073 281 No 
consistency 
- 
0066 104 11 9.45 
0083 238 11 21.64 
0080 74 15 4.93 
0068 65 24 2.71 
0016 105 19 5.53 
0042 105 6 17.5 
0058 129 13 9.92 
0054 0 2 0.00 
0049 78 6 13.00 
0037 119 5 23.8 
0035 279 15 18.6 
0024 222 7 31.71 
0009 203 17 11.94 
0017 417 33 12.64 
0008 222 7 31.71 
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0007 87 15 5.80 
0006 151 15 10.07 
0001 127 7 18.14 
0000 401 8 50.13 
 
3. The average degree of structural difference that participants believe to 
exist between them and members of their close social network. This was determined 
by first adding up the number of differences (other than political policy positions or 
value emphases) between the participant and members of the participant’s social 
network. These differences included such characteristics as gender, sexual 
orientation, primary language, ethnicity, religion, religiosity, class, and education. 
Then, the sum of the values recorded for each of these areas of difference was 
divided by the number of members of the participant’s close social network whose 
structural characteristics were being recorded. Some participants did not record the 
structural characteristics of the same number of members of their close social 
network for each type of structural characteristic. Therefore, the number which was 
most frequently used was applied to determine the Average Structural Social Network 
Difference Score (ASSNDS). 
Methodology for calculating participants’ Average Structural Social Network Difference 
Scores (ASSNDSs) 
Relevant survey questions: 103 – 115. 
Responses to these questions were used to assess the degree to which members of 
participants’ networks were structurally (as opposed ideologically/politically) unlike the 
participant. Structural variables considered included age, gender, sexuality, country of birth, 
ethnicity, English/foreign language proficiency, education, socio-economic status, religion 
and religiosity. 
Step 1 - For each of the relevant questions (questions 103 – 115) the number of members of 
participants’ close social networks that the participant had indicated had different structural 
traits/characteristics to the participant were counted. The sum of these numbers became the 
participants’ Structural Social Network Difference Scores (SSNDSs). 





Step 2 – Participants’ SSNDSs were divided by the number of close social network members 
whose structural traits/characteristics the participants indicated in their responses to 
questions 103 – 1115. Participants were asked to consider the same number of social 
network members when responding to each of these questions. If they did not know and 
could not guess the traits/characteristics of one or more of their close social network 
members regarding a structural variable they were asked to place them in the ‘Definitely do 
not know’ category. However, not all participants indicated the same number of mutually 
exclusive traits/characteristics for their close social network members from question to 
question. This variation was very minor for all but one of the participants. Their ASSNDSs 
were determined by dividing their SSNDSs by the number of close social network members 
they considered when responding to a majority of the relevant questions (questions 103-
115). The one participant who responded to the relevant questions but was extremely 
inconsistent regarding the number of close social network members they considered when 
answering each question was not given an ASSNDS. 
Below is a table of the Participants’ PCNs,694 SSNDSs, and ASSNDSs as well as the number of 
close social network members considered by participants. 
Table 6.4 
Participants’ PCNs, SSNDSs and ASSNDSs and the number of close social network 
members. 
PCNs SSNDSs Network 
Size 
ASSNDSs 
0069 64 26 2.46 
0074 103 17 6.06 
0078 84 14 6.00 
0073 93 No 
consistency 
- 
0066 48 11 4.36 
0083 51 11 4.64 
0080 46 15 3.07 
                                                          
694 Defined in Appendix 569 





0084 69 24 2.88 
0068 110 24 4.58 
0016 36 19 1.89 
0042 44 6 7.33 
0058 54 13 4.15 
0044 29 8 3.63 
0054 7 2 3.50 
0049 38 6 6.33 
0045 15 4 3.75 
0037 29 5 5.80 
0035 92 15 6.13 
0024 68 7 9.71 
0009 53 18 2.94 
0017 159 33 4.82 
0008 26 7 3.71 
0007 61 15 4.07 
0006 76 15 5.07 
0001 42 7 6.00 
0000 34 8 4.25 
 
4. The average degree of difference that participants believe exists 
between the emphasis they place on values and the emphasis placed on those same 
values by members of their close social network. This was determined by first adding 
up the various degrees of difference between the participant’s self-placed emphasis 
(or lack thereof) on values and those of the members of their close social network. 
The sum of these recorded value differences was then divided by the number of 
members of the participant’s close social network whose supposed value emphases 
were recorded. Some participants did not record the values emphases of the same 
number of members of their close social network for each value. Therefore, the 
number which was most frequently used was applied to determine the Average 
Values Social Network Difference Score (AVSNDS). 





Methodology for calculating participants’ Average Value Social Network Difference Scores 
(AVSNDSs) 
Relevant survey questions: 151/152 
Question 151 asked participants to distribute 40 points between 10 ultimate values (values 
that are not derived from other values); giving no one value more than seven points or less 
than one point. Participants were asked to distribute these points based on how many 
political contexts they, as individuals, tend to prioritise each of these values over others, 
relative to the average Australian. It was stated that the average Australian would distribute 
their 40 points by placing a 4 in each cell corresponding to each ultimate value. 
Question 152 asked participants to indicate how they would distribute the 40 points of each 
member of their close network based on what they know of their politics (the same people 
they used to answer questions 103-146). 
Step 1 - The difference between ‘the number of points participants indicated represented 
their own overall level of emphasis on a value’ and ‘the numbers of points participants 
indicated was representative of the overall level of emphasis placed on this value by each 
member of their close social network’ was added to participants’ Value Social Network 
Difference Scores (VSNDSs). 
Step 2 - This was repeated for each value. 
Step 3 – Participants VSNDSs were divided by the number of close social network members 
whose value emphases the participants indicated in their responses to question 152. 
Participants were asked to consider the value emphases of the same close social network 
members per value. However, not all participants indicated the same number of value 
emphases per value. Therefore, AVSNDSs were determined by dividing VSNDSs by the 
number of value emphases considered for at least five of the 10 values. Again, as discussed in 
the previous two appendices one participant (with PCN 0073) who responded to the relevant 
questions but was extremely inconsistent regarding the number of close social network 
members they considered when answering questions 103 – 146, and 152 was not given an 
AVSNDS. 
Below is a table of participants’ PCNs,695 VSNDSs and AVSNDSs of participants as well as the 
number of close social network members whose value emphases participants considered. 
                                                          
695 Defined in Appendix 569 






Participants’ PCNs, VSNDSs, AVSNDSs and number of close social network members 
whose value emphases participants considered. 
PCN VSNDSs Network Size AVSNDSs 
0074 190 17 11.18 
0078 179 14 12.79 
0066 66 11 6.00 
0080 64 15 4.27 
0042 106 6 17.67 
0044 77 10 7.70 
0054 0 2 0.00 
0049 0 6 0.00 
0045 18 1 18.00 
0037 0 5 0.00 
0035 196 15 13.07 
0024 161 7 23.00 
0017 416 33 12.61 
0008 72 7 10.29 
0007 15 15 1.00 
0006 234 13 18.00 
0001 119 7 17.00 
0000 124 8 15.50 
 
Additionally, participants were asked four simple yes/no questions regarding 
structural characteristics of the people they had met and visited socially in the previous 
month. Were they mostly of a different: ethnic or linguistic group, economic status, social 
status, or religious group? Responses to these survey questions (all survey questions can be 
viewed in Appendix 568) were used to measure the following variables.  
Table 6.6 





Variables measured by, and wordings of survey questions 51 A to 51 D. 
Variables/Question wordings Survey questions 
assessing these 
variables 
V: The extent to which participants’ informal social networks (outside the immediate 
family) are ethnically/linguistically diverse 
Q: Were the people you met and visited with [in the last month – this is made clear by 
previous three questions] mostly of different ethnic or linguistic groups? Yes/No 
51 A 
V: The extent to which members of participants’ informal social networks (outside the 
immediate family) have diverse economic status 
Q: Were the people you met and visited with [in the last month – this is made clear by 
previous three questions] mostly of different economic status? Yes/No 
51 B 
V: The extent to which members of participants’ informal social networks (outside the 
immediate family) have diverse social status 
Q: Were the people you met and visited with [in the last month – this is made clear by 
previous three questions] mostly of different social status? Yes/No 
51 C 
V: The extent to which participants’ informal social networks (outside the immediate 
family) are religiously diverse 
Q: Were the people you met and visited with [in the last month – this is made clear by 
previous three questions] mostly of different religious groups? Yes/No 
51 D 
 
Correlations between these responses and other variables were employed to generate a 
greater understanding of the diversity within informal networks and how this diversity may 
influence, or be affected by, other factors.  
Binary yes/no questions regarding the structural characteristics of members of the 
most important formal organisations to which participants belonged were also asked to 
deduce the following variables.  
Table 6.7 
Variables measured by, and wordings of survey questions 95 A to 95 F, 96 A and 96 B. 
Variables/Question wordings Survey questions 
assessing these 
variables 





V: Participants agreeing that most members of the most important formal group in 
which they are involved reside in the same neighbourhood/town 
Q: Thinking about the membership of your most important group [same group 
considered in the previous five questions], are most of them of the same 
neighbourhood/town? Yes/No 
95 A 
V: Participants agreeing that most members of the most important formal group in 
which they are involved are of the same family or kin group 
Q: Thinking about the membership of your most important group [same group 
considered in the previous five questions], are most of them of the same family or kin 
group? Yes/No 
95B 
V: Participants agreeing that most members of the most important formal group in 
which they are involved have the same religion 
Q: Thinking about the membership of your most important group [same group 
considered in the previous five questions], are most of them of the same religion? 
Yes/No 
95C 
V: Participants agreeing that most members of the most important formal group in 
which they are involved have the same gender 
Q: Thinking about the membership of your most important group [same group 
considered in the previous five questions], are most of them of the same gender? 
Yes/No 
95 D 
V: Participants agreeing that most members of the most important formal group in 
which they are involved are of the same age 
Q: Thinking about the membership of your most important group [same group 
considered in the previous five questions], are most of them of the same age? Yes/No 
95 E 
V: Participants agreeing that most members of the most important formal group in 
which they are involved are of the same ethnic/linguistic group 
Q: Thinking about the membership of your most important group [same group 
considered in the previous five questions], are most of them of the same 
ethnic/linguistic group? Yes/No 
95 F 
V: Participants agreeing that most members of the most important formal group in 
which they are involved have the same occupation 
Q: [Thinking about the membership of your most important group - same group 
considered in the previous six questions] Do members mostly have the same 
occupation? Yes/No 
96 A 
V: Participants agreeing that most members of the most important formal group in 
which they are involved have the same educational background/level 
Q: [Thinking about the membership of your most important group - same group 
96 B 





considered in the previous six questions] Do members mostly have the same 
educational background/level? Yes/No 
 
Responses to these questions were used to gauge the diversity within formal networks and 
how this diversity is related to informal social network diversity and other variables.  
The variables below are among those considered/discussed over the final three 
chapters. I have formulated this table to clarify the survey questions from which these 
variables are gleaned.  
Table 6.8 
Variables measured by, and wordings of survey questions 37, 62 to 68, 71, 86 and 116. 
Variables Survey questions 
assessing these 
variables 
V: The number of close friends that participants reported having. 
Q: Approximately how many close friends, close work colleagues, close family 
members and close others do you have these days? Write numbers, not names, in the 
boxes below. These are people with whom you feel comfortable talking to about 
serious and private matters and who you can call on for help. Indicate at least 3 but no 
more than 15 of these people in total. (Write the names of these people on a separate 
piece of paper. This is for your benefit only. Do not submit this piece of paper with the 
survey. This list will assist you to answer questions later in the survey)  
- Close friends  
- Close work colleagues  
- Close family members  
- Other 
37 
V: Believing society is ideologically homogenous. 
Q: Generally speaking most people and politicians know and agree what has to be 
done. Most political debate, negotiation and compromise are therefore unnecessary, 
distract people and politicians from the big picture and slows/waters down widely 
accepted policy positions. To what extent do you agree? 
1. Strongly agree      2. Mildly agree      3. Depends       
4. Mildly disagree       5. Strongly disagree 
62 





V: Believing there is little to be learnt from political discussion with those with whom 
one disagrees. 
Q: There is little to be learnt or achieved by discussing politics informally with people 
who strongly disagree with your views. It’s unpleasant and neither side is likely to 
change their mind. To what extent do you agree? 
1. Strongly agree      2. Mildly agree      3. Depends       
4. Mildly disagree       5. Strongly disagree 
63 
V: An unwillingness to accept political compromise. 
Q: Formal politics is a win-lose zero-sum game between competing interests. 
Compromise is ultimately a loss for all parties involved. To what extent do you agree? 
1. Strongly agree      2. Mildly agree      3. Depends       
4. Mildly disagree       5. Strongly disagree 
64 
Believing in the effectiveness of voting. 
Q: Some people say that no matter who people vote for, it won’t make any difference 
to what happens. Others say that who people vote for can make a big difference to 
what happens. Where would you place yourself? 
1. Can make an enormous difference 
2. Can make a significant difference 
3. Can make some difference 
4. Will make little difference  
5. Won’t make any difference 
65 
V: Having greater confidence in one’s political debating skills. 
Q: To what extent are you able to persuade other people, with different political views 
from your own, of the merits of your political arguments? 
1. A great extent      2. Some extent       3. Depends 
 4. Hardly ever       5. Never 
66 
V: Frequency of debating people with political views different from one’s own. 
Q: How many times in the past month have you discussed and debated political issues 
with people who disagreed with your views regarding the issue(s) discussed? 
67 
V: Believing that voting is worthwhile. 
Q: Is voting at Federal and State elections worthwhile? 
- Yes definitely 
- Probably 
- Not Sure 
- Probably not 
- Not at all 
68 





Being politically involved in conflict prone settings or activities (such as attending a 
town/neighbourhood council meeting, public hearing or public discussion group; 
meeting with, calling or sending letters or emails to, politicians; and participating in 
information or election campaigns). 
Q71: In the past 12 months, how many times have you done the following?  
- Attended a town/neighbourhood council meeting, public hearing, or public 
discussion group  
- Organised or signed a written or online petition  
- Met with a politician, called him/her, or sent a letter/email  
- Participated in a protest or demonstration  
- Participated in an information or election campaign  
- Alerted newspaper, radio or TV to a local problem  
- Notified police or court about a local problem 
71 
V: Believing that political checks and compromise are beneficial. 
Q: Which do you think is better – when the Federal Government has a majority in both 
the House of Representatives and the Senate, OR when the Federal Government in the 
House of Representatives does not control the Senate? 
1. Much better when Government controls both 
2. Better when Government controls both 
3. Neither / doesn’t matter 
4. Better when Government does not control the Senate 
5. Much better when Government does not control the Senate 
86 
V: Being less conflict avoidant. 
Q: How prepared are you and members of your close social network to discuss politics 
with others? 
- Try to avoid getting into political discussions because they can be unpleasant. 
- Enjoy discussing politics even though it sometimes leads to arguments. 
- Somewhere in between previous two answers. 
- Definitely do not know 
116 
 
Furthermore, the methods by which the variables in the next table are derived are 
illuminated in their corresponding appendices.  
Table 6.9 





Variables measured by survey questions 573 to 583. 
Variables Appendices discussing 
how these variables 
were measured 
Participants’ frequency of meeting informally with members of their social 
networks 
Appendix 573 
Participants’ Formal Organisational Engagement Score Appendix 574 
The relative membership growth of the two most important formal groups in 
which participants are involved 
Appendix 575 
The degree to which participants’ most important formal groups (in which they 
are involved) have egalitarian decision-making processes 
Appendix 576 
The degree to which participants’ two most important formal groups (in which 
they are involved) have egalitarian decision-making processes 
Appendix 577 
The degree to which participants’ most important formal groups (in which they 
are involved) have egalitarian leadership-selection processes 
Appendix 578 
The degree to which participants’ two most important formal groups (in which 
they are involved) have egalitarian leadership-selection processes 
Appendix 579 
The extent to which participants’ informal social networks (outside the immediate 
family) are structurally (ethnically/linguistically, economically, socially and 
religiously) diverse 
Appendix 580 
Participants agreeing that most members of the most important formal groups in 
which they are involved have the same income/wealth 
Appendix 581 
Membership of / willingness to join, a political party Appendix 582 
Willingness of non-members to join a political party Appendix 583 
 
Given that my survey only had 36 participants, the significances of these results tend 
to be lower than the Australian WVS statistics which had thousands of participants. 
Consequently, the correlations deemed significant enough to discuss are those with (p) 
values below a higher threshold than what was used for the WVS. The correlation statistics 
produced from my survey data will be considered moderately significant if they have a (p) 
value of between 0.200 and 0.050, highly significant if they have a (p) value of between 0.050 
and 0.010 and extremely significant if they have a (p) value of 0.010 or less. Most statisticians 
consider correlations to be significant if they have a (p) value of less than 0.1 or 0.05 i.e. 
statistics that have less than either a 10% or 5% chance of representing no real correlations 





between variables. I acknowledge that a (p) value threshold of 0.2 (or a correlation with less 
than 20% chance of there not being any real relationship between tested variables) is not 
ideal. However, given the length of my survey and limits on financial resources/incentives 
only 36 people were willing and able to participate and not all of these participants 
completed the whole survey.  
 Positive correlations are found between social network homogeneity and indicators 
of egalitarian/self-expression values orientation: suggesting the existence of a Self-Expression 
Values/Homogenous Social Network (SEVHSN) Complex. Such a complex is consistent with 
Homogenisation, but is in stark contradiction to Modernisation theory. Other variables and 
trends related to formal and informal group engagement, and social/political trust and 
confidence are both found to be correlated with, and argued to be facets of, the SEVHSN 
Complex. These relationships support my Homogenisation theory.  
Believing both that society is ideologically homogenous, and that there is little to be 
learnt from political debate with those with whom one disagrees, are linked to an 
unwillingness to accept political compromise as well as variables part of, or linked to, the 
SEVHSN Complex. These correlations may be explained by people with more homogenous 
networks over-estimating the degree to which society reflects their views and characteristics. 
Consequently, they may be less inclined to recognise the value of political discussion and 
political compromise with those with whom they disagree. This disincentive to engage 
constructively with those who hold alternative views potentially results in inexperience, 
discomfort and inefficacy when debating, negotiating and compromising; this, in turn 
possibly discourages meaningful conflict prone forms of political involvement. Politicians 
frequently fail to meet the expectations of citizens who overestimate the degree to which 
their own views and ideas are reflected by the public at large. It will be argued in Chapter 
Eight that these citizens are significantly more inclined to believe that politicians and the 
political establishment are corrupted by sectional/minority concerns. This further 
undermines the propensity for political party and electoral participation. 
Chapters Seven and Eight will present and discuss correlations between the SEVHSN 
Complex and:  





- time spent listening to personal devices, looking at screens and communicating 
online for non-work-related purposes,  
- the proportion of participants’ close friends they initially met online,  
- the proportion of participants’ online communication spent communicating with 
people they initially met online and/or who live far away,  
- measures of previous and current socio-economic status,  
- formal education attainment,  
- familial patterns, and  
- the ways in which news and political information are accessed.  
Other discussed correlation statistics include those between measures of SEVHSN Complex 
immersion and:  
- voting patterns,  
- support for and willingness to accept political checks and compromise,  
- frequency of debating people with different political beliefs, and tolerance of (and 
willingness to engage in debate with) people who hold different political views;  
- confidence in one’s own political debating skills,  
- conflict avoidance,  
- various kinds of political engagement and belief in the effectiveness of such 
engagement,  
- satisfaction with the way democracy works in Australia, and  
- support for electoral reform. 
SEVHSN Complex 
Responses to questions assessing the degree to which the decision-making and 
leadership selection processes of participants’ most important formal groups are egalitarian 
can be used as an indicator of the extent to which participants emphasise self-expression 
over survival values. The most important formal groups in which some people are involved 
have egalitarian/democratic governance procedures (i.e. decision making and leadership 
selection processes that distribute power more evenly among group members). These people 





are more likely to heavily emphasise autonomy and egalitarian self-expression values than 
those whose most important formal organisations are governed by hierarchies relatively 
unaccountable to their memberships. Undeniably, significant positive correlations were 
found between the degree to which participants’ most important formal groups have 
egalitarian decision-making and leadership selection processes and the extent to which these 
participants have:  
- structurally homogenous informal social networks, and  
- structurally/ideologically reinforcing close social networks.  
These statistics would indicate a strong relationship between a self-expression values 
orientation and social network homogeneity.  
This finding is immensely important as it is consistent with this the fundamental 
premise of this thesis that greater emphasis on self-expression values raises social modularity 
which precipitates the homogenisation of social networks. This, in turn facilitates more 
bonding and less bridging social capital. Conversely, these results cast considerable doubt on 
Inglehart and Welzel’s contention that a rising emphasis on self-expression values and social 
modularity causes the diversification of social networks: facilitating more bridging and less 
bonding social capital.696  
Table 6.10 
Correlations between the degree to which participants’ two most important formal 
groups (in which they are involved) have egalitarian decision-making processes and 
measures of the structural diversity within participants’ informal social networks. 
 
2015 Correlations between The degree to which participants’ two most important formal 




The extent to which participants’ informal 
social networks (outside the immediate 
family) are structurally 
(ethnically/linguistically, economically, 
socially and religiously) diverse 
r= -.354, p= .027 22 
                                                          
696 Inglehart, and Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy, p.142, 143 & 294 





The extent to which participants’ informal 
social networks (outside the immediate 
family) are ethnically/linguistically diverse 
r= -.411, p= .009 23 
 
Table 6.11 
The correlation between the degree to which participants’ two most important formal 
groups (in which they are involved) have egalitarian leadership-selection processes and 
the extent to which members of participants’ informal social networks (outside the 
immediate family) have diverse social status. 
 
2015 Correlations between The degree to which participants’ two most important formal 




The extent to which members of 
participants’ informal social networks 
(outside the immediate family) have 
diverse social status 
R= -.260, p= .131 22 
 
Table 6.12 
Correlations between the degree to which participants’ two most important formal 
groups (in which they are involved) have egalitarian decision-making processes and 
measures of structural, ideological and values diversity within participants’ social 
networks. 
 
2015 Correlations between The degree to which participants’ two most important formal 




ASSNDS r= -.502, p= .002 21 
AISNDS r= -.323, p= .081 19 
AVSNDS r= -.468, p= .014 16 
 
Table 6.13 
Correlations between the degree to which participants’ two most important formal 
groups (in which they are involved) have egalitarian leadership-selection processes and 
measures of structural and ideological diversity within participants’ social networks. 






2015 Correlations between The degree to which participants’ two most important formal 




ASSNDS r= -.523, p= .055 21 
ISNDS r= -.491, p= .089 20 
 
Ascendency of Homogenous Formal Groups 
The link between self-expression values and social network homogeneity is one core 
component of a web of correlations indicating the existence of the SEVHSN Complex central 
to my argument. Certain other relationships between this core and variables/statistics 
related to group engagement, and social/political trust/confidence must be demonstrated to 
support both the existence of the complex and the validity of my thesis. According to my 
Homogenisation thesis a large majority of people in Australia (this thesis’ case study) and 
other post-industrial societies (with high social modularity and individual empowerment) are 
immersed in the SEVHSN Complex and consequently prefer to participate in egalitarian over 
hierarchical formal organisations. They also have less contact, and feel less comfortable with 
people whose interests, values and beliefs are unlike their own than did/do persons several 
generations their senior. However, the degree to which formal groups have egalitarian 
decision-making processes and homogenous memberships tends to have a greater influence 
on whether the more Complex embedded participate than on whether the relatively less 
Complex immersed become involved.  
Therefore, the early twenty-first century rise in secular and non-political-party formal 
group engagement may be primarily attributable to formal organisations adapting to the 
egalitarian preferences and conflict avoidant dispositions of the highly Complex immersed. 
That is, Australian formal structural social capital may be transitioning from fewer but larger 
diverse and hierarchical organisations to more but relatively smaller homogenous and 
democratic groups. Indeed, as discussed in Chapters Three and Five, research conducted by 
Gregory Saxton indicates that in the United States (an advanced post-industrial country with 
which Australia shares many cultural, linguistic, historical and political similarities) greater 
education attainment, advances in communications technology and intergenerational value 





shifts have empowered and motivated organisation members to demand, and individuals to 
form groups with, more egalitarian structures and procedures.697 Furthermore, research 
suggests that Americans are increasingly likely both; to involve themselves in the same on-
and-offline groups, attend the same events and frequent the same establishments as people 
who hold political beliefs with which they agree, and; to avoid those at, and in which they are 
likely to encounter persons who have different/opposing political views.698 Additionally, since 
at least 2003, annual growth rates in the number of Australian Not-for-Profit organisations 
(which include charitable, sports, cultural, health, educational and religious groups) have 
tended to exceed Australian population growth rates.699 This evidence supports my theory 
that organisations are both democratising and splintering into more groups with relatively 
homogenous memberships. These adaptations have (as argued in Chapter Three) helped to 
raise confidence and involvement in many types of groups and organisations, particularly 
among the self-expression oriented and conflict averse. 
In accordance with my previous conjecture, statistics produced from my survey data 
reveal positive correlations between measures of structural homogeneity within, and hours 
given by participants to, the formal organisations which participants indicated were most 
important to them. Additionally, positive correlations were found between measures of 
structural homogeneity within these groups and participants’ formal organisational 
engagement score. This score is the degree to which participants are involved in, particularly 
the decision making of, formal groups.  
Table 6.14 
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Correlations between hours participants give to their two most important formal 
groups (in which they are involved) and measures of structural diversity within the 
most important formal groups in which participants are involved. 
 
2015 Correlations between Hours participants give to their two most important formal 
groups (in which they are involved). 
Number of 
participants 
Participants agreeing that most members 
of the most important formal group in 
which they are involved reside in the same 
neighbourhood/town 
R= .298, p= .168 23 
Participants agreeing that most members 
of the most important formal group in 
which they are involved have the same 
gender 
R= .427, p= .042 23 
Participants agreeing that most members 
of the two most important formal groups in 
which they are involved have the same 
wealth/income 
R= .291, p= .167 24 
 
Table 6.15 
Correlations between participants’ Formal Organisational Engagement Score and 
measures of structural diversity within the most important formal groups in which 
participants are involved. 
 
2015 Correlations between Participants’ Formal Organisational Engagement Score Number of 
participants 
Participants agreeing that most members 
of the most important formal group in 
which they are involved have the same 
gender 
r= .349, p= .103 23 
Participants agreeing that most members 
of the two most important formal groups 
in which they are involved have the same 
wealth/income 
r= .435, p= .034 24 
 
These statistics are consistent with my Homogenisation theory. I maintain that most people 
(but particularly the Complex immersed) are more willing to involve themselves in 





organisations if the memberships of these groups strongly reflect/reaffirm their own views 
and interests. Inglehart and Welzel hold those who place greater emphasis on survival values 
tend to invest more of their time and resources into formal groups than do those who place 
relatively more emphasis on self-expression values.700 However, Inglehart and Welzel’s 
Modernisation thesis cannot account for the increased engagement in sport, volunteering 
and art organisations during the early twenty-first century.701 This was/is a period in which an 
increasing proportion of Australians placed greater emphasis on self-expression values (as 
illustrated in Chapter Three), which Inglehart and Welzel argue act to reduce formal group 
involvement.702 Their thesis does not entertain the possibility of formal group decline being 
reversed by structural/procedural reform/adaptation. 
Furthermore, my survey data reveals moderate significant positive correlations 
between measures of structural homogeneity within, and the membership growth of, the 
formal groups participants reported as most important to them.  
Table 6.16 
Correlations between the relative membership growth of the two most important 
formal groups in which participants are involved and measures of structural diversity 
within the most important formal groups in which participants are involved. 
 
2015 Correlations between The relative membership growth of the two most important 
formal groups in which participants are involved 
Number of 
participants 
Participants agreeing that most members 
of the most important formal group in 
which they are involved have the same 
gender 
r= .305, p= .066 20 
Participants agreeing that most members 
of the most important formal group in 
which they are involved have the same 
educational background/level 
r= .366, p= .022 21 
Participants agreeing that most members 
of the most important formal group in 
r= .304, p= .060 21 
                                                          
700 Inglehart, and Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy, p.44, 116-118 & 294 
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Volunteering Australia, State of Volunteering in Australia: 2012, p.7-9; Australian Council of the Arts, Arts in 
Daily Life: Australian Participation in the Arts, Report May 2014, p.12 
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which they are involved have the same 
occupation 
Participants agreeing that most members 
of the two most important formal groups 
in which they are involved have the same 
wealth/income 
r= .307, p= .057 21 
 
These statistics combined with evidence of rising early twenty-first century secular/non-
political-party formal group engagement suggest that formal groups with structurally more 
homogenous memberships are becoming increasingly larger and more popular relative to 
those with structurally heterogeneous memberships. However, overall the size of formal 
group memberships is probably declining as more groups with more homogenous 
memberships are established. Consequently, these statistics appear to buttress my 
Homogenisation, while undermining Inglehart and Welzel’s Modernisation, theory. Inglehart 
and Welzel stress that formal and bonding is replaced by informal and bridging social capital 
in advancing post-industrial societies.703 
Link between Structural & Ideological Homogeneity 
So far the statistics in this chapter have focused on the structural, rather than the 
ideological/political homogeneity of social networks. The structural homogeneity of social 
networks is measured by the degree to which members of these groups were mostly of the 
same age, religion, neighbourhood, ethnicity, gender, occupation, educational 
background/level and income/wealth. Still, (as shown in Figures 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3 as well as the 
tables below) positive correlations were also found between measures of structural diversity 
within informal social networks and the degree to which participants encounter political 
values, views and attitudes different from their own within their close social networks. This 
may indicate that the structural composition of informal networks has a significant bearing 
on the ideological homogeneity of those networks.  
Table 6.17 
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Correlations between participants’ AISNDSs and measures of structural diversity within 
participants’ informal social networks. 
 
2015 Correlations between AISNDS Number of 
participants 
The extent to which participants’ informal 
social networks (outside the immediate 
family) are ethnically/linguistically diverse 
r= .617, p= .002 22 
The extent to which members of 
participants’ informal social networks 
(outside the immediate family) have diverse 
economic status 
r= .430, p= .046 22 
The extent to which participants’ informal 
social networks (outside the immediate 
family) are structurally 
(ethnically/linguistically, economically, 
socially and religiously) diverse 
r= .529, p= .011 22 
 
Figure 6.1 
The correlation between participants’ AISNDSs and the degree to which their informal 
social networks are structurally diverse. 
 
Table 6.18 
Correlations between Participants ASSNDSs and measures of structural diversity within 
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2015 Correlations between ASSNDS Number of 
participants 
The extent to which participants’ informal 
social networks (outside the immediate 
family) are ethnically/linguistically diverse 
R= .422, p= .036 25 
The extent to which members of 
participants’ informal social networks 
(outside the immediate family) have diverse 
economic status 
R= .290, p= .160 25 
The extent to which participants’ informal 
social networks (outside the immediate 
family) are structurally 
(ethnically/linguistically, economically, 
socially and religiously) diverse 
R= .402, p= .046 25 
 
Table 6.19 
Correlations between participants’ AVSNDSs and measures of structural diversity within 
participants’ informal social networks. 
 
2015 Correlations between AVSNDS Number of 
participants 
The extent to which participants’ informal 
social networks (outside the immediate 
family) are ethnically/linguistically diverse 
R= .435, p= .071 18 
The extent to which members of 
participants’ informal social networks 
(outside the immediate family) have diverse 
economic status 
R= .366, p= .135 18 
The extent to which participants’ informal 
social networks (outside the immediate 
family) are structurally 
(ethnically/linguistically, economically, 
socially and religiously) diverse 
R= .467, p= .051 18 
 
Figure 6.2 
The correlation between participants’ AVSNDSs and the degree to which their informal 
social networks are structurally diverse. 







Correlations between participants ISNDSs and measures of structural diversity within 
participants’ informal social networks. 
 
2015 Correlations between ISNDS Number of 
participants 
The extent to which participants’ informal 
social networks (outside the immediate 
family) are ethnically/linguistically diverse 
r= .506, p= .014 23 
The extent to which members of 
participants’ informal social networks 
(outside the immediate family) have diverse 
economic status 
r= .486, p= .019 23 
The extent to which members of 
participants’ informal social networks 
(outside the immediate family) have diverse 
social status 
r= .531, p= .009 23 
The extent to which participants’ informal 
social networks (outside the immediate 
family) are structurally 
(ethnically/linguistically, economically, 
socially and religiously) diverse 
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The correlation between participants’ ISNDSs and the degree to which their informal 
social networks are structurally diverse. 
 
Although my survey does not ask questions regarding the political/ideological 
compositions/homogeneity of the formal organisations in which participants are involved and 
deem most important, these statistics suggest that the structural and ideological 
homogeneity of participants’ informal social networks are positively linked. It is salient to 
consider this data, along with statistics indicating rising engagement in structurally 
homogenous organisations; raising overall formal group engagement. Together, they suggest 
that the structural homogeneity of formal groups may have little or no effect on the formal 
group engagement of citizens. Instead, they indicate that people may be more enticed to 
participate in formal organisations with politically/ideologically/philosophically homogenous 
(than heterogenous) memberships. The fact that those memberships also tend to be 
structurally homogenous could be coincidental. 
Organisational Democratisation 
Another reason for rising rates of formal group engagement in Australia, consistent 
with Homogenisation theory, is the increasing extent to which formal organisations are 
governed in an egalitarian/democratic manner compatible with autonomy/egalitarian self-
expression values. This explanation is supported by my own survey statistics. Positive 
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and both the egalitarian decision-making and egalitarian leadership selection processes of 
these groups. Positive correlations were also revealed between the degree to which the 
decision-making processes of participants’ most important groups are egalitarian and 
participants’ formal organisational engagement score.  Correlations found between the 
membership growth of participants’ most important formal groups and the degree to which 
the leaders of these groups are chosen in an egalitarian manner also suggest a connection 
between egalitarian governance of, and involvement in, formal organisations. Contrastingly, 
the Modernisation theory that formal group participation declines in advancing post-
industrial societies like Australia is not supported by my evidence.704 Neither is the 
Modernisationist position that this process of decline cannot be reversed by reform of formal 
organisations’ structures and governing processes. That is from fewer larger heterogenous 
hierarchical and elite-led to more but smaller homogenous egalitarian and democratic formal 
groups. As was surmised in Chapter Three, beyond a certain point during the post-industrial 
stage of modernisation formal organisations may begin adapting to new value emphases and 
preferences (particularly of younger generations). This may help lift rates of formal 
organisational engagement particularly among those heavily embedded in the SEVHSN 
Complex. Their formal group involvement rates are lower than those of people relatively less 
Complex immersed. 
Table 6.21 
Correlations between hours participants give to their two most important formal 
groups (in which they are involved) and the degree to which participants’ two most 
important formal groups (in which they are involved) have egalitarian decision-making 
and leadership-selection processes. 
 
2015 Correlations between Hours participants give to their two most important formal 
groups (in which they are involved). 
Number of 
participants 
The degree to which participants’ two 
most important formal groups (in which 
they are involved) have egalitarian 
decision-making processes. 
r= .350, p= .029 23 
The degree to which participants’ two 
most important formal groups (in which 
r= .240, p= .165 22 
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The correlation between participants’ Formal Organisational Engagement Score and the 
degree to which participants’ two most important formal groups (in which they are 
involved) have egalitarian decision-making processes. 
 
2015 Correlations between Participants’ Formal Organisational Engagement Score Number of 
participants 
The degree to which participants’ two 
most important formal groups (in which 
they are involved) have egalitarian 
decision-making processes. 
r= .263, p= .106 23 
 
Table 6.23 
The correlation between the relative membership growth of the two most important 
formal groups in which participants are involved and the degree to which participants’ 
most important formal groups (in which they are involved) have egalitarian leadership-
selection processes. 
 
2015 Correlations between The relative membership growth of the two most important 
formal groups in which participants are involved 
Number of 
participants 
The degree to which participants’ most 
important formal groups (in which they 
are involved) have egalitarian 
leadership-selection processes 
r= .432, p= .084 19 
 
Informal Structural Social Capital 
Both Homogenisation and Modernisation theories maintain that greater emphasis on 
self-expression values is correlated with more involvement with, informal social networks. I 
contend that greater emphasis placed on self-expression values raises social modularity 
enabling individuals to more freely forge relationships, and associate, with others based on 





their personal preferences. When social connections are based on egalitarian choice rather 
than community or familial obligation, there is greater incentive to forge more of, and invest 
more time in, these types of mutually beneficial and pleasurable relationships. In contexts in 
which social connections are more rigid and restricted (due in part to greater emphasis 
placed on survival values) social bonds are less likely to be considered mutually pleasurable 
and/or beneficial. Consequently, at least one of the parties to such social bonds may have 
relatively less incentive to invest time, and energy into the relationship. When social 
connections are restricted fewer mutually beneficial relationships are possible and people 
have less incentive to grow their social networks. Likewise, Inglehart and Welzel argue that 
self-expression values and social modularity encourage greater time and energy to be 
invested into strengthening and growing informal social networks.705  
As anticipated, there were highly significant positive correlations found between:  
- the frequency of participants informal social meetings (home visits and meeting 
people in public places either to talk or have food/drinks) with people outside 
their immediate family, and  
- the degree to which their most important formal organisations have egalitarian 
decision-making and leadership selection processes.  
Additionally, significant (one highly significant) positive correlations were discovered between 
the number of close friends that participants reported having and the extent to which their 
most important formal groups have egalitarian decision-making and leadership selection 
procedures. These statistics suggest the existence of a link between the strength/size of 
informal social networks/connections and indicators of a self-expression values orientation. 
This is consistent with both Homogenisation and Modernisation theses.  
Table 6.24 
Correlations between participants’ frequency of meeting informally with members of 
their social networks and the degree to which participants’ two most important formal 
groups (in which they are involved) have egalitarian decision-making and leadership 
selection processes. 
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2015 Correlations between Participants’ frequency of meeting informally with members of 
their social networks 
Number of 
participants 
The degree to which participants’ two 
most important formal groups (in which 
they are involved) have egalitarian 
decision-making processes 
R= .487, p= .002 23 
The degree to which participants’ two 
most important formal groups (in which 
they are involved) have egalitarian 
leadership-selection processes 
R= .494, p= .003 22 
 
Table 6.25 
Correlations between the number of close friends that participants reported having and 
the degree to which participants’ two most important formal groups (in which they are 
involved) have egalitarian decision-making and leadership selection processes. 
 
2015 Correlations between The number of close friends that participants reported having Number of 
participants 
The degree to which participants’ two 
most important formal groups (in which 
they are involved) have egalitarian 
decision-making processes. 
R= .466, p= .025 23 
The degree to which participants’ two 
most important formal groups (in which 
they are involved) have egalitarian 
leadership-selection processes. 
R= .335, p= .127 22 
 
Social & Political Trust & Confidence 
Like informal structural social capital, variables and patterns related to social/political 
trust/confidence are revealed to be correlated with, and may indeed be facets of, the 
SEVHSN Complex. According to Modernisation theory, a self-expression values orientation is 
linked to greater general interpersonal trust but less political trust and confidence.706 
Inglehart and Welzel maintain that self-expression value orientations contribute to a decline 
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in bonding and a rise in bridging social capital.707 Therefore, negative correlations between 
social network homogeneity and general interpersonal trust on the one hand and positive 
correlations between social network homogeneity and political trust and confidence, on the 
other, would be consistent with the Modernisation thesis. Similarly, I contend that self-
expression values are positively correlated with general interpersonal trust and negatively 
correlated with trust and confidence in the federal government. However, unlike Inglehart 
and Welzel, I maintain that a greater emphasis on self-expression values is compatible with 
the principle of subsidiarity and being more trusting/confident in local/state government 
than those who strongly emphasise survival values. Those who emphasise survival values are 
inclined to view difference in their society as weakness.708 Therefore, powerful local/state 
authorities (which create inconsistencies between intra-national jurisdictions) are deemed 
potentially threatening, particularly if they undermine the platform/agenda of the national 
government.  
Conversely, those who place greater emphasis on self-expression values (e.g. 
autonomy and egalitarianism) are more concerned with having governments listening to and 
acting on the views of the citizens they serve.709 Combined statewide/local majorities are 
likely to be greater than a simple majority Australia wide. National policies and decisions may 
have greater majority support but are more prone to being supported by only a minority of 
voters in particular parts of the country. Additionally, those who emphasise self-expression, 
as opposed to survival values are relatively more inclined to view diversity as beneficial; that 
is, expressions of tastes and sources of learning, interests and new experiences.710 
Consequently, these citizens are more likely to both be satisfied with the way their local/state 
rather than the federal government is run, and believe they individually have greater and 
more successful influence over local/state, rather than federal, government decision-making. 
As anticipated statistics collated from my survey data reveal that indicators of a self-
expression values orientation are both positively correlated with measures of general 
interpersonal trust and negatively correlated with evidence of trust/confidence in the federal 
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government. These indicators include the degrees to which the most important formal 
organisations in which participants are involved have egalitarian decision-making and 
leadership-selection processes. Indeed, the degree to which participants’ most important 
formal groups had egalitarian decision-making processes was revealed to be both:  
- positively correlated with the belief that “most people can be trusted” and  
- negatively correlated with the belief that “you can’t be too careful in your 
dealings with others”.  
The extent to which participants’ most important formal groups have egalitarian leadership 
selection procedures was found to be positively linked to trusting strangers and post-office 
staff. Also, the extent to which participants’ most important formal groups have egalitarian 
decision-making processes was found to be negatively correlated with believing both:  
- that the federal government was run for all (rather than just a few big interests), 
and  
- that federal politicians take account of one’s concerns and those of people like 
oneself.  
These statistics are consistent with both Modernisation and my Homogenisation thesis. 
However, the degree to which participants’ most important formal groups had egalitarian 
decision-making processes was found to be positively linked to:  
- believing that local and state governments are run for all rather than just a few big 
interests,  
- believing that local politicians take account of one’s concerns and those of people 
like oneself, and  
- trusting state government officials.  
These statistics suggest a link between greater emphasis on self-expression values and more 
trust and confidence in local and state governments thereby buttressing my Homogenisation 
while undermining Inglehart and Welzel’s Modernisation theses. 
Table 6.26 





Correlations between the degree to which participants’ two most important formal 
groups (in which they are involved) have egalitarian decision-making processes and 
measures of interpersonal trust. 
 
2015 Correlations between The degree to which participants’ two most important formal 




Believing that most people can be 
trusted 
R= .346, p= .106 23 
Believing that you can’t be too careful in 
your dealings with others 
R= -.375, p= .077 23 
 
Table 6.27 
Correlations between the degree to which participants’ two most important formal 
groups (in which they are involved) have egalitarian leadership-selection processes and 
measures of interpersonal and social trust. 
 
2015 Correlations between The degree to which participants’ two most important formal 




Trusting strangers R= .356, p= .104 22 
Trusting post office staff R= .329, p= .135 22 
 
Table 6.28 
Correlations between the degree to which participants’ two most important formal 
groups (in which they are involved) have egalitarian decision-making processes and 
measures of trust and confidence in the federal government and federal politicians. 
 
2015 Correlations between The degree to which participants’ two most important formal 




Believing that the federal government is 
run for all, rather than just a few big 
interests 
R= -.353, p= .098 23 
Believing that federal politicians take 
account of one’s concerns and those of 
R= -.322, p= .134 23 





people like oneself 
 
Table 6.29 
Correlations between the degree to which participants’ two most important formal 
groups (in which they are involved) have egalitarian decision-making processes and 
measures of trust and confidence in state and local government and politicians. 
 
2015 Correlations between The degree to which participants’ two most important formal 




Believing that the local government is 
run for all, rather than just a few big 
interests 
R= .467, p= .024 23 
Believing that the state government is 
run for all, rather than just a few big 
interests 
R= .287, p= .184 23 
Believing that local politicians take 
account of one’s concerns and those of 
people like oneself 
R= .490, p= .018 23 
Trusting state government officials R= .338, p= .115 23 
 
I have argued that self-expression values (and social modularity) contribute to a rise in 
bonding and a decline in bridging social capital: that there exists an SEVHSN Complex. 
Therefore, positive correlations between social network homogeneity and both general 
interpersonal trust and trust/confidence in local/state government are consistent with my 
Homogenisation thesis. Negative correlations between social network homogeneity and 
trust/confidence in the Australian federal government would also be consistent with my 
theory. Hence, Homogenisation and Modernisation theses differ regarding the ways in which 
social network homogeneity is correlated with general interpersonal trust and 
trust/confidence in distant central governments. 
As predicted, my statistics reveal a link between social network homogeneity and 
trust/confidence in local/state government. Measures of structural homogeneity within 





participants’ most important formal groups were found to be positively correlated with 
believing both:  
- that local and state politicians take account of one’s concerns (and those of 
people like one’s self), and  
- that local and state governments are run for all (rather than just a few big 
interests).  
Indeed, the degree to which participants’ most important formal groups are age and 
ethnically/linguistically homogenous seems to be positively linked to the belief that state 
politicians take account of one’s concerns and those of people like oneself. Additionally, 
participants whose most important formal groups have memberships with homogenous 
(rather than heterogenous) levels of income and wealth were more likely to believe that local 
and state governments are run for all people rather than just a few big interests. Those 
whose important formal groups have relatively socio-economically homogenous, rather than 
heterogenous memberships are also more inclined (than those whose most important formal 
groups have socio-economically heterogeneous memberships) to believe that local politicians 
take account of their concerns and those of people like themselves.  
Positive correlations were found between overall levels of structural homogeneity 
within informal social networks and trusting local government officials. Additionally, the 
degree to which participants’ informal social networks were ethnically/linguistically and/or 
overall structurally homogenous was found to be positively correlated with trusting state 
government officials. The degree to which participants’ structural characteristics are 
reflected on average by members of their close social networks was found to be positively 
correlated with:  
- believing that local and state governments are run for all, and  
- state politicians take account of your concerns and those of people like you.  
The degree to which participants’ political views on policy matters are reflected on average 
by members of their close social networks was found to be positively correlated with both:  





- the belief that state politicians take account of one’s concerns and those of 
persons like oneself, and  
- trust in state government officials. 
 
Table 6.30 
Correlations between believing that state politicians take account of one’s concerns 
and those of people like oneself and measures of structural diversity within 
participants’ social networks. 
 
2015 Correlations between Believing that state politicians take account of one’s concerns 
and those of people like oneself 
Number of 
participants 
Participants agreeing that most members 
of the most important formal group in 
which they are involved are of the same 
ethnic/linguistic group 
R= .316, p= .142 23 
Participants agreeing that most members 
of the most important formal group in 
which they are involved are of the same 
age 
R= .510, p= .013 23 
 
Table 6.31 
Correlations between participants agreeing that most members of the two most 
important formal groups in which they are involved have the same wealth/income and 
measures of trust and confidence in local and state governments and politicians. 
 
2015 Correlations between Participants agreeing that most members of the two most 




Believing that local government is run 
for all rather than just a few big 
interests 
R= .489, p= .015 24 
Believing that state government is run 
for all rather than just a few big 
interests 
R= .366, p= .079 24 
Believing that local politicians take R= .534, p= .007 24 





account of one’s concerns and those of 
people like oneself 
 
Table 6.32 
Correlations between structural diversity within participants’ informal social networks 
and participants trusting local and state governments. 
 
2015 Correlations between The extent to which participants’ informal social networks (outside 
the immediate family) are structurally (ethnically/linguistically, 
economically, socially and religiously) diverse 
Number of 
participants 
Trusting local government officials R= -.275, p= .104 36 
Trusting state government officials R= -.252, p= .138 36 
 
Table 6.33 
The correlation between the extent to which participants’ informal social networks 
(outside the immediate family) are ethnically/linguistically diverse and participants 
trusting state government officials. 
 
2015 Correlations between The extent to which participants’ informal social networks (outside 
the immediate family) are ethnically/linguistically diverse 
Number of 
participants 
Trusting state government officials R= -.275, p= .104 36 
 
Table 6.34 
Correlations between participants ASSNDSs and measures of trust and confidence in 
state and local government and politicians. 
 
2015 Correlations between ASSNDS Number of 
participants 
Believing that local government is run for 
all rather than just a few big interests 
R= -.341, p= .096 25 
Believing that state government is run 
for all rather than just a few big interests 
R= -.498, p= .011 25 
Believing that state politicians take 
account of one’s concerns and those of 
R= -.666, p= .000 25 





people like oneself 
 
Table 6.35 
Correlations between participants’ AISNDSs and measures of trust and confidence in 
state politicians and officials. 
 
2015 Correlations between AISNDS Number of 
participants 
Believing that state politicians take 
account of one’s concerns and those of 
people like oneself 
R= -.300, p= .176 19 
Trusting state government officials R= -.337, p= .125 22 
 
These statistics are consistent with the Modernisation thesis position that more 
bonding social capital is linked to a greater emphasis on survival values that raise confidence 
in hierarchical institutions/organisations including all levels of government.711 The statistics 
are also consistent with my argument that more bonding social capital is connected to 
greater emphasis on self-expression values which encourage support for the principle of 
subsidiarity in government decision-making. Contrastingly, the statistics indicating that 
measures of social network homogeneity are:  
- positively correlated with general interpersonal trust, and  
- negatively correlated with trust/confidence in the federal government  
are consistent with my Homogenisation, but contradict the Modernisation theory.  
According to Modernisation theory, social network homogeneity is linked to survival 
values which raise suspicion of people unlike:  
- oneself (in terms of demographics, interests, personal preferences, and 
political/philosophical views), and  
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- members of one’s family and immediate community (ethnic, religious and 
otherwise).712  
In diverse and complex post-industrial societies like Australia this suspicion can inhibit the 
formation and undermine the strength of general interpersonal trust. Inglehart and Welzel 
hold that survival values raise confidence/trust in government, including the federal 
government.713 Conversely, I maintain that social network homogeneity is linked to self-
expression values which reduce suspicion of people who are unlike oneself or members of 
one’s immediate community. These values thereby facilitate the generation of, and 
strengthen general, interpersonal trust within diverse societies. Additionally, I argue (for 
reasons previously explained) that a self-expression values orientation (part of a SEVHSN 
Complex and therefore connected to social network homogeneity) erodes trust/confidence 
in distant central/national governments. 
My statistics uncover a positive correlation between reporting involvement in formal 
groups with ethnically/linguistically homogenous memberships and believing that most 
people can be trusted. This pattern appears to be replicated in informal social networks. 
Those with ethnically/linguistically homogenous informal social networks are more likely to 
trust teachers, nurses, doctors, shopkeepers, and NGO staff. Positive correlations were found 
between overall levels of structural homogeneity within informal social networks and trusting 
teachers, post office staff and judges/court staff. The degree to which participants’ structural 
characteristics are reflected on average by members of their close social networks was found 
to be positively correlated with:  
- trusting teachers, nurses, doctors, post office staff, judges/court staff, NGO staff, 
and  
- believing that most people can be trusted (illustrated in Figure 6.4).  
The extent to which participants’ structural characteristics are reflected on average by 
members of their close social networks was also revealed to be negatively correlated with 
trust in federal government officials (as demonstrated by Figure 6.5).  
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The correlation between participants agreeing that most members of the most 
important formal group in which they are involved are of the same ethnic/linguistic 
group and participants believing that most people can be trusted. 
 
2015 Correlations between Participants agreeing that most members of the most important 




Believing that most people can be 
trusted 
R= .337, p= .116 23 
 
Table 6.37 
Correlations between the extent to which participants’ informal social networks 
(outside the immediate family) are ethnically/linguistically diverse and measures of 
social trust. 
 
2015 Correlations between The extent to which participants’ informal social networks (outside 
the immediate family) are ethnically/linguistically diverse 
Number of 
participants 
Trusting teachers R= -.396, p= .017 36 
Trusting nurses/doctors R= -.224, p= .190 36 
Trusting shopkeepers R= -.310, p= .065 36 
Trusting NGO staff R= -.343, p= .041 36 
 
Table 6.38 
Correlations between the extent to which participants’ informal social networks 
(outside the immediate family) are structurally (ethnically/linguistically, economically, 
socially and religiously) diverse and measures of social trust. 
 
2015 Correlations between The extent to which participants’ informal social networks (outside 
the immediate family) are structurally (ethnically/linguistically, 
economically, socially and religiously) diverse 
Number of 
participants 
Trusting teachers R= -.448, p= .006 36 
Trusting post office staff R= -.258, p= .128 36 
Trusting judges/court staff R= -.234, p= .170 36 
 






Correlations between participants’ ASSNDSs and measures of participants’ social, 
interpersonal and political trust. 
 
2015 Correlations between ASSNDS Number of 
participants 
Trusting teachers R= -.407, p= .044 25 
Trusting nurses/doctors R= -.325, p= .113 25 
Trusting post office staff R= -.556, p= .004 25 
Trusting judges/court staff R= -.310, p= .132 25 
Trusting NGO staff R= -.312, p= .128 25 
Believing that most people can be trusted R= -.494, p= .012 25 
Trusting federal government officials R= .450, p= .024 25 
 
Figure 6.4 
The correlation between participants’ ASSNDSs and the extent to which participants 
agree that most people can be trusted. 
 
Figure 6.5 
The correlation between participants’ ASSNDSs and the extent to which participants 
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Similar relationships were uncovered between the political/ideological/values 
homogeneity/reinforcement of close social networks and trust/confidence in the federal 
government and federal government officials. The degree to which participants’ emphasis on 
values are reflected on average by members of their close social networks was found to be 
negatively correlated with both:  
- the belief that the federal government is run for all rather than just a few big 
interests (shown in Figure 6.6), and  
- a belief that federal politicians take account of one’s concerns and the concerns of 
people like oneself (illustrated by Figure 6.7).  
Participants who encounter fewer, rather than more, differences between their own political 
views on policy matters and those of their close social network members appear to be less 
convinced that the federal government is run for all and less trusting of federal government 
officials. These statistics support my Homogenisation argument that a SEVHSN Complex is 
linked to greater interpersonal trust and greater distrust of the federal government. 
Contrastingly, they are inconsistent with the Modernisation thesis in which greater social 
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general interpersonal trust while consolidating trust and confidence in the national 
government and leadership.714  
Table 6.40 
Correlations between participants’ AVSNDSs and measures of participants’ trust and 
confidence in the federal government and in federal politicians. 
 
2015 Correlations between AVSNDS Number of 
participants 
Believing that the federal government is 
run for all rather than just a few big 
interests 
r= .595, p= .009 18 
Believing that federal politicians take 
account of one’s concerns and those 
like oneself 
r= .709, p= .001 18 
 
Figure 6.6 
The correlation between participants’ AVSNDSs and the extent to which 
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The correlation between participants’ AVSNDSs and the extent to which participants 
believe that federal politicians take into account their concerns and those voiced by 
people like them. 
 
Table 6.41 
Correlations between participants’ ISNDSs and their trust in the federal government 
and in federal government officials. 
 
2015 Correlations between ISNDS Number of 
participants 
Believing that the federal government is 
run for all rather than just a few big 
interests 
R= .288, p= .183 23 
Trusting federal government officials R= .308, p= .153 23 
 
However, not all statistics indicate the relative explanatory superiority of 
Homogenisation over Modernisation theory. While structural measures of social network 
homogeneity were linked to greater general interpersonal trust, ideological/values 
homogeneity was not. The degree to which participants’ political views on policy matters are 
reflected on average by their close social network members was found to be negatively 
correlated with trusting strangers. Participants who encounter fewer differences between 
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also appear to have less trust in strangers than those participants who encounter relatively 
more such differences.  
Table 6.42 
Correlations between the degree to which participants’ trust strangers and their 
AISNDSs and ISNDSs. 
 
2015 Correlations between Trusting strangers Number of 
participants 
AISNDS R= .338, p= .123 22 
ISNDS R= .370, p= .082 23 
 
These statistics expose a sharp contrast in the relationships between measures of 
social trust and structural versus political network reinforcement. Social trust is positively 
correlated with structural homogeneity and negatively correlated with political/ideological 
homogeneity within social networks. Initially these findings may appear to undermine my 
Homogenisation position that general interpersonal trust is linked to, and may be a facet of, 
the SEVHSN Complex. Alternatively, they could suggest that those with more 
politically/ideologically homogenous social networks tend to have less trusting personalities. 
They may, to a greater extent than those with more social trust, seek friendship and 
association with people with whom they share similar beliefs, values and views. This is 
because trust is more easily built between people who share common ideals, understandings 
and perspectives. This does not necessarily undermine my Homogenisationist contention 
that those who emphasise autonomy and egalitarian self-expression values tend to have both 
greater social trust and homogenous networks. Both greater emphasis on self-expression 
values and less trusting personality traits may influence levels of political homogeneity within 
social networks. That is, the effects of less trusting personality traits on network ideological 
homogeneity are possibly just stronger than the correlation self-expression values generate 
between network political/ideological homogeneity and social trust. The fact that so many 
measures of structural homogeneity/reinforcement within social networks were positively 
correlated with measures of social trust would suggest that social trust and social network 
homogeneity (of all kinds) are positively linked within a larger complex. 





Trust, Confidence & Informal Structural Social Capital 
Further evidence that interpersonal trust, trust/confidence in local/state government 
and distrust/less confidence in the federal government are intertwined with the SEVHSN 
Complex comprise correlations between these variables and informal structural social capital. 
Greater informal structural social capital was previously exposed as a facet of the Complex. 
More frequent informal meetings with members of one’s social network was found to be 
positively correlated with trust in local and state government officials and believing that local 
and state governments were run for all rather than just a few big interests. More frequent 
informal meetings with members of one’s social network was also found to be negatively 
correlated with the belief that federal politicians take account of one’s concerns and those of 
people like oneself. Additionally, more frequent informal meetings with members of one’s 
social network is positively correlated with trusting strangers (as demonstrated in Figure 6.8), 
members of other ethnic/linguistic groups, post-office staff, judges and court staff. These 
correlations uncover links between informal social network engagement (previously revealed 
as a probable facet of the SEVHSN Complex) and both social trust and a preference for, and 
greater trust in, decentralised government.  
Table 6.43 
Correlations between participants’ frequency of meeting informally with members of 
their social networks and measures of social, interpersonal and political trust. 
 
2015 Correlations between Participants’ frequency of meeting informally with members of 
their social networks 
Number of 
participants 
Trusting local government officials R= .276, p= .103 36 
Trusting state government officials R= .270, p= .112 36 
Believing that local government is run 
for all rather than just a few big interests 
R= .235, p= .168 36 
Believing that state government is run 
for all rather than just a few big interests 
R= .285, p= .092 36 
Believing that federal politicians take 
account of one’s concerns and those of 
people like oneself 
R= -.235, p= .167 36 
Trusting members of other 
ethnic/linguistic groups 
R= .308, p= .067 36 





Trusting strangers R= .510, p= .001 36 
Trusting post-office staff R= .252, p= .139 36 
Trusting judges and court staff R= .304, p= .071 36 
 
Figure 6.8 
The correlation between the extent to which participants trust strangers and 
participants’ frequency of meeting informally with members of their social networks. 
 
This chapter has thus far discussed correlation statistics indicating the existence of a 
SEVHSN Complex: a connection between autonomy/egalitarian self-expression values and 
social network homogeneity. Trends revealed by WVS data and previously discussed in 
Chapter Three demonstrate that an increasing proportion of the Australian population are 
greatly emphasising self-expression values. This would suggest that a growing proportion of 
Australians are becoming more heavily embedded in the Complex. Other variables and trends 
related to structural social capital and social/political trust/confidence were found to be 
correlated with, and argued to be facets of, the SEVHSN Complex. These relationships are 
consistent with my Homogenisation thesis. Conversely, rising involvement in formal 
organisations in this the early twenty-first century is inconsistent with Inglehart and Welzel’s 
Modernisation theory as it pertains to prosperous and advancing post-industrial societies like 
Australia.715 Many correlations revealed in this chapter are also inconsistent with Inglehart 
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and Welzel’s arguments. The most important of these correlations being those linking self-
expression values with homogenous social networks. 
Political Interest & Network Homogeneity  
Now that I have provided evidence that a SEVHSN Complex exists and that the 
proportion of Australians embedded in this complex seems to be growing, the ways in which 
these patterns are influencing political engagement will be exposed and analysed. 
Political/ideological reinforcement/homogeneity within social networks is a salient facet of 
the SEVHSN Complex. Political interest was found to be positively correlated with participants 
reporting greater/stronger differences between their own views on political policy matters 
and those of their close social network members. This finding indicates that those whose 
political positions are reinforced by the members of their close social network are probably 
less likely to be interested in politics. This relationship would seem to support my argument 
that homogenisation of social networks has a negative impact on political engagement.  
Table 6.44 
The correlation between participants’ ISNDSs and their level of political interest. 
 
2015 Correlations between ISNDS Number of 
participants 
Political interest r= .320, p= .136 23 
 
Contrastingly, those who encounter more rather than less significant 
political/values/ideological difference within their social networks are arguably likely to have 
more, and more interesting, political discussions and debates that raise political interest and 
understanding. They are also more likely to develop debating skills/experience and greater 
tolerance of others with different political views, thereby lowering the emotional, 
psychological and social costs of discussing political issues with those with whom they 
disagree. Indeed, according to my Homogenisation theory, there exists a causal relationship 
between social network homogeneity and believing both that society is ideologically 
homogenous and that there is little to be learnt from political discussion with those with 





whom one disagrees. Furthermore, I contend that these patterns lead the members of 
individual social networks (whose political views increasingly go unchecked by those holding 
contrary beliefs) to drift further from the political/ideological centre. This, in turn, 
precipitates a diversification of political views, beliefs and attitudes within society. 
Imagined Societal & Actual Network Homogeneity 
Believing that society is ideologically homogenous was found to be positively 
correlated with both ethnic/linguistic and socio-economic homogeneity within informal 
networks and age homogeneity within participants most important formal groups. 
Additionally, those who encounter less political difference in their close social network, seem 
to be more inclined to believe that society is ideologically homogenous than those who 
encounter more ideological difference in their close social networks. As shown in Figure 6.9, 
those whose political views tend to be reinforced by a large proportion of their close social 
network members, seem more disposed to believing that society is ideologically homogenous 
than are those whose political views are contradicted by a relatively greater proportion of 
these members. These correlations suggest that structural and/or ideological homogeneity 
and reinforcement within social networks may raise the degree to which people believe 
society is ideologically homogenous. This would indicate that believing society is ideologically 
homogenous is perhaps linked to the SEVHSN Complex. Further evidence to that effect 
includes the positive correlation between:  
- believing that society is ideologically homogenous, and  
- the extent to which the most important formal groups in which participants are 
involved have egalitarian leadership selection processes (a measure of self-
expression values emphasis).  
Additionally, believing that society is more homogenous is positively correlated with other 
variables attached to the complex. These variables include believing that local politicians take 
account of one’s concerns and those of people like oneself and “not” believing that the 
federal government is run for all, rather than just a few big interests.  
Table 6.45 





Correlations between believing society is ideologically homogenous and variables 
positively or negatively linked to the SEVHSN Complex. 
 
2015 Correlations between Believing society is ideologically homogenous Number of 
participants 
The extent to which participants’ informal 
social networks (outside the immediate 
family) are ethnically/linguistically diverse 
R= -.228, p= .181 36 
The extent to which members of 
participants’ informal social networks 
(outside the immediate family) have 
diverse economic status 
R= -.335, p= .046 36 
Participants agreeing that most members 
of the most important formal group in 
which they are involved have the same age 
R= .555, p= .006 23 
ISNDS R= -.327, p= .128 23 
AISNDS R= -.472, p= .027 22 
The degree to which participants’ two 
most important formal groups (in which 
they are involved) have egalitarian 
leadership-selection processes. 
R= -.376, p= .102 22 
Believing that local politicians take account 
of one’s concerns and those of people like 
oneself 
R= .265, p= .118 36 
Believing that the federal government is 
run for all, rather than just a few big 
interests 
R= -.400, p= .016 36 
 
Figure 6.9 
The correlation between participants’ AISNDSs and the extent to which participants 
believe society is ideologically homogenous. 






Believing that society is ideologically homogenous is also negatively correlated with 
trusting people from different ethnic/linguistic groups. This finding possibly indicates that 
those more heavily embedded in the SEVHSN Complex may be having their social trust 
moulded by two opposing forces. First, a self-expression values orientation may be acting to 
lift social trust. However, greater social network homogeneity is positively correlated with 
(and is likely to be instigating) both:  
- a belief that society is ideologically homogenous, and  
- a greater distrust of people whose appearance and language visibly and audibly 
set them apart from those who are considered normal by people situated in 
homogenous social networks. 
 
Table 6.46 
The correlation between believing society is ideologically homogenous and trusting 
members of other ethnic/linguistic groups. 
 
2015 Correlations between Believing society is ideologically homogenous Number of 
participants 
Trusting members of other 
ethnic/linguistic groups 
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Political Debate, Compromise & Diversification  
My statistics also indicate that believing there is little to be learnt from political 
discussion with those with whom one disagrees is:  
- positively correlated with believing society is ideologically homogenous, and  
- itself a consequence of entrenchment in the SEVHSN Complex.  
Indeed, a belief there is little to be learnt from political discussion with those with whom one 
disagrees was positively correlated with measures of social network homogeneity. These 
measures include:  
- the gender homogeneity of participants’ most important formal groups,  
- the degree to which participants’ political views on policy matters tend to be 
reinforced by members of their close social networks, and  
- participants encountering fewer political views on policy matters different from 
their own within their close social networks. 
 
Table 6.47 
Correlations between believing there is little to be learnt from political discussion with 
those with whom one disagrees and variables positively or negatively linked to the 
SEVHSN Complex. 
 
2015 Correlations between Believing there is little to be learnt from political discussion with 
those with whom one disagrees 
Number of 
participants 
Believing society is ideologically 
homogenous 
R= .297, p= .078 36 
Participants agreeing that most 
members of the most important formal 
group in which they are involved have 
the same gender 
R= .313, p= .146 23 
AISNDS R= -.331, p= .133 22 
ISNDS R= -.451, p= .031 23 
 





Believing that society is ideologically homogenous and believing there is little to be 
learnt from political discussion with those with whom one disagrees are both positively 
correlated with an unwillingness to accept political compromise. This is consistent with my 
Homogenisation argument that as social networks become increasingly homogenous their 
members (particularly younger members still in their formative years) become more prone to 
assuming that society as a whole is politically/ideologically homogenous. Consequently, these 
people develop greater indifference and resistance toward political views/opinions that are 
contrary to those held by their close social network members. Significantly, they assume, 
often wrongly, that these alternative views are held by only an insignificant minority. This, 
combined with their relative inexperience in discussing/debating political issues with those 
with whom they disagree, reduces their ability and willingness to politically debate, negotiate 
and compromise. 
Table 6.48 
Correlations between an unwillingness to accept political compromise and believing 
that society is highly ideologically homogenous and that there is little t be learnt from 
political discussion with those with whom one disagrees. 
 
2015 Correlations between An unwillingness to accept political compromise Number of 
participants 
Believing society is ideologically 
homogenous 
R= .326, p= .052 36 
Believing there is little to be learnt from 
political discussion with those with 
whom one disagrees 
R= .424, p= .010 36 
 
As explained earlier in this chapter, another of my Homogenisation arguments is that 
SNH is allowing each network to drift further from the ideological centre, thereby instigating 
ideological diversification. Greater ideological diversity among the young than among the old 
would be consistent with my Homogenisation theory because younger people are relatively 
more immersed in the SEVHSN Complex than are older generations. Indeed, according to the 
correlation statistics generated from my survey data, younger Australians are more inclined 
to vote for minor parties and independents in Senate elections then are older people. These 





patterns are supported by other sources.716 Furthermore, these trends cannot be solely 
attributed to a life-cycle phenomenon because the proportion of Australians voting for minor 
parties and independents has been rising almost consistently since 1975. In 1975 non-major 
parties received 4% of valid votes cast in the House of Representatives election and 7.5% of 
those cast in the Senate election. In 2016 non-major parties received 23.2% of the valid votes 
cast in the House of Representatives election and 35.0% of those cast in the Senate 
election.717 These trends (greater ideological diversity among younger than among older 
people and a growing proportion of Australians voting for minor parties; which are often 
peculiar or extreme) may be indicative of a generational political diversification of Australian 
political views and attitudes. 
Table 6.49 
The correlation between age of participants and participants reporting that they 
normally vote for minor parties and/or independents in senate elections. 
 
2015 Correlations between Age of participants Number of 
participants 
Participants reporting that they normally 
vote for minor parties and/or 
independents in senate elections 
R= -.348, p= .047 33 
 
Ideological diversification may exacerbate political distrust and disengagement and 
further narrow the capacity of government to satisfactorily and effectively address issues of 
concern. Ideological diversification necessarily reduces the proportion of the public 
government can satisfy with their decision-making. By extension, it also limits the proportion 
of the population able to be recruited by major parties. Although minor party membership 
probably benefited from ideological diversification, the overall impact likely contributed to a 
                                                          
716 ABC NEWS, (2016) ‘Fact Check: Would a vote among under 30s possibly deliver a Greens PM?’, viewed 2 
August 2017, http://www.abc.net.au/news/factcheck/2016-06-10/fact-check-would-voters-aged-under-30-
possible-elect-a-green-pm/7467068; Beaumont, Adrian. (2013) ‘Making sense of the polls: Age Breakdowns 
show Huge Difference’, The Conversation, viewed 2 August 2017, http://theconversation.com/age-
breakdowns-show-huge-differences-17361 
717 Antony Green’s Election Blog, ‘Record Vote for Minor Parties at 2013 Federal Election’; Australian Electoral 
Commission, ‘2016 Federal Election: First preferences by Party’; Australian Electoral Commission, ‘2016 
Federal Election: First preferences by Senate group’ 





decline in the proportion of the public involved in political parties during the latter twentieth-
century (for reasons discussed over the next two paragraphs). Rates of engagement then 
plateaued and have not even begun to recover.  
According to Gauja and Haute there are two main motives driving political party 
membership and participation. The first is conviction: belief in the party’s platform, 
candidates, leadership and values. “[I]deological incentives dominate party members’ 
reasons for joining.”718 The second is efficacy or means of influence: the possibility of the 
party influencing government decisions and individual members influencing party decisions. 
“Overall, process incentives take second place to ideology as a motivating factor.”719 
Additionally, Gauja and Haute’s research reveals that across all democracies material rewards 
and career advancement were insignificant motivations for joining political parties.720 
Societal ideological diversification may mean more people supporting the values, 
platform, candidates and leadership of, as well as propensity to vote for, minor parties. 
However, minor party membership growth and engagement will always be inhibited by their 
relative lack of influence over government decision-making. Still, the potential influence 
individuals can wield through party membership and engagement would be significantly 
increased by:  
- democratising the internal decision-making and leadership selection procedures 
of political parties,721 and  
- reforming Parliamentary electoral systems (in at least one chamber of any 
legislature) to grant minor parties power/influence more proportional to their 
electoral popularity.722  
                                                          
718 Gauja, Anika and Haute, Emilie. (2015) ‘Members and Activists of Political Parties in Comparative 
Perspective’, a paper prepared for the IPSA World Congress of Political Science – Panel ‘What is party 
membership?’, p.8, viewed 12 September 2017, 
http://www.partirep.eu/sites/default/files/publication/file/IPSAPaper-Gauja-vanHaute.pdf  
719 Gauja, Anika and Haute, Emilie. ‘Members and Activists of Political Parties in Comparative Perspective’, p.8  
720 Gauja, Anika and Haute, Emilie. ‘Members and Activists of Political Parties in Comparative Perspective’, p.8 
721 Garland, Jessica. (2016) ‘A Wider Range of Friends: Multi-speed Organising during the 2015 Labour 
Leadership Contest’ in The Political Quarterly, vol:87(1), p.23-30 
722 Karp, Jeffrey, A and Banducci, Susan, A. (2008) ‘Political Efficacy and Participation in Twenty-Seven 
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vol:38(2), p.311-334 





Admittedly, democratisation must be balanced against other often competing priorities 
including consistency of party message. This conflict between party democracy and unity is 
exemplified by the Australian Greens NSW branch using internal democratic procedures to 
pre-select candidates and bind them to motions at odds with the views of other Greens.723 A 
more detailed and extensive discussion about how current rates of party membership can be 
raised by adapting internal party processes and electoral regimes to the values and conflict-
aversion of contemporary Australians is presented later in this thesis. 
The combination of societal diversification and social network homogenisation can 
also act to undermine levels of political trust/confidence. That is, people over estimate the 
degree to which their political views are held by society at large. Consequently, they are 
prone to believing that the political system, parties and leaders have become corrupted and 
beholden to minority interests when government fails to meet their expectations. This lack of 
trust and confidence in government can severely limit political capital and therefore the 
capacity of government to address significant problems and issues of concern.724  
Community Cohesion, Social Capital, Generosity & Wellbeing 
Yet, my statistics also suggest that immersion in the SEVHSN Complex has several 
positive effects on community cohesion, social capital, generosity and subjective sense of 
wellbeing. The degree to which participants’ ideological/political views and structural 
characteristics tend to be reinforced/reflected by the members of their close social networks 
is positively correlated with their self-reported happiness. Self-reported happiness is also 
positively correlated with the degree to which participants’ most important formal groups 
make decisions through egalitarian processes (a measure of self-expression values emphasis). 
A positive relationship was found between the socio-economic homogeneity of participants’ 
informal social networks and the extent to which participants agreed that ‘they lived in a 
                                                          
723 Hunter, Fergus. (2017) “She is the odd person out’: Greens senators hit out at Lee Rhiannon’, The Sydney 
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the-odd-person-out-greens-senators-hit-out-at-lee-rhiannon-20170702-gx39bn.html  
724 Kaina, Viktoria. (2008) ‘Declining Trust in Elites and Why We Should Worry About It – With Empirical 
Evidence from Germany’ in GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION: AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE 
POLITICS, vol:43(3), p.405-423 





peaceful town/neighbourhood’. The degree to which participants agreed that ‘they lived in a 
peaceful town/neighbourhood’ was found to be positively correlated to both:  
- a lack of encountering political/ideological views that differed from their own 
within their close social network, and  
- the degrees to which the emphasis participants place on values tend to be 
reinforced by members of their close social networks.  
These statistics indicate that greater immersion in the SEVHSN Complex may induce greater 
levels of a subjective sense of wellbeing and community cohesion.  
Table 6.50 
Correlations between participants’ self-reported happiness and measures positively or 
negatively linked to the SEVHSN Complex. 
 
2015 Correlations between Participants’ self-reported happiness Number of 
participants 
AISNDS R= -.438, p= .041 22 
ASSNDS R= -.336, p= .101 25 
The degree to which participants’ two 
most important formal groups (in which 
they are involved) have egalitarian 
decision-making processes. 
R= .312, p= .147 23 
 
Table 6.51 
Correlations between the extent to which participants agree that they live in a peaceful 
town/neighbourhood and measures of the economic status, ideological and values 
diversity within participants’ informal/close social networks. 
 




The extent to which members of 
participants’ informal social networks 
(outside the immediate family) have 
diverse economic status 
R= -.236, p= .166 36 





ISNDS R= -.334, p= .119 23 
AVSNDS R= -.496, p= .036 18 
 
Measures of social capital and generosity were also positively correlated with other 
variables linked to the Complex. Reporting that one could rely on their neighbours to care of 
their children (if they had children) for a few days if they suddenly/unexpectedly had to leave 
town was positively correlated with believing society is ideologically homogenous. The self-
reported belief in the likelihood that ‘one’s neighbours would help a person in need’ was 
found to be positively correlated with the degree to which the structural characteristics of 
participants’ close-social-network-members tend to reflect participants’ own. The extent to 
which the structural characteristics of participants’ close-social-network-members tend to 
reflect participants’ own is also positively linked to participants’ financial donations to charity. 
This finding is reinforced by a positive relationship found between the degree to which 
participants’ most important formal groups have ethnically/linguistically homogenous 
memberships and the extent to which participants donate both time and money to charity. 
Also, the overall structural homogeneity of participants’ informal social networks was 
positively correlated with participants indicating/reporting that their neighbours were likely 
to help a person in need. ‘Participants indicating that their neighbours were likely to assist a 
person in need’ was also positively linked to the socio-economic homogeneity of participants’ 
informal social network. The degrees to which the emphasis participants place on values tend 
to be reinforced by members of their close social networks was, in turn, positively linked to 
the number of people participants believed would provide (loan) them the equivalent of a 
week’s wages if they suddenly required it. 
Table 6.52 
The correlation between participants reporting that they could rely on neighbours to 
care for their children (if they had children) for a few days if they 
suddenly/unexpectedly had to leave town, and believing society is ideologically 
homogenous. 
 
2015 Correlations between Participants reporting that they could rely on neighbours to care for 
their children (if they had children) for a few days if they 
suddenly/unexpectedly had to leave town. 
Number of 
participants 





Believing society is ideologically 
homogenous 
R= .231, p= .176 36 
 
Table 6.53 
Correlations between participants’ ASSNDSs and the generosity of participants 
themselves and their neighbours. 
 
2015 Correlations between ASSNDS Number of 
participants 
Participants’ reported likelihood that 
their neighbours would help a person in 
need 
R= -.377, p= .064 25 
Participants’ financial donations to 
charity 
R= -.348, p= .088 25 
 
Table 6.54 
Correlations between Participants agreeing that most members of the most important 
formal group in which they are involved are of the same ethnic/linguistic group and 
their time and financial donations to charity. 
 
2015 Correlations between Participants agreeing that most members of the most important 




Participants’ financial donations to 
charity 
R= .344, p= .108 23 
Participants’ time donations to charity R= .338, p= .115 23 
 
Table 6.55 
Correlations between Participants’ reported likelihood that their neighbours would help 
a person in need and the extent to which participants’ informal social networks are 
structurally and economically diverse. 
 
2015 Correlations between Participants’ reported likelihood that their neighbours would 
help a person in need 
Number of 
participants 





The extent to which participants’ informal 
social networks (outside the immediate 
family) are structurally 
(ethnically/linguistically, economically, 
socially and religiously) diverse 
R= -.255, p= .134 36 
The extent to which members of 
participants’ informal social networks 
(outside the immediate family) have diverse 
economic status 
R= -.229, p= .179 36 
 
Table 6.56 
The correlation between participants’ AVSNDSs and number of people participants 
believe would provide (loan) them the equivalent of a week’s wages if they suddenly 
required it. 
 
2015 Correlations between AVSNDS Number of 
participants 
Number of people participants believe 
would provide (loan) them the 
equivalent of a week’s wages if they 
suddenly required it. 
R= -.387, p= .113 18 
 
The ‘SEVHSN Complex’ and ‘Ascendency of Homogenous Formal Groups’ sections of 
this chapter reveal a strong link between self-expression values and homogenous social 
networks and suggest that the former may precipitate the latter. As self-expression values 
have been rising generationally (discussed in Chapter Three), it is argued that the extent to 
which social networks are ideologically/recreationally homogenous may also be 
generationally rising. Indeed, this and previous chapters have discussed evidence from prior 
studies in the United States (an anglosphere country with strong similarities to Australia) that 
indicate similar trends as well as the adaptation of organisational governing processes to the 
values of younger generations; who desire a greater say in the decision-making of these 
groups. Furthermore, I have presented Australian statistics and research suggesting that 
formal organisations may be adapting to the preferences of the SEVHSN Complex immersed 
by splintering into more formal organisations with more homogenous memberships. This 





adaptation may explain the early twenty-first century rise in the rates of secular and non-
political formal organisational engagement in Australia.  
Therefore, if a higher proportion of Australians are becoming more immersed in the 
SEVHSN Complex, then the correlations discussed in this chapter could indicate that this 
trend may be inducing greater social capital, subjective sense of wellbeing and community 
cohesion. However, my statistics also indicate that the socio-economic homogeneity of 
networks may be linked to less generosity and less generous networks. Indeed, socio-
economic homogeneity within informal social networks was found to be negatively 
correlated with time donated to charity. Socio-economic homogeneity within formal 
organisations was found to be negatively correlated with the number of people participants 
indicated would be willing to assist them if they suddenly faced a long-term emergency. 
Examples provided of a long-term emergency included the death of a breadwinner, job loss 
[urban] or harvest failure [rural]. These statistics may indicate that those with more 
economically homogenous networks have had relatively few experiences encountering 
poverty among their friends/family and are therefore both:  
- less sympathetic to the plight of those facing significant financial difficulties, and  
- less confident that others (who are probably members of the same economically 
homogenous social networks) would assist them if they were suddenly plunged 
into financial hardship. 
 
Table 6.57 
The correlation between the extent to which members of participants’ informal social 
networks (outside the immediate family) have diverse economic status and 
participants’ time donations to charity. 
 
2015 Correlations between The extent to which members of participants’ informal social 




Participants’ time donations to charity R= .233, p= .172 36 
 






The correlation between participants agreeing that most members of the two most 
important formal groups in which they are involved have the same wealth/income and 
the number of people participants indicated would be willing to assist them if they 
suddenly faced a long-term emergency. 
 
2015 Correlations between Participants agreeing that most members of the two most 




Number of people participants 
indicated would be willing to assist 
them if they suddenly faced a long-term 
emergency 
R= -.308, p= .143 24 
 
Conclusion 
Using statistics drawn from my own “Political Participation and Conflict Avoidance” 
Survey, this sixth chapter has highlighted significant differences between my Homogenisation 
and Inglehart and Welzel’s Modernisation theses. Where there is disagreement, the statistics 
examined have almost consistently supported my argument. Initially, the chapter explored 
compelling evidence revealing the existence of a Self-Expression Values Homogenous Social 
Network (SEVHSN) Complex: consistent with Homogenisation, but in stark contradiction to 
Modernisation, theory. Consequently, other variables and trends pertaining to structural 
social capital and interpersonal/political trust/confidence were found to be correlated with, 
and held to be facets of, the SEVHSN Complex. These relationships, combined with previously 
analysed patterns regarding formal organisational involvement and the emphasis placed on 
self-expression values, demonstrates that a larger proportion of the Australian population are 
becoming more immersed in the complex. 
Survey data statistics suggested that participants’ involvement in formal organisations 
is positively correlated with the degree to which the formal groups in which they are involved 
have homogenous memberships and egalitarian governing processes. Additionally, the 
statistics demonstrated that Australian formal organisational participation is rising. That is, 
formal group involvement may be rising as organisations adapt to new societal value 





emphases and homogenous group membership expectations of the SEVHSN Complex 
immersed. Secular and non-political-party formal organisations are likely to be democratising 
their governing structures/processes and proliferating into a greater number of formal 
groups with relatively smaller and homogenous memberships. These results are consistent 
with my Homogenisation thesis. Conversely, the statistics indicating rising formal group 
engagement are antithetical to Modernisation theory. Furthermore, my statistics suggest the 
existence of a link between the size/strength of participants’ informal social 
networks/connections and measures of the participants’ self-expression values emphasis. 
This is consistent with both Homogenisation and Modernisation theses which maintain that 
greater emphasis on self-expression values (and subsequent social modularity) acts to 
strengthen and enlarge informal networks.  
The statistics generated by data from my 36-participant survey revealed that 
indicators of the degree of emphasis participants’ place on self-expression values are both:  
- positively correlated with measures of general interpersonal trust, and  
- negatively correlated with measures of participants’ trust/confidence in the 
federal government.  
These findings are consistent with both Homogenisation and Modernisation theses. 
However, my statistics suggest a link between greater emphasis on self-expression values and 
more trust and confidence in local and state governments. These correlations conflict with 
the Modernisation argument that a self-expression values orientation weakens 
trust/confidence in hierarchal formal organisations and institutions at all levels of 
government. Conversely, they support my Homogenisation thesis that greater emphasis on 
self-expression values is compatible with the principal of subsidiarity and being more 
trusting/confident in local/state government than those who strongly emphasise survival 
values. 
If an SEVHSN Complex exists, then ‘having homogenous social networks’ and 
‘emphasising self-expression values’ should be correlated with social/political 
trust/confidence in identical ways. My statistics reveal positive correlations between social 
network homogeneity and trust/confidence in local/state government. This is consistent with 





my Homogenisation argument that more bonding social capital is connected to a greater 
emphasis on self-expression values which encourage support for the principal of subsidiarity 
in government decision-making. They also support the Modernisation position that bonding 
social capital is linked to greater emphasis on survival values which raise confidence in 
hierarchal institutions/organisations (including all government levels).  
However, my statistics indicate that measures of social network homogeneity are 
positively correlated with general interpersonal trust and negatively correlated with 
trust/confidence in the federal government. These statistics support my Homogenisation 
argument that a SEVHSN Complex is linked to greater interpersonal trust and distrust in the 
federal government. Conversely, they are inconsistent with the Modernisation thesis that 
greater social network homogeneity is tied to more emphasis on survival values which 
undermine general interpersonal trust while consolidating trust and confidence in the 
national government and leadership. A study of post-industrial western European 
democracies undertaken by Fitzgerald and Wolak establishes that citizens tend to trust their 
smaller scale local more than their larger scale national governments.725 In the words of 
Fitzgerald and Wolak “federalism … is associated with higher trust in local authorities, and 
lower trust in central government. In countries where local governments hold more influence 
and authority, people also tend to be more trusting of local authorities.”726 Analysis of my 
own data suggests that greater immersion in the SEVHSN Complex may amplify these 
tendencies. 
Additionally, my statistics uncovered links between informal social network 
engagement (revealed as a probable facet of the Complex) and general interpersonal trust, 
trust/confidence in local/state government as well as distrust/lack of confidence in the 
federal government. This is further evidence that greater embeddedness in the SEVHSN 
Complex amplifies a preference for decentralized government (well-established in advanced 
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post-industrial societies)727 as well as for more autonomously forged and largely self-
governed social connections.  
Hence, this chapter has established that statistics collated from my survey are 
consistent with the Homogenisation arguments that:  
1) an SEVHSN Complex exists,   
2) a generationally growing proportion of Australians are immersed in it, and  
3) it is linked to: 
a)  more informal structural social capital,  
b) more general interpersonal trust,  
c) more trust/confidence in decentralise local/state government, and 
d)  less trust/confidence in the centralised federal government.  
From there the chapter explored more correlations buttressing my Homogenisation 
thesis that greater immersion in the SEVHSN Complex is undermining:  
1) exposure to ideological diversity, and  
2) willingness to debate, compromise and participate in conflict prone forms of 
engagement.  
It was argued that many of these trends will have (and are having) an undermining influence 
on the effectiveness of, and support for, our political system. Still, I stressed that the data 
also indicate that greater immersion in the SEVHSN Complex probably acts to lift overall 
levels of community cohesion, social capital, generosity and a subjective sense of wellbeing.  
The remaining chapters will present and discuss correlations between the SEVHSN 
Complex and: 
1)  patterns of political: a) engagement, b) efficacy, c) confidence, and d) tolerance,  
2) support for and willingness to accept political checks and compromise, and  
3) factors influencing social modularity and atomism.  
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There will also be a detailed and extensive discussion about how party democratisation and 
electoral reform can raise current rates of party membership. 
  






--DRIVERS OF COMPLEX-IMMERSION-- 
Technology, Wealth, Education & Information 
Dissemination 
 
The previous chapter discussed my own statistical evidence that measures of self-
expression values orientation and social network homogeneity are positively correlated. That 
is, it was shown that there exists a Self-Expression Values Homogenous Social Network 
(SEVHSN) Complex. Interpersonal and political trust/confidence as well as community and 
political engagement were revealed to be correlated with the Complex in ways consistent 
with my Homogenisation thesis. Furthermore, statistics presented indicated that an 
increasing proportion of the Australian population is becoming more heavily immersed in the 
Complex. This seventh chapter investigates the validity of theorised drivers of SEVHSN 
Complex-immersion, including:  
- use of technologies (such as online communication and audio and screen 
entertainment),  
- economic development/degree of financial security,  
- education attainment, and  
- level and means of news/information dissemination.  
It discusses how relationships between these ‘potential/suggested’ drivers and indicators of 
Complex-embeddedness support and/or contradict my Homogenisation theory. 
Access to & Use of Technology 
Links between the use of technology and SEVHSN Complex-immersion are the initial 
foci of this chapter. Measures of SEVHSN Complex-immersion were found to be positively 
correlated with indicators of greater access to, and use of, communications and personal 





entertainment technologies (such as iPods and internet equipped PCs, tablets and 
smartphones). The degree to which the decision-making processes of participants’ most 
important formal organisations were egalitarian (a measure of self-expression values 
orientation) was positively correlated with the time participants spent both:  
- listening to personal devices, and  
- communicating online for non-work-related purposes.  
Hence, these correlations appear consistent with both my Homogenisation and Inglehart and 
Welzel’s Modernisation arguments. That is, those who are relatively more empowered by, 
and prefer using and communicating with, contemporary/modern technologies are likely to 
place greater emphasis on self-expression values than are persons with less access to, and 
less inclination to utilise, such devices. 
Table 7.1 
Correlations between the degree to which participants’ two most important formal 
groups (in which they are involved) have egalitarian decision-making processes and the 
time participants spent listening to personal devices and communicating online for 
non-work-related purposes. 
 
2015 Correlations between The degree to which participants’ two most important formal 




Time participants spent listening to 
personal devices for non-work-related 
purposes 
r= .341, p= .112 23 
Time participants spent communicating 
online for non-work-related purposes 
r= .318, p= .139 23 
 
According to my Homogenisation theory those who place more (rather than less) 
emphasis on self-expression values have a greater propensity to use technology to find and 
connect to people with whom they share similar interests and values. These technologies 
include the Internet, social media, chat rooms and audio/video chat. Those who are self-
expression values oriented tend to feel less bound by social conventions and obligations and 





at greater liberty to forge, maintain and sever social connections based on their individual 
preferences than do those who place greater emphasis on survival values. Therefore, they 
may be more inclined to use advanced technologies to enhance their social modularity by 
overcoming geographic distance. Consequently, they may be prevailing over practical 
obstacles that previously limited opportunities for individuals with similar interests/ideas to 
form connections and discussion groups around these topics/themes. I contend that this 
contributes to the development of a SEVHSN Complex. Thus, positive correlations between 
measures of participants’ Complex-immersion and both their use of communications 
technologies and the proportion of their friends met online would be consistent with my 
Homogenisation thesis. 
The time participants spent communicating online for non-work-related purposes was 
indeed negatively correlated with the extent to which participants encounter political views 
on policy matters different from their own within their close social networks as well as 
positively correlated with:  
1. the degree to which the most important formal groups in which they are involved 
have egalitarian decision-making processes, and  
2. the ethnic/linguistic homogeneity of their informal social networks.  
The proportion of participants’ close friends whom they initially met online was also 
positively correlated with:  
- the religious homogeneity of participants’ informal social networks, and  
- the degree to which members of participants’ most important formal groups have 
a similar educational background/level.  
Additionally, the time participants spent looking at screens for non-work-related purposes 
was positively correlated with:  
- the ethnic/linguistic homogeneity of their informal social networks, and  
- the extent to which their political values tended to be reinforced by the members 
of their close social networks (as shown in Figure 7.1).  





These statistics suggest that spending more time using technology to maintain and forge 
more friendships and relationships over significant distances is linked to measures of SEVHSN 
Complex-immersion. Hence, they are consistent with my Homogenisation theory.  
Table 7.2 
Correlations between the time participants spent communicating online for non-work-
related purposes and variables connected with the SEVHSN Complex. 
 




The degree to which participants’ two 
most important formal groups (in which 
they are involved) have egalitarian 
decision-making processes. 
r= .318, p= .139 23 
The extent to which participants’ informal 
social networks (outside the immediate 
family) are ethnically/linguistically diverse 
r= -.273, p= .107 36 
ISNDS r= -.330, p= .125 23 
 
Table 7.3 
Correlations between the proportion of participants’ close friends initially met online 
and measures of structural diversity within participants social networks. 
 
2015 Correlations between Proportion of participants’ close friends initially met online Number of 
participants 
The extent to which participants’ informal 
social networks (outside the immediate 
family) are religiously diverse 
r= -.284, p= .098 31 
Participants agreeing that most members 
of the most important formal group in 
which they are involved have the same 
educational background/level 
r= .290, p= .180 20 
 
Table 7.4 





Correlations between the time participants spent looking at screens for non-work-
related purposes and measures of diversity within participants social networks. 
 




The extent to which participants’ informal 
social networks (outside the immediate 
family) are ethnically/linguistically diverse 
r= -.273, p= .107 36 
AVSNDS r= -.486, p= .041 18 
 
Figure 7.1 
The correlation between participants’ AVSNDSs and the time participants spent looking 
at screens for non-work-related purposes. 
 
Furthermore, these positive correlations between indicators of participants’ social 
network homogeneity and both the time they devote to using communications technology 
and the proportion of their close friends whom they initially met online are inconsistent with 
the Modernisation thesis. Modernisation theory maintains that having more homogenous 
social networks is linked to emphasising survival values and experiencing less secure and 
liberating economic/technological contexts.728 That is, according to Inglehart and Welzel 
those with relatively homogenous social networks are less likely to have access to, or the 
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inclination to use, technology to forge and maintain friendships outside their family and local 
community. Survival values raise feelings of obligation towards family and local community 
members thereby reducing opportunities to invest time and energy into social connections 
unlikely to be as helpful in a crisis.729 
Correlations revealed between the proportion of online communication spent 
communicating with people who live far away and measures of SEVHSN Complex-immersion 
initially appear to undermine my Homogenisation theory. The proportion of participants’ 
online communication spent communicating with people who live far away was found to be 
negatively correlated with:  
- the degree to which participants’ most important formal groups in which they are 
involved have egalitarian decision-making processes,  
- the extent to which the political values of participants tended to be reinforced by 
members of their close social networks, and  
- the degree to which members of participants’ most important formal groups in 
which they are involved are of a similar age.  
Additionally, the proportion of participants’ online communication spent communicating with 
people they initially met online was negatively correlated with the degree to which 
participants’ most important formal groups in which they are involved have egalitarian 
decision-making processes. 
Table 7.5 
Correlations between the proportion of participants’ online communication spent 
communicating with people who live far away, and variables connected with the 
SEVHSN Complex. 
 
2015 Correlations between Proportion of participants’ online communication spent 
communicating with people who live far away 
Number of 
participants 
The degree to which participants’ two 
most important formal groups (in which 
they are involved) have egalitarian 
r= -.340, p= .113 23 
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AVSNDS r= .387, p= .113 18 
Participants agreeing that most 
members of the most important formal 
group in which they are involved are of 
the same age 
r= -.299, p= .166 23 
 
Table 7.6 
The correlation between the proportion of participants’ online communication spent 
communicating with people they initially met online and the degree to which 
participants’ two most important formal groups (in which they are involved) have 
egalitarian decision-making processes. 
 
2015 Correlations between Proportion of participants’ online communication spent 
communicating with people they initially met online 
Number of 
participants 
The degree to which participants’ two 
most important formal groups (in which 
they are involved) have egalitarian 
decision-making processes. 
r= -.453, p= .045 20 
 
However, these statistics may not suggest that SEVHSN Complex-embeddedness is 
negatively correlated with spending time communicating with persons met online and living 
far away. Instead, these correlations probably indicate that those deeply embedded in the 
SEVHSN Complex spend more time (than those less immersed) communicating online; with 
those whom they initially met in person and online, who are geographically close and distant. 
Those who are more (rather than less) embedded in the Complex may simply spend a greater 
proportion of their online communication communicating with locals. Previously discussed 
correlations linking greater immersion in the Complex with both more time spent 
communicating online and a higher proportion of close friends met online, support this 
conclusion. This is consistent with my Homogenisation arguments that those who place 
greater emphasis on self-expression values tend to be wealthier, more educated and have 
greater access to technology than those with a survival values orientation. They are also 
more inclined to act autonomously when forging, maintaining or severing social connections: 
considering familial and community obligations and expectations less than those who 





emphasise hierarchal, conformity and survival values. The internet and particularly social 
media, chat rooms, blogs and video/audio chat provide these individuals with the means to 
easily connect with like-minded people and to maintain these connections over great 
distances. Consequently, more socially autonomous persons (usually heavily embedded in 
the SEVHSN Complex) are probably more inclined and more empowered to spend longer 
communicating online than those who are less socially autonomous and less immersed in the 
Complex. 
Statistics presented in the previous chapter suggested that greater informal structural 
social capital is tied to (and is potentially a facet of) deeper embeddedness in the SEVHSN 
Complex. Therefore, informal structural social capital, according to Homogenisation theory, is 
correlated with certain measures of the extent to, and manner in, which technology and the 
Internet are used. These measures were previously linked to indicators of both self-
expression values orientation and social network homogeneity. Indeed, participants’ 
frequency of informal meetings with members of their close social networks was revealed to 
be:  
- positively correlated with the time they spent communicating online for non-
work-related purposes, and  
- negatively correlated with the proportion of their online communication (for non-
work-related purposes) communicating with people they initially met online.  
These correlations between informal structural social capital (linked to the SEVHSN Complex) 
and previously discussed patterns of technology use are consistent with my Homogenisation 
arguments. Per my Homogenisation thesis, values change is being brought about by 
technological, economic and human capital advance. This is precipitating changing patterns 
of structural social capital which is resulting in homogenising social networks. These changing 
patterns of structural social capital probably include more time communicating online for 
non-work-related purposes. This would enable greater levels of contact between people who 
share similar beliefs, values, views and attitudes but who may be separated by significant, or 
even enormous, geographical distances. 
Table 7.7 





Correlations between participants’ frequency of meeting informally with members of 
their social networks and measures of participants’ online communication. 
 
2015 Correlations between Participants’ frequency of meeting informally with members of 
their social networks 
Number of 
participants 
Time participants spent communicating 
online for non-work-related purposes 
r= .382, p= .022 36 
Proportion of participants’ online 
communication spent communicating 
with people they initially met online 
r= -.246, p= .182 31 
 
Past & Present Socio-economic Status 
Modernisation and Homogenisation theories are unanimous in their recognition of 
technological access and economic development as factors influencing the security and 
therefore the value orientations of individuals, generations and societies. Both theses 
maintain that as societies economically transition from industrial to post-industrial phases of 
modernisation citizens become increasingly:  
- financially secure (particularly with the development of the welfare state),730 and  
- inclined to shift their emphasis from hierarchical, conformity survival to 
egalitarian, autonomy self-expression values.731  
They maintain that a reduction in the emphasis placed on survival values (engendered by 
economic development and rising financial security) fray familial and community obligations. 
Lamentationists allege that such trends undermine positive liberty by eroding the social 
capital from which it is largely derived. Conversely, Modernisation and Homogenisation 
theses reason that these patterns amount to a reduction in neither social capital nor 
autonomy. Instead, they empower individuals to forge, maintain and sever social connections 
based on their own preferences.  
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However, unlike Modernisation, Homogenisation theory holds that this rising social 
modularity brought about by economic development and values reorientation indirectly 
facilitates both:  
- the homogenisation of members within social networks, and  
- the widening of (structural and ideological) differences between networks.  
That is, social networks become increasingly ideologically homogenous as people are drawn 
to those with whom they share social values, beliefs and interests. Persons who have similar 
views and attitudes also often share structural characteristics. The ideological and structural 
homogenisation of social networks tend to unleash centrifugal forces which widen ideological 
differences between networks as network members have fewer interactions with those with 
whom they disagree and have little in common. 
Contrastingly, Inglehart and Welzel claim that technological and economic 
development combined with the survival to self-expression values shift emancipate 
individuals from rigid and obligatory ‘bonding’ social capital.732 They maintain that this 
enables the formation of more ‘bridging’ connections, friendships and relationships entered 
and maintained by choice.733 Hence, these Modernisationists insist that far from 
homogenising, social network members are becoming increasingly diverse/heterogeneous 
because of empowering and modernising trends. Ergo, analysing correlations between 
participants’ reported socio-economic status (both past and present) and measures of 
Complex-immersion will help ascertain the relative strength/validity of Homogenisation and 
Modernisation theories. These measures include value orientations and social network 
homogeneity. 
However, prior to exploring these and other statistics, the method of assessing 
participants’ reported past and present socio-economic status must be explained. My survey 
did not ask participants to divulge their personal/household income. Many participants may 
have been uncomfortable reporting their income even when assured that their personal 
responses would be kept confidential. Instead, class/socio-economic status was surmised by 
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participants’ reported employment type. While relatively less precise than personal or 
household income, this measure of socio-economic status is still reasonably accurate for the 
purposes of this investigation. Below is a table showing each socio-economic score from 1 to 
5 and a description of the categories they represent. 
  








Socio-economic categories 1 – 5 
1 Unemployed or part-time-employed welfare recipient (includes students and stay-at-home-parents) 
2 Working class (Factory workers, clerical workers, retail sales, low paid crafts people) 
3 Lower middle class (Semi-professionals and lower managers, craftspeople) 
4 Upper middle class (Professionals and upper managers) 
5 Upper class (Executives of large corporations and very wealthy investors) 
 
Stay at home parents, full-time students and both unemployed and part-time 
employed welfare recipients were assigned the lowest score of 1. Participants were 
categorised without consideration for the socio-economic status of their spouse or significant 
family members/others with whom they reside. This may have had some unintended effects 
on the results as a significant proportion of financially affluent people choose to be stay at 
home parents and full-time students often come from wealthy backgrounds.734 However, the 
impact of these oversights would be small. The proportion of people who have chosen to be 
stay-at-home-parents past their children’s early childhood has declined considerably over the 
last four decades.735 Although there has always been a significant disparity between the 
socio-economic status of men and women, persons with high socio-economic status for their 
sex tend to partner persons with similarly high socio-economic status for their sex. The same 
is true for the lower and middle classes.736 It is likely that only a small proportion of parents 
are full-time students when their children are 12 years old. Therefore, full-time students may 
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only undermine results regarding measures of ‘present socio-economic status’ and ‘socio-
economic status seven years ago’ not the ‘socio-economic status of participants’ parents 
when participants were 12 years old.’ Also, I must acknowledge that some people may have 
difficulty recalling previous socioeconomic status. However, most would not find this task 
overly challenging. 
As previously explained, positive correlations between indicators of self-expression 
values orientation and past and present socio-economic status would buttress both 
Homogenisation and Modernisation theses. This is because both theories hold that economic 
development and financial security act to raise the emphasis placed on self-expression 
values.737 Furthermore, both theories maintain that these trends have a much greater impact 
on the value orientations of young people in their formative years than on adults.738 Thus, 
societal value shifts tend to occur mainly, but not exclusively, through generational 
replacement. That is, within the same society the values of wealthy and poor individuals of 
similar age will tend to be closer than those shared by persons of similar socio-economic 
status but of different generations.739 This is particularly true when there has been 
substantial economic, technological and educational development over the preceding 
decades.740 Therefore, positive correlations between the current socio-economic status of 
participants (or their socio-economic status seven years ago) and self-expression values 
emphases support Modernisation and Homogenisation theories. Yet, so too would even 
stronger, and more significant positive correlations between the socio-economic status of 
participants’ parents when participants were 12 years old and participants having a self-
expression values orientation. 
Indeed, the socio-economic status of participants 7 years prior to their undertaking 
the survey was found to be moderately, and highly significantly, correlated with the degree 
to which participants’ most important formal organisations have egalitarian decision-making 
processes. A highly significant positive correlation was uncovered between participants’ 
mothers’ socio-economic status when participants were 12 years old and the extent to which 
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participants’ most important formal organisations have egalitarian leadership selection 
procedures. This correlation was strong rather than moderate. As previously explained, the 
degree to which participants’ most important formal organisations have egalitarian decision-
making and leadership selection processes can be used to measure the emphasis placed on 
self-expression values and therefore SEVHSN Complex-immersion. Hence, these correlation 
statistics provide evidence that socio-economic status (now and in one’s formative years) is 
linked to SEVHSN Complex-embeddedness. 
Table 7.9 
The correlation between the degree to which participants’ two most important formal 
groups (in which they are involved) have egalitarian decision-making processes and 
participants socio-economic status 7 years ago. 
 
2015 Correlations between The degree to which participants’ two most important formal 




Participants socio-economic status 7 
years ago 
r= .460, p= .031 22 
 
Table 7.10 
The correlation between the degree to which participants’ two most important formal 
groups (in which they are involved) have egalitarian leadership-selection processes and 
participants’ mothers’ socio-economic status when participants were 12 years old. 
 
2015 Correlations between The degree to which participants’ two most important formal 




Participants’ mothers’ socio-economic 
status when participants were 12 years 
old 
r= .505, p= .016 22 
 
As previously explained, positive correlations between measures of social network 
homogeneity and present, but particularly past, socio-economic status would both support 
my Homogenisation and run counter to Inglehart and Welzel’s Modernisation theories. Both 





theories hold that individuals and generations raised in physically, financially and 
economically secure, rather than precarious conditions tend to place less emphasis on 
hierarchical, conformity survival values.741 Hence, they maintain that these individuals and 
generations tend to place less priority on obligatory interpersonal, familial and community 
ties.742 However, Homogenisation and Modernisation theses have opposing positions 
regarding the impact of these patterns on levels of bonding and bridging social capital. I 
argue that greater social modularity has been brought about by:  
- rising economic/financial security,  
- shifting values,  
- demographic trends (such as a larger proportion of Australians living in 
metropolises),  
- advances in communications technology, and  
- increased social media engagement.  
I contend that these developments have both:  
- reduced costs (such as isolation and alienation) of discontinuing or leaving 
unforged older more traditional social bonds  
while  
- empowering individuals to find and connect with those with whom they share 
more attitudes and interests.  
Consequently, those who were raised in relatively secure economic environments and place 
less emphasis on survival values:  
- tend to have (in the contemporary period) few experiences negotiating and 
compromising through difficult relationships, and  
- are relatively more inclined to view such connections and bonds as too much 
trouble  
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than are those who place greater emphasis on survival values. Additionally, I hold that those 
who have similar views and attitudes often share structural characteristics, and that 
consequently ideological and structural homogeneity usually rise and fall in tandem. 
Conversely, Inglehart and Welzel surmise that facets of modernisation including technological 
advancement, economic prosperity and value shifts free individuals from obligatory and 
‘bonding’ familial and community ties and empower them to establish relatively more 
‘bridging’ connections and heterogeneous social networks.743 I contend that changes in social 
network homogeneity mainly occur through generational replacement.  
Correlation statistics collated from my survey data support Homogenisation over 
Modernisation theory. Indeed, participants’ socio-economic status was revealed to be 
negatively correlated with both:  
- the extent to which participants encounter views on political policy matters 
different from their own within their close social networks, and  
- the degree to which the members of participants’ close social networks tend to 
have views on policy matters different from the participants’.  
Furthermore, measures of past (participants in childhood and seven years prior to 
undertaking the survey)744 and present socio-economic status were found to be positively 
correlated with structural homogeneity within social networks, indicating generational rather 
than period shifts. Participants’ socio-economic status was positively correlated with:  
- the economic and social status homogeneity of participants’ informal social 
networks, and  
- the degree to which the members of participants’ social networks tend to reflect 
participants’ structural characteristics (as illustrated by Figure 7.2).  
Participants’ socio-economic status seven years prior to undertaking the survey was found to 
be positively correlated with:  
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- the economic status homogeneity of participants’ informal social networks, and  
- the extent to which the members of participants’ social networks tended to 
reflect participants’ structural characteristics (as demonstrated by Figure 7.3).  
The socio-economic status of participants’ mothers’ when participants were 12 years 
old was positively correlated with:  
- the ethnic/linguistic homogeneity, economic status homogeneity, social status 
homogeneity and the overall structural homogeneity of participants’ informal 
social networks, and  
- the gender and occupational homogeneity of members of participants’ most 
important formal groups.  
The socio-economic status of participants’ fathers’ when participants were 12 years old was 
positively correlated with the income/wealth and ethnic/linguistic background homogeneity 
of the members of participants’ most important formal groups. Furthermore, the socio-
economic status of participants’ parents when participants were 12 years old was revealed to 
be positively correlated with the age and educational (background/level) homogeneity of 
members of participants’ most important formal groups. Other evidence that socio-economic 
status is linked to SEVHSN Complex-immersion includes the positive correlations found 
between socio-economic status and:  
- a subjective sense of autonomy, and  
- believing that society is ideologically homogenous.  
Statistics analysed previously indicated that the latter variables were tied to the Complex. 
Table 7.11 
Correlations between Participants socio-economic status and measures of the 
ideological and structural diversity within their social networks. 
 
2015 Correlations between Participants socio-economic status Number of 
participants 
ISNDS r= -.310, p= .160 22 





AISNDS r= -.401, p= .072 21 
The extent to which members of 
participants’ informal social networks 
(outside the immediate family) have 
diverse economic status 
r= -.371, p= .028 35 
The extent to which members of 
participants’ informal social networks 
(outside the immediate family) have 
diverse social status 
r= -.223, p= .198 35 
ASSNDS r= -.443, p= .030 24 
 
Figure 7.2 




Correlations between participants’ socio-economic status 7 years ago and measures of 
structural diversity within participants’ informal and close social networks. 
 
2015 Correlations between Participants’ socio-economic status 7 years ago Number of 
participants 
The extent to which members of 
participants’ informal social networks 
(outside the immediate family) have 
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diverse economic status 
ASSNDS r= -.517, p= .010 24 
 
Figure 7.3 
The correlation between participants’ ASSNDSs and participants’ socio-economic status 
7 years ago. 
 
Table 7.13 
Correlations between Participants’ mothers’ socio-economic status when participants 
were 12 years old and measures of structural diversity within participants’ informal 
social networks and most important formal groups. 
 
2015 Correlations between Participants’ mothers’ socio-economic status when 
participants were 12 years old 
Number of 
participants 
The extent to which participants’ informal 
social networks (outside the immediate 
family) are ethnically/linguistically diverse 
r= -.225, p= .194 35 
The extent to which members of 
participants’ informal social networks 
(outside the immediate family) have diverse 
economic status 
r= -.242, p= .161 35 
The extent to which members of 
participants’ informal social networks 
(outside the immediate family) have diverse 
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The extent to which participants’ informal 
social networks (outside the immediate 
family) are structurally 
(ethnically/linguistically, economically, 
socially and religiously) diverse 
r= -.290, p= .092 35 
Participants agreeing that most members 
of the most important formal group in 
which they are involved have the same 
gender 
r= .307, p= .164 22 
Participants agreeing that most members 
of the most important formal group in 
which they are involved have the same 
occupation 
r= .278, p= .200 23 
Participants agreeing that most members 
of the most important formal group in 
which they are involved are of the same 
age 
r= .372, p= .088 22 
Participants agreeing that most members 
of the most important formal group in 
which they are involved have the same 
educational background/level 
r= .419, p= .052 22 
 
Table 7.14 
Correlations between participants’ fathers’ socio-economic status when participants 
were 12 years old and measures of structural diversity within participants’ most 
important formal groups. 
 
2015 Correlations between Participants’ fathers’ socio-economic status when participants 
were 12 years old 
Number of 
participants 
Participants agreeing that most 
members of the most important formal 
groups in which they are involved have 
the same income/wealth 
r= .366, p= .078 24 
Participants agreeing that most 
members of the most important formal 
group in which they are involved have 
the same ethnic/linguistic background 
r= .288, p= .182 23 
Participants agreeing that most r= .419, p= .047 23 





members of the most important formal 
group in which they are involved are of 
the same age 
Participants agreeing that most 
members of the most important formal 
group in which they are involved have 
the same educational background/level 
r= .395, p= .062 23 
 
Table 7.15 
Correlations between participants’ socio-economic status and the extents to which 
they believe society is ideologically homogenous and that they have freedom and 
control of their own lives. 
 
2015 Correlations between Participants’ socio-economic status Number of 
participants 
Participants’ subjective sense of 
autonomy 
r= .367, p= .078 24 
Believing society is ideologically 
homogenous 
r= .331, p= .052 35 
 
There was only one significant negative correlation found between measures of socio-
economic status and structural social network homogeneity. Participant’ socio-economic 
status when they undertook the survey was revealed to be negatively correlated with the 
religious homogeneity of participants’ informal social networks. This result may initially 
appear to support the Modernisationist argument that higher living standards precipitate a 
value shift that instigates greater diversity within social networks.745 Yet, evidence 
overwhelmingly shows positive (rather than negative) correlations between socio-economic 
status and other measures of structural homogeneity within both formal and informal 
networks.  
Table 7.16 
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The correlation between participants’ socio-economic status and the extent to which 
participants’ informal social networks (outside the immediate family) are religiously 
diverse. 
 
2015 Correlations between Participants’ socio-economic status Number of 
participants 
The extent to which participants’ 
informal social networks (outside the 
immediate family) are religiously 
diverse 
r= .244, p= .165 34 
 
Previous studies have found that people with lower socio-economic status are more 
inclined to be heavily religious and to more regularly attend religious services.746 People who 
are heavily religious probably associate more often with others of their religious 
denomination, even informally, than do people who are not so religious.747 Moreover, age 
was negatively correlated with the socio-economic status of participants’ parents when 
participants were 12 years old (evidenced by Figure 7.4) suggesting that a higher proportion 
of Australians are working in high skilled jobs now than in the past. Additionally, while 
statistics reveal recent increasing participation rates for many formal organisation types,748 
involvement in religious organisations continues to decline749 and the decline in membership 
of, and engagement in, political parties has largely plateaued (see Chapter Three).  
Table 7.17 
Correlations between participants’ age and participants’ parents’ socio-economic status 
when participants were 12 years old. 
 
2015 Correlations between Participants’ age Number of 
participants 
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Participants’ mothers’ socio-economic 
status when participants were 12 years 
old 
r= -.227, p= .190 35 
Participants’ fathers’ socio-economic 
status when participants were 12 years 
old 
r= -.506, p= .002 36 
 
Figure 7.4 
The correlation between participants’ age and participants’ fathers’ socio-economic 
status when participants were 12 years old. 
 
Together this evidence may suggest that greater religious homogeneity within social 
networks is not a facet of modernisation. Wealthier individuals tend to be more heavily 
embedded in the SEVHSN Complex than are poorer persons. Consequently, they are 
empowered by their modern-values750 and greater resources to find, forge and maintain 
social connections with people with whom they share important (or subjectively important) 
similarities. However, religious identity is not a significant factor for these wealthy people in 
determining with whom they forge and maintain social connections. This relationship was 
detected as early as 1967 when Christensen and Barber’s study revealed that persons of 
higher socio-economic status were more inclined to have interfaith marriages than those of 
                                                          











0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
Y axis - Participants' fathers' socio-economic status when participants 
were 12 years old
X axis - Participants' age





lower socioeconomic status.751 Thus, the negative correlation between participants’ socio-
economic status and the religious homogeneity within participants’ informal social networks 
is consistent with my Homogenisation theory. So too the positive correlations between 
participants socio-economic status and other measures of social network homogeneity. As 
Australia continues to economically develop, religious identity is likely to become even less of 
the determinant of social connections, further diversifying religious identity and religious 
affiliation within social networks. 
This seventh chapter has examined statistics revealing that financial/socio-economic 
prosperity and technology development, accessibility and usage patterns are probable 
drivers of SEVHSN Complex-immersion. This evidence supports my Homogenisation theory 
while contradicting parts of Inglehart and Welzel’s Modernisation thesis. From here other 
variables connected to SEVHSN Complex-immersion are similarly investigated. These include 
education, knowledge attainment and spending less time reading traditional print media 
(including newspapers and political/news magazines and journals). Correlations between 
these variables and measures of Complex-embeddedness are revealed to be largely 
consistent with my Homogenisation arguments.  
 
Education and Knowledge Attainment 
Over the past 40 years the proportion of Australians with higher education 
qualifications has grown enormously; and generationally. Between 1976 and 2011 the 
proportion of young adults (18 to 34) who had obtained non-school qualifications grew from 
30% to 52%. Additionally, the proportion of young adults who had obtained bachelor degrees 
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rose from 5% to 26% during that same period.752 
753 
Inglehart and Welzel argue that growing access to, and prevalence of, formal education has 
been the most important factor fuelling the survival-to-self-expression values transition and 
the consequent trends in structural social capital and political engagement since the mid-
twentieth century.754 That is, the impact of education and knowledge proliferation on such 
variables has far exceeded even that of greater material wealth and security.  
 WVS statistics discussed in Chapter Five indicate that when controlling for other 
salient variables higher levels of formal education attainment is positively correlated with 
patterns that are linked to the Complex. These patterns include greater interpersonal trust, 
more liberal views on family and morality and belief in egalitarian work procedures and in the 
importance of children learning self-expression (as opposed to survival) values. These 
statistics suggest that the generational growth in the proportion of Australians with higher 
education qualifications is not only contributing to an increase in Complex-immersion 
indirectly, but also directly. That is, education does not just indirectly raise Complex 
embeddedness by lifting incomes and financial security which in turn induce greater 
autonomy, self-expression values emphasis and social network homogeneity. Education also 
appears to have a direct influence on Complex-immersion. 
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Furthermore, rising levels of higher formal education attainment is not the only 
significant contemporary trend changing knowledge and information dissemination. Over the 
last decade there has been a significant acceleration in the shift from traditional news media 
consumption (including sales of newspapers, political/news journals and magazines) to new 
online sources.755 This shift has been largely generational with Millennials relying more 
heavily on Internet sources for news content than older generations. According to Deloitte’s 
Media Consumer Survey Report 2016, the proportion of younger and older Millennials who 
primarily used online sources to consume news was 53% and 58% respectively. Contrastingly, 
only 43% of Xers, 22% of Boomers and 9% of Silent and older generations primarily used 
online sources to access news content.756 The shift has enabled a proliferation of 
online/political blogs and sites to contribute to social/political discourse (often disseminated 
through social media) without the same degree of fact-checking and scrutiny required of 
more traditional news media.757 More contributors competing for readership and less fact 
checking/scrutiny has fuelled consumption of unbalanced and extreme sources feeding 
ideological and other biases of various kinds within sections of the community.758 These 
patterns enhance autonomy by providing individuals with greater news source and content 
options. Consequently, they are helping to drive the ideological diversification of society and 
the survival to self-expression values transition, both of which are facilitated by individual 
empowerment.  
Additionally, individuals empowered by technological advances such as the Internet 
and social media (as well as by rising wealth and value shifts) can more easily find and 
connect with people with whom they share views, attitudes and interests. The ideological 
homogeneity of social networks tends to be linked with both believing society is ideologically 
homogenous and the structural homogeneity of social networks (as shown by Figures 7.6 and 
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7.5 respectively). Hence, according to my Homogenisation thesis, the frequency of 
consuming traditional news media is negatively correlated with the structural homogeneity 
of social networks and believing that society is ideologically homogenous. Statistics support 
these Homogenisation arguments (see below). Indeed, participants’ frequency of reading 
newspapers, political/news journals and magazines were found to be negatively correlated 
with both the overall structural homogeneity of participants’ informal social networks and 
the extent to which participants believe that their society is ideologically homogenous. 
Table 7.18 
Correlations between participants’ AISNDSs and both their believing that society is 
ideologically homogenous and measures of structural diversity within their informal 
social networks. 
 
2015 Correlations between AISNDS Number of 
participants 
Believing society is ideologically 
homogenous 
r= -.472, p= .027 22 
The extent to which participants’ informal 
social networks (outside the immediate 
family) are ethnically/linguistically diverse 
r= .617, p= .002 22 
The extent to which members of 
participants’ informal social networks 
(outside the immediate family) have 
diverse economic status 
r= .430, p= .046 22 
The extent to which participants’ informal 
social networks (outside the immediate 
family) are structurally 
(ethnically/linguistically, economically, 
socially and religiously) diverse 
r= .529, p= .011 22 
 
Figure 7.5 
The correlation between participants’ AISNDSs and the overall structural diversity 
within participants’ informal social networks. 







Correlations between participants’ ISNDSs and both their believing that society is 
ideologically homogenous and measures of structural diversity within their informal 
social networks. 
 
2015 Correlations between ISNDS Number of 
participants 
Believing society is ideologically 
homogenous 
r= -.327, p= .128 23 
The extent to which participants’ informal 
social networks (outside the immediate 
family) are ethnically/linguistically diverse 
r= .506, p= .014 23 
The extent to which members of 
participants’ informal social networks 
(outside the immediate family) have diverse 
economic status 
r= .486, p= .019 23 
The extent to which members of 
participants’ informal social networks 
(outside the immediate family) have diverse 
social status 
r= .531, p= .009 23 
The extent to which participants’ informal 
social networks (outside the immediate 
family) are structurally 
(ethnically/linguistically, economically, 
socially and religiously) diverse 









0.00 10.00 20.00 30.00 40.00 50.00 60.00
Y axis - Overall structural diversity within participants' informal social 
networks
X axis - AISNDS







The correlation between participants’ ISNDSs and the extent to which participants 
believe that society is ideologically homogenous. 
 
Table 7.20 
Correlations between Participants’ frequency of reading newspapers and political/news 
journals/magazines and both their believing that society is ideologically homogenous 
and the extent to which their informal social networks are structurally diverse. 
 




The extent to which participants’ informal 
social networks (outside the immediate 
family) are structurally 
(ethnically/linguistically, economically, 
socially and religiously) diverse 
r= .233, p= .172 36 
Believing society is ideologically 
homogenous 
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This seventh chapter has examined the validity of theorised drivers of SEVHSN 
complex-immersion, including:  
- use of technologies (such as online communication and audio and screen 
entertainment),  
- financial security/economic development,  
- educational attainment, and  
- news/information dissemination.  
It has explored the extent to which relationships between these ‘potential/suggested’ drivers 
and indicators of Complex-embeddedness buttress my Homogenisation thesis. 
My statistics indicate that those who are relatively more empowered by, and prefer 
using and communicating with, contemporary/modern technologies tend to place greater 
emphasis on self-expression values than persons with less access to, and less inclination to 
utilise, such devices. This is consistent with both my Homogenisation and Inglehart and 
Welzel’s Modernisation arguments. Contrastingly, positive correlations found between 
indicators of participants’ social network homogeneity and both the time they devote to 
using online communications technology and the proportion of their close friends who they 
initially met online support my Homogenisation, while undermining Modernisation theses. 
This is because Modernisation (as opposed to Homogenisation) theory maintains that social 
network homogeneity is linked to survival values and less secure and liberating 
economic/technological contexts. Additionally, my data revealed links between variables and 
patterns shown to be connected to the SEVHSN complex; strengthening my argument. These 
variables include those related to informal structural social capital and patterns of technology 
use. 
My survey data has provided evidence that formative, past and present socio-
economic status are all linked to core components of the SEVHSN Complex. Core 
components of the Complex encompass self-expression value orientations and structural and 
ideological social network homogeneity. Furthermore, socio-economic status was found to 





be positively correlated with variables previously connected to core components of the 
Complex. These variables include a subjective sense of autonomy and believing that society is 
ideologically homogenous. Socio-economic status was revealed to be negatively correlated 
with the religious homogeneity of participants’ informal social networks. However, religious 
identity tends not to be a significant factor for wealthy people (typically more immersed in 
the Complex than the less wealthy) in determining with whom they forge and maintain social 
connections. Thus, greater religious homogeneity within social networks may not be a facet 
of modernisation. Wealthier individuals are typically less religious, more heavily embedded in 
the SEVHSN Complex and empowered by modern values and greater resources than are 
relatively less wealthy people. Therefore, they are probably finding, forging and maintaining 
social connections with people with whom they share subjectively more important 
similarities than religious identity. 
Homogenisation and Modernisation theories maintain that growing access to, and 
prevalence of, formal education has been one of the most important factors fuelling the 
survival to self-expression values transition. WVS and other statistics support this position. 
However, the generational growth in the proportion of Australians with higher formal 
education qualifications is not the only significant contemporary knowledge dissemination 
trend precipitating greater SEVHSN Complex-immersion. Evidence analysed in this seventh 
chapter was found to corroborate my Homogenisation thesis positions that those younger, 
rather than older, tend to consume less traditional/reliable and more 
online/editorialised/biased news media. This is one reason why younger people are more 
heavily embedded in the SEVHSN Complex than are older persons. This media consumption 
pattern of the young and Complex-immersed potentially contributes to, and exacerbates: 
a) greater structural and ideological homogenisation of social networks, and 
b) the belief that society is ideologically homogenous. 
I surmised that these possible trends are facilitated by enhanced individual empowerment 
(particularly in one’s formative years), and are helping to drive societal ideological 
diversification. 
  






--RAMIFICATIONS OF NETWORK HOMOGENISATION-- 
Conflict Avoidance, Party Disengagement & Political 
Intolerance, Distrust & Dissatisfaction 
 
Chapter Six examined statistics drawn from my own survey data. Correlations 
between indicators/measures of the degree to which participants  
- emphasise self-expression values, and  
- have homogenous networks  
supported my hypothesis that a Self-Expression Values Homogenous Social Network 
(SEVHSN) Complex exists. The statistics also showed that interpersonal and political 
trust/confidence as well as community and political involvement are correlated with the 
Complex in ways consistent with my Homogenisation thesis. Additionally, statistics presented 
suggested that an increasing proportion of the Australian population is becoming more 
heavily embedded in the Complex. The seventh chapter evaluated the validity of theorised 
drivers of SEVHSN Complex-immersion, including:  
- use of technologies (such as online communication and audio and screen 
entertainment),  
- economic development/financial security,  
- education attainment, and  
- news/information dissemination.  
The relationships revealed between these ‘potential/suggested’ drivers and indicators of 
Complex-embeddedness were found to be consistent with my Homogenisation theory.  





Some scholars like Joseph Schumpeter believe in an extremely limited decision-
making role in public affairs for what they consider is a largely ignorant, superficial and 
irrational public. However, Chapter One reasoned that their assertions are based on a 
questionable “utilitarian” value-monist premise. Acceptance of this value-monist metaethical 
position renders political disagreements the product of ignorance, irrationality and/or the 
prioritisation of self-interest over the “Common Good”. However, as ultimate values are 
incommensurable when devoid of context, there are often multiple rational ways to balance 
these frequently conflicting values within particular contexts.759 Highly representative 
democracy is therefore the optimal and -- arguably -- most legitimate way to overcome 
disputes over equally rational policy positions advocated by rational individuals of equal 
moral worth. Therefore, I argued that high levels of civic involvement are necessary to sustain 
a thriving, representative and responsive democracy.  
Hence, this eighth and final chapter investigates the ways in which Social Network 
Homogenisation or SNH (a core component of the SEVHSN Complex) influences political 
participation, revealing statistical relationships consistent with my Homogenisation thesis. 
The part of my Homogenisation theory relating to the influence of SNH on political 
engagement was summarised in Chapter One by referring to the Social Network 
Homogenisation and Political Engagement (SNHPE) Chart on page 48. To begin, this eighth 
chapter reiterates the limitations of my survey statistics (considered in previous chapters) as 
well as the most appropriate ways to utilise/interpret them. These statistics are then 
analysed to determine the extent to which they support (or contradict) my theory. Finally, the 
ways in which electoral and intra-party reforms may help to raise party participation, despite 
SNH and Societal Ideological Diversification (SID) are explored. 
Limitations of My Survey Statistics 
The survey, which was extremely complex and long (taking participants approximately 
2 hours to complete), had 36 participants. As previously explained (in Chapters Six and 
Seven), none of the statistics drawn from my survey data controlled for extraneous variables 
as doing so would have meant relying too heavily on a handful of participant responses; 
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raising p values above even moderate significance. Hence, the value of any single correlation 
statistic, or absence thereof in supporting or undermining theorised causal relationships 
between any two variables is limited. One must consider the general picture that the 
statistics (acting like brushstrokes) paint when evaluating the degree to which such evidence 
reinforces or contradicts a theory. All correlation statistics discussed in this thesis are at least 
moderately significant; having p. values of less than 0.2. While a (p) value of less than 0.1 is 
deemed significant by convention, the relatively few participants in this survey necessitated 
the consideration of statistics with higher (p) values. Hence, correlation statistics were 
deemed significant enough to warrant discussion if they had (p) values of less than 0.2 i.e. if 
there was a greater than 80% chance of there being a correlation between the relevant 
variables. 
Statistical Analysis 
Per Homogenisation theory, the SNHPE Chart (in Chapter One) illustrates how greater 
intolerance for (as well as of those holding/expressing) political views inconsistent with one’s 
own is symptomatic of deeper SEVHSN Complex-embeddedness. Therefore, statistics 
indicating links between this intolerance and trends theoretically associated with SNH (as 
indicated by the Chart) would support my Homogenisation thesis. Indeed, greater intolerance 
of people holding political views with which one disagrees was found to be positively 
correlated with:  
- measures of (i.e. overall structural and social status) informal social network 
homogeneity, and  
- less willingness to become, and less likelihood of being, political party members.  
 
Table 8.1 
Correlations between participants’ tolerance of those who hold political views with 
which they disagree and both measures of structural diversity within participants’ 
informal social networks and participants’ membership of, and willingness to join a 
political party. 










The extent to which participants’ informal 
social networks (outside the immediate 
family) are structurally 
(ethnically/linguistically, economically, 
socially and religiously) diverse 
r= .252, p= .139 36 
The extent to which members of 
participants’ informal social networks 
(outside the immediate family) have diverse 
economic status 
r= .232, p= .174 36 
Willingness of non-members to join a 
political party 
r= .382, p= .087 21 
Membership of / willingness to join, a 
political party 
r= .290, p= .151 26 
 
As discussed in previous chapters, personal structural characteristics are often highly 
correlated with political views, values, interests and ideas. Additionally, ‘structural’ is 
frequently/commonly linked with ‘ideological’ social network homogeneity. Hence, the 
positive correlations revealed between political intolerance and ‘structural’ social network 
homogeneity may suggest that a causal relationship possibly exists between ‘ideological’ 
social network homogeneity and political intolerance. That is, uncontrolled extraneous 
variables are masking a significant correlation between these (ideological network 
homogeneity and political intolerance) variables.  
My Homogenisation theory is also supported by the statistics suggesting a negative 
correlation between political intolerance and both measures, and desirability of party 
engagement. Per Homogenisation theory, those more immersed in the SEVHSN Complex 
tend to be more conflict averse (and thus less inclined to participate in conflict-prone 
activities such as party activities) than those relatively less Complex-embedded. The theory 
maintains that this is because persons with relatively ideologically homogenous networks 
tend to have less confidence and less experience debating political issues than those with 
more diverse networks. Homogenisation theory contends that they are also more inclined to 
severely underestimate the prevalence of people who hold political views and weigh political 





values in ways that are significantly different from their own. Consequently, those with 
ideologically homogenous networks are more inclined than those with relatively diverse 
networks to consider the potential (thought probable) costs of political debate greater than 
the possible (judged unlikely) benefits. That is, the emotional and social costs of debating 
those with whom they disagree (such as embarrassment, anxiety, fear and ridicule) is 
deemed to outweigh the possible benefits of convincing people (whom they estimate to be a 
small insignificant minority) of their mistaken opinions. Therefore, positive correlations 
between political ‘tolerance’ and both measures of social network diversity and political party 
engagement are entirely consistent with my Homogenisation theory. 
Another symptom of greater Complex-immersion, according to my Homogenisation 
theory and the SNHPE Chart, is increased unwillingness to accept political compromise. The 
theory holds that the Complex-immersed are disposed to more acutely overestimate the 
prevalence of their own political beliefs within, and the ideological homogeneity of society 
than are those with relatively diverse networks. I theorise that this may be because their 
political perspectives tend to be greatly reinforced by their social network members. 
According to my Homogenisation theory, this overestimation may act to diminish the 
willingness of the Complex-embedded to accept political compromise. Thus, evidence 
suggesting ties between this unwillingness to accept political compromise and patterns 
theoretically associated with Complex-immersion and SNH (as indicated by the Chart) would 
buttress my Homogenisation thesis. Unwillingness to accept political compromise was 
measured by the degree to which participants agreed with the statement: “Formal politics is 
a win-lose zero-sum game between competing interests. Compromise is ultimately a loss for 
all parties involved.”760 Agreement with this statement was found to be positively correlated 
with two indicators of Complex-embeddedness discussed in previous chapters. These 
indicators were:  
1. the degree to which participants’ most important formal organisations have 
egalitarian decision-making processes (a strong indicator of self-expression 
values orientation) and  
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2. the extent to which participants believe that society is ideologically 
homogenous (a signal of social network homogeneity).  
Thus, an unwillingness to accept political compromise (which is positively linked to these 
variables) is probably a component or consequence of Complex-embeddedness. This is 
consistent with my Homogenisation theory.  
Table 8.2 
Correlations between participants’ unwillingness to accept political compromise and 
variables connected to the SEVHSN Complex. 
 
2015 Correlations between An unwillingness to accept political compromise Number of 
participants 
The degree to which participants’ two 
most important formal groups (in which 
they are involved) have egalitarian 
decision-making processes 
r= .279, p=. 198 23 
Believing society is ideologically 
homogenous 
r= .326, p=. 052 36 
 
Likewise, not believing in political checks and compromise is (per my Homogenisation 
theory and the SNHPE Chart) a facet of greater Complex-embeddedness and SNH. According 
to my thesis, those with more ideologically homogenous networks are less inclined to regard 
political compromise as necessary or justified than are those with relatively ideologically 
heterogeneous networks. This, I contend, is explained by their propensity to more greatly 
overestimate the extent to which their own political views are shared by other citizens. 
Hence, statistics denoting connections between this antipathy toward political checks and 
compromise and trends theoretically associated with Complex-immersion and SNH (as 
illustrated by the SNHPE Chart) would reinforce my Homogenisation theory. Aversion to, and 
support for political checks and compromise were gauged by participants’ answers to the 
question “Which do you think is better - when the Federal government has a majority in both 
the House of Representatives and the Senate, or when the Federal government in the House 
of Representatives does not controlled the Senate?” Disapproval of political checks and 





compromise was revealed to be positively correlated with three previously discussed 
indicators/symptoms of Complex-immersion/SNH. These were: 
1. believing that society is ideologically homogenous, 
2. the extent to which participants’ value emphases are reflected by members of their 
close social networks (as shown in Figure 8.1), and 
3. doubting one’s own political debating skills. 
This evidence would appear to support my Homogenisation theory. 
Table 8.3 
Correlations between Believing that political checks and compromise are beneficial, 
and variables linked to the SEVHSN Complex. 
 
2015 Correlations between Believing that political checks and compromise are beneficial Number of 
participants 
Believing society is ideologically 
homogenous 
r= -.307, p= .069 36 
AVSNDS r= .447, p= .063 18 
Having greater confidence in one’s 
political debating skills 
r= .219, p= .200 36 
 
Figure 8.1 
The correlation between participants’ AVSNDSs and the degree to which they 
disapprove of political checks and balances. 






As discussed in the Introduction and Chapter One of this thesis, Aaron Martin has 
found that party identification in Australia is in generational decline. In 1990 only 5% of 
Australian young people did not identify with a party. By 2010 that figure had grown to 
24%.761 Per my Homogenisation thesis and the SNHPE Chart, this lower party identification is 
brought about by greater resistance to political parties moulding one’s own attitudes and 
opinions and is yet another symptom of more intense Complex-immersion/SNH. According to 
my theory, those with more ideologically homogenous networks are less inclined to identify 
with political parties than are those with relatively ideologically diverse networks. This, I hold, 
is largely due to their tendency to be intolerant of persons/parties with political views 
different from their own.762 Lower rates of party identification tend to produce higher levels 
of swing or ‘softly committed’ voting. Therefore, evidence signalling links between swing 
voting and patterns theoretically indicative of SNH (as shown by the SNHPE Chart) would 
corroborate my Homogenisation thesis. 
The proclivity of participants to ‘swing vote’ was determined by their response to my 
eighty-second survey question “Have your voting patterns (the parties you’ve voted for) in 
House of Representatives elections changed over the last 10 years (for those younger than 28 
since you began voting)?” Each participant was assigned a ‘Swing Voting Score’. Those who 
answered “No, neither my two-party-preferred nor my primary vote has changed” were 
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762 Political intolerance in turn is a product of the disposition of the Complex-embedded to severely 
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given a Swing Voting Score of 1. Those whose primary vote changed but whose two-party-
preferred vote remained the same were assigned a Score of 2. Those whose two-party-
preferred vote had changed but whose primary vote had remained the same received a 
Score of 3 and those whose primary and two-party-preferred votes had changed were 
conferred a Swing Voting Score of 4. Higher Swing Voting Scores were indeed found to be 
positively correlated with indicators of structural social network homogeneity. These include: 
- the degree to which the structural characteristics of participants’ close social 
network members tend to be shared by the participant, and 
- the religious, social status and overall structural homogeneity of participants’ 
informal social networks. 
As previously discussed, ‘structural’ and ‘ideological’ social network homogeneity are 
commonly linked. Consequently, these positive correlations revealed between Swing Voting 
Scores and ‘structural’ social network homogeneity may denote that a causal relationship 
probably exists between ‘ideological’ social network homogeneity and proclivity towards 
swing voting. This is because uncontrolled extraneous variables could be masking a significant 
correlation between the (ideological network homogeneity and swing voting) variables. 
Hence, these statistics are consistent with my Homogenisation thesis. 
Table 8.4 
Correlations between participants’ propensity to ‘swing vote’ and measures of 
structural diversity within participants’ close and informal networks. 
 
2015 Correlations between Propensity to ‘swing vote’ Number of 
participants 
ASSNDS r= -.290, p= .179 23 
The extent to which participants’ informal 
social networks (outside the immediate 
family) are religiously diverse 
r= -.545, p= .002 31 
The extent to which members of 
participants’ informal social networks 
(outside the immediate family) have diverse 
social status 
r= -.259, p= .152 32 
The extent to which participants’ informal r= -.449, p= .010 32 





social networks (outside the immediate 
family) are structurally 
(ethnically/linguistically, economically, 
socially and religiously) diverse 
 
Another consequence of greater Complex-embeddedness, according to my 
Homogenisation thesis and the SNHPE Chart, is a rise in the ‘belief that there is little to be 
learnt from political discussion with those with whom one disagrees’. Per my theory, those 
with more ideologically homogenous networks are less disposed to believe that political 
debate is beneficial than are those with relatively ideologically heterogenous networks. This, I 
reason, is due to: 
1. their tendency to more severely underestimate: 
a) the extent to which different political attitudes are held by other citizens, and 
b) the value of persuading what they deem to be an insignificant minority of their 
point of view and, 
2. their relative lack of experience and skills in political debate rendering such 
discussions frustrating and unpleasant, and their contributions subjectively 
experienced as unconvincing and inadequate. 
Hence, statistics suggesting relationships between ‘believing that there is little to be learnt 
from political discussion with those with whom one disagrees’ and trends theoretically 
associated with Complex-immersion and SNH (as illustrated by the Chart) would support my 
Homogenisation argument. Indeed, statistics collated from my survey data reveal that 
‘believing that there is little to be learnt from political discussion with those with whom one 
disagrees’ was both positively correlated with: 
1. believing that society is ideologically homogenous, 
2. the extent to which the political views of participants’ close social network members 
(on policy matters) tend to be shared by the participants 





3. the degree to which the structural characteristics/traits of participants’ close social 
network members tend to reflect those of the participants, 
4. participants encountering fewer political views on policy matters within their close 
social networks that differ from their own (as illustrated by Figure 8.2), and 
5. the extent to which participants’ most important formal organisations have 
egalitarian decision-making processes (which is used statistically, rather than 
individually, as an indicator of participants’ hierarchal to egalitarian values 
orientation) 
and negatively correlated with: 
1. a willingness to accept political compromise, 
2. believing in the effectiveness of voting (a measure of external political efficacy), 
3. believing that voting is worthwhile, 
4. the frequency of debating people with political views different from one’s own, and 
5. having greater confidence in the effectiveness of one’s own political debating skills. 
This evidence would seem to bolster my Homogenisation thesis. 
Table 8.5 
Correlations between participants’ believing there is little to be learnt from political 
discussion with those with whom one disagrees and variables linked to the SEVHSN 
Complex. 
 
2015 Correlations between Believing there is little to be learnt from political discussion with 
those with whom one disagrees 
Number of 
participants 
Believing society is ideologically 
homogenous 
r= .297, p= .078 36 
AISNDS r= -.331, p= .133 22 
ASSNDS r= -.300, p= .146 25 
ISNDS r= -.451, p= .031 23 
The degree to which participants’ two 
most important formal groups (in which 
they are involved) have egalitarian 
decision-making processes 
r= .211, p= .197 23 
The degree to which participants’ most r= .382, p= .072 23 





important formal groups (in which they 
are involved) have egalitarian decision-
making processes 
An unwillingness to accept political 
compromise 
r= .424, p= .010 36 
Believing in the effectiveness of voting r= -.396, p= .017 36 
Believing that voting is worthwhile r= -.360, p= .031 36 
Frequency of debating people with 
political views different from one’s own 
r= -.226, p= .186 36 
Having greater confidence in one’s 
political debating skills 
r= -.304, p= .072 36 
 
Figure 8.2 
The correlation between participants’ ISNDSs and the extent to which participants 
believe there is little to be learnt from political discussion with those with whom they 
disagree. 
 
An unwillingness to join political parties is deemed the most significant and 
consequential product of greater Complex-immersion according to my Homogenisation 
theory and the SNHPE Chart. Per my theory, those with more ideologically homogenous 
networks are less inclined to join political parties than those with relatively ideologically 
diverse networks. Thus, statistics denoting ties between unwillingness to join political parties 
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Chart) would bolster my Homogenisation thesis. Indeed, membership of / willingness to join, 
a political party was found to be negatively correlated with: 
1. the degree to which the political views of participants’ close social network 
members (on policy matters) tend to be shared by the participants (as 
demonstrated by Figure 8.3), and 
2. the extent to which the structural characteristics/traits of participants’ close 
social network members tend to reflect those of the participants (as shown in 
Figure 8.4). 
Furthermore, membership of and willingness to join, a political party as well as the 
willingness of non-members to join a political party were revealed to be both negatively 
correlated with conflict avoidance and positively correlated with: 
1. frequency of political discussion with those with whom one disagrees, 
2. believing that there is much to be learnt from political discussion with those 
with whom one disagrees, 
3. believing in the effectiveness of voting, 
4. believing that voting is worthwhile, 
5. confidence in one’s own political debating skills, and 
6. being politically involved in other conflict prone settings or activities such as 
attending a town/neighbourhood council meeting, public hearing or public 
discussion group; meeting with, calling or sending letters or emails to, 
politicians; and participating in information or election campaigns. 
Additionally, the willingness of non-members to join political parties was revealed to 
be positively correlated with a willingness to accept political compromise. Therefore, party 
membership and the willingness of non-members to join a political party are revealed to be:  
- negatively correlated with measures and indicators of SNH, and  
- positively correlated with trends opposite to those hypothesised (per my 
Homogenisation theory) as connected to, SNH.  





As political party membership and the willingness of non-members to join a party are 
patterns associated with less Complex-embeddedness and less SNH (according to my 
Homogenisation thesis) these statistics appear to support my Homogenisation theory. 
Table 8.6 
Correlations between participants’ Membership of / willingness to join, a political party 
and variables linked to the SEVHSN Complex. 
 
2015 Correlations between Membership of / willingness to join, a political party Number of 
participants 
AISNDS r= .356, p= .103 22 
ASSNDS r= .310, p= .132 25 
Being less conflict avoidant r= .493, p= .010 26 
Frequency of debating people with 
political views different from one’s own 
r= .355, p= .075 26 
Believing there is little to be learnt from 
political discussion with those with whom 
one disagrees 
r= -.318, p= .113 26 
Believing in the effectiveness of voting r= .340, p= .089 26 
Believing that voting is worthwhile r= .424, p= .031 26 
Having greater confidence in one’s 
political debating skills 
r= .353, p= .077 26 
Being politically involved in conflict prone 
settings or activities (such as attending a 
town/neighbourhood council meeting, 
public hearing or public discussion group; 
meeting with, calling or sending letters or 
emails to, politicians; and participating in 
information or election campaigns) 
r= .570, p= .002 26 
 
Figure 8.3 
The correlation between participants’ AISNDSs and participants’ membership of / 
willingness to join, a political party. 







The correlation between participants’ ASSNDSs and participants’ membership of 
/willingness to join, a political party. 
 
Table 8.7 
Correlations between the willingness of non-members to join a political party and 
variables linked to the SEVHSN Complex. 
 
2015 Correlations between Willingness of non-members to join a political party Number of 
participants 
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Frequency of debating people with 
political views different from one’s own 
r= .467, p= .033 21 
Believing there is little to be learnt from 
political discussion with those with whom 
one disagrees 
r= -.360, p= .109 21 
Believing in the effectiveness of voting r= .327, p= .148 21 
Believing that voting is worthwhile r= .425, p= .055 21 
Having greater confidence in one’s 
political debating skills 
r= .347, p= .123 21 
Being politically involved in conflict prone 
settings or activities (such as attending a 
town/neighbourhood council meeting, 
public hearing or public discussion group; 
meeting with, calling or sending letters or 
emails to, politicians; and participating in 
information or election campaigns) 
r= .332, p= .142 21 
An unwillingness to accept political 
compromise 
r= -.297, p= .191 21 
 
Per my Homogenisation thesis and the SNHPE Chart, a decline in all (not just party) 
forms of conflict-prone political involvement is another consequence of greater Complex-
embeddedness. According to my theory, those with more ideologically homogenous 
networks are less disposed to engage in conflict-prone activities than are those with relatively 
ideologically heterogeneous networks. Hence, evidence suggesting connections between less 
participation in conflict-prone activities and trends theoretically tied to Complex-immersion 
and SNH (as illustrated in the Chart) would strengthen my Homogenisation theory. As 
predicted, undertaking and being more engaged in conflict-prone political activities763 was 
shown to be both negatively correlated with: 
1. more severely overestimating the extent to which society is ideologically 
homogenous, and 
2. believing that there is little to be learnt from political discussion with those with 
whom one disagrees 
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as well as positively correlated with: 
1. membership of / willingness to join, a political party, 
2. willingness of non-members to join a political party, 
3. believing in the effectiveness of voting, 
4. the frequency of discussing politics with those with whom one disagrees, and 
5. the degree to which participants believe that the value emphases of their close social 
network members tend to be ‘dissimilar’ to their own. 
These correlations would seem to indicate that (like party membership/engagement) 
involvement in other forms of conflict-prone political activities is associated with less 
Complex-immersion/SNH. Thus, they bolster my Homogenisation argument. 
 The correlations revealed suggesting a negative relationship between network 
homogeneity and conflict prone political engagement cannot be explained by marriage or 
romantic partnerships acting to both ideologically homogenise networks and reduce conflict 
prone political activities/party involvement. In Chapter Five marriage was found not to be 
correlated with political engagement; neither conflict prone nor conflict free. Furthermore, 
indicators of network homogeneity are negatively and positively (discussed in the next 
paragraph) correlated with conflict prone and conflict free political engagement respectively. 
Therefore, political interest alone cannot explain these relationships because political interest 
on its own would act to raise both conflict prone and conflict free political involvement 
regardless of its possible influence on network homogeneity/diversity. 
Table 8.8 
Correlations between being politically involved in conflict prone settings or activities 
and variables connected to the SEVHSN Complex. 
 
2015 Correlations between Being politically involved in conflict prone settings or activities 
(such as attending a town/neighbourhood council meeting, public 
hearing or public discussion group; meeting with, calling or sending 




Believing society is ideologically r= -.359, p= .032 36 






Believing there is little to be learnt 
from political discussion with those 
with whom one disagrees 
r= -.383, p= .021 36 
Membership of / willingness to join, a 
political party 
r= .570, p= .002 26 
Willingness of non-members to join a 
political party 
r= .332, p= .142 21 
Believing in the effectiveness of voting r= .327, p= .051 36 
Frequency of debating people with 
political views different from one’s 
own 
r= .335, p= .046 36 
AVSNDS r= .354, p= .149 25 
 
Contrastingly, increased engagement in activities that require, or are subject to, little 
or no conflict is deemed another corollary of Complex-embeddedness and SNH according to 
my Homogenisation thesis. That is, per my theory, those who are conflict averse tend to 
politically engage more in conflict-free settings and activities than those who are relatively 
less conflict avoidant. This is how conflict averse people (partly or wholly) compensate for 
being less involved in conflict-prone political activities than those who are less conflict 
avoidant. Perhaps the most common conflict free political activity is political consumerism: 
individually making decisions about one’s (or one’s family’s) consumption based on political 
or ethical considerations to help bring about positive change.764 Thus, statistics denoting ties 
between greater political consumerism and patterns theoretically bound to Complex-
immersion and SNH (as shown in the Chart) would buttress my Homogenisation thesis. As 
anticipated, more political consumerism was found to be positively correlated with several 
other effects of greater SNH. These were: 
1. greater conflict avoidance, 
2. an unwillingness to accept political compromise, and 
3. a belief that there is little to be learnt from political discussion with those with 
whom one disagrees. 
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These statistics appear to signal that political consumerism (generally a conflict free form of 
engagement) is linked to greater Complex-embeddedness/SNH. Therefore, they corroborate 
my theory. 
Table 8.9 
Correlations between participants’ engagement in political consumerism and variables 
linked to the SEVHSN Complex. 
 
2015 Correlations between Greater political consumerism Number of 
participants 
Being less conflict avoidant r= -.347, p= .083 26 
An unwillingness to accept political 
compromise 
r= .286, p= .091 36 
Believing there is little to be learnt from 
political discussion with those with 
whom one disagrees 
r= .223, p= .192 36 
 
According to my Homogenisation theory and the SNHPE Chart, believing that voting is 
ineffective and not worthwhile is a ramification of greater Complex-immersion and SNH. Per 
my Homogenisation thesis, those with more ideologically homogenous networks are more 
inclined to hold that the political system and parties are unrepresentative, unresponsive and 
possibly corrupt than are those with relatively ideologically diverse networks. Consequently, 
they are also relatively more disposed to thinking that they have low external political 
efficacy and thus voting is ineffective and not worthwhile. Hence, evidence suggesting links 
between believing that voting is ineffective and not worthwhile, and trends theoretically tied 
to Complex-embeddedness and SNH (as illustrated in the Chart) would help to validate my 
Homogenisation thesis. Indeed, statistics collated from my survey data reveal that believing 
that voting is ‘effective’ and ‘worthwhile’ are positively correlated with the degree to which 
participants believe that the value emphases of their close social network members tend to 
be ‘dissimilar’ to their own. They also indicate that believing in the ‘effectiveness’ of voting is 
both negatively correlated with the ethnic/linguistic homogeneity of one’s informal social 
network and positively correlated with: 





1. the frequency of debating political issues with those with whom one 
disagrees, and 
2. having confidence in one’s own political debating skills. 
These correlations would appear to suggest that having more ideologically and structurally 
homogenous networks as well as other hypothesised corollaries of SNH (per my 
Homogenisation theory) are associated with being less convinced of the efficacy of voting. 
Hence, they strengthen my thesis. 
Table 8.10 
Correlations between participants’ AVSNDSs and their believing that voting is effective 
and worthwhile. 
 
2015 Correlations between AVSNDS Number of 
participants 
Believing in the effectiveness of voting r= .383, p= .117 18 
Believing that voting is worthwhile r= .350, p= .154 18 
 
Table 8.11 
Correlations between believing in the effectiveness of voting and variables connected 
with the SEVHSN Complex. 
 
2015 Correlations between Believing in the effectiveness of voting Number of 
participants 
The extent to which participants’ informal 
social networks (outside the immediate 
family) are ethnically/linguistically diverse 
r= .350, p= .036 36 
Frequency of debating people with 
political views different from one’s own 
r= .312, p= .064 36 
Having greater confidence in one’s 
political debating skills 
r= .421, p= .010 36 
 
Finally, being less satisfied with the political system is (per my Homogenisation theory 
and the SNHPE Chart) a facet of greater Complex-immersion and SNH. According to my 





thesis, those with more ideologically homogenous networks are less inclined to be satisfied 
with the political system (in their country) than are those with relatively ideologically 
heterogeneous networks. This, I contend, is explained by both:  
- their tendency to be more intolerant of political compromise and persons/parties 
with different political attitudes/obligations, and  
- the increasing inability of the political/electoral systems to satisfactorily represent a 
great majority of political persuasions.  
This inability is largely due to an ideological diversification of society brought about by SNH. 
Thus, evidence signalling ties between this dissatisfaction with political and electoral 
arrangements and patterns/demographics theoretically linked to Complex-embeddedness 
and SNH (as shown by the SNHPE Chart) would reinforce my Homogenisation theory. 
Satisfaction/dissatisfaction with Australian political and electoral regimes were gauged by 
participants’ answers to two questions. 
1. “On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not 
at all satisfied with the way democracy works in Australia?” 
2. “Would you support changing the electoral system for the House of 
Representatives from the Alternative Vote: … To the Hare-Clark system: …” 
Greater sense of satisfaction with the way democracy works in Australia was revealed 
to be both positively correlated with older age and negatively correlated with the overall 
structural and social status homogeneity of one’s informal social network. Furthermore, 
wanting the House of Representatives Alternative Vote electoral system to be reformed to 
Hare-Clark was found to be both negatively correlated with believing that voting is 
worthwhile as well as positively correlated with: 
1. the economic status homogeneity of participants’ informal social networks, 
2. the educational background/level homogeneity of members of participants’ 
most important formal groups, 
3. the degree to which participants’ most important formal groups have 
egalitarian decision-making procedures, and 





4. the extent to which participants’ most important formal organisations have 
egalitarian leadership selection processes. 
Per my theory, older people are less likely to be as embedded in the Complex than are 
younger persons. Additionally, believing that voting is ‘not’ worthwhile and being more 
involved in formal groups with egalitarian decision-making/leadership-selection processes are 
corollaries of SNH and Complex-immersion respectively. Consequently, these statistics would 
buttress my Homogenisation argument. This completes the analysis/exploration of my survey 
statistics. The evidence largely supports, rather than contradicts, my thesis. How electoral 
and intra-party reforms may help to raise party engagement despite SNH and SID are now 
considered, before this eighth and final chapter is concluded. 
Table 8.12 
Correlations between having a greater sense of satisfaction with the way democracy 
works in Australia and both being older and having more structurally diverse informal 
social networks. 
 




Being older r= .252, p= .137 36 
The extent to which participants’ informal 
social networks (outside the immediate 
family) are structurally 
(ethnically/linguistically, economically, 
socially and religiously) diverse 
r= .261, p= .125 36 
The extent to which members of 
participants’ informal social networks 
(outside the immediate family) have diverse 
social status 
r= .267, p= .116 36 
 
Table 8.13 
Correlations between Wanting the Hare-Clark electoral system to be used in House of 
Representatives elections and variables connected with the SEVHSN Complex. 
 
2015 Correlations between Wanting the Hare-Clark electoral system to be used in House of Number of 





Representatives elections participants 
Believing that voting is worthwhile r= -229, p= .179 36 
The extent to which members of 
participants’ informal social networks 
(outside the immediate family) have 
diverse economic status 
r= -.238, p= .163 36 
Participants agreeing that most 
members of the most important formal 
group in which they are involved have 
the same educational background/level 
r= .489, p= .018 23 
The degree to which participants’ two 
most important formal groups (in which 
they are involved) have egalitarian 
decision-making processes 
r= .286, p= .186 23 
The degree to which participants’ two 
most important formal groups (in which 
they are involved) have egalitarian 
leadership-selection processes 
r= .474, p= .026 22 
 
Raising Party Engagement 
Refer to the SNHPE Chart. Per my theory, SNH and greater SEVHSN Complex-
immersion are inextricably tied to modernising trends such as technological advance, rising 
economic prosperity and greater knowledge accessibility and dissemination. Therefore, a 
reversal of SNH is both improbable and undesirable. However, the ways in which SNH affects 
variables of the Prime Circuit (previously discussed in Chapter One) may potentially be 
mitigated by electoral reforms and intra-party democratisation and conflict prevention. The 
mitigation of SNH’s impact on Prime Circuit variables is not the focus of my thesis 
investigation. However, such possibilities are worth discussing as some may consider party 
disengagement a serious problem requiring solutions. Initially explored are the ways in which 
reform of Australian parliamentary electoral regimes may mitigate the extent to which SID 
diminishes the representativeness and responsiveness of the political system and parties.  
Electoral Reform 
 





Chapter Three argued that the ideological, philosophical and recreational 
diversification of society brought about by SNH is precipitating an increase in the number of 
formal groups. That is, those more Complex-immersed, with niche interests and intolerance 
toward philosophical and ideological difference, are more inclined to participate in 
organisations with relatively more homogenous memberships than are persons less 
embedded. Consequently, the formal group/organisational market has adapted to the 
preferences of the growing proportion of SEVHSN Complex-immersed people. A rising 
proportion of formal groups have democratised their decision-making and leadership 
selection processes to meet the egalitarian expectations of those with a self-expression 
values orientation. They have also been transitioning from fewer (but perhaps larger) 
organisations with heterogeneous memberships to more (but possibly smaller) groups with 
relatively homogenous memberships. This change to the structure of formal organisations 
has been in response to the expectations of those with relatively homogenous networks who 
tend to have relatively niche recreational interests and be relatively conflict averse and 
politically/philosophically intolerant. 
Contrastingly, ‘supply’ of Parliamentary representation cannot respond to changing 
voter ‘demand’ as dynamically and efficaciously as supply responds to demand in the formal 
group market. The ability of Australian legislatures to provide fair and meaningful 
representation of political preferences/persuasions is restricted by electoral regimes. This is 
particularly true for single member district electoral systems such as the Alternative Vote 
used for House of Representatives elections. These regimes tend to exaggerate the 
representation of major parties and severely underrepresent minor parties relative to the 
proportion of votes they receive.765 As Australia has become increasingly ideologically diverse 
(with a higher proportion of Australians voting for non-major party candidates) this disparity 
between House of Representatives votes and seats has (and will continue to) become more 
acute. 
Table 8.14 
Australian House of Representatives Election results (votes, seats and distortions). 
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Election % of first preference 
votes for major (Labor & 
Liberal/National 
Coalition) parties 
% of seats won by major 
parties 
% point distortion 
between the first 
preference votes received 
and seats won by major 
parties 
2 July 2016 76.77 96.67 19.90 
7 September 2013 78.90 96.68 17.78 
21 August 2010 81.61 96.67 15.06 
24 November 2007 85.47 98.67 13.20 
9 October 2004 84.34 98.00 13.66 
10 November 2001 80.85 98.00 17.15 
3 October 1998 79.60 99.32 19.72 
2 March 1996 86.00 96.62 10.62 
13 March 1993 89.19 98.64 9.45 
24 March 1990 82.90 99.32 16.42 
11 July 1987 91.90 100.00 8.10 
1 December 1984 92.55 100.00 7.45 
5 March 1983 93.05 100.00 6.95 
18 October 1980 91.44 100.00 8.56 
10 December 1977 87.75 100.00 12.25 
13 December 1975 95.89 100.00 4.11 
766 
Figure 8.5 
% point distortion between votes received and seats won by major parties at Australian 
House of Representatives elections. 
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 Furthermore, neither the Alternative Vote system (used for Federal and most State lower 
house elections), nor particular versions of Single Transferable Vote regimes (employed for 
Federal and most State upper chamber elections) generate significant intraparty 
competition.767 This lack of intra-party competition encourages strong party discipline 
because party candidates are pre-selected by their party organisations which highly value 
overall party (rather than individual candidate) electoral success.768 Party electoral success is 
largely dependent on candidates and members being more united than those of rival 
parties.769 This strong party discipline acts to reduce the number of perspectives and 
attitudes expressed by parliamentarians in words and deeds, on the campaign trail and in 
legislative chambers. Hence, greater SID brought about by SNH raises the proportion of 
Australians whose political attitudes, views and ideas are unrepresented in Parliament due to 
suppression by Australia’s present electoral regimes. This increasingly severe distortion 
precipitates decline in both satisfaction and identification with as well as belief in the 
effectiveness of engaging in, political parties.770 These trends subsequently produce a 
corresponding erosion in party involvement which exacerbates the degree to which political 
parties become unrepresentative of, and unresponsive to the public.771 
This thesis refrains from passing judgement on the desirability of SID and rising non-
major-party voting. However, the ability of current electoral regimes to 
equitably/satisfactorily translate votes into seats is being undermined by this shifting 
paradigm. Arguably, the growing disconnect between voter preferences and parliamentary 
compositions is undermining party engagement. Such disincentives to party involvement can 
potentially weaken the representative character of parliament which (for reasons explored in 
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the first, and early in this chapter) is necessary to sustain a thriving democracy. For the 
foreseeable future, most parliamentary seats are likely to be filled by party members, rather 
than by independents. Consequently, reasonably high membership and participation rates 
are necessary to ensure parties represent, and are accountable to, their constituencies rather 
than just wealthy and connected elites.772  
One possible method of revitalising party participation would be to reform present 
Australian electoral systems to those that more proportionally represent inter-and-intra-
party preferences and produce significant intra-party competition. These reforms would not 
only reduce distortions between the proportion of ‘votes’ and ‘seats’ received by parties and 
candidates. They also would diminish the extent to which such distortions are affected by 
continued changes in voter-preference/ideological diversity. This relative absence of electoral 
distortion would ensure that more political views were meaningfully represented. This would 
raise both satisfaction/confidence with the political system as well as identification with 
Parliamentary (electorally viable) parties/candidates with significant (or the realistic potential 
for significant) legislative influence.773 These trends may subsequently encourage a larger 
proportion of Australians to involve themselves in party activities, pre-selections and 
campaigning;774 further raising the representativeness and responsiveness of parties and the 
political system.775 
Hare-Clark (used to elect the Tasmanian House of Assembly)776 is an example of an 
electoral system that meets the criteria of:  
1. proportionally representing inter-and-intra-party political-preferences,777 
while 
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2. generating significant intra-party competition.778 
Unlike the versions of STV employed to elect Federal at most State upper chambers Hare-
Clark does not provide voters with ‘above the line’ group and party ticketing options, but 
instead requires voters to rank order a minimum number of individual candidates.779 The 
order in which these candidates appear on ballots are randomised from ballot paper to ballot 
paper to ensure candidates are not advantaged or disadvantaged by what would otherwise 
be a set order.780 Hence, the system avoids the influence of ‘donkey voters’ (those who rank 
order candidates or a party’s candidates in the order they appear) and produces real intra-
party competition.781 Hare-Clark secures the proportional representation of inter-and-intra-
party political-preferences by distributing and redistributing the accumulated and surplus 
votes and vote fractions of eliminated and elected candidates respectively.782 Votes and vote 
fractions are distributed and redistributed according to voters’ chosen individual candidate 
preferences so as to fill individual (rather than party) candidate election quotas (the Droop 
Quota).783 This intra-party competition and proportional representation of inter-and-intra-
party political/electoral-preferences are what position Hare-Clark as one of, and probably the 
most voter empowering, individual candidate oriented, and intra-party competitive 
proportional electoral systems.784 Conversely, most electoral regimes used for Australian 
State and Federal elections are party empowering and party oriented; generating little intra-
party competition.785 The Alternative Vote system is not even party proportional.786 
Hare-Clark would not only mitigate the eroding effects SID is having on Prime Circuit 
variables under present electoral regimes. Voter empowering, it would also better reflect the 
self-expression value of autonomy emphasised by the growing proportion of Australians 
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heavily immersed in the Complex. This consistency between values orientation and electoral 
regime may help raise rates of voting participation. Electoral participation has declined (even 
under conditions of compulsory voting) because of the SID, lower party identification and 
self-expression values orientation of an increasing SEVHSN Complex-immersed public. Those 
heavily Complex-embedded want and need more electorally viable candidate and party 
options because they highly value choice and are, as a group, becoming increasingly 
ideologically diverse; with fewer identifying with major parties. 
Furthermore, electoral systems that more proportionally translate votes into party 
seats provide citizens with more Parliamentary, and electorally viable parties with, or with 
realistic potential for significant legislative power.787 Consequently, those interested in 
joining a party with political influence (to gain political influence), can choose among a larger 
and more diverse variety of options. As party platforms, policies and ideologies are likely to 
be either ‘a’ or ‘the’ major concern when making such decisions, more significant options will 
induce greater ideological homogeneity among the members of each party organisation. That 
is, more party proportional electoral regimes would probably precipitate a transformation of 
the Australian party system; from fewer significant parties with ideologically diverse 
memberships, to more numerous influential parties with relatively ideologically homogenous 
memberships.  
Therefore, the chances and incidence of unpleasant disagreements/disputes between 
members of the same party would likely diminish when more party proportional 
Parliamentary electoral regimes are employed. This would reduce disincentives to party 
engagement experienced particularly strongly by conflict avoidant persons. As greater 
conflict aversion is a corollary of SNH, tempering these barriers with electoral reform may 
attenuate the adverse impact trends toward heavier and more widespread Complex-
embeddedness are having on political party involvement. These reforms would require 
replacing majoritarian with proportional electoral regimes and increasing the number of 
members elected proportionally from each STV district (i.e. district magnitude). 
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The electronic democratisation of internal party decision-making procedures 
(discussed below) is another possible means by which to spur greater party engagement 
among the Complex-immersed. It would be consistent with the value of egalitarianism which 
tends to be more heavily emphasised by those with a self-expression values orientation (due 
to greater Complex-embeddedness) than by those with a survival values orientation. As 
citizens become more Complex-embedded, they expect and demand a more equal 
distribution of political, institutional and organisational power. When institutions and 
organisations do not adapt to these changing expectations they risk having their 
memberships shrink. Thus, electronic democratisation may quell the extent to which SEVHSN 
Complex-immersion impedes party engagement. 
However, democratisation often requires group deliberation which can precipitate 
combative debate/conflict, particularly when the issues concerned are political and the 
decisions made would/could have a consequential and/or enduring social/economic impact. 
Therefore, mechanisms/procedures to de-escalate the unpleasant tensions often associated 
with group deliberation are also required. Otherwise, the heavily Complex-
immersed/conflict-averse will continue to be less inclined to join and engage in political 
parties than those relatively less complex-embedded. This is despite the inducement of an 
egalitarian distribution of decision-making power between party members. There may seem 
to be an incompatibility between the decision-making-process reform options that are 
congruous with the values espoused by the increasingly Complex-immersed and those that 
are pursuant to their conflict aversion. Yet, certain online discussion and voting procedures 
could potentially solve this dilemma. 
For example, imagine an online method for nominating candidates, moving policy 
motions, scrutinising their strengths and weaknesses and submitting votes in which: 
1. Any member may nominate themselves as a pre-selection candidate or anonymously 
move a policy motion; presenting their arguments in favour of the candidate or 
motion. 





2. Other members may view and anonymously indicate approval for these policy 
motions and pre-selection nominees. 
3. A minimum number of members indicating approval for, would initiate a discussion 
regarding these motions and nominations. Related policy motions and pre-selection 
nominees for the same electoral race may be grouped together for discussion. 
4. Any member may anonymously contribute to these discussions by means of posting 
no more than one comment. Prior to their discussion page publication, these 
comments would require approval from selected party moderators (not to censor the 
expression of ideas but) to ensure discussion remains respectful. 
5. Following a specified time, no further comments may be posted, and an online vote 
would be conducted. If there were only two options (i.e. to either except/approve the 
proposed policy or maintain the status quo) then members would be asked to select 
one or other position. If there were more than two options (i.e. multiple related 
policy proposals or a few or more pre-selection candidates to choose between) then 
members would be asked to rank order these options according to their preference. A 
preferential vote counting method (such as the Alternative Vote, Single Transferable 
Vote or Borda count) would be employed. The selection of these preferential vote 
counting regimes would be determined by context. That is, whether the count is to:  
a. pre-select, or determine a single ‘candidate’ or ‘policy position’, or 
b. pre-select multiple candidates; perhaps for a multi-membered electorate. 
This system would be more democratic/egalitarian than most internal party-decision-
making-procedures currently employed. Major party ‘candidate pre-selection’ and ‘policy 
determination’ processes used at present concentrate power in party elites and hierarchies 
comprising ‘faction heavyweights’ and ‘party hacks’ rather than in rank-and-file members.788 
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Contrastingly, my suggestions would empower the rank-and-file to make consequential 
decisions at electorate, state and national levels without approval from ‘above’. 
Consequently, greater consistency between ‘internal party government’ and ‘self-expression 
values’ (emphasised by the growing proportion of citizens who are Complex-immersed) 
would be achieved by such a reform. 
Besides being congruous with the values emphasised and cherished by the Complex-
embedded, my candidate and policy selection procedure would probably reduce the conflict 
exposure experienced by engaged party members. The procedure does not require face-to-
face communication. Thus, the identity of those involved (except the pre-selection 
candidates themselves) can remain concealed. Consequently, participants would no longer 
be concerned about their contributions fraying relationships, or provoking face-to-face 
hostility/unpleasantness, with other members. Hence, the anonymity may encourage more 
people (but particularly conflict averse members) to participate in salient party decision-
making. In person contact between rank-and-file members would be reserved for activities 
relatively less conflict-prone such as campaigning and fund raising. 
Elimination of non-linguistic expression as well as moderation of party discussion 
pages may also help assuage the anxieties and concerns of, and unpleasantness felt by, the 
conflict averse. Perhaps more unpleasant than words spoken, written or typed in 
acrimonious discussion, debate, or argument are virulent and cutting facial expressions and 
body language. By moving potentially fierce and impassioned debates online these forms of 
non-linguistic communication can be eliminated, particularly if emojis are blocked from party 
discussion boards/pages. Furthermore, by having moderators (perhaps aided by computer 
programs) check online discussion contributions before they are posted (to ensure the tone 
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of contributors remains respectful) certain disincentives to, and anxieties discouraging, party 
engagement can be mitigated. These disincentives and anxieties are particularly effective in 
reducing participation among the growing proportion of citizens who are conflict-
avoidant/Complex-embedded. The highly Complex-embedded with ideologically 
homogenous networks have fewer experiences than do the relatively less Complex-immersed 
debating politics with those with whom they disagree. Consequently, they are unlikely to 
have developed as competent debating skills as those with relatively heterogeneous 
networks. This lack of debating experience and prowess arguably tends to render a larger 
proportion of their debating involvement unpleasant and confronting and a considerable 
proportion of their arguments uncompelling. Hence, those heavily SEVHSN Complex-
embedded tend to be relatively more conflict averse (and anxious about participation in 
conflict prone activities) than those relatively less Complex-immersed. 
Finally, by allowing each member only one contribution per discussion, my suggested 
candidate pre-selection and policy determination procedure would probably lessen the 
potential for harsh, heated, non-constructive and thoughtless criticisms. It may also 
encourage contributors to be mindful of how their arguments/positions may be interpreted, 
and excoriated. When members are restricted to one comment per discussion-page they are 
motivated to make their contribution as persuasive as possible by leaving no (or little) room 
for misinterpretation. They are driven to fully articulate their position/reasoning, and pre-
empt/address possible concerns and opposing arguments which may be expressed by other 
members. Persuasiveness requires civility, thought and empathy. By coaxing people to 
embrace these qualities/abilities my suggested procedure may not only help to maintain 
respectful discussion; thereby removing barriers to party engagement encountered by the 
conflict-averse/Complex-embedded. The procedure may also prompt more party members 
to view discussion topics from the perspectives of persons unlike themselves; something the 
Complex-immersed do less frequently than others. As previously argued, party involvement is 
deterred and/or reduced by the absence of encountering and considering views different 
from one’s own. 
 






This final chapter has examined the ways in which SNH (a fundamental component of 
the SEVHSN Complex) affects political participation according to my Homogenisation theory. 
The limitations of my survey statistics as well as the most appropriate manner of 
utilising/interpreting them (discussed in Chapters Six and Seven) were reiterated. Extraneous 
variables could not be controlled for because the survey had 36 participants. Hence, doing so 
would have meant relying too heavily on a handful of participant responses rather than the 
more robust number of 36 in depth and highly revealing sets of responses; raising p values 
above even moderate significance. Salient is the picture that the statistics paint (rather than 
any single correlation found) when evaluating the degree to which the data supports or 
challenges my theory. Indeed, statistics indicated ties between patterns symptomatic of 
deeper Complex-embeddedness and other trends theoretically associated with SNH. The 
patterns include: 
- greater intolerance of people holding political views with which one disagrees 
- unwillingness to accept political compromise 
- doubting the benefit of political checks and compromise 
- propensity to ‘swing vote’ 
- believing that there is little to be learnt from political discussion with those 
with whom one disagrees 
- unwillingness/disinclination to join political parties 
- unwillingness/disinclination to engage in conflict-prone activities 
- political consumerism 
- believing that voting is not worthwhile 
- doubting the effectiveness of voting, and 
- dissatisfaction with the way democracy works in Australia 
This evidence buttresses my Homogenisation thesis. 
Finally, this chapter pondered how reform of Australian electoral regimes and intra-
party decision making processes may mitigate the degree to which SNH impedes party 
membership and participation. The benefits of reforming Australian electoral systems to the 





Hare-Clark version of the Single Transferable Vote and more equally distributing internal 
party decision making power among members were discussed. These reforms were found to 
be consistent with the self-expression values orientation of the increasing proportion of 
Australians heavily immersed in the SEVHSN Complex. Additionally, proportional electoral 
regimes such as Hare-Clark (as opposed to the Alternative Vote currently employed for 
Australian House of Representatives elections) were reasoned to reduce the ideological 
diversity (and therefore potential conflict) within political parties. SNH has likely contributed 
to raised SID and conflict aversion. Consequently, a reduction in intra-party ideological 
heterogeneity would probably diminish the potency of certain disincentives to party 
involvement to which the growing proportion of Complex-embedded are particularly 
sensitive. It was hypothesised that this potency may be further stemmed by providing party 
members with a moderated online space in which to submit and comment on policy 
proposals and pre-selection candidate nominations. This space would be relatively free from 
aggressive, unpleasant and non-constructive contributions and face-to-face expressions.  
  






Over the last half century, a time of rising individual autonomy in post-industrial 
societies, numerous political scientists, sociologists and commentators have observed 
marked declines in satisfaction and identification with, and confidence and involvement in 
party political organisations.789 Some have concluded that these trends are simply the 
consequence of social atomisation and/or value shifts.790 However, these theories do not 
satisfactorily explain why levels of engagement in many other types of formal group declined 
in the late twentieth century but are slowly recovering in the early twenty-first.791 By 
illustrating the underlying causes of these inconsistencies, this thesis offers an informed path 
to raising party participation. Reinvigorated levels of party involvement would increase the 
representativeness, responsiveness and efficacy of our democratic institutions: 
reinforcing/reasserting the connection between the political apparatus and majority will. 
While some scholars believe in an extremely limited political decision-making role for 
the public, their beliefs are often based on the questionable premise that political 
disagreement usually stems from ignorance and/or irrationality.792 Others argue that, more 
often political disagreements are between equally informed and rational people arriving at 
different balances between frequently conflicting incommensurable values within particular 
contexts.793 Accordant with this value pluralist view, highly representative democracy is the 
only legitimate way to overcome disputes over equally rational policy positions advocated by 
rational and informed individuals of equal moral worth. Hence, declining party membership is 
genuinely troubling as it threatens the ability of political parties to effectively represent 
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constituencies and supporters by delegating the selection of candidates and adoption of 
policies to an increasingly narrow and unrepresentative sample.794 
This thesis has also been concerned with political/ideological 
polarisation/diversification, and the fraying of connections between persons with different 
views, ideals and interests. As social modularity is amplified by individual empowerment, and 
people present greater liking for those who possess similar attitudes and value emphases to 
their own, I have reasoned that post-industrial technological advance as well as greater 
financial security and higher education attainment induce social network homogenisation. 
Ideologically homogenous social networks in which beliefs and opinions are strengthened 
and intensified are prone to drift further from the political centre than are relatively diverse 
networks in which views and ideals are more frequently challenged and reconsidered. Thus, 
network homogenisation precipitates societal ideological diversification. I have argued that 
these trends erode satisfaction and identification with and confidence, membership and 
involvement in political parties by decreasing personal experience in, and tolerance for, 
political disagreement; thereby reducing both preparedness to politically compromise and 
efficacy in political debate, deliberation and negotiation. 
Robert Putnam’s Lamentation and Inglehart and Welzel’s Modernisation were 
identified as the dominant, best known and arguably most comprehensive sociological 
participation theories. While previous, and my own survey, research as well as Australian 
WVS trend and correlation statistics relating to social and political values, engagement and 
trust indicated that both theses have strengths, they also suggest that each is flawed. My 
data analysis contradicts the Modernisationist position that post-industrial development is 
replacing bonding with bridging connections. Indeed, evidence indicates that the 
Modernisation theorists identified instigators of social modularity maybe homogenising 
networks and diversifying societal attitudes and convictions. Similarly, not all the trends 
Putnam views as having an eroding influence on social capital and political involvement were 
corroborated by other, and my own statistics. Moreover, Putnam’s contention that almost all 
forms of social capital are (or were) in secular decline was reasoned undeservedly bleak. 
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Furthermore, shifts in value orientations and rates of unconventional political involvement 
were shown to weaken Putnam’s Lamentation arguments. Trends in political interest levels 
as well as engagement and confidence in formal groups were inconsistent with 
Modernisation and Lamentation theories.  
Instead, my investigation points to an Homogenisationist explanation. Post-industrial 
technological and economic development linked to a values shift is raising social modularity 
and network homogeneity. Evidence has indicated that these trends are eroding confidence 
and involvement in formal organisations and institutions that do not adapt to the desires and 
expectations of those (particularly younger) people/generations more heavily immersed in 
this new sociological context, i.e. the Self-Expression Values Homogenous Social Network 
Complex. Finally, this thesis reasoned that membership of and participation and confidence 
in political parties may be lifted by reforming Australian electoral systems and intraparty 
decision-making processes to accommodate the views and expectations of the Complex-
embedded. 
Low levels of membership, participation and confidence in political parties is reason 
for concern. Without widespread engagement in political parties, these critical mediums 
through which citizens connect with, and influence government and legislators become 
susceptible to hijacking by monied and sectional interests795 whose ambitions and goals often 
run counter to those of the majority and the young/vulnerable. Examples of this rift between 
the views of typical citizens and the policy positions taken by political elites are displayed by 
the major parties’ unresponsiveness to the plurality of Australians favouring free (tax payer 
funded) university education,796 and large majorities of citizens supporting a moratorium on 
foreign ownership of farmland and gambling reform (more regulation of online gambling, 
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poker machines and sports betting and mandatory pre-commitment technology).797 Wealthy 
older Australians and foreign and gambling interests make significant contributions to major 
parties and benefit from the status quo.798 Gambling reform (except for the Tasmanian Labor 
Party)799 and overall reductions to levels of foreign ownership of agricultural land remains off 
major party platforms and policy agendas and the Australian government is pursuing 
university funding cuts and higher tuition fees.800  
WVS statistics suggest that rates of party involvement in Australia declined to 
historical lows during the late twentieth century.801 The country’s leaders and major parties 
appear to lack a complete understanding about the sociological factors/trends that drove, 
and hinder recovery from party disengagement. Subjecting Australian social capital and 
political participation trends to thorough evaluation may help to remedy this situation. 
Ultimately, this thesis has sought to demonstrate how, contrary to the conventional wisdom, 
sociological patterns associated with post-industrial development erodes bridging while 
enabling more bonding ties. Evidence suggests that these patterns discourage both party 
involvement as well as confidence in democratic institutions. Importantly, this study offers 
possible electoral and internal party solutions to remove the barriers and disincentives to 
party participation faced by the likes of John Hyde Page (quoted at the beginning of Chapter 
One) and so many other members of conflict avoidant and politically disenchanted 
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generations. The wealth generated in the impending age of automation may, if distributed 
equitably, could act to further raise levels of individual empowerment. With greater 
empowerment comes increased social modularity and less permeable ideological bubbles. 
Without party and electoral reform these bubbles will continue to undermine representative 
democracy by hindering unwitting generations from an effective participation in the political 
process. 
By focussing on the relationship between social network compositions and political 
engagement this thesis is a significant contribution to the emerging study of social networks 
and political behaviour. This area of research has mainly investigated the ways in which 
ideological bubbles, fuelled by contemporary communications technology, have brought 
about greater political polarisation; undermining the functionality of representative 
government. This thesis has sought to examine the distinct but related topic of whether 
ideological homogenisation within individual social networks has eroded participation in 
political parties, thereby undermining the representativeness of democratic organisations 
and institutions. I have concluded that this trend has indeed taken place and reform is 
needed to re-establish healthy levels of party trust, identification and involvement. 
  







% of Australian WVS participants within different age groups who had a “great deal” or “quite a lot” of confidence in 
churches 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 56.1 47.3 63.4 66.7 68.0 
1995 42.5 36.9 42.1 43.1 52.4 
2005 38.8 34.8 34.7 37.3 50.0 
2012 34.5 28.4 28.2 31.3 46.5 
 
Appendix 2 
% of Australian WVS participants within different age groups who had a “great deal” or “quite a lot” of confidence in political 
parties 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1995 15.7 14.8 13.9 14.6 19.9 
2005 14.3 17.4 12.9 12.4 16.0 
2012 12.9 15.0 14.3 11.3 12.7 
 
Appendix 3 
% of Australian WVS participants within different age groups who had a “great deal” or “quite a lot” of confidence in the 
Armed Forces 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 66.9 58.9 66.0 78.6 78.3 
1995 67.6 63.6 66.2 66.9 78.0 
2005 82.6 78.3 80.2 86.0 84.8 
2012 86.7 84.5 86.4 86.2 88.9 
 
Appendix 4 
% of Australian WVS participants within different age groups who had a “great deal” or “quite a lot” of confidence in the UN 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1995 50.4 56.4 46.6 47.6 46.1 
2005 45.5 55.3 48.6 43.2 36.3 
2012 54.9 63.7 58.6 54.9 47.4 
 
Appendix 5 
% of Australian WVS participants within different age groups who had a “great deal” or “quite a lot” of confidence in 
charitable/humanitarian organisations 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
2005 69.0 70.3 69.5 68.5 68.6 





2012 72.6 72.6 70.2 74.4 72.3 
 
Appendix 6 
% of Australian WVS participants within different age groups who had a “great deal” or “quite a lot” of confidence in 
Parliament 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 55.3 52.1 53.7 58.6 68.3 
1995 30.5 28.0 30.6 28.9 36.7 
2005 35.4 33.5 34.0 33.5 40.8 
2012 31.5 33.3 31.1 30.3 32.4 
 
Appendix 7 
% of Australian WVS participants within different age groups who had a “great deal” or “quite a lot” of confidence in the Civil 
Service 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 47.3 43.2 41.5 51.4 66.1 
1995 37.9 39.7 34.9 30.7 42.4 
2005 40.1 52.7 38.4 33.6 40.5 
2012 45.3 52.4 46.3 41.4 45.4 
 
Appendix 8 
% of Australian WVS participants within different age groups who had a “great deal” or “quite a lot” of confidence in labour 
unions 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 24.1 23.1 21.8 27.0 28.1 
1995 25.7 27.9 25.3 20.3 24.5 
2005 28.8 40.9 26.2 26.0 24.8 
2012 27.3 29.9 28.6 28.4 23.1 
 
Appendix 9 
% of Australian WVS participants within different age groups who had a “great deal” or “quite a lot” of confidence in the 
police 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 80.4 74.9 82.0 88.4 91.7 
1995 75.8 74.8 77.1 74.1 79.4 
2005 82.7 80.1 77.7 85.3 88.2 
2012 85.3 81.4 83.8 86.4 87.7 
 
Appendix 10 
% of Australian WVS participants within different age groups who had a “great deal” or “quite a lot” of confidence in the 






 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1995 26.1 26.1 28.7 20.2 24.8 
2005 40.1 42.0 37.3 39.5 42.5 
2012 31.8 39.4 31.8 29.8 30.3 
 
Appendix 11 
% of Australian WVS participants within different age groups who had a “great deal” or “quite a lot” of confidence in the 
Justice/Legal System (the Courts) 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 60.5 55.2 60.4 67.1 65.5 
1995 34.7 36.9 32.9 30.7 33.6 
2005 53.8 62.0 52.6 53.8 46.8 
2012 61.5 65.5 63.8 59.3 61.0 
 
Appendix 12 
% of Australian WVS participants within different age groups who had a “great deal” or “quite a lot” of confidence in the 
Press 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 28.7 25.9 27.2 30.7 38.5 
1995 16.4 18.9 13.9 14.6 15.8 
2005 11.5 14.9 10.2 9.1 13.6 
2012 16.5 16.4 14.6 14.5 20.8 
 
Appendix 13 
% of Australian WVS participants within different age groups who had a “great deal” or “quite a lot” of confidence in the 
TV 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1995 25.3 26.3 20.3 22.7 28.0 
2005 17.2 22.2 15.6 14.8 18.7 
2012 18.0 19.0 14.9 17.5 20.6 
 
Appendix 14 
% of Australian WVS participants within different age groups who had a “great deal” or “quite a lot” of confidence in major 
companies 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 79.2 78.0 80.7 78.3 80.7 
1995 58.6 61.1 57.4 53.1 56.9 
2005 30.2 36.9 30.5 27.9 26.7 
2012 48.7 55.6 51.1 45.7 47.1 
 






% of Australian WVS participants within different age groups who had a “great deal” or “quite a lot” of confidence in the 
Green/Ecology/Environmental movement 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1995 55.6 63.9 59.0 47.7 34.9 
2005 60.0 65.9 59.5 60.0 55.3 
2012 58.7 65.8 62.8 60.6 49.0 
 
Appendix 16 
% of Australian WVS participants within different age groups who indicated being active members of church/religious 
organisations 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 10.6 7.9 13.7 14.8 10.6 
1995 21.0 16.1 20.0 23.2 29.5 
2005 16.6 9.9 11.7 16.2 30.5 
2012 17.0 14.0 14.3 13.4 25.3 
 
Appendix 17 
% of Australian WVS participants within different age groups who indicated being active members of a political party 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 1.2 1.3 2.1 0.9 8.1 
1995 2.6 1.7 2.9 2.7 4.5 
2005 2.1 1.8 0.8 2.7 3.5 
2012 2.1 1.8 1.6 1.6 3.4 
 
Appendix 18 
% of Australian WVS participants within different age groups who indicated being active members of sport/recreational 
organisations 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1995 37.0 40.5 36.1 35.4 25.6 
2005 33.3 33.6 35.9 30.1 34.2 
2012 32.1 35.2 42.5 29.0 26.0 
 
Appendix 19 
% of Australian WVS participants within different age groups who indicated being active members of art, music or 
educational organisations 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 4.2 4.7 6.7 2.8 0.8 
1995 25.0 26.0 29.0 18.8 14.4 
2005 18.8 24.1 21.2 14.3 16.7 





2012 18.7 24.6 19.9 18.2 15.0 
 
Appendix 20 
% of Australian WVS participants within different age groups who indicated being active members of labour unions 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 1.1 2.1 0.4 0.9 3.3 
1995 11.9 13.5 15.2 13.6 2.6 
2005 8.7 9.1 12.6 9.7 0.8 
2012 9.0 8.3 12.1 12.1 2.4 
 
Appendix 21 
% of Australian WVS participants within different age groups who indicated being active members of environmental 
organisations 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 0.7 1.3 1.4 0.5 3.3 
1995 6.7 7.2 7.3 6.8 3.2 
2005 4.3 2.6 3.7 4.3 7.5 
2012 5.0 4.4 5.9 5.1 4.5 
 
Appendix 22 
% of Australian WVS participants within different age groups who indicated being active members of professional 
associations 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 2.4 2.3 3.9 2.3 0.8 
1995 20.0 22.8 25.8 21.3 7.4 
2005 16.2 15.8 20.8 15.9 10.4 
2012 16.2 15.9 24.1 18.2 7.4 
 
Appendix 23 
% of Australian WVS participants within different age groups who indicated being active members of charitable 
organisations 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 8.1 4.3 8.4 14.8 14.6 
1995 17.6 12.5 18.3 22.4 24.4 
2005 16.5 10.6 13.0 17.2 26.1 
2012 19.2 18.0 16.0 17.2 25.7 
 
Appendix 24 
% of Australian WVS participants within different age groups who indicated being active members of consumer 
organisations 





 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
2005 3.0 5.2 2.6 2.8 1.6 
2012 3.2 6.1 2.6 2.7 2.4 
 
Appendix 25 
% of Australian WVS participants within different age groups who indicated being active members of other voluntary 
organisations 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1995 16.1 11.9 18.4 15.9 21.6 
2005 4.5 3.2 3.3 5.0 7.7 
2012 7.1 3.4 6.5 5.7 12.7 
 
Appendix 26 
Correlations between “A subjective sense of autonomy” and “believing that Voluntary Euthanasia is justifiable” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 x x x x x 
1995 r= .055, p= .016 r= .074, p= .058 x x x 
2005 x x x x x 
 
Appendix 27 
Correlations between “A subjective sense of autonomy” and “believing that Abortion is justifiable” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 x x x x X 
1995 r= .047, p= .041 x r= .084, p= .057 X x 
2005 x x x x X 
2012 x x x x x 
 
Appendix 28 
Correlations between “A subjective sense of autonomy” and “believing that Prostitution is justifiable” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 X X r= .162, p= .064 X X 
1995 X X X X X 
2005 X x X X X 
2012 X r= .151, p= .044 x X X 
 
Appendix 29 
Correlations between “A subjective sense of autonomy” and “believing that Homosexuality is justifiable” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 x x x x X 
1995 x x x x X 





2005 x x x x X 
2012 r= .073, p= .023 r= .156, p= .038 x r= .090, p= .093 x 
 
Appendix 30 
Correlations between “A subjective sense of autonomy” and “believing that Sex before Marriage is justifiable” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
2012 r= .078, p= .015 x x r= .097, p= .070 r= .135, p= .070 
 
Appendix 31 
Correlations between “A subjective sense of autonomy” and “Disagreeing that when jobs are scarce men should have more 
right to a job than women” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1995 x x x r= .107, p= .048 x 
2005 x r= .137, p= .033 x r= -.121, p= .023 x 
2012 r= .097, p= .003 x r= .189, p= .004 x r= .142, p= .056 
 
Appendix 32 
Correlations between “A subjective sense of autonomy” and “Disagreeing that when jobs are scarce older people should be 
forced to retire from work early” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1995 r= .065, p= .004 x x r= .134, p= .013 r= .118, p= .048 
 
Appendix 33 
Correlations between “A subjective sense of autonomy” and “Disagreeing that when jobs are scarce employers should give 
priority to Australians over immigrants” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1995 x x X x x 
2005 r= .063, p= .030 x x x x 
2012 x x x x x 
 
Appendix 34 
Correlations between “A subjective sense of autonomy” and “Believing that children do ‘not’ need both a mother and a 
father to grow up happily” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 x x r= .256, p= .009 x x 
1995 r= .059, p= .010 r= .073, p= .062 x x x 
2005 x x x x x 
 
Appendix 35 
Correlations between “A subjective sense of autonomy” and “Not being proud to be Australian” 





 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 r= -.105, p= .021 x r= -.182, p= .045 x x 
1995 r= -.086, p= .000 r= -.174, p= .000 x x x 
2005 r= -.092, p= .002 r= -.217, p= .001 x x x 
2012 r= -.091, p= .005 x r= -.152, p= .022 r= -.116, p= .029 x 
 
Appendix 36 
Correlations between “A subjective sense of autonomy” and “believing that most people ‘cannot’ be trusted” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 r= -.092, p= .039 x x x x 
1995 r= -.082, p= .000 x r= -.079, p= .072 r= -.128, p= .017 x 
2005 r= -.061, p= .035 x r= -.196, p= .000 x x 
2012 r= -.133, p= .000 r= -.167, p= .026 r= -.211, p= .001 r= -.143, p= .007 x 
 
Appendix 37 
Correlations between “A subjective sense of autonomy” and “believing that accepting bribes in the course of one’s duties is 
justifiable” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 x x x x x 
1995 r= -.043, p= .059 x r= -.085, p= .049 x r= -.127, p= .031 
2005 x x r= -.117, p= .028 x x 
2012 x x x x x 
 
Appendix 38 
Correlations between “A subjective sense of autonomy” and “believing that cheating on taxes if you had the chance is 
justifiable”  
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 x r= -.147, p= .032 r= .163, p= .061 x x 
1995 x x x x x 
2005 r= -.083, p= .004 r= -.122, p= .061 x x x 
2012 x x x x x 
 
Appendix 39 
Correlations between “A subjective sense of autonomy” and “believing that avoiding a fare on public transport is justifiable” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 x x x x x 
1995 x x x x x 
2005 r= -.048, p= .100 x r= -.104, p= .052 x x 
2012 x r= -.150, p= .046 x x x 
 
Appendix 40 





Correlations between “A subjective sense of autonomy” and “believing that claiming government benefits to which you are 
not entitled is justifiable” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 x r= -.172, p= .012 x x x 
1995 x x x x x 
2005 x x x x x 
2012 r= -.103, p= .001 r= -.138, p= .066 x r= -.112, p= .036 r= -.171, p= .020 
 
Appendix 41 
Correlations between “A subjective sense of autonomy” and “being uninterested in politics” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1995 x x r= -.078, p= .074 x X 
2005 x x x x X 
2012 x x x x x 
 
Appendix 42 
Correlations between “A subjective sense of autonomy” and “Not believing in the importance of children learning self-
expression” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
2012 r= -.069, p= .031 x x r= -.108, p= .042 x 
 
Appendix 43 
Correlations between “A subjective sense of autonomy” and “Not believing in the importance of children learning good 
manners” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 x x x X r= .333, p= .029 
1995 x x x x x 
 
Appendix 44 
Correlations between “A subjective sense of autonomy” and “Not believing in the importance of children learning thrift” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 x x x x x 
1995 r= .061, p= .007 r= .100, p= .010 x x x 
2005 x x x x x 
2012 x x x r= .095, p= .074 r= -.133, p= .070 
 
Appendix 45 





Correlations between “A subjective sense of autonomy” and “being less involved in charitable organisations” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 x x x x x 
1995 x x x x x 
2005 x x x x x 
2012 r= .081, p= .011 x r= .124, p= .063 x x 
 
Appendix 46 
Correlations between “A subjective sense of autonomy” and “being less involved in professional associations” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 x x x x x 
1995 r= -.050, p= .027 x r= -.123, p= .005 x x 
2005 r= .062, p= .038 x x x x 
2012 x r= .152, p= .044 x x x 
 
Appendix 47 
Correlations between “A subjective sense of autonomy” and “being less involved in environmental organisations” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 x x x x X 
1995 x x x x X 
2005 x x x X r= -.124, p= .098 
2012 r= .116, p= .000 r= .288, p= .000 r= .173, p= .009 x x 
 
Appendix 48 
Correlations between “A subjective sense of autonomy” and “being less involved in art, music and educational 
organisations” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 x x x x x 
1995 r= -.041, p= .069 x r= -.087, p= .046 x x 
2005 x x x x x 
2012 r= .057, p= .075 r= .144, p= .054 x x x 
 
Appendix 49 
Correlations between “A subjective sense of autonomy” and “being less involved in sport/recreational organisations” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1995 x x x x x 
2005 x x x x r= .124, p= .084 
2012 r= .059, p= .068 r= .157, p= .037 r= .151, p= .023 x x 
 
Appendix 50 





Correlations between “A subjective sense of autonomy” and “being less involved in church/religious organisations” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 x x x x x 
1995 x x x x r= .120, p= .042 
2005 r= .066, p= .025 x r= .078, p= .049 r= .113, p= .038 x 
2012 r= .066, p= .041 r= .139, p= .063 x x x 
 
Appendix 51 
Correlations between “A subjective sense of autonomy” and “being less involved in labour unions” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 x x x x x 
1995 r= .044, p= .050 r= .086, p= .025 x x r= .119, p= .045 
2005 r= -.076, p= .011 r= -.162, p= .013 r= -.119, p= .027 x x 
2012 x x x x x 
 
Appendix 52 
Correlations between “A subjective sense of autonomy” and “having less confidence in the UN” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1995 r= -.049, p= .032 x x r= -.127, p= .019 x 
2005 r= -.134, p= .000 r= -.190, p= .003 r= -.088, p= .100 r= -.140, p= .008 r= -.155, p= .027 
2012 r= -.124, p= .000 r= -.158, p= .036 r= -.139, p= .036 r= -.138, p= .010 x 
 
Appendix 53 
Correlations between “A subjective sense of autonomy” and “having less confidence in parliament” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 x x x x x 
1995 x x x x x 
2005 r= -.098, p= .001 r= -.139, p= .032 r= -.099, p= .065 r= -.105, p= .049 x 
2012 r= -.075, p= .021 r= -.182, p= .015 r= -.121, p= .068 x x 
 
Appendix 54 
Correlations between “A subjective sense of autonomy” and “having less confidence in political parties” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1995 r= -.051, p= .025 x x r= -.143, p= .008 x 
2005 r= -.086, p= .003 r= -.147, p= .023 x x x 
2012 r= -.072, p= .026 r= -.131, p= .082 x x x 
 
Appendix 55 
Correlations between “A subjective sense of autonomy” and “having less confidence in the national government” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 





1995 x x x x x 
2005 r= -.133, p= .000 r= -.170, p= .009 r= -.150, p= .005 r= -.126, p= .017 x 
2012 x x x x x 
 
Appendix 56 
Correlations between “A subjective sense of autonomy” and “having less confidence in the police” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 r= -.079, p= .074 x r= -.172, p= .046 r= -.184, p= .098 x 
1995 r= -.097, p= .000 r= -.101, p= .009 r= -.093, p= .033 x x 
2005 r= -.092, p= .002 r= -.210, p= .001 r= -.125, p= .020 x x 
2012 r= -.118, p= .000 r= -.267, p= .000 x r= -.115, p= .032 x 
 
Appendix 57 
Correlations between “A subjective sense of autonomy” and “having less confidence in the press” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 x x x r= -.211, p= .059 x 
1995 x x x x x 
2005 x x x x x 
2012 x r= -.163, p= .030 x x x 
 
Appendix 58 
Correlations between “A subjective sense of autonomy” and “having less confidence in the legal system” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 r= -.130, p= .003 x x r= -.263, p= .017 x 
1995 r= -.047, p= .037 x x x r= -.127, p= .035 
2005 r= -.069, p= .019 r= -.182, p= .005 x x x 
2012 r= -.101, p= .002 r= -.146, p= .052 x r= -.101, p= .042 x 
 
Appendix 59 
Correlations between “A subjective sense of autonomy” and “having less confidence in the armed forces” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 r= -.080, p= .070 x r= -.184, p= .033 x x 
1995 r= -.068, p= .003 r= -.082, p= .037 x r= -.103, p= .057 x 
2005 r= -.080, p= .006 r= -.137, p= .034 x r= -.122, p= .022 x 
2012 r= -.089, p= .006 r= -.144, p= .057 r= -.123, p= .064 r= -.096, p= .074 x 
 
Appendix 60 
Correlations between “A subjective sense of autonomy” and “having less confidence in major companies” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 x x r= -.148, p= .087 x x 





1995 r= -.073, p= .002 x r= -.133, p= .003 x x 
2005 r= -.114, p= .000 x r= -.200, p= .000 r= -.108, p= .042 X 
2012 r= -.130, p= .000 x x r= -.145, p= .007 r= -.148, p= .047 
 
Appendix 61 
Correlations between “A subjective sense of autonomy” and “having less confidence in charitable/humanitarian 
organisations” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
2005 r= -.055, p= .059 x x x r= -.160, p= .022 
2012 r= -.094, p= .003 r= -.136, p= .071 x r= -.091, p= .091 x 
 
Appendix 62 
Correlations between “A subjective sense of autonomy” and “having less confidence in the environmental protection 
movement” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
2005 r= -.061, p= .037 r= -.147, p= .023 x x x 
2012 r= -.088, p= .006 r= -.141, p= .062 x x r= -.142, p= .059 
 
Appendix 63 
Correlations between “A subjective sense of autonomy” and “having less confidence in banks” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
2012 r= -.068, p= .034 r= -.141, p= .061 x r= -.137, p= .011 x 
 
Appendix 64 
Correlations between “A subjective sense of autonomy” and “having less confidence in labour unions” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 x x x x x 
1995 x x x x x 
2005 x x r= .103, p= .054 x x 
2012 x x x x x 
 
Appendix 65 
Correlations between “Income” and “Financial Satisfaction” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 r= .256, p= .000 r= .242, p= .000 r= .348, p= .000 r= .190, p= .080 r= .303, p= .041 
1995 r= .093, p= .000 r= .077, p= .046 r= .075, p= .084 x x 
2005 r= .326, p= .000 r= .453, p= .000 r= .323, p= .000 r= .259, p= .000 r= .325, p= .000 
2012 r= .360, p= .000 r= .499, p= .000 r= .315, p= .000 r= .371, p= .000 r= .280, p= .000 
 
Appendix 66 





Correlations between “Financial Satisfaction” and “A subjective sense of autonomy” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 r= .209, p= .000 r= .210, p= .002 r= .260, p= .002 x r= .396, p= .008 
1995 r= .284, p= .000 r= .257, p= .000 r= .279, p= .000 r= .356, p= .000 r= .226, p= .000 
2005 r= .308, p= .000 r= .318, p= .000 r= .300, p= .000 r= .361, p= .000 r= .191, p= .005 
2012 r= .312, p= .000 r= .168, p= .024 r= .408, p= .000 r= .243, p= .000 r= .349, p= .000 
 
Appendix 67 
Correlations between “Income” and “A subjective sense of autonomy” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 x x x x r= -.312, p= .039 
1995 r= -.046, p= .041 r= -.112, p= .004 x x x 
2005 x x r= .093, p= .079 r= .104, p= .050 x 
2012 x x x x x 
 
Appendix 68 
Correlations between “Financial Satisfaction” and “Not believing that most people can be trusted” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 x r= -.138, p= .048 x x r= -.294, p= .050 
1995 X r= -.079, p= .042 x x x 
2005 r= -.075, p= .009 r= -.122, p= .057 x r= -.118, p= .026 x 
2012 r= -.069, p= .031 x x r= -.109, p= .009 x 
 
Appendix 69 
Correlations between “Income” and “Not believing that most people can be trusted” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 r= -.107, p= .016 x x x x 
1995 r= .040, p= .077 x x x x 
2005 r= -.098, p= .001 x x r= -.160, p= .003 x 
2012 r= -.084, p= .009 x r= -.166, p= .012 x r= -.131, p= .076 
 
Appendix 70 
Correlations between “Financial Satisfaction” and “being less involved in sports/recreational organisations” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1995 r= -.121, p= .000 r= -.111, p= .004 r= -.172, p= .000 r= -.94, p= .078 x 





2005 x x x x x 
2012 x r= -.170, p= .023 x x x 
 
Appendix 71 
Correlations between “Financial Satisfaction” and “being less involved in art, music and educational organisations” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 x x x x x 
1995 r= -.047, p= .038 x x x x 
2005 x x x x x 
2012 x x x x x 
 
Appendix 72 
Correlations between “Financial Satisfaction” and “being less involved in political parties” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 x x x x x 
1995 r= -.051, p= .023 x x r= -.091, p= .088 r= -.099, p= .092 
2005 r= .061, p= .039 x r= .094, p= .082 x x 
2012 x x x x x 
 
Appendix 73 
Correlations between “Financial Satisfaction” and “being less involved in church/religious organisations (when religious 
attendance was not controlled)” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 r= -.064, p= .067 x x x x 
1995 r= -.077, p= .001 x x r= -.153, p= .004 x 
2005 r= .101, p= .001 r= .161, p= .013 x x r= .117, p= .094 
2012 r= .054, p= .094 x x x x 
 
Appendix 74 
Correlations between “Income” and “being less involved in charitable organisations” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 x x x x x 
1995 x x x x x 
2005 r= .072, p= .015 x r= .100, p= .062 x x 





2012 x X x r= .108, p= .043 x 
 
Appendix 75 
Correlations between “Income” and “being less involved in professional associations” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 r= -.111, p= .011 x r= -.169, p= .046 x x 
1995 x x x x x 
2005 r= .153, p= .000 x r= .215, p= .000 r= .158, p= .004 x 
2012 r= .106, p= .001 x x r= .187, p= .000 x 
 
Appendix 76 
Correlations between “Income” and “being less involved in sport/recreational organisations” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1995 x x x r= .139, p= .009 x 
2005 r= .073, p= .014 x r= .207, p= .000 r= .099, p= .065 x 
2012 r= .082, p= .011 x x x r= .164, p= .030 
 
Appendix 77 
Correlations between “Income” and “being less involved in political parties” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 x x x x x 
1995 x x x x x 
2005 r= -.055, p= .067 x r= -.104, p= .054 x x 
2012 x x r= -.113, p= .090 x r= .148, p= .052 
 
Appendix 78 
Correlations between “Income” and “being less involved in church/religious organisations (when religious attendance was 
not controlled)” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 x x x x x 
1995 x x x x x 
2005 r= -.064, p= .028 x r= -.136, p= .011 x x 
2012 r= -.107, p= .001 r= -.131, p= .079 x r= -.081, p= .029 r= -.159, p= .031 
 
Appendix 79 





Correlations between “Income” and “being less involved in church/religious organisations” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 x x x x x 
1995 x x x x x 
2005 x x x x x 
2012 x x x x x 
 
Appendix 80 
Correlations between “Financial Satisfaction” and “having joined in boycotts during the last five years” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
2005 x x X x x 
2012 x x X x x 
 
Appendix 81 
Correlations between “Income” and “having signed petitions during the last five years” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
2005 r= .104, p= .000 x x r= .226, p= .000 x 
2012 x x X x x 
 
Appendix 82 
Correlations between “Financial Satisfaction” and “having signed petitions during the last five years” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
2005 r= -.090, p= .002 x x r= -.088, p= .097 x 
2012 x x X x x 
 
Appendix 83 
Correlations between “Financial Satisfaction” and “having attended peaceful demonstrations during the last five years” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
2005 x x X x x 
2012 x x X x x 
 
Appendix 84 
Correlations between “Financial Satisfaction” and “being uninterested in politics” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 





1995 r= -.043, p= .056 x x r= -.124, p= .020 r= -.100, p= .088 
2005 x x x x X 
2012 x x x r= -.100, p= .061 X 
 
Appendix 85 
Correlations between “Financial Satisfaction” and “Not discussing politics with friends and work colleagues” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 x r= -.150, p= .028 x x x 
1995 r= -.048, p= .034 x r= -.089, p= .039 r= -.108, p= .043 X 
2005 x r= -.118, p= .068 x x X 
2012 x x r= -.180, p= .006 x x 
 
Appendix 86 
Correlations between “Income” and “being uninterested in politics” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1995 r= .038, p= .088 x x r= .128, p= .016 X 
2005 r= -.050, p= .086 x r= -.164, p= .002 x X 
2012 r= -.078, p= .014 r= -.157, p= .032 r= -.170, p= .010 x r= -.157, p= .032 
 
Appendix 87 
Correlations between “Income” and “Not discussing politics with friends and work colleagues” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 r= -.086, p= .049 x x x X 
1995 x x x x x 
2005 r= -.077, p= .008 x x x X 
2012 x x x x x 
 
Appendix 88 
Correlations between “Financial Satisfaction” and “having less confidence in the Press” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 x X x x X 
1995 x X x x r= -.128, p= .031 
2005 r= -.092, p= .001 r= -.119, p= .066 x r= -.103, p= .052 x 
2012 r= -.083, p= .010 X x x r= -.199, p= .007 







Correlations between “Financial Satisfaction” and “having less confidence in major companies” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 x X x x X 
1995 r= -.095, p= .000 X r= -.100, p= .023 x r= -.182, p= .003 
2005 r= -.091, p= .002 r= -.196, p= .002 x x x 
2012 x X x x x 
 
Appendix 90 
Correlations between “Financial Satisfaction” and “having less confidence in charitable/humanitarian organisations” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
2005 x X x x x 
2012 r= -.083, p= .010 r= -.186, p= .013 x x x 
 
Appendix 91 
Correlations between “Financial Satisfaction” and “having less confidence in the environmental movement” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
2005 x x x r= -.093, p= .081 x 
2012 r= -.060, p= .063 r= -.169, p= .024 x x x 
 
Appendix 92 
Correlations between “Financial Satisfaction” and “having less confidence in banks” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
2012 r= -.140, p= .000 r= -.214, p= .004 x r= -.200, p= .000 x 
 
Appendix 93 
Correlations between “Financial Satisfaction” and “having less confidence in the UN” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1995 r= -.039, p= .090 X x x r= -.124, p= .040 
2005 r= -.077, p= .008 r= -.147, p= .022 x r= -.116, p= .029 x 
2012 r= -.082, p= .010 x x x x 
 
Appendix 94 
Correlations between “Financial Satisfaction” and “having less confidence in the civil service” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 r= -.100, p= .022 r= -.236, p= .001 x x x 
1995 r= -.095, p= .000 X r= -.084, p= .055 x r= -.100, p= .092 
2005 r= -.123, p= .000 r= -.178, p= .006 r= -.108, p= .042 r= -.104, p= .050 x 
2012 r= -.105, p= .001 r= -.216, p= .004 x r= -.114, p= .035 x 
 






Correlations between “Financial Satisfaction” and “having less confidence in Parliament” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 x X x x x 
1995 r= -.107, p= .000 x r= -.091, p= .038 r= -.169, p= .002 x 
2005 r= -.079, p= .007 x r= -.109, p= .042 x x 
2012 r= -.089, p= .006 r= -.223, p= .003 x x r= -.146, p= .047 
 
Appendix 96 
Correlations between “Financial Satisfaction” and “having less confidence in political parties” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1995 r= -.080, p= .000 x r= -.085, p= .053 x x 
2005 r= -.101, p= 000 r= -.170, p= .008 x x x 
2012 r= -.076, p= .018 r= -.160, p= .033 x x r= -.138, p= .062 
 
Appendix 97 
Correlations between “Financial Satisfaction” and “having less confidence in the national government” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1995 r= -.098, p= .000 r= -.079, p= .043 r= -.116, p= .008 x r= -.103, p= .081 
2005 r= -.110, p= .000 r= -.128, p= .046 r= -.108, p= .044 r= -.100, p= .058 x 
2012 r= -.111, p= .001 r= -.193, p= .010 x r= -.156, p= .004 r= -.132, p= .074 
 
Appendix 98 
Correlations between “Financial Satisfaction” and “having less confidence in the police” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 r= -.077, p= .077 x x x x 
1995 r= -.080, p= .000 r= -.095, p= .014 x r= -.088, p= .100 r= -.116, p= .050 
2005 r= -.115, p= .000 r= -.155, p= .016 r= -.131, p= .014 r= -.113, p= .033 x 
2012 r= -.119, p= .000 r= -.189, p= .011 x r= -.105, p= .051 r= -.136, p= .065 
 
Appendix 99 
Correlations between “Financial Satisfaction” and “having less confidence in labour unions” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 r= -.094, p= .031 X x x x 
1995 x X x x x 
2005 x X r= -.089, p= .097 x x 
2012 r= -.083, p= .010 X x r= -.114, p= .034 r= -.202, p= .006 
 
Appendix 100 
Correlations between “Financial Satisfaction” and “having less confidence in the legal system” 





 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 x x x r= .199, p= .068 x 
1995 r= -.107, p= .000 x x r= -.137, p= .011 x 
2005 r= -.131, p= .000 r= -.188, p= .003 r= -.137, p= .010 r= -.139, p= .008 x 
2012 r= -.109, p= .001 r= -.163, p= .029 x x r= -.148, p= .046 
 
Appendix 101 
Correlations between “Financial Satisfaction” and “having less confidence in the armed forces” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 x X x r= .207, p= .059 x 
1995 r= -.049, p= .032 X x x x 
2005 r= -.068, p= .019 r= -.123, p= .057 x x x 
2012 r= -.107, p= .001 r= -.179, p= .017 x r= -.104, p= .053 x 
 
Appendix 102 
Correlations between “Financial Satisfaction” and “having less confidence in churches” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 x X x x x 
1995 r= -.041, p= .069 X x x r= -.097, p= .099 
2005 x r= -.140, p= .030 x x r= -.190, p= .006 
2012 r= -.061, p= .059 r= -.128, p= .088 x x x 
 
Appendix 103 
Correlations between “Financial Satisfaction” and “believing that one’s country is run for the benefit of all people, rather 
than for a few big interests” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1995 r= .074, p= .001 X x x r= .132, p= .029 
 
Appendix 104 
Correlations between “Income” and “having less confidence in the United Nations” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1995 r= .046, p= .044 x x x x 
2005 r= .071, p= .015 x x x r= .173, p= .013 
2012 x X x r= -.104, p= .053 x 
 
Appendix 105 
Correlations between “Income” and “having less confidence in the civil service” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 x r= .154, p= .025 x x x 
1995 r= .039, p= .083 X r= .114, p= .009 x x 





2005 x X x x x 
2012 r= .080, p= .013 r= .217, p= .004 x x x 
 
Appendix 106 
Correlations between “Income” and “having less confidence in the police” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 x X x x r= .249, p= .100 
1995 r= .079, p= .000 r= .066, p= .089 r= .091, p= .035 r= .106, p= .047 x 
2005 x X x x x 
2012 x X x x x 
 
Appendix 107 
Correlations between “Income” and “having less confidence in labour unions” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 x X x x x 
1995 r= .048, p= .037 X x x r= .116, p= .057 
2005 r= .081, p= .005 X r= .135, p= .011 r= .111, p= .036 x 
2012 x x x x x 
 
Appendix 108 
Correlations between “Income” and “having less confidence in TV” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1995 x X r= .074, p= .086 x x 
2005 r= .074, p= .011 X x x r= .119, p= .087 
2012 x r= -.131, p= .080 x x x 
 
Appendix 109 
Correlations between “Income” and “having less confidence in the Press” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 x X x x x 
1995 x X r= .092, p= .035 x x 
2005 r= .056, p= .054 X x x r= .154, p= .025 
2012 x X x x x 
 
Appendix 110 
Correlations between “Income” and “having less confidence in churches” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 x X x x x 
1995 r= .049, p= .030 X x r= .098, p= .067 x 
2005 x X x r= -.092, p= .080 x 





2012 x r= .143, p= .057 x x x 
 
Appendix 111 
Correlations between “Income” and “believing that one’s country is run for the benefit of all people, rather than for a few 
big interests” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1995 x X r= -.080, p= .070 x x 
 
Appendix 112 
Correlations between “Income” and “having less confidence in parliament” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 x r= -.157, p= .022 x x x 
1995 x X r= .105, p= .016 x x 
2005 r= -.048, p= .096 X r= -.110, p= .039 x x 
2012 x r= .239, p= .001 x r= -.160, p= .003 x 
 
Appendix 113 
Correlations between “Income” and “having less confidence in major companies” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 x X x x x 
1995 x X x x x 
2005 x X x x x 
2012 r= -.086, p= .007 X r= -.117, p= .078 r= -.192, p= .000 x 
 
Appendix 114 
Correlations between “Income” and “having less confidence in charitable/humanitarian organisations” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
2005 x X r= .091, p= .087 r= -.108, p= .042 x 
2012 r= -.059, p= .066 X x r= -.157, p= .003 x 
 
Appendix 115 
Correlations between “Income” and “having less confidence in banks” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
2012 x X r= -.116, p= .080 x x 
 
Appendix 116 
Correlations between “Income” and “Not being willing to pay higher taxes to help poorer countries” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1995 x X r= .074, p= .088 x X 
2005 x r= .183, p= .005 x x x 
 






Correlations between “Income” and “believing that accepting bribes in the course of one’s duties is justifiable” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 x X x x X 
1995 x X r= .073, p= .091 x X 
2005 r= -.068, p= .020 X r= -.101, p= .058 x X 
2012 r= -.065, p= .043 X x r= -.103, p= .053 X 
 
Appendix 118 
Correlations between “Income” and “believing that buying something you knew was stolen is justifiable” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 x x x x X 
1995 x x x x X 
 
Appendix 119 
Correlations between “Income” and “believing that cheating on taxes if you have a chance is justifiable” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 x r= .113, p= .099 x x X 
1995 x x x x X 
2005 x x x x X 
2012 x r= .218, p= .003 x x X 
 
Appendix 120 
Correlations between “Income” and “believing that avoiding a fare on public transport is justifiable” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 x r= .139, p= .043 x x X 
1995 x x x x X 
2005 x r= -.130, p= .044 x x X 
2012 x x x x X 
 
Appendix 121 
Correlations between “Income” and “believing that claiming government benefits to which you are not entitled is justifiable” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 x x r= -.185, p= .030 x X 
1995 x x x x X 
2005 r= -.060, p= .037 x r= -.145, p= .006 x X 
2012 x x x x X 
 
Appendix 122 
Correlations between “Financial Satisfaction” and “Not being willing to pay higher taxes to help poorer countries” 





 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1995 x x r= -.079, p= .069 x X 
2005 x r= -.191, p= .003 x x X 
 
Appendix 123 
Correlations between “Financial Satisfaction” and “believing that accepting bribes in the course of one’s duties is justifiable” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 x x x x X 
1995 x x x x X 
2005 r= -.053, p= .066 r= -.114, p= .077 x x X 
2012 x x x x X 
 
Appendix 124 
Correlations between “Financial Satisfaction” and “believing that buying something you knew was stolen is justifiable” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 x x x x X 
1995 x r= -.081, p= .037 x x X 
 
Appendix 125 
Correlations between “Financial Satisfaction” and “believing that cheating on taxes if you have a chance is justifiable” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 x r= -.119, p= .083 x x X 
1995 r= -.086, p= .000 r= -.078, p= .042 r= -.114, p= .009 x X 
2005 r= -.087, p= .003 r= -.121, p= .060 x r= -.104, p= .050 X 
2012 r= -.053, p= .095 r= -.229, p= .002 x x X 
 
Appendix 126 
Correlations between “Financial Satisfaction” and “believing that avoiding a fare on public transport is justifiable” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 x x x r= .209, p= .055 X 
1995 x x x r= -.089, p= .097 X 
2005 x x x x X 
2012 r= -.079, p= .014 r= -.226, p= .002 x x X 
 
Appendix 127 
Correlations between “Financial Satisfaction” and “believing that claiming government benefits to which you are not entitled 
is justifiable” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 x x x x X 
1995 r= -.084, p= .000 r= -.168, p= .000 x r= -.137, p= .010 X 





2005 r= -.069, p= .018 x x x X 
2012 r= -.060, p= .060 x x r= -.112, p= .035 X 
 
Appendix 128 
Correlations between “Income” and “Not being proud to be Australian” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 x x x x X 
1995 x x x x X 
2005 x x x x X 
2012 x x r= .146, p= .028 x X 
 
Appendix 129 
Correlations between “Income” and “Unhappiness” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 x x r= -.157, p= .065 x x 
1995 x x x x x 
2005 r= .051, p= .076 x r= .107, p= .045 x x 
2012 x r= -.125, p= .094 x x x 
 
Appendix 130 
Correlations between “Income” and “Life Satisfaction” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 x x x x x 
1995 x x x x x 
2005 x x x x x 
2012 x x x x x 
 
Appendix 131 
Correlations between “Financial Satisfaction” and “Not being proud to be Australian” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 x x x x x 
1995 r= -.076, p= .001 r= -.167, p= .000 x x x 
2005 r= -.091, p= .002 x x r= -.105, p= .047 x 
2012 r= -.077, p= .016 r= -.160, p= .032 r= -.150, p= .023 x x 
 
Appendix 132 
Correlations between “Financial Satisfaction” and “Unhappiness” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 r= -.293, p= .000 r= -.172, p= .012 r= -.328, p= .000 r= -.475, p= .000 r= -.450, p= .002 
1995 r= -.245, p= .000 r= -.185, p= .000 r= -.210, p= .000 r= -.310, p= .000 r= -.222, p= .000 





2005 r= -.359, p= .000 r= -.314, p= .000 r= -.413, p= .000 r= -.364, p= .000 r= -.200, p= .004 
2012 r= -.272, p= .000 r= -.211, p= .004 r= -.320, p= .000 r= -.237, p= .000 r= -.233, p= .001 
 
Appendix 133 
Correlations between “Financial Satisfaction” and “Life Satisfaction” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 r= .351, p= .000 r= .298, p= .000 r= .344, p= .000 r= .498, p= .000 r= .428, p= .003 
1995 r= .470, p= .000 r= .400, p= .000 r= .443, p= .000 r= .576, p= .000 r= .445, p= .000 
2005 r= .422, p= .000 r= .388, p= .000 r= .395, p= .000 r= .455, p= .000 r= .346, p= .000 
2012 r= .515, p= .000 r= .501, p= .000 r= .582, p= .000 r= .512, p= .000 r= .440, p= .000 
 
Appendix 134 
Correlations between “Financial Satisfaction” and “believing that Voluntary Euthanasia is justifiable” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 x x x x x 
1995 r= -.055, p= .017 r= -.091, p= .019 r= -.101, p= .021 x x 
2005 x x x x x 
 
Appendix 135 
Correlations between “Financial Satisfaction” and “believing that Divorce is justifiable” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 x x x x x 
1995 x r= -.066, p= .089 x x x 
2005 r= -.106, p= .000 x r= -.096, p= .072 x r= -.222, p= .001 
2012 x x x x x 
 
Appendix 136 
Correlations between “Financial Satisfaction” and “believing that Abortion is justifiable” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 x x x x x 
1995 x x x x x 
2005 r= -.061, p= .035 r= -.153, p= .018 x x x 
2012 x x x x x 
 
Appendix 137 





Correlations between “Financial Satisfaction” and “believing that Prostitution is justifiable” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 r= -.074, p= .095 x x x x 
1995 r= -.045, p= .049 r= -.066, p= .090 x x x 
2005 r= -.087, p= .003 x x x x 
2012 x x x x x 
 
Appendix 138 
Correlations between “Financial Satisfaction” and “believing that Homosexuality is justifiable” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 x x x x x 
1995 x x x x x 
2005 r= .076, p= .009 x x x r= -.152, p= .031 
2012 x x x x x 
 
Appendix 139 
Correlations between “Financial Satisfaction” and “believing that sex before marriage is justifiable” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
2012 r= -.064, p= .046 x x x x 
 
Appendix 140 
Correlations between “Income” and “believing that Voluntary Euthanasia is justifiable” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 x x x x r= .279, p= .073 
1995 x x x x x 
2005 r= .053, p= .066 x r= .092, p= .085 x x 
 
Appendix 141 
Correlations between “Income” and “believing that Divorce is justifiable” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 x r= .250, p= .000 r= -.181, p= .034 r= -.199, p= .073 x 
1995 x x x x x 
2005 r= .082, p= .005 x r= .142, p= .007 r= .093, p= .079 x 
2012 r= .078, p= .015 r= .152, p= .041 x r= .114, p= .032 x 







Correlations between “Income” and “believing that Abortion is justifiable” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 r= .084, p= .055 r= .171, p= .013 x x x 
1995 x x r= .074, p= .091 x x 
2005 r= .088, p= .002 r= .126, p= .052 r= .095, p= .073 r= .119, p= .025 x 
2012 r= .103, p= .001 r= .168, p= .024 x r= .131, p= .014 r= .127, p= .085 
 
Appendix 143 
Correlations between “Income” and “believing that Prostitution is justifiable” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 r= .084, p= .058 r= .143, p= .038 x x x 
1995 x x x x x 
2005 r= .090, p= .002 x x r= .138, p= .009 x 
2012 r= .065, p= .044 x x r= .144, p= .007 x 
 
Appendix 144 
Correlations between “Income” and “believing that Homosexuality is justifiable” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 r= .085, p= .055 r= .159, p= .022 x x x 
1995 x x x x x 
2005 r= .134, p= .000 x r= .149, p= .005 r= .181, p= .001 x 
2012 r= .079, p= .015 r= .166, p= .026 x r= .100, p= .061 x 
 
Appendix 145 
Correlations between “Income” and “believing that sex before marriage is justifiable” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
2012 = .056, p= .081 x x x x 
 
Appendix 146 
Correlations between “Income” and “Not believing in the importance of children learning obedience” 





 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 r= .081, p= .065 x r= .140, p= .098 x x 
1995 x x x x x 
2005 r= .109, p= .000 x x r= .118, p= .025 r= .130, p= .057 
2012 x x x x x 
 
Appendix 147 
Correlations between “Income” and “Not believing in the importance of children learning religious faith” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 x x x x x 
1995 x x x x x 
2005 r= .088, p= .002 r= .210, p= .001 r= .197, p= .000 x x 
2012 x r= .176, p= .018 r= -.193, p= .003 x x 
 
Appendix 148 
Correlations between “Financial Satisfaction” and “Not believing in the importance of children learning religious faith” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 r= -.112, p= .010 r= -.151, p= .027 r= -.168, p= .047 x x 
1995 x x x x x 
2005 x x x x x 
2012 x x x x x 
 
Appendix 149 
Correlations between “Financial Satisfaction” and “Not believing in the importance of children learning feelings of 
responsibility” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 x x x x x 
1995 x x x x x 
2005 x x x r= -.095, p= .072 x 
2012 x x x x x 
 
Appendix 150 
Correlations between “Financial Satisfaction” and “Not believing in the importance of children learning imagination” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 x x x x x 
1995 x x x x x 
2005 x r= .108, p= .094 x x x 
2012 x x r= .130, p= .050 x x 
 






Correlations between “Financial Satisfaction” and “Not believing in the importance of children learning self-expression” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
2012 r= .063, p= .049 x x r= .104, p= .050 x 
 
Appendix 152 
Correlations between “Financial Satisfaction” and “Not believing in the importance of children learning obedience” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 x r= .118, p= .085 x x x 
1995 x x x x x 
2005 x x x x x 
2012 r= -.054, p= .094 x x x r= -.144, p= .050 
 
Appendix 153 
Correlations between “Financial Satisfaction” and “Not believing in the importance of children learning tolerance and 
respect for other” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 x x x x x 
1995 x x x x x 
2005 r= -.058, p= .044 x x x x 
2012 r= .075, p= .019 x x r= .125, p= .019 x 
 
Appendix 154 
Correlations between “Financial Satisfaction” and “Disagreeing that when jobs are scarce employers should give priority to 
Australians over immigrants” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1995 r= .052, p= .022 x x x x 
2005 x r= .126, p= .051 x x x 
2012 x x x x x 
 
Appendix 155 
Correlations between “Income” and “Disagreeing that when jobs are scarce employers should give priority to Australians 
over immigrants” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1995 x x x r= -.089, p= .100 x 
2005 x x x x x 
2012 x x x x x 
 
Appendix 156 





Correlations between “Not being Married” and “being less involved in labour unions” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 x x x x X 
1995 x x r= -.106, p= .015 x x 
2005 x x r= .168, p= .002 x x 
2012 x x x x x 
 
Appendix 157 
Correlations between “Not being Married” and “being less involved in sport/recreational organisations” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1995 x x x x x 
2005 x x x r= .121, p= .024 x 
2012 x x x x x 
 
Appendix 158 
Correlations between “Not being Married” and “being less involved in consumer organisations” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
2005 x x x x x 
2012 x x x x x 
 
Appendix 159 
Correlations between “Not being Married” and “believing that most people ‘cannot’ be trusted” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 x r= -.127, p= .069 x r= -.195, p= .077 x 
1995 x x x x x 
2005 x x x x x 
2012 x x x x x 
 
Appendix 160 
Correlations between “Not being Married” and “being uninterested in politics” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1995 x x x x x 
2005 x x x x r= .156, p= .024 
2012 x x x x x 







Correlations between “Not being Married” and “Not discussing politics with friends and work colleagues” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 x x x x x 
1995 r= .044, p= .049 x x x x 
2005 x x r= -.131, p= .014 x x 
2012 x x x x x 
 
Appendix 162 
Correlations between “Not being Married” and “having joined in boycotts during the last five years” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
2005 x x x x x 
2012 x x x x x 
 
Appendix 163 
Correlations between “Not being Married” and “having signed petitions during the last five years” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
2005 x x x x x 
2012 x x x x x 
 
Appendix 164 
Correlations between “Not being Married” and “having attended peaceful demonstrations during the last five years” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
2005 x r= .152, p= .018 x x x 
2012 x x x r= .195, p= .050 r= -.399, p= .021 
 
Appendix 165 
Correlations between “Not being Married” and “having less confidence in the civil service” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 x x x x x 
1995 x x r= .082, p= .061 x x 





2005 x x x x x 
2012 r= -.070, p= .030 x x x x 
 
Appendix 166 
Correlations between “Not being Married” and “having less confidence in parliament” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 x x x x x 
1995 x x x x x 
2005 x x x x x 
2012 x x x x x 
 
Appendix 167 
Correlations between “Not being Married” and “having less confidence in political parties” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1995 x x x x x 
2005 x x x x x 
2012 x x x x x 
 
Appendix 168 
Correlations between “Not being Married” and “having less confidence in the national government” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1995 x x x x x 
2005 x x x x x 
2012 r= -.088, p= .006 x x r= -.145, p= .007 x 
 
Appendix 169 
Correlations between “Not being Married” and “having less confidence in TV” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1995 x x x x x 
2005 x x x x x 
2012 r= -.072, p= .025 x x x x 
 
Appendix 170 





Correlations between “Not being Married” and “having less confidence in the press” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 x x r= .150, p= .079 x x 
1995 r= -.042, p= .061 x x x r= -.134, p= .024 
2005 x x x x x 
2012 x x x x x 
 
Appendix 171 
Correlations between “Not being Married” and “having less confidence in the armed forces” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 r= -.107, p= .014 x x x r= -.287, p= .059 
1995 x x x x x 
2005 r= .069, p= .018 x x x x 
2012 x x x x x 
 
Appendix 172 
Correlations between “Not being Married” and “having less confidence in charitable/humanitarian organisations” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
2005 x x r= .167, p= .002 x x 
2012 x x x x r= .128, p= .083 
 
Appendix 173 
Correlations between “Not being Married” and “having less confidence in the environmental protection movement” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
2005 x x r= .104, p= .051 x r= -.126, p= .069 
2012 x x x r= -.104, p= .053 x 
 
Appendix 174 
Correlations between “Not being Married” and “having less confidence in Banks” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
2012 r= -.060, p= .063 x x x x 
 
Appendix 175 





Correlations between “Not being Married” and “being less involved in environmental organisations” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 r= .090, p= .039 x r= -.143, p= .091 x x 
1995 x x x x x 
2005 x x x x x 
2012 x x x r= .127, p= .017 r= .138, p= .068 
 
Appendix 176 
Correlations between “Not being Married” and “being less involved in political parties” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 x x x x x 
1995 x x x x x 
2005 r= .054, p= .068 x x r= .136, p= .013 x 
2012 x x x x x 
 
Appendix 177 
Correlations between “Not being Married” and “having less confidence in the police” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 x x r= .162, p= .057 x x 
1995 x x r= .107, p= .013 x x 
2005 x x x x x 
2012 x x x x x 
 
Appendix 178 
Correlations between “Not being Married” and “having less confidence in churches” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 x x x x x 
1995 x x x x x 
2005 x x x x x 
2012 x r= .192, p= .010 x x x 
 
Appendix 179 
Correlations between “Not being Married” and “having less confidence in major companies” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 





1981 x x x x x 
1995 x x x x x 
2005 r= .065, p= .026 x r= .132, p= .013 x x 
2012 x x x x x 
 
Appendix 180 
Correlations between “Not being Married” and “believing that accepting bribes in the course of one’s duties is justifiable” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 x x x x x 
1995 r= .049, p= .031 x x x x 
2005 x x x x r= .151, p= .028 
2012 x x r= .113, p= .090 r= -.098, p= .064 x 
 
Appendix 181 
Correlations between “Not being Married” and “believing that buying something you knew was stolen is justifiable” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 x x x x x 
1995 r= .091, p= .000 x x x x 
 
Appendix 182 
Correlations between “Not being Married” and “believing that cheating on taxes if you had the chance is justifiable” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 x x x x x 
1995 r= .049, p= .030 x x x x 
2005 x x x x x 
2012 x x r= .110, p= .096 r= -.130, p= .014 r= .155, p= .035 
 
Appendix 183 
Correlations between “Not being Married” and “believing that avoiding a fare on public transport is justifiable” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 r= .085, p= .054 x x x x 
1995 r= .085, p= .000 x x x x 
2005 x x x x x 
2012 r= .085, p= .008 x x x r= .135, p= .066 







Correlations between “Not being Married” and “believing that claiming government benefits to which you are not 
entitled is justifiable” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 r= .124, p= .004 r= .117, p= .087 x x x 
1995 r= .080, p= .000 x r= .083, p= .056 x x 
2005 x x x r= .100, p= .060 x 
2012 r= .108, p= .001 r= .166, p= .026 x x x 
 
Appendix 185 
Correlations between “Not being Married” and “believing that stealing property is justifiable” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
2012 x x x x r= .157, p= .034 
 
Appendix 186 
Correlations between “Not being Married” and “being less involved in church/religious organisations when religious 
service attendance is not a control variable” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 x x x x x 
1995 r= -.043, p= .056 x x x x 
2005 x x r= -.152, p= .004 x r= .138, p= .047 
2012 x x x x x 
 
Appendix 187 
Correlations between “Not being Married” and “having less confidence in the legal system” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 x x x x x 
1995 x x x x x 
2005 x x x x x 
2012 x x r= -.128, p= .054 r= -.114, p= .034 r= .132, p= .076 
 
Appendix 188 





Correlations between “Not being Married” and “Not being willing to pay higher taxes to help poorer countries” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1995 x r= -.113, p= .004 x x x 
2005 r= -.059, p= .045 x x x x 
 
Appendix 189 
Correlations between “Not being Married” and “believing that one’s country is run for the benefit of all people, rather 
than for a few big interests” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1995 x x x x x 
 
Appendix 190 
Correlations between “Not being Married” and “being less involved in charitable organisations” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 x x x x x 
1995 x x x x x 
2005 r= .059, p= .046 x x x x 
2012 r= .100, p= .002 x x x r= .151, p= .044 
 
Appendix 191 
Correlations between “Not being Married” and “being less involved in art, music and educational organisations” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 x r= -.113, p= .100 x x x 
1995 x x x x x 
2005 r= .049, p= .097 x x x r= .171, p= .021 
2012 r= .065, p= .043 x x x x 
 
Appendix 192 
Correlations between “Not being Married” and “being less involved in professional associations” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 x x x r= -.276, p= .011 x 
1995 r= .062, p= .006 x x x x 
2005 x x x x x 
2012 x x x x x 







Correlations between “Having more children” and “believing that most people ‘cannot’ be trusted” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 x x x x x 
1995 x x x x x 
2005 x x x x x 
2012 x x x x x 
 
Appendix 194 
Correlations between “Having more children” and “Not discussing politics with friends and work colleagues” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 x x x x x 
1995 x x x x x 
2005 x x r= -.092, p= .088 x x 
2012 x x x x x 
 
Appendix 195 
Correlations between “Having more children” and “believing that one’s country is run for the benefit of all people, rather 
than for a few big interests” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1995 x x x x x 
 
Appendix 196 
Correlations between “Having more children” and “Not being willing to pay higher taxes to help poorer countries” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1995 x r= -.072, p= .063 x x x 
2005 x x x r= .110, p= .038 x 
 
Appendix 197 
Correlations between “Having more children” and “having signed petitions during the last five years” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 





2005 r= .058, p= .044 x x x x 
2012 x x x x x 
 
Appendix 198 
Correlations between “Having more children” and “believing that accepting bribes in the course of one’s duties is 
justifiable” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 x r= -.115, p= .094 x x x 
1995 r= -.052, p= .021 r= -.087, p= .024 r= -.078, p= .073 x x 
2005 x x x r= -.091, p= .087 x 
2012 r= -.053, p= .100 x r= -.139, p= .036 x x 
 
Appendix 199 
Correlations between “Having more children” and “believing that buying something you knew was stolen is justifiable” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 x x x x x 
1995 x x r= -.083, p= .055 r= -.089, p= .097 x 
 
Appendix 200 
Correlations between “Having more children” and “believing that cheating on taxes if you have the chance is justifiable” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 r= -.083, p= .059 x x x x 
1995 x x x x x 
2005 x x x x x 
2012 x x x x x 
 
Appendix 201 
Correlations between “Having more children” and “believing that avoiding a fare on public transport is justifiable” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 r= -.073, p= .095 x x x x 
1995 r= -.050, p= .027 x r= -.112, p= .010 x x 
2005 x x x x x 
2012 x x x x x 
 






Correlations between “Having more children” and “believing that claiming government benefits to which you are not 
entitled is justifiable” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 x x x x x 
1995 r= -.043, p= .059 x x x x 
2005 x x x x x 
2012 x x x r= -.107, p= .044 x 
 
Appendix 203 
Correlations between “Having more children” and “believing that stealing property is justifiable” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
2012 x x r= -.115, p= .083 x x 
 
Appendix 204 
Correlations between “Having more children” and “having less confidence in the police” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 x x r= .173, p= .042 x x 
1995 x x x x x 
2005 x r= -.122, p= .058 r= -.092, p= .083 x x 
2012 r= -.060, p= .062 x r= -.200, p= .002 r= -.108, p= .044 x 
 
Appendix 205 
Correlations between “Having more children” and “having less confidence in TV” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1995 x x x x x 
2005 r= -.052, p= .071 r= -.136, p= .035 x x x 
2012 x x r= -.114, p= .086 x x 
 
Appendix 206 
Correlations between “Having more children” and “having less confidence in the legal system” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 x r= -.161, p= .019 r= .231, p= .006 x x 





1995 x x x x x 
2005 x x x x x 
2012 r= -.061, p= .059 x r= -.201, p= .002 x x 
 
Appendix 207 
Correlations between “Having more children” and “having less confidence in the armed forces” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 x r= -.149, p= .030 x x x 
1995 x x x x x 
2005 x r= -.122, p= .058 x x x 
2012 r= -.101, p= .002 x r= -.179, p= .007 r= -.093, p= .083 x 
 
Appendix 208 
Correlations between “Having more children” and “having less confidence in churches” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 r= -.154, p= .000 r= -.169, p= .013 r= -.193, p= .023 x x 
1995 x x x x r= -.117, p= .048 
2005 x x x x x 
2012 x x x x x 
 
Appendix 209 
Correlations between “Having more children” and “having joined in boycotts during the last five years” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
2005 r= -.053, p= .070 x x x x 
2012 x x x x x 
 
Appendix 210 
Correlations between “Having more children” and “being uninterested in politics” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1995 x r= .069, p= .072 x x x 
2005 r= .067, p= .021 x x r= .116, p= .028 x 
2012 x x x x r= .136, p= .064 
 






Correlations between “Having more children” and “having attended peaceful demonstrations during the last five years” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
2005 r= -.051, p= .079 x x x x 
2012 r= .118, p= .079 x x r= .273, p= .005 x 
 
Appendix 212 
Correlations between “Having more children” and “being less involved in environmental organisations” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 x x x x x 
1995 r= .038, p= .095 r= .101, p= .009 x x x 
2005 x x x r= -.120, p= .029 r= .124, p= .093 
2012 x x r= -.139, p= .037 x x 
 
Appendix 213 
Correlations between “Having more children” and “being less involved in political parties” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 x x x x x 
1995 x x x x x 
2005 x x r= -.109, p= .043 x x 
2012 x x x x x 
 
Appendix 214 
Correlations between “Having more children” and “being less involved in sport/recreational organisations” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1995 r= -.046, p= .043 x r= -.112, p= .010 x x 
2005 r= .063, p= .033 x r= .095, p= .078 r= .106, p= .049 x 
2012 x x x r= .090, p= .090 x 
 
Appendix 215 
Correlations between “Having more children” and “being less involved in church/religious organisations” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 r= -.094, p= .032 x x r= -.253, p= .019 x 





1995 r= -.042, p= .063 x x x x 
2005 x x x r= .107, p= .046 x 
2012 r= .057, p= .077 x x x x 
 
Appendix 216 
Correlations between “Having more children” and “being less involved in church/religious organisations when religious 
service attendance is not a control variable” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 r= -.116, p= .001 x x r= -.204, p= .020 x 
1995 r= -.097, p= .000 x r= -.163, p= .000 r= -.090, p= .092 r= -.111, p= .058 
2005 r= .102, p= .000 x x r= .150, p= .005 x 
2012 r= .136, p= .000 r= .192, p= .009 x r= .127, p= .017 r= .126, p= .088 
 
Appendix 217 
Correlations between “watching more TV” and “being uninterested in politics” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1995 x x x x x 
 
Appendix 218 
Correlations between “watching more TV” and “believing that accepting bribes in the course of one’s duties is justifiable” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1995 x x x x x 
 
Appendix 219 
Correlations between “watching more TV” and “believing that buying something you knew was stolen is justifiable” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1995 x x x x x 
 
Appendix 220 
Correlations between “watching more TV” and “believing that cheating on taxes if you have a chance is justifiable” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1995 x x x x r= .116, p= .050 







Correlations between “watching more TV” and “believing that avoiding a fare on public transport is justifiable” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1995 x x x x x 
 
Appendix 222 
Correlations between “watching more TV” and “believing that claiming government benefits to which you are not 
entitled is justifiable” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1995 x x x x r= -.114, p= .053 
 
Appendix 223 
Correlations between “watching more TV” and “being less involved in charitable organisations” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1995 x r= .075, p= .051 x x x 
 
Appendix 224 
Correlations between “watching more TV” and “being less involved in art, music and educational organisations” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1995 x x x x x 
 
Appendix 225 
Correlations between “watching more TV” and “being less involved in sport/recreational organisations” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1995 x r= .077, p= .047 x x x 
 
Appendix 226 
Correlations between “watching more TV” and “being less involved in labour unions” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1995 x r= .077, p= .047 x x x 







Correlations between “watching more TV” and “having less confidence in the UN” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1995 x x x x x 
 
Appendix 228 
Correlations between “watching more TV” and “having less confidence in the civil service” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1995 x x x x x 
 
Appendix 229 
Correlations between “watching more TV” and “having less confidence in parliament” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1995 x r= .081, p= .037 x x x 
 
Appendix 230 
Correlations between “watching more TV” and “having less confidence in political parties” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1995 x x x x x 
 
Appendix 231 
Correlations between “watching more TV” and “having less confidence in labour unions” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1995 x x x x x 
 
Appendix 232 
Correlations between “watching more TV” and “having less confidence in the press” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1995 x x r= -.073, p= .093 x x 
 






Correlations between “watching more TV” and “having less confidence in the legal system” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1995 x x r= -.075, p= .087 x x 
 
Appendix 234 
Correlations between “watching more TV” and “having less confidence in the Armed Forces” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1995 x x x x x 
 
Appendix 235 
Correlations between “watching more TV” and “having less confidence in churches” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1995 x x x x x 
 
Appendix 236 
Correlations between “watching more TV” and “having less confidence in major companies” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1995 x x x x x 
 
Appendix 237 
Correlations between “watching more TV” and “believing that the country is run for the benefit of all the people rather 
than by a few big interests looking out for themselves” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1995 x x x x r= .174, p= .004 
 
Appendix 238 
Correlations between “watching more TV” and “Not being willing to pay higher taxes to help poorer countries” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1995 r= .079, p= .001 x x r= .148, p= .006 x 
 






Correlations between “watching more TV” and “Not discussing politics with friends and work colleagues” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1995 r= .071, p= .002 r= .081, p= .035 x x r= .165, p= .005 
 
Appendix 240 
Correlations between “watching more TV” and “being less involved in professional associations” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1995 r= .077, p= .001 x r= .080, p= .066 r= .139, p= .009 x 
 
Appendix 241 
Correlations between “watching more TV” and “being less involved in political parties” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1995 r= .047, p= .036 x x x x 
 
Appendix 242 
Correlations between “watching more TV” and “being less involved in environmental organisations” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1995 r= .051, p= .024 r= .112, p= .004 x x x 
 
Appendix 243 
Correlations between “watching more TV” and “being less involved in religious organisations when church/religious 
attendance is not a control variable” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1995 r= .103, p= .000 r= .138, p= .000 x x r= .126, p= .032 
 
Appendix 244 
Correlations between “watching more TV” and “having less confidence in the national government” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1995 x x x x x 
 






Correlations between “watching more TV” and “having less confidence in the police” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1995 r= -.061, p= .006 x x x r= -.105, p= .076 
 
Appendix 246 
Correlations between “watching more TV” and “having less confidence in TV” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1995 r= -.165, p= .000 r= -.212, p= .000 r= -.162, p= .000 r= -.128, p= .017 r= -.117, p= .048 
 
Appendix 247 
Correlations between “attending religious services less frequently” and “believing that most people ‘cannot’ be trusted” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 r= -.110, p= .013 x r= -.191, p= .026 x r= -.356, p= .016 
1995 x x x x x 
2005 x x x x r= .142, p= .039 
2012 r= -.077, p= .016 x r= -.212, p= .001 r= -.115, p= .031 x 
 
Appendix 248 
Correlations between “attending religious services less frequently” and “being less involved in charitable organisations” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 r= -.121, p= .006 x r= -.239, p= .004 x x 
1995 r= .185, p= .000 r= .189, p= .000 r= .173, p= .000 r= .215, p= .000 r= .151, p= .010 
2005 r= -.161, p= .000 r= -.110, p= .092 r= -.107, p= .045 x r= -.390, p= .000 
2012 r= -.163, p= .000 r= -.188, p= .012 x r= -.121, p= .023 r= -.286, p= .000 
 
Appendix 249 
Correlations between “attending religious services less frequently” and “being less involved in professional associations” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 x x x x x 
1995 r= .060, p= .007 r= .077, p= .046 x x x 
2005 r= -.076, p= .010 r= -.150, p= .021 x r= -.093, p= .088 x 
2012 x x x x x 







Correlations between “attending religious services less frequently” and “being less involved in environmental 
orgainsations” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 x x x r= .189, p= .084 x 
1995 x x x x x 
2005 x x x x x 
2012 x x x r= .089, p= .093 x 
 
Appendix 251 
Correlations between “attending religious services less frequently” and “being less involved in political parties” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 x x x x x 
1995 x x x x r= .107, p= .068 
2005 r= -.049, p= .098 x x x r= -.144, p= .049 
2012 r= -.062, p= .055 x x x r= -.219, p= .004 
 
Appendix 252 
Correlations between “attending religious services less frequently” and “being less involved in labour unions” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 x x x x x 
1995 x x x x x 
2005 x x x x x 
2012 x x x x r= -.136, p= .076 
 
Appendix 253 
Correlations between “attending religious services less frequently” and “being less involved in art, music and educational 
organisations” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 x x x x x 
1995 r= .111, p= .000 r= .096, p= .012 r= .096, p= .027 r= .114, p= .033 r= .117, p= .047 
2005 r= -.079, p= .008 x x x r= -.265, p= .000 
2012 x x x x r= -.194, p= .011 







Correlations between “attending religious services less frequently” and “being less involved in sport/recreational 
organisations” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1995 x x x x x 
2005 x x x x x 
2012 x x x r= .092, p= .082 x 
 
Appendix 255 
Correlations between “attending religious services less frequently” and “Not discussing politics with friends and work 
colleagues” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 x x x x x 
1995 x x x x x 
2005 x x r= -.148, p= .006 x x 
2012 x x x x x 
 
Appendix 256 
Correlations between “attending religious services less frequently” and “being uninterested in politics” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1995 x r= .087, p= .024 x x x 
2005 x x x x x 
2012 x r= .136, p= .070 x x x 
 
Appendix 257 
Correlations between “attending religious services less frequently” and “having attended peaceful demonstrations during 
the last five years” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
2005 x x r= .088, p= .099 x x 
2012 x x x x x 
 
Appendix 258 





Correlations between “attending religious services less frequently” and “having joined in boycotts during the last five 
years” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
2005 x x r= .089, p= .095 x x 
2012 r= -.186, p= .017 x x r= -.328, p= .007 x 
 
Appendix 259 
Correlations between “attending religious services less frequently” and “having signed petitions during the last five years” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
2005 x x x x r= -.138, p= .044 
2012 x x x x x 
 
Appendix 260 
Correlations between “attending religious services less frequently” and “believing that accepting bribes in the course of 
one’s duties is justifiable” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 r= -.119, p= .007 x r= -.225, p= .008 r= -.202, p= .066 x 
1995 x x x x x 
2005 x x r= .092, p= .084 x x 
2012 x x x x x 
 
Appendix 261 
Correlations between “attending religious services less frequently” and “believing that buying something you knew was 
stolen is justifiable” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 r= -.171, p= .000 r= -.139, p= .042 r= -.272, p= .001 x r= -.259, p= .090 
1995 r= .074, p= .001 r= .105, p= .006 x r= .089, p= .096 x 
 
Appendix 262 
Correlations between “attending religious services less frequently” and “believing that cheating on taxes if you had a 
chance is justifiable” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 r= -.149, p= .001 r= -.154, p= .025 r= -.220, p= .010 x x 
1995 r= .124, p= .000 r= .140, p= .000 r= .154, p= .000 r= .138, p= .010 x 





2005 r= .092, p= .002 x r= .150, p= .005 x x 
2012 r= .132, p= .000 x r= .135, p= .042 r= .155, p= .004 r= .124, p= .092 
 
Appendix 263 
Correlations between “attending religious services less frequently” and “believing that avoiding a fare on public transport 
is justifiable” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 r= -.200, p= .000 r= -.203, p= .003 r= -.170, p= .047 r= -.198, p= .069 x 
1995 r= .056, p= .012 r= .118, p= .002 x x x 
2005 r= .082, p= .005 x r= .193, p= .000 x x 
2012 r= .087, p= .006 x r= .131, p= .048 r= .127, p= .016 x 
 
Appendix 264 
Correlations between “attending religious services less frequently” and “believing that claiming government benefits to 
which you are not entitled is justifiable” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 r= -.085, p= .053 x x x x 
1995 x r= .074, p= .055 x x x 
2005 x x r= .102, p= .054 x x 
2012 x x x x x 
 
Appendix 265 
Correlations between “attending religious services less frequently” and “believing that stealing property is justifiable” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
2012 r= .055, p= .087 x x r= .094, p= .078 x 
 
Appendix 266 
Correlations between “attending religious services less frequently” and “having less confidence in the UN” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1995 x x x r= .089, p= .099 x 
2005 x x x x x 
2012 x x x x x 
 






Correlations between “attending religious services less frequently” and “having less confidence in the civil service” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 x r= -.191, p= .005 x x x 
1995 r= .054, p= .017 x x r= .106, p= .050 x 
2005 r= .098, p= .001 x r= .179, p= .001 x x 
2012 x x x x x 
 
Appendix 268 
Correlations between “attending religious services less frequently” and “having less confidence in parliament” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 x x x x x 
1995 r= .071, p= .002 r= .139, p= .000 x x x 
2005 r= .100, p= .001 r= .149, p= .021 r= .144, p= .007 r= .100, p= .058 x 
2012 x r= .134, p= .074 x x x 
 
Appendix 269 
Correlations between “attending religious services less frequently” and “having less confidence in labour unions” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 x x x x x 
1995 x x x x r= -.147, p= .016 
2005 x x x x r= .156, p= .025 
2012 x x x x x 
 
Appendix 270 
Correlations between “attending religious services less frequently” and “having less confidence in the press” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 x x x x x 
1995 x x x x x 
2005 x x x x x 
2012 x x r= -.117, p= .078 r= -.093, p= .082 x 
 
Appendix 271 





Correlations between “attending religious services less frequently” and “having less confidence in the legal system” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 x x x x x 
1995 r= .051, p= .025 x x x x 
2005 x x r= .131, p= .014 x x 
2012 x x x x x 
 
Appendix 272 
Correlations between “attending religious services less frequently” and “having less confidence in the Armed forces” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 x x x x x 
1995 x x x x x 
2005 r= .058, p= .044 x r= .134, p= .012 x x 
2012 x x x x x 
 
Appendix 273 
Correlations between “attending religious services less frequently” and “having less confidence in the environmental 
protection movement” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
2005 x r= -.205, p= .001 x x r= .122, p= .079 
2012 r= -.061, p= .058 x r= -.146, p= .027 x x 
 
Appendix 274 
Correlations between “attending religious services less frequently” and “believing that one’s country is run for the benefit 
of all people, rather than for a few big interests” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1995 x x x x x 
 
Appendix 275 
Correlations between “attending religious services less frequently” and “Not being willing to pay higher taxes to help 
poorer countries” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1995 r= .106, p= .000 r= .067, p= .084 r= .105, p= .016 x r= .265, p= .000 
2005 r= .107, p= .000 x x r= .161, p= .002 r= .180, p= .010 







Correlations between “attending religious services less frequently” and “having less confidence in political parties” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1995 r= .062, p= .006 r= .114, p= .003 x x x 
2005 r= .089, p= .002 x r= .093, p= .082 r= .155, p= .003 x 
2012 r= .055, p= .088 x x x x 
 
Appendix 277 
Correlations between “attending religious services less frequently” and “having less confidence in the national 
government” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1995 r= .057, p= .012 r= .094, p= .016 x x x 
2005 r= .110, p= .000 x r= .167, p= .002 r= .140, p= .008 x 
2012 r= .062, p= .055 x x x r= .124, p= .093 
 
Appendix 278 
Correlations between “attending religious services less frequently” and “having less confidence in the police” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 x x x x x 
1995 r= .050, p= .028 x r= .090, p= .037 r= .107, p= .045 x 
2005 r= .063, p= .030 x r= .145, p= .007 x x 
2012 x x x x x 
 
Appendix 279 
Correlations between “attending religious services less frequently” and “having less confidence in major companies” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 x x x x x 
1995 r= .046, p= .043 x x x x 
2005 r= .050, p= .085 x r= .103, p= .054 x x 
2012 x x r= .142, p= .031 x x 
 
Appendix 280 





Correlations between “attending religious services less frequently” and “having less confidence in 
humanitarian/charitable organisations” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
2005 r= .091, p= .002 x x r= .147, p= .005 r= .176, p= .011 
2012 x x x x x 
 
Appendix 281 
Correlations between “attending religious services less frequently” and “watching more TV” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1995 r= .121, p= .000 r= .151, p= .000 r= .105, p= .016 x r= .139, p= .017 
 
Appendix 282 
Correlations between “Town/City Size” and “being uninterested in politics” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1995 r= -.038, p= .095 r= -.065, p= .090 x x x 
2005 r= -.073, p= .011 r= -.172, p= .007 x x x 
2012 r= -.061, p= .059 r= -.133, p= .075 x x x 
 
Appendix 283 
Correlations between “Town/City Size” and “having less confidence in parliament” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1995 r= -.067, p= .003 x x x x 
2005 x x x x x 
2012 x x x x x 
 
Appendix 284 
Correlations between “Town/City Size” and “having less confidence in the civil service” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1995 r= -.042, p= .063 x x x x 
2005 x x x x x 
2012 r= -.053, p= .099 x x x x 
 
Appendix 285 





Correlations between “Town/City Size” and “having less confidence in political parties” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1995 r= -.058, p= .011 r= -.069, p= .075 x x r= -.123, p= .040 
2005 x x x x x 
2012 x x x x x 
 
Appendix 286 
Correlations between “Town/City Size” and “having less confidence in the legal system” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1995 x x x x x 
2005 x x x x x 
2012 r= -.070, p= .030 x x x x 
 
Appendix 287 
Correlations between “Town/City Size” and “believing that most people cannot be trusted” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1995 x x x x x 
2005 r= .049, p= .091 x r= .102, p= .055 x x 
2012 x x x x x 
 
Appendix 288 
Correlations between “Town/City Size” and “being less involved in charitable organisations” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1995 x x x x x 
2005 x x x x x 
2012 x x x r= -.106, p= .047 x 
 
Appendix 289 
Correlations between “Town/City Size” and “being less involved in environmental organisations” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1995 x x x r= .153, p= .004 x 
2005 r= -.065, p= .029 x x r= -.106, p= .053 x 
2012 x x r= -.113, p= .088 x x 
 






Correlations between “Town/City Size” and “being less involved in art, music and educational organisations” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1995 x x x x x 
2005 x x x x x 
2012 x x x x x 
 
Appendix 291 
Correlations between “Town/City Size” and “being less involved in sport/recreational organisations” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1995 x x x r= .091, p= .090 x 
2005 x x x x x 
2012 x x x x x 
 
Appendix 292 
Correlations between “Town/City Size” and “being less involved in consumer organisations” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
2005 x x r= -.098, p= .070 x x 
2012 x x x x r= -.184, p= .016 
 
Appendix 293 
Correlations between “Town/City Size” and “being less involved in religious organisations” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1995 r= .055, p= .014 x r= .086, p= .046 x r= .160, p= .006 
2005 x x x r= -.124, p= .022 x 
2012 x x x x r= -.124, p= .095 
 
Appendix 294 
Correlations between “Town/City Size” and “being less involved in religious organisations when religious service 
attendance is not a control variable” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1995 x x x x r= .099, p= .091 
2005 x x x x x 





2012 x x x x x 
 
Appendix 295 
Correlations between “Town/City Size” and “being less involved in professional associations” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1995 x x x x x 
2005 x x x x x 
2012 x x x x x 
 
Appendix 296 
Correlations between “Town/City Size” and “being less involved in political parties” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1995 x x x r= .134, p= .012 x 
2005 x r= .131, p= .044 x x x 
2012 x x x x x 
 
Appendix 297 
Correlations between “Town/City Size” and “being less involved in labour unions” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1995 x x r= .073, p= .092 x x 
2005 x x x x x 
2012 x x x x x 
 
Appendix 298 
Correlations between “Town/City Size” and “Not discussing politics with friends and work colleagues” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1995 r= -.056, p= .014 r= -.089, p= .021 x x x 
2005 x x x x x 
2012 x x x x x 
 
Appendix 299 
Correlations between “Town/City Size” and “Not being willing to pay higher taxes to help poorer countries” 





 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1995 r= -.051, p= .023 x r= -.095, p= .029 x r= -.142, p= .016 
2005 x x x x x 
 
Appendix 300 
Correlations between “Town/City Size” and “believing that accepting bribes in the course of one’s duties is justifiable” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1995 x x x x x 
2005 x x r= .103, p= .054 x x 
2012 x x x x x 
 
Appendix 301 
Correlations between “Town/City Size” and “believing that buying something you knew was stolen is justifiable” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1995 x x x x x 
 
Appendix 302 
Correlations between “Town/City Size” and “believing that cheating on taxes if you have a chance is justifiable”  
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1995 x x x x x 
2005 x x x r= -.091, p= .086 x 
2012 x x x r= -.104, p= .050 x 
 
Appendix 303 
Correlations between “Town/City Size” and “believing that avoiding a fare on public transport is justifiable” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1995 x x x x x 
2005 x x x x x 
2012 x x x x x 
 
Appendix 304 
Correlations between “Town/City Size” and “believing that claiming government benefits to which you are not entitled is 






 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1995 x x x x x 
2005 x x r= .125, p= .019 x x 
2012 x x x x x 
 
Appendix 305 
Correlations between “Town/City Size” and “believing that stealing property is justifiable” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
2012 x x x r= -.126, p= .018 x 
 
Appendix 306 
Correlations between “Town/City Size” and “believing that one’s country is run for the benefit of all people, rather than 
for a few big interests” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1995 x x x x r= .147, p= .015 
 
Appendix 307 
Correlations between “Town/City Size” and “having attended peaceful demonstrations during the last five years” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
2005 x x x x x 
2012 x r= .437, p= .080 x x x 
 
Appendix 308 
Correlations between “Town/City Size” and “having joined in boycotts during the last five years” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
2005 x x x x x 
2012 x x r= .298, p= .056 x x 
 
Appendix 309 
Correlations between “Town/City Size” and “having signed petitions during the last five years” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 





2005 x x r= -.115, p= .030 x x 
2012 x x x x x 
 
Appendix 310 
Correlations between “Town/City Size” and “having less confidence in the UN” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1995 x x x x x 
2005 x x x x x 
2012 x r= -.172, p= .021 x r= .108, p= .044 x 
 
Appendix 311 
Correlations between “Town/City Size” and “having less confidence in the national government” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1995 x x x x x 
2005 x x x r= -.107, p= .043 x 
2012 x x x x x 
 
Appendix 312 
Correlations between “Town/City Size” and “having less confidence in police” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1995 x x x x x 
2005 x x x x x 
2012 x x x x x 
 
Appendix 313 
Correlations between “Town/City Size” and “having less confidence in labour unions” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1995 x x x x x 
2005 x x x x x 
2012 x r= -.180, p= .016 x x x 
 
Appendix 314 





Correlations between “Town/City Size” and “having less confidence in TV” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1995 x x x x x 
2005 x x x x x 
2012 x x r= -.132, p= .046 x x 
 
Appendix 315 
Correlations between “Town/City Size” and “having less confidence in the press” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1995 x x x x x 
2005 x x x x x 
2012 x x x x x 
 
Appendix 316 
Correlations between “Town/City Size” and “having less confidence in the Armed Forces” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1995 x x x x x 
2005 x x x r= .106, p= .045 x 
2012 x x x x x 
 
Appendix 317 
Correlations between “Town/City Size” and “having less confidence in Churches” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1995 r= .055, p= .015 r= .089, p= .021 x x x 
2005 x x x x x 
2012 x x x r= -.111, p= .038 x 
 
Appendix 318 
Correlations between “Town/City Size” and “having less confidence in major companies” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1995 x x x x x 
2005 x x x x x 
2012 r= -.063, p= .052 x x x x 
 






Correlations between “Town/City Size” and “having less confidence in charitable/humanitarian organisations” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
2005 x x x x x 
2012 x x x x x 
 
Appendix 320 
Correlations between “Town/City Size” and “having less confidence in the environmental protection movement” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
2005 r= -.085, p= .003 x r= -.155, p= .004 x r= -.140, p= .044 
2012 x r= -.125, p= .097 x x x 
 
Appendix 321 
Correlations between “being female” and “being less involved in church/religious organisations” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 x x x x x 
1995 r= -.055, p= .015 r= -.114, p= .003 x x x 
2005 r= .056, p= .057 r= .154, p= .018 x x x 
2012 x r= -.198, p= .008 x x x 
 
Appendix 322 
Correlations between “being female” and “being less involved in consumer organisations” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
2005 x x r= .137, p= .011 x x 
2012 x r= -.178, p= .017 x x x 
 
Appendix 323 
Correlations between “being female” and “being less involved in labour unions” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 r= .099, p= .023 x r= .153, p= .071 x x 
1995 r= .038, p= .093 r= .072, p= .060 x x r= .128, p= .029 
2005 x x x x x 
2012 x x x x x 







Correlations between “being female” and “being less involved in charitable organisations” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 x r= -.139, p= .042 x x x 
1995 r= -.066, p= .003 x x x x 
2005 r= .143, p= .000 r= .210, p= .001 r= .110, p= .040 r= .092, p= .090 r= .244, p= .001 
2012 r= .091, p= .005 x x r= .122, p= .022 x 
 
Appendix 325 
Correlations between “being female” and “being less involved in church/religious organisations when frequency of 
religious attendance is not a control variable” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 r= -.089, p= .011 x x r= -.200, p= .023 x 
1995 r= -.111, p= .000 r= -.156, p= .000 x r= -.119, p= .025 r= -.133, p= .023 
2005 r= .092, p= .002 r= .156, p= .015 x r= .130, p= .015 x 
2012 x r= -.193, p= .009 x r= .119, p= .025 x 
 
Appendix 326 
Correlations between “being female” and “being less involved in professional associations” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 x r= .120, p= .079 x x x 
1995 r= .037, p= .098 x x r= .110, p= .040 x 
2005 x x x x x 
2012 x x x x x 
 
Appendix 327 
Correlations between “being female” and “being less involved in environmental organisations” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 x x x x x 
1995 r= -.069, p= .002 r= -.082, p= .034 x r= -.112, p= .036 x 
2005 x x x x x 
2012 r= .083, p= .010 x r= .186, p= .005 r= .103, p= .054 x 
 






Correlations between “being female” and “being less involved in art, music and educational organisations” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 x x x x x 
1995 r= -.125, p= .000 r= -.152, p= .000 r= -.111, p= .010 x r= -.185, p= .001 
2005 r= .167, p= .000 r= .155, p= .017 r= .198, p= .000 r= .173, p= .002 r= .165, p= .026 
2012 r= .141, p= .000 x x r= .164, p= .002 r= .267, p= .000 
 
Appendix 329 
Correlations between “being female” and “being less involved in political parties” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 r= .080, p= .066 x x x x 
1995 x x x x r= .144, p= .014 
2005 x x x r= -.101, p= .063 x 
2012 x r= -.138, p= .065 r= .157, p= .018 x x 
 
Appendix 330 
Correlations between “being female” and “being less involved in sport/recreational organisations” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1995 r= .079, p= .000 r= .096, p= .012 x x x 
2005 r= -.070, p= .000 r= -.125, p= .053 x r= -.119, p= .027 x 
2012 x x x x x 
 
Appendix 331 
Correlations between “being female” and “believing that most people ‘cannot’ be trusted” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 x x r= -.190, p= .027 x x 
1995 x r= .081, p= .037 x x r= -.100, p= .090 
2005 x x r= .096, p= .072 x x 
2012 x r= .166, p= .027 x x x 
 
Appendix 332 
Correlations between “being female” and “Not discussing politics with friends and work colleagues” 





 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 r= 101, p= .021 r= .179, p= .009 x r= .200, p= .068 x 
1995 r= .055, p= .014 x r= .090, p= .038 r= .143, p= .007 x 
2005 x x x x x 
2012 r= -.074, p= .022 x r= -.110, p= .097 x x 
 
Appendix 333 
Correlations between “being female” and “being uninterested in politics” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1995 r= .078, p= .000 x r= .116, p= .007 r= .118, p= .027 x 
2005 r= .104, p= .000 r= .118, p= .067 r= .105, p= .049 r= .114, p= .032 x 
2012 r= .130, p= .000 r= .212, p= .004 x r= .137, p= .010 x 
 
Appendix 334 
Correlations between “being female” and “having less confidence in parliament” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 r= .140, p= .001 r= .126, p= .067 x x x 
1995 r= .084, p= .000 r= .119, p= .002 r= .138, p= .001 x x 
2005 r= .080, p= .006 r= .108, p= .095 r= .128, p= .017 x x 
2012 r= .059, p= .065 x x x x 
 
Appendix 335 
Correlations between “being female” and “having less confidence in the UN” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1995 x x x x x 
2005 x x x r= -.133, p= .011 x 
2012 r= -.125, p= .000 x x r= -.146, p= .006 r= -.153, p= .039 
 
Appendix 336 
Correlations between “being female” and “having less confidence in police” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 x r= -.138, p= .044 x x x 
1995 r= -.073, p= .001 x x r= -.126, p= .018 x 
2005 x x x x x 





2012 x x x x x 
 
Appendix 337 
Correlations between “being female” and “having less confidence in churches” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 x r= -.127, p= .063 x x x 
1995 r= -.044, p= .051 x x x r= -.107, p= .071 
2005 x x x x x 
2012 x x x x x 
 
Appendix 338 
Correlations between “being female” and “having less confidence in charitable organisations” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
2005 r= -.056, p= .053 r= -.147, p= .023 x x x 
2012 r= -.124, p= .000 x r= -.145, p= .028 r= -.183, p= .001 x 
 
Appendix 339 
Correlations between “being female” and “having less confidence in environmental organisations” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
2005 x x x x x 
2012 r= -.131, p= .000 x r= -.160, p= .016 r= -.153, p= .004 r= -.130, p= .085 
 
Appendix 340 
Correlations between “being female” and “having less confidence in the civil service” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 x x x x x 
1995 x r= -.068, p= .081 x x x 
2005 x x x x x 
2012 x x x x x 
 
Appendix 341 
Correlations between “being female” and “having less confidence in the national government” 





 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1995 r= .066, p= .004 r= .080, p= .041 r= .104, p= .017 x x 
2005 x x x x r= -.124, p= .074 
2012 x x x x x 
 
Appendix 342 
Correlations between “being female” and “having less confidence in TV” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1995 x x x x x 
2005 x x x x x 
2012 x x x x x 
 
Appendix 343 
Correlations between “being female” and “having less confidence in the legal system” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 x x x x x 
1995 x x x r= -.103, p= .058 x 
2005 r= .051, p= .080 x x r= .104, p= .050 x 
2012 x x x x x 
 
Appendix 344 
Correlations between “being female” and “having less confidence in major companies” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 x x x x x 
1995 r= .051, p= .027 x x x x 
2005 x x x x x 
2012 x x x x x 
 
Appendix 345 
Correlations between “being female” and “having less confidence in the Armed Forces” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 x x x x x 
1995 x x x x x 
2005 x x x r= -.098, p= .063 x 





2012 x x x x r= .128, p= .086 
 
Appendix 346 
Correlations between “being female” and “having less confidence in political parties” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1995 r= .037, p= .100 x x x x 
2005 r= .052, p= .073 x x x x 
2012 x x r= -.148, p= .025 x x 
 
Appendix 347 
Correlations between “being female” and “having less confidence in labour unions” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 r= .098, p= .026 x x x r= .346, p= .020 
1995 r= .051, p= .026 x r= .082, p= .062 x x 
2005 r= -.074, p= .011 r= -.171, p= .008 r= -.097, p= .068 x x 
2012 x x x x x 
 
Appendix 348 
Correlations between “being female” and “having signed petitions during the last five years” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
2005 r= .146, p= .000 r= .262, p= .000 r= .112, p= .035 r= .111, p= .036 r= .167, p= .014 
2012 x x x x x 
 
Appendix 349 
Correlations between “being female” and “having attended peaceful demonstrations during the last five years” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
2005 x r= .107, p= .097 r= -.090, p= .093 x x 
2012 x x x x x 
 
Appendix 350 
Correlations between “being female” and “having joined in boycotts during the last five years” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 





2005 x x x x x 
2012 x x x x x 
 
Appendix 351 
Correlations between “being female” and “Not being willing to pay higher taxes to help poorer countries” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1995 x x x x x 
2005 x x x x x 
 
Appendix 352 
Correlations between “being female” and “believing that one’s country is run for the benefit of all people, rather than for 
a few big interests” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1995 r= -.064, p= .006 x r= -.136, p= .002 x x 
 
Appendix 353 
Correlations between “being female” and “believing that accepting bribes in the course of one’s duties is justifiable” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 x x x x x 
1995 r= -.052, p= .020 x x x x 
2005 r= -.080, p= .006 r= -.163, p= .012 x r= -.087, p= .100 x 
2012 r= -.073, p= .022 x r= -.137, p= .039 x x 
 
Appendix 354 
Correlations between “being female” and “believing that buying something you knew was stolen is justifiable” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 r= -.116, p= .008 r= -.173, p= .011 x x r= -.279, p= .067 
1995 r= -.091, p= .000 r= -.092, p= .018 r= -.116, p= .007 x x 
 
Appendix 355 
Correlations between “being female” and “believing that cheating on taxes if you had the chance is justifiable” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 





1981 r= -.190, p= .000 r= -.163, p= .017 x r= -.360, p= .001 x 
1995 r= -.116, p= .000 r= -.122, p= .002 r= -.088, p= .042 r= -.137, p= .010 x 
2005 r= -.099, p= .001 r= -.130, p= .044 r= -.124, p= .020 r= -.093, p= .082 x 
2012 r= -.123, p= .000 x r= -.141, p= .034 x r= -.250, p= .001 
 
Appendix 356 
Correlations between “being female” and “believing that avoiding a fare on public transport is justifiable” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 r= -.119, p= .007 x x x r= -.346, p= .021 
1995 r= -.054, p= .016 x x x x 
2005 x x x x x 
2012 x x x x r= -.224, p= .002 
 
Appendix 357 
Correlations between “being female” and “believing that claiming government benefits to which you are not entitled is 
justifiable”  
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 x x r= .189, p= .026 x r= -.318, p= .036 
1995 r= -.043, p= .058 x x x x 
2005 r= -.050, p= .083 r= -.152, p= .018 x x x 
2012 r= -.073, p= .022 r= -.167, p= .025 x x r= -.155, p= .035 
 
Appendix 358 
Correlations between “being female” and “believing that stealing property is justifiable” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
2012 x x x x x 
 
Appendix 359 
Correlations between “women being part (as opposed to full) time employed” and “believing that most people ‘cannot’ 
be trusted” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 
1981 x x x x 
1995 x x x x 
2005 x x x x 





2012 x x x x 
 
Appendix 360 
Correlations between “women being part (as opposed to full) time employed” and “being less involved in political 
parties” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 
1981 x x x x 
1995 x x x x 
2005 x x r= -.181, p= .043 x 
2012 x r= -.246, p= .034 x r= .158, p= .076 
 
Appendix 361 
Correlations between “women being part (as opposed to full) time employed” and “being less involved in labour unions” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 
1981 x x r= .368, p= .035 x 
1995 r= .079, p= .077 r= .114, p= .098 x x 
2005 x x x x 
2012 x x x x 
 
Appendix 362 
Correlations between “women being part (as opposed to full) time employed” and “being less involved in environmental 
organisations” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 
1981 x x x x 
1995 x x x r= .228, p= .072 
2005 x x x x 
2012 x x x r= .165, p= .063 
 
Appendix 363 
Correlations between “women being part (as opposed to full) time employed” and “being less involved in consumer 
organisations” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 
2005 x r= .254, p= .008 x x 
2012 x x x x 







Correlations between “women being part (as opposed to full) time employed” and “being less involved in religious 
organisations” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 
1981 x x x x 
1995 x x x r= -.284, p= .024 
2005 x x x x 
2012 x x x x 
 
Appendix 365 
Correlations between “women being part (as opposed to full) time employed” and “being less involved in religious 
organisations when religious service attendance is not a control variable” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 
1981 r= -.137, p= .099 x x r= -.915, p= .010 
1995 x x x x 
2005 x x x x 
2012 r= .105, p= .068 x x x 
 
Appendix 366 
Correlations between “women being part (as opposed to full) time employed” and “having attended peaceful 
demonstrations during the last five years” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 
2005 x x r= -.177, p= .048 x 
2012 x x x x 
 
Appendix 367 
Correlations between “women being part (as opposed to full) time employed” and “having joined in boycotts during the 
last five years” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 
2005 x x x x 
2012 x x x x 
 






Correlations between “women being part (as opposed to full) time employed” and “having signed petitions during the 
last five years” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 
2005 x x x x 
2012 x x x x 
 
Appendix 369 
Correlations between “women being part (as opposed to full) time employed” and “being uninterested in politics” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 
1995 x x x x 
2005 x x x x 
2012 x x x x 
 
Appendix 370 
Correlations between “women being part (as opposed to full) time employed” and “having less confidence in the UN” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 
1995 r= -.077, p= .092 x x x 
2005 x r= -.171, p= .072 x x 
2012 x x x x 
 
Appendix 371 
Correlations between “women being part (as opposed to full) time employed” and “having less confidence in the civil 
service” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 
1981 x x x x 
1995 x x x x 
2005 x x x x 
2012 x x x x 
 
Appendix 372 
Correlations between “women being part (as opposed to full) time employed” and “having less confidence in political 
parties” 





 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 
1995 x x x x 
2005 r= -.128, p= .020 x r= -.179, p= .044 x 
2012 x r= .207, p= .077 x x 
 
Appendix 373 
Correlations between “women being part (as opposed to full) time employed” and “having less confidence in police” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 
1981 x x x x 
1995 x x r= -.127, p= .080 x 
2005 x x x x 
2012 x x x x 
 
Appendix 374 
Correlations between “women being part (as opposed to full) time employed” and “having less confidence in labour 
unions” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 
1981 x x x x 
1995 r= -.080, p= .079 x x x 
2005 x x x x 
2012 x x x x 
 
Appendix 375 
Correlations between “women being part (as opposed to full) time employed” and “having less confidence in TV” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 
1995 x x x x 
2005 x x x x 
2012 x x x x 
 
Appendix 376 
Correlations between “women being part (as opposed to full) time employed” and “having less confidence in the press” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 
1981 x x x x 
1995 x x x r= .248, p= .050 





2005 x x x x 
2012 x x x x 
 
Appendix 377 
Correlations between “women being part (as opposed to full) time employed” and “having less confidence in the legal 
system” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 
1981 x x x x 
1995 r= -.110, p= .015 x r= -.134, p= .069 x 
2005 x x x x 
2012 x x x x 
 
Appendix 378 
Correlations between “women being part (as opposed to full) time employed” and “having less confidence in the Armed 
Forces” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 
1981 x x x x 
1995 x x x x 
2005 x x x r= .204, p= .087 
2012 x x x x 
 
Appendix 379 
Correlations between “women being part (as opposed to full) time employed” and “having less confidence in churches” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 
1981 x x x x 
1995 x x x x 
2005 x x x x 
2012 x x x x 
 
Appendix 380 
Correlations between “women being part (as opposed to full) time employed” and “having less confidence in 
charitable/humanitarian organisations” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 
2005 x x x x 





2012 x x x x 
 
Appendix 381 
Correlations between “women being part (as opposed to full) time employed” and “having less confidence in banks” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 
2012 x x x x 
 
Appendix 382 
Correlations between “women being part (as opposed to full) time employed” and “having less confidence in the 
environmental movement” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 
2005 x x x x 
2012 x x x x 
 
Appendix 383 
Correlations between “women being part (as opposed to full) time employed” and “believing that one’s country is run for 
the benefit of all people, rather than for a few big interests” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 
1995 x x x x 
 
Appendix 384 
Correlations between “women being part (as opposed to full) time employed” and “believing that accepting bribes in the 
course of one’s duties is justifiable” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 
1981 x x x x 
1995 x x x x 
2005 x x x x 
2012 r= .112, p= .050 x x r= .208, p= .019 
 
Appendix 385 
Correlations between “women being part (as opposed to full) time employed” and “believing that buying something you 
knew was stolen is justifiable” 





 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 
1981 x x x x 
1995 x x x x 
 
Appendix 386 
Correlations between “women being part (as opposed to full) time employed” and “believing that cheating on taxes if 
you have the chance is justifiable” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 
1981 x x x x 
1995 x x x x 
2005 x x x x 
2012 x x x x 
 
Appendix 387 
Correlations between “women being part (as opposed to full) time employed” and “believing that avoiding fares on 
public transport is justifiable” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 
1981 x x x x 
1995 x x x x 
2005 x x x x 
2012 r= .128, p= .026 x r= .236, p= .034 r= .154, p= .084 
 
Appendix 388 
Correlations between “women being part (as opposed to full) time employed” and “believing that claiming government 
benefits to which you are not entitled is justifiable” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 
1981 x x x x 
1995 r= .079, p= .079 x x x 
2005 x x x x 
2012 x x x x 
 
Appendix 389 
Correlations between “women being part (as opposed to full) time employed” and “believing that stealing property is 
justifiable” 





 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 
2012 x x x r= .193, p= .030 
 
Appendix 390 
Correlations between “women being part (as opposed to full) time employed” and “having less confidence in major 
companies” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 
1981 x x x r= -.998, p= .040 
1995     
2005 r= -.108, p= .052 x r= -.198, p= .026 x 
2012 x x x x 
 
Appendix 391 
Correlations between “women being part (as opposed to full) time employed” and “being less involved in charitable 
organisations” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 
1981 x x x r= -1.000, p= .017 
1995 x r= .117, p= .091 x x 
2005 x x x x 
2012 x x x x 
 
Appendix 392 
Correlations between “women being part (as opposed to full) time employed” and “being less involved in professional 
associations” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 
1981 x x x x 
1995 r= .095, p= .034 x x r= .228, p= .078 
2005 r= -.131, p= .019 x r= -.177, p= .047 x 
2012 x x x x 
 
Appendix 393 
Correlations between “women being part (as opposed to full) time employed” and “being less involved in art, music and 
educational organisations” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 





1981 x x x x 
1995 r= -.083, p= .063 r= -.143, p= .038 x x 
2005 r= .145, p= .009 x r= .197, p= .027 x 
2012 r= .119, p= .038 x r= .218, p= .051 x 
 
Appendix 394 
Correlations between “women being part (as opposed to full) time employed” and “being less involved in sport 
recreational organisations” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 
1995 x x x x 
2005 r= .143, p= .010 x r= .187, p= .036 x 
2012 r= -.122, p= .033 r= -.345, p= .003 x x 
 
Appendix 395 
Correlations between “women being part (as opposed to full) time employed” and “having less confidence in parliament” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 
1981 x x x x 
1995 r= -.093, p= .041 x x x 
2005 r= -.138, p= .012 x r= -.210, p= .018 x 
2012 x r= .240, p= .039 x x 
 
Appendix 396 
Correlations between “women being part (as opposed to full) time employed” and “having less confidence in the national 
government” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 
1995 r= -.107, p= .018 x x x 
2005 r= -.157, p= .004 x r= -.200, p= .023 x 
2012 x x x x 
 
Appendix 397 
Correlations between “women being part (as opposed to full) time employed” and “having less confidence in the legal 
system” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 
1981 x x x x 





1995 r= -.110, p= .015 x r= -.134, p= .069 x 
2005 x x x x 
2012 x x x x 
 
Appendix 398 
Correlations between “women being part (as opposed to full) time employed” and “Not being willing to pay higher taxes 
to help poorer countries” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 
1995 x r= -.122, p= .081 x x 
2005 x x x x 
 
Appendix 399 
Correlations between “women being housewives (as opposed to working part-time)” and “believing that most people 
‘cannot’ be trusted” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 
1981 x x x x 
1995 r= .105, p= .024 x r= .177, p= .027 x 
2005 r= .171, p= .013 x r= .289, p= .013 x 
2012 x x x r= .196, p= .068 
 
Appendix 400 
Correlations between “women being housewives (as opposed to working part-time)” and “having less confidence in the 
UN” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 
1995 x x x x 
2005 x x x x 
2012 x x x x 
 
Appendix 401 
Correlations between “women being housewives (as opposed to working part-time)” and “having less confidence in the 
civil service” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 
1981 x x x r= .479, p= .006 
1995 x x x x 





2005 r= .137, p= .050 x x x 
2012 x x x x 
 
Appendix 402 
Correlations between “women being housewives (as opposed to working part-time)” and “having less confidence in 
parliament” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 
1981 x x x r= .347, p= .048 
1995 r= .156, p= .001 r= .143, p= .064 r= .269, p= .001 x 
2005 r= .158, p= .023 x r= .253, p= .031 x 
2012 x x x x 
 
Appendix 403 
Correlations between “women being housewives (as opposed to working part-time)” and “having less confidence in 
political parties” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 
1995 x x r= .133, p= .100 x 
2005 r= .146, p= .035 r= .261, p= .041 x x 
2012 r= .135, p= .096 x x r= .233, p= .032 
 
Appendix 404 
Correlations between “women being housewives (as opposed to working part-time)” and “having less confidence in the 
national government” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 
1995 r= .108, p= .022 x x x 
2005 r= .173, p= .013 x r= .288, p= .013 x 
2012 x x x x 
 
Appendix 405 
Correlations between “women being housewives (as opposed to working part-time)” and “having less confidence in 
labour unions” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 
1981 x x x r= .375, p= .031 
1995 x x x x 





2005 x x x x 
2012 r= .266, p= .001 x x r= .284, p= .009 
 
Appendix 406 
Correlations between “women being housewives (as opposed to working part-time)” and “having less confidence in the 
legal system” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 
1981 x x x r= .333, p= .059 
1995 r= .097, p= .039 x r= .140, p= .088 x 
2005 x x r= .202, p= .086 x 
2012 x x x x 
 
Appendix 407 
Correlations between “women being housewives (as opposed to working part-time)” and “having less confidence in 
major companies” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 
1981 r= .157, p= .035 x x r= .315, p= .079 
1995     
2005 r= .135, p= .054 x x x 
2012 x x x x 
 
Appendix 408 
Correlations between “women being housewives (as opposed to working part-time)” and “having less confidence in 
charitable/humanitarian organisations” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 
2005 x x x x 
2012 x x x x 
 
Appendix 409 
Correlations between “women being housewives (as opposed to working part-time)” and “being uninterested in politics” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 
1995 r= .084, p= .071 x x x 
2005 r= -.129, p= .063 x r= -.197, p= .091 x 
2012 x r= -.381, p= .050 x x 







Correlations between “women being housewives (as opposed to working part-time)” and “having less confidence in the 
police” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 
1981 x r= -.201, p= .088 x x 
1995 x x x x 
2005 x x x x 
2012 x x x x 
 
Appendix 411 
Correlations between “women being housewives (as opposed to working part-time)” and “having less confidence in TV” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 
1995 r= -.079, p= .090 x x r= -.286, p= .026 
2005 x x x x 
2012 x x x x 
 
Appendix 412 
Correlations between “women being housewives (as opposed to working part-time)” and “having less confidence in the 
press” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 
1981 x x x x 
1995 x x x x 
2005 x x x x 
2012 x x x x 
 
Appendix 413 
Correlations between “women being housewives (as opposed to working part-time)” and “having less confidence in the 
Armed Forces” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 
1981 x x x r= .319, p= .075 
1995 x x r= .202, p= .013 x 
2005 x x x x 
2012 x x x x 







Correlations between “women being housewives (as opposed to working part-time)” and “having less confidence in 
churches” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 
1981 x x r= -.231, p= .100 x 
1995 x x x x 
2005 x x x r= -.242, p= .083 
2012 x x x x 
 
Appendix 415 
Correlations between “women being housewives (as opposed to working part-time)” and “having less confidence in 
banks” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 
2012 x x x x 
 
Appendix 416 
Correlations between “women being housewives (as opposed to working part-time)” and “having less confidence in the 
environmental movement” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 
2005 x x x x 
2012 x x x x 
 
Appendix 417 
Correlations between “women being housewives (as opposed to working part-time)” and “being less involved in 
charitable organisations” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 
1981 x x x x 
1995 x x x x 
2005 x x x x 
2012 x x x x 
 
Appendix 418 





Correlations between “women being housewives (as opposed to working part-time)” and “being less involved in 
environmental organisations” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 
1981 x x r= -.293, p= .035 x 
1995 x x x x 
2005 x x x x 
2012 r= -.155, p= .053 x x x 
 
Appendix 419 
Correlations between “women being housewives (as opposed to working part-time)” and “being less involved in art, 
music and educational organisations” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 
1981 x x x x 
1995 r= .085, p= .066 r= .172, p= .023 x x 
2005 r= -.125, p= .079 x r= -.217, p= .065 x 
2012 x x x x 
 
Appendix 420 
Correlations between “women being housewives (as opposed to working part-time)” and “being less involved in 
sport/recreational organisations” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 
1995 x x x x 
2005 x r= -.272, p= .032 x x 
2012 x x x x 
 
Appendix 421 
Correlations between “women being housewives (as opposed to working part-time)” and “being less involved in 
church/religious organisations” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 
1981 x x x x 
1995 x x x x 
2005 x x r= -.284, p= .015 x 
2012 x x x x 
 
Appendix 422 





Correlations between “women being housewives (as opposed to working part-time)” and “being less involved in 
consumer organisations” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 
2005 x r= -.214, p= .097 x x 
2012 x x r= .302, p= .065 x 
 
Appendix 423 
Correlations between “women being housewives (as opposed to working part-time)” and “being less involved in political 
parties” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 
1981 x x x x 
1995 x x x x 
2005 x x x x 
2012 r= -.181, p= .023 x x x 
 
Appendix 424 
Correlations between “women being housewives (as opposed to working part-time)” and “being less involved in labour 
unions” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 
1981 r= .201, p= .006 r= .390, p= .001 x r= .504, p= .003 
1995 r= .299, p= .000 r= .172, p= .023 r= .363, p= .000 r= .220, p= .088 
2005 r= -.297, p= .000 r= -.235, p= .068 r= -.325, p= .005 r= -.345, p= .018 
2012 r= -.274, p= .001 x r= -.332, p= .042 r= -.242, p= .023 
 
Appendix 425 
Correlations between “women being housewives (as opposed to working part-time)” and “Not discussing politics with 
friends and work colleagues” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 
1981 x x x x 
1995 x x x x 
2005 r= .125, p= .074 x r= .325, p= .005 x 
2012 x x x x 
 
Appendix 426 





Correlations between “women being housewives (as opposed to working part-time)” and “having attended peaceful 
demonstrations in the previous five years” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 
2005 x x x x 
2012 x x x x 
 
Appendix 427 
Correlations between “women being housewives (as opposed to working part-time)” and “having joined boycotts in the 
previous five years” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 
2005 x x x x 
2012 x x x x 
 
Appendix 428 
Correlations between “women being housewives (as opposed to working part-time)” and “having signed petitions in the 
previous five years” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 
2005 x x x x 
2012 x x x x 
 
Appendix 429 
Correlations between “women being housewives (as opposed to working part-time)” and “Not being willing to pay higher 
taxes to help poorer countries” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 
1995 x x x x 
2005 x x x x 
 
Appendix 430 
Correlations between “women being housewives (as opposed to working part-time)” and “believing that accepting bribes 
in the course of one’s duties in justifiable” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 
1981 x x x x 
1995 x x x x 
2005 x x x x 





2012 x x r= .318, p= .051 x 
 
Appendix 431 
Correlations between “women being housewives (as opposed to working part-time)” and “believing that buying 
something you knew was stolen is justifiable” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 
1981 x x x x 
1995 x x x x 
 
Appendix 432 
Correlations between “women being housewives (as opposed to working part-time)” and “believing that cheating on 
taxes if you have a chance is justifiable” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 
1981 x x x x 
1995 r= -.117, p= .011 x x r= -.233, p= .070 
2005 x x x x 
2012 x x x x 
 
Appendix 433 
Correlations between “women being housewives (as opposed to working part-time)” and “believing that avoiding a fare 
on public transport is justifiable” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 
1981 x x x x 
1995 x x x x 
2005 x x x x 
2012 x x x x 
 
Appendix 434 
Correlations between “women being housewives (as opposed to working part-time)” and “believing that claiming 
government benefits to which you are not entitled is justifiable” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 
1981 x x x x 
1995 x x x x 
2005 x x x x 





2012 x x x x 
 
Appendix 435 
Correlations between “women being housewives (as opposed to working part-time)” and “believing that stealing 
property is justifiable” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 
2012 x x x x 
 
Appendix 436 
Correlations between “having performed or having to perform mostly creative (rather than routine) tasks for 
previous (if currently not employed) or current work” and “unhappiness” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
2005 r= -.086, p= .003 r= -.131, p= .045 r= -.135, p= .012 x r= -.128, p= .074 
2012 r= -.119, p= .000 r= -.171, p= .022 x r= -.130, p= .015 r= -.167, p= .027 
 
Appendix 437 
Correlations between “having performed or having to perform mostly creative (rather than routine) tasks for previous (if 
currently not employed) or current work” and “Life Satisfaction” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
2005 x r= .131, p= .045 x x x 
2012 r= .075, p= .020 x x r= .118, p= .028 x 
 
Appendix 438 
Correlations between “having performed or having to perform mostly creative (rather than routine) tasks for previous (if 
currently not employed) or current work” and “being uninterested in politics” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
2005 r= -.069, p= .019 x r= -.152, p= .005 x x 
2012 r= -.127, p= .000 r= -.214, p= .004 x r= -.114, p= .033 x 
 
Appendix 439 
Correlations between “having performed or having to perform mostly creative (rather than routine) tasks for previous (if 
currently not employed) or current work” and “Disagreeing that when jobs are scarce men should have more right to a 





job than women” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
2005 x x r= .128, p= .018 x x 
2012 r= .093, p= .004 x x r= .100, p= .062 r= .140, p= .068 
 
Appendix 440 
Correlations between “having performed or having to perform mostly creative (rather than routine) tasks for previous (if 
currently not employed) or current work” and “Disagreeing that when jobs are scarce employers should give priority to 
Australians over immigrants” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
2005 r= .065, p= .027 r= .128, p= .051 r= .139, p= .010 x x 
2012 r= .090, p= .006 r= .217, p= .004 x x x 
 
Appendix 441 
Correlations between “having performed or having to perform mostly creative (rather than routine) tasks for previous (if 
currently not employed) or current work” and “Not believing in the importance of children learning imagination” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
2005 r= -.108, p= .000 x r= -.144, p= .007 x x 
2012 r= -.054, p= .098 x x r= -.103, p= .054 x 
 
Appendix 442 
Correlations between “having performed or having to perform mostly creative (rather than routine) tasks for previous (if 
currently not employed) or current work” and “Not believing in the importance of children learning self-expression” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
2012 r= -.077, p= .017 x x x r= -.127, p= .093 
 
Appendix 443 
Correlations between “having performed or having to perform mostly creative (rather than routine) tasks for previous (if 
currently not employed) or current work” and “Believing that children do ‘not’ need both a mother and a father to grow 
up happily” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
2005 x x x x x 
 






Correlations between “having performed or having to perform mostly creative (rather than routine) tasks for previous (if 
currently not employed) or current work” and “disapproving of women wanting a child as a single parent without a stable 
relationship with a man” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
2005 x x x r= -.112, p= .039 x 
 
Appendix 445 
Correlations between “having performed or having to perform mostly creative (rather than routine) tasks for previous (if 
currently not employed) or current work” and “believing that suicide is justifiable” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
2005 r= .053, p= .072 x x r= .129, p= .017 x 
2012 x r= .153, p= .042 x x x 
 
Appendix 446 
Correlations between “having performed or having to perform mostly creative (rather than routine) tasks for previous (if 
currently not employed) or current work” and “believing that euthanasia is justifiable” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
2005 x x x x x 
 
Appendix 447 
Correlations between “having performed or having to perform mostly creative (rather than routine) tasks for previous (if 
currently not employed) or current work” and “believing that divorce is justifiable” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
2005 x x x x x 
2012 r= .064, p= .049 x x r= .144, p= .007 x 
 
Appendix 448 
Correlations between “having performed or having to perform mostly creative (rather than routine) tasks for previous (if 
currently not employed) or current work” and “believing that abortion is justifiable” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
2005 r= .055, p= .061 x r= .124, p= .022 x x 
2012 r= .066, p= .043 x x r= .091, p= .090 x 







Correlations between “having performed or having to perform mostly creative (rather than routine) tasks for previous (if 
currently not employed) or current work” and “believing that prostitution is justifiable” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
2005 r= .089, p= .002 r= .177, p= .007 r= .121, p= .025 x x 
2012 r= .105, p= .001 x x r= .147, p= .006 x 
 
Appendix 450 
Correlations between “having performed or having to perform mostly creative (rather than routine) tasks for previous (if 
currently not employed) or current work” and “believing that homosexuality is justifiable” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
2005 r= .098, p= .001 x r= .155, p= .004 r= .156, p= .004 x 
2012 r= .097, p= .003 x r= .121, p= .072 r= .143, p= .008 x 
 
Appendix 451 
Correlations between “having performed or having to perform mostly creative (rather than routine) tasks for previous (if 
currently not employed) or current work” and “believing that sex before marriage is justifiable” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
2012 r= .091, p= .005 x x r= .135, p= .012 x 
 
Appendix 452 
Correlations between “having performed or having to perform mostly creative (rather than routine) tasks for previous (if 
currently not employed) or current work” and “being less involved in professional associations” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
2005 r= .138, p= .000 r= .126, p= .057 x r= .197, p= .000 r= .168, p= .028 
2012 r= .142, p= .000 x r= .166, p= .013 r= .129, p= .017 r= .194, p= .013 
 
Appendix 453 
Correlations between “having performed or having to perform mostly creative (rather than routine) tasks for previous (if 
currently not employed) or current work” and “being less involved in art, music and educational organisations” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 





2005 r= .136, p= .000 r= .127, p= .054 r= .130, p= .018 r= .158, p= .005 r= .133, p= .083 
2012 r= .151, p= .000 r= .134, p= .074 r= .140, p= .036 r= .191, p= .000 r= .162, p= .039 
 
Appendix 454 
Correlations between “having performed or having to perform mostly creative (rather than routine) tasks for previous (if 
currently not employed) or current work” and “being less involved in charitable organisations” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
2005 r= .051, p= .091 x x x x 
2012 x x x x x 
 
Appendix 455 
Correlations between “having performed or having to perform mostly creative (rather than routine) tasks for previous (if 
currently not employed) or current work” and “being less involved in environmental organisations” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
2005 r= .067, p= .027 r= .120, p= .069 x r= .121, p= .030 x 
2012 r= .167, p= .000 r= .207, p= .006 r= .163, p= .015 r= .145, p= .007 x 
 
Appendix 456 
Correlations between “having performed or having to perform mostly creative (rather than routine) tasks for previous (if 
currently not employed) or current work” and “Not being willing to pay higher taxes to help poorer countries” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
2005 r= -.051, p= .088 x x r= -.127, p= .018 x 
 
Appendix 457 
Correlations between “having performed or having to perform mostly creative (rather than routine) tasks for previous (if 
currently not employed) or current work” and “having less confidence in labour unions” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
2005 x x x x x 
2012 r= .070, p= .032 x x x x 
 
Appendix 458 
Correlations between “having performed or having to perform mostly creative (rather than routine) tasks for previous (if 





currently not employed) or current work” and “having less confidence in TV” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
2005 r= .070, p= .018 x x x r= .188, p= .008 
2012 r= .107, p= .001 x x r= .171, p= .002 x 
 
Appendix 459 
Correlations between “having performed or having to perform mostly creative (rather than routine) tasks for previous (if 
currently not employed) or current work” and “having less confidence in the press” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
2005 x r= .118, p= .071 x x r= .142, p= .046 
2012 x x x r= .101, p= .061 x 
 
Appendix 460 
Correlations between “having performed or having to perform mostly creative (rather than routine) tasks for previous (if 
currently not employed) or current work” and “having less confidence in Armed Forces” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
2005 r= .063, p= .032 r= .134, p= .041 x x x 
2012 r= .066, p= .042 r= .163, p= .031 x x x 
 
Appendix 461 
Correlations between “having performed or having to perform mostly creative (rather than routine) tasks for previous (if 
currently not employed) or current work” and “having less confidence in Churches 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
2005 r= .055, p= .062 r= .150, p= .022 x x r= .177, p= .013 
2012 r= .063, p= .052 x x x r= .197, p= .009 
 
Appendix 462 
Correlations between “having performed or having to perform mostly creative (rather than routine) tasks for previous (if 
currently not employed) or current work” and “having less confidence in Banks” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
2012 r= .081, p= .013 r= .156, p= .038 x r= .099, p= .068 x 
 
Appendix 463 





Correlations between “having performed or having to perform mostly creative (rather than routine) tasks for previous (if 
currently not employed) or current work” and “being less involved in church/religious organisations when religious 
service attendance is not a control variable” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
2005 x x r= -.145, p= .008 x x 
2012 r= -.057, p= .076 x x x x 
 
Appendix 464 
Correlations between “having performed or having to perform mostly creative (rather than routine) tasks for previous (if 
currently not employed) or current work” and “believing that accepting bribes in the course of one’s duties is justifiable” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
2005 x x x x x 
2012 x r= -.148, p= .049 r= .144, p= .032 x r= .219, p= .004 
 
Appendix 465 
Correlations between “having performed or having to perform mostly creative (rather than routine) tasks for previous (if 
currently not employed) or current work” and “believing that cheating on taxes if you have a chance is justifiable” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
2005 x x x x r= -.195, p= .006 
2012 x x x x x 
 
Appendix 466 
Correlations between “having performed or having to perform mostly creative (rather than routine) tasks for previous (if 
currently not employed) or current work” and “believing that avoiding a fare on public transport is justifiable” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
2005 x x r= .143, p= .008 x r= -.137, p= .054 
2012 x x x x x 
 
Appendix 467 
Correlations between “having performed or having to perform mostly creative (rather than routine) tasks for previous (if 
currently not employed) or current work” and “believing that claiming government benefits to which you are not entitled 
is justifiable” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
2005 x x r= .117, p= .030 x x 
2012 x x x x x 
 
Appendix 468 
Correlations between “having performed or having to perform mostly creative (rather than routine) tasks for previous (if 
currently not employed) or current work” and “believing that stealing property is justifiable” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
2012 r= .066, p= .043 x x x r= .127, p= .097 







Correlations between “having performed or having to perform mostly creative (rather than routine) tasks for previous (if 
currently not employed) or current work” and “believing that most people ‘cannot’ be trusted” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
2005 x x x x x 
2012 x x x r= -.095, p= .077 x 
 
Appendix 470 
Correlations between “having performed or having to perform mostly creative (rather than routine) tasks for previous (if 
currently not employed) or current work” and “Not being proud to be Australian” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
2005 x x x x x 
2012 r= .086, p= .008 r= .187, p= .013 x x x 
 
Appendix 471 
Correlations between “having performed or having to perform mostly creative (rather than routine) tasks for previous (if 
currently not employed) or current work” and “having attended peaceful demonstrations in the previous five years” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
2005 x x x x x 
2012 x r= .631, p= .012 r= -.378, p= .010 r= -.180, p= .075 x 
 
Appendix 472 
Correlations between “having performed or having to perform mostly creative (rather than routine) tasks for previous (if 
currently not employed) or current work” and “having joined in boycotts in the previous five years” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
2005 r= .086, p= .004 x x r= .150, p= .005 x 
2012 x x x x x 
 
Appendix 473 
Correlations between “having performed or having to perform mostly creative (rather than routine) tasks for previous (if 
currently not employed) or current work” and “having signed petitions in the previous five years” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
2005 x x x x x 
2012 x r= .186, p= .052 x x x 
 
Appendix 474 
Correlations between “having performed or having to perform mostly creative (rather than routine) tasks for previous (if 
currently not employed) or current work” and “believing that euthanasia is justifiable” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
2005 x x x x x 







Correlations between “having performed or having to perform mostly creative (rather than routine) tasks for previous (if 
currently not employed) or current work” and “Believing that children do ‘not’ need both a mother and a father to grow 
up happily” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
2005 x x x x x 
 
Appendix 476 
Correlations between “having performed or having to perform mostly creative (rather than routine) tasks for previous (if 
currently not employed) or current work” and “disapproving of women wanting a child as a single parent without a stable 
relationship with a man” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
2005 x x x r= -.112, p= .039 x 
 
Appendix 477 
Correlations between “having performed or having to perform mostly creative (rather than routine) tasks for previous (if 
currently not employed) or current work” and “being less involved in political parties” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
2005 x x x x x 
2012 x r= .156, p= .037 x x x 
 
Appendix 478 
Correlations between “having performed or having to perform mostly creative (rather than routine) tasks for previous (if 
currently not employed) or current work” and “being less involved in labour unions” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
2005 x x x x x 
2012 x x x x x 
 
Appendix 479 
Correlations between “having performed or having to perform mostly creative (rather than routine) tasks for previous (if 
currently not employed) or current work” and “being less involved in consumer organisations” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
2005 x x r= .110, p= .046 x x 
2012 x x x x x 
 
Appendix 480 
Correlations between “having performed or having to perform mostly creative (rather than routine) tasks for previous (if 
currently not employed) or current work” and “being less involved in sport and recreational organisations” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
2005 x x x x x 





2012 r= .061, p= .061 x x x x 
 
Appendix 481 
Correlations between “having performed or having to perform mostly creative (rather than routine) tasks for previous (if 
currently not employed) or current work” and “having less confidence in the UN” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
2005 r= .051, p= .085 x x r= .128, p= .017 x 




Correlations between “having performed or having to perform mostly creative (rather than routine) tasks for previous (if 
currently not employed) or current work” and “having less confidence in the civil service” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
2005 x x r= -.102, p= .059 x x 
2012 r= .071, p= .028 x x r= .090, p= .099 r= .138, p= .072 
 
Appendix 483 
Correlations between “having performed or having to perform mostly creative (rather than routine) tasks for previous (if 
currently not employed) or current work” and “having less confidence in parliament” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
2005 x x r= -.100, p= .067 x x 
2012 x x x x x 
 
Appendix 484 
Correlations between “having performed or having to perform mostly creative (rather than routine) tasks for previous (if 
currently not employed) or current work” and “having less confidence in political parties” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
2005 x x x x x 
2012 x x x x x 
 
Appendix 485 
Correlations between “having performed or having to perform mostly creative (rather than routine) tasks for previous (if 
currently not employed) or current work” and “having less confidence in the national government” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
2005 x r= .117, p= .074 x x x 
2012 x x x x x 
 
Appendix 486 
Correlations between “having performed or having to perform mostly creative (rather than routine) tasks for previous (if 





currently not employed) or current work” and “having less confidence in police” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
2005 x x x x x 
2012 x r= .146, p= .052 x x x 
 
Appendix 487 
Correlations between “having performed or having to perform mostly creative (rather than routine) tasks for previous (if 
currently not employed) or current work” and “having less confidence in the legal system” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
2005 x x r= -.209, p= .000 x x 
2012 x x x x x 
 
Appendix 488 
Correlations between “having performed or having to perform mostly creative (rather than routine) tasks for previous (if 
currently not employed) or current work” and “having less confidence in major companies” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
2005 r= .092, p= .002 r= .170, p= .009 x x r= .252, p= .000 
2012 x r= .215, p= .004 x x x 
 
Appendix 489 
Correlations between “having performed or having to perform mostly creative (rather than routine) tasks for previous (if 
currently not employed) or current work” and “having less confidence in charitable/humanitarian organisations” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
2005 x x x x r= .118, p= .099 
2012 r= .071, p= .029 x x x x 
 
Appendix 490 
Correlations between “having performed or having to perform mostly creative (rather than routine) tasks for previous (if 
currently not employed) or current work” and “having less confidence in the environmental protection movement” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
2005 x x r= -.130, p= .017 x r= .165, p= .021 
2012 x x x x x 
 
Appendix 491 
Correlations between “having performed or having to perform mostly creative (rather than routine) tasks for previous (if 
currently not employed) or current work” and “Not believing in the importance of children learning obedience” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
2005 x x x r= .098, p= .068 x 
2012 x x x x x 
 
Appendix 492 





Correlations between “having performed or having to perform mostly creative (rather than routine) tasks for previous (if 
currently not employed) or current work” and “Not believing in the importance of children learning unselfishness” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
2005 x x x x x 
2012 x x x x x 
 
Appendix 493 
Correlations between “having performed or having to perform mostly creative (rather than routine) tasks for previous (if 
currently not employed) or current work” and “Not believing in the importance of children learning religious faith” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
2005 x r= .120, p= .066 x x r= -.136, p= .055 
2012 x x x x x 
 
Appendix 494 
Correlations between “having performed or having to perform mostly creative (rather than routine) tasks for previous (if 
currently not employed) or current work” and “Not believing in the importance of children learning 
determination/perseverance” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
2005 x x x x x 
2012 r= -.063, p= .051 x x x x 
 
Appendix 495 
Correlations between “having performed or having to perform mostly creative (rather than routine) tasks for previous (if 
currently not employed) or current work” and “Not believing in the importance of children learning thrift” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
2005 x x x x x 
2012 x x x x x 
 
Appendix 496 
Correlations between “having performed or having to perform mostly creative (rather than routine) tasks for previous (if 
currently not employed) or current work” and “Not believing in the importance of children learning tolerance” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
2005 x x x x x 
2012 x x x x x 
 
Appendix 497 
Correlations between “having performed or having to perform mostly creative (rather than routine) tasks for previous (if 
currently not employed) or current work” and “Not believing in the importance of children learning responsibility” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
2005 x x x x x 
2012 x x x x x 







Correlations between “having performed or having to perform mostly creative (rather than routine) tasks for previous (if 
currently not employed) or current work” and “Not believing in the importance of children learning hard work” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
2005 x x x x x 
2012 x x x x x 
 
Appendix 499 
Correlations between “having performed or having to perform mostly creative (rather than routine) tasks for previous (if 
currently not employed) or current work” and “Not believing in the importance of children learning independence” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
2005 x x x x x 
2012 x x x x x 
 
Appendix 500 
Correlations between “having a higher level of formal education” and “believing that most people ‘cannot’ be trusted” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 x x x x x 
1995 r= -.140, p= .000 r= -.110, p= .005 r= -.180, p= .000 r= -.208, p= .000 r= -.099, p= .095 
2005 r= -.160, p= .000 r= -.197, p= .002 r= -.151, p= .004 r= -.187, p= .000 r= -.149, p= .030 
2012 r= -.172, p= .000 x r= -.168, p= .011 r= -.186, p= .000 r= -.201, p= .006 
 
Appendix 501 
Correlations between “having a higher level of formal education” and “being politically uninterested” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1995 r= -.274, p= .000 r= -.251, p= .000 r= -.288, p= .000 r= -.276, p= .000 r= -.239, p= .000 
2005 r= -.134, p= .000 r= -.214, p= .001 r= -.148, p= .005 r= -.125, p= .018 x 
2012 r= -.183, p= .000 r= -.185, p= .013 x r= -.227, p= .000 r= -.169, p= .022 
 
Appendix 502 
Correlations between “having a higher level of formal education” and “Not discussing politics with friends and work 
colleagues” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 r= -.199, p= .000 r= -.237, p= .000 r= -.195, p= .021 x x 
1995 r= -.255, p= .000 r= -.244, p= .000 r= -.288, p= .000 r= -.254, p= .000 r= -.239, p= .009 
2005 r= -.077, p= .008 x r= -.210, p= .000 x x 
2012 r= -.060, p= .061 x x r= -.135, p= .011 x 
 
Appendix 503 





Correlations between “having a higher level of formal education” and “Not being willing to pay higher taxes to help 
poorer countries” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1995 r= -.176, p= .000 r= -.162, p= .000 r= -.206, p= .000 r= -.175, p= .001 r= -.119, p= .043 
2005 r= -.164, p= .000 r= -.235, p= .000 r= -.180, p= .001 r= -.148, p= .005 x 
 
Appendix 504 
Correlations between “having a higher level of formal education” and “believing that one does not have the duty to 
respect and love parents who have not earned it by their behaviour and attitudes” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1995 r= .150, p= .000 r= .107, p= .006 r= .173, p= .000 r= .213, p= .000 r= .133, p= .025 
 
Appendix 505 
Correlations between “having a higher level of formal education” and “believing that parents should have a life of their 
own and should not be asked to sacrifice their own well-being for the sake of their children” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1995 r= .082, p= .000 x r= .092, p= .033 x x 
 
Appendix 506 
Correlations between “having a higher level of formal education” and “believing that children do ‘not’ need both a 
mother and father to grow up happily” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 x x r= .198, p= .040 x x 
1995 r= .053, p= .021 x x x r= .107, p= .070 
2005 r= .068, p= .019 x x x x 
 
Appendix 507 
Correlations between “having a higher level of formal education” and “thinking that women do ‘not’ have to have 
children to be fulfilled” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 x r= -.238, p= .065 x x r= .434, p= .044 
1995 x x x r= .124, p= .028 r= .102, p= .097 
 
Appendix 508 
Correlations between “having a higher level of formal education” and “disapproving of women wanting a child as a single 
parent without a stable relationship with a man” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 x x x x x 
1995 x x x x x 
2005 r= -.054, p= .063 x x x x 
 






Correlations between “having a higher level of formal education” and “thinking that a working mother ‘cannot’ establish 
as warm and secure a relationship with her children as a mother who does not work” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1995 r= -.055, p= .014 r= -.077, p= .047 r= -.104, p= .017 x x 
 
Appendix 510 
Correlations between “having a higher level of formal education” and “believing that suicide is justifiable” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 r= .166, p= .000 r= .154, p= .024 r= .187, p= .029 x x 
1995 r= .124, p= .000 x r= .191, p= .000 r= .272, p= .000 x 
2005 r= .136, p= .000 x r= .155, p= .003 x r= .254, p= .000 
2012 r= .158, p= .000 x r= .227, p= .001 r= .181, p= .001 x 
 
Appendix 511 
Correlations between “having a higher level of formal education” and “believing that euthanasia is justifiable” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 x x x x x 
1995 r= .065, p= .005 x r= .125, p= .004 x x 
2005 r= .066, p= .022 x x x r= .205, p= .003 
 
Appendix 512 
Correlations between “having a higher level of formal education” and “believing that divorce is justifiable” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 x x x x x 
1995 r= .151, p= .000 x r= .231, p= .000 r= .234, p= .000 x 
2005 r= .182, p= .000 r= .113, p= .079 x r= .186, p= .000 r= .345, p= .000 
2012 r= .142, p= .000 x x r= .114, p= .032 r= .227, p= .002 
 
Appendix 513 
Correlations between “having a higher level of formal education” and “believing that abortion is justifiable” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 r= .104, p= .018 x x x r= .398, p= .008 
1995 r= .166, p= .000 r= .078, p= .044 r= .243, p= .000 r= .207, p= .000 r= .133, p= .026 
2005 r= .160, p= .000 r= .152, p= .019 x r= .125, p= .018 r= .333, p= .000 
2012 r= .181, p= .000 r= .199, p= .008 r= .211, p= .001 r= .114, p= .032 r= .185, p= .012 
 
Appendix 514 
Correlations between “having a higher level of formal education” and “believing that prostitution is justifiable” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 





1981 x x x x x 
1995 r= .168, p= .000 r= .110, p= .004 r= .209, p= .000 r= .253, p= .000 r= .108, p= .068 
2005 r= .122, p= .000 x r= .169, p= .001 r= .130, p= .014 r= .139, p= .047 
2012 r= .059, p= .066 x x x r= .122, p= .098 
 
Appendix 515 
Correlations between “having a higher level of formal education” and “believing that homosexuality is justifiable” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 r= .178, p= .000 r= .120, p= .085 r= .261, p= .002 x x 
1995 r= .252, p= .000 r= .203, p= .000 r= .296, p= .000 r= .342, p= .000 r= .162, p= .006 
2005 r= .213, p= .000 r= .236, p= .000 r= .195, p= .000 r= .204, p= .000 r= .209, p= .003 
2012 r= .163, p= .000 x r= .147, p= .028 r= .120, p= .025 r= .278, p= .000 
 
Appendix 516 
Correlations between “having a higher level of formal education” and “believing that sex before marriage is justifiable” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
2012 r= .135, p= .000 x r= .145, p= .028 r= .119, p= .026 r= .162, p= .028 
 
Appendix 517 
Correlations between “having a higher level of formal education” and “Disagreeing that when jobs are scarce men should 
have more right to a job than women” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1995 r= .103, p= .000 x r= .149, p= .001 r= .205, p= .000 x 
2005 r= .085, p= .003 r= .158, p= .014 x x r= .147, p= .033 
2012 r= .114, p= .000 x r= .136, p= .040 x r= .257, p= .000 
 
Appendix 518 
Correlations between “having a higher level of formal education” and “Disagreeing that when jobs are scarce older 
people should be forced to retire from work early” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1995 r= .130, p= .000 r= .112, p= .004 r= .139, p= .001 r= .229, p= .000 x 
 
Appendix 519 
Correlations between “having a higher level of formal education” and “Disagreeing that when jobs are scarce employers 
should give priority to Australians over immigrants” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1995 r= .176, p= .000 r= .130, p= .001 r= .146, p= .001 r= .325, p= .000 r= .119, p= .046 
2005 r= .114, p= .000 r= .168, p= .009 r= .138, p= .010 r= .104, p= .049 x 
2012 r= .185, p= .000 x r= .140, p= .035 r= .233, p= .000 r= .229, p= .002 
 
Appendix 520 





Correlations between “having a higher level of formal education” and “believing that one should follow one’s superior’s 
instructions only when one is convinced that they are right” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1995 r= .108, p= .000 r= .136, p= .000 r= .135, p= .002 r= .092, p= .086 x 
 
Appendix 521 
Correlations between “having a higher level of formal education” and “Not believing in the importance of children 
learning imagination” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 r= -.138, p= .002 r= -.189, p= .006 r= -.140, p= .099 x x 
1995 r= -.137, p= .000 r= -.122, p= .001 r= -.165, p= .000 x r= -.183, p= .002 
2005 r= -.075, p= .009 x r= -.094, p= .076 x x 
2012 r= -.084, p= .009 x x r= -.088, p= .098 r= -.143, p= .051 
 
Appendix 522 
Correlations between “having a higher level of formal education” and “Not believing in the importance of children 
learning self-expression” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
2012 r= -.067, p= .037 x x x r= -.125, p= .088 
 
Appendix 523 
Correlations between “having a higher level of formal education” and “Not believing in the importance of children 
learning obedience” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 x x x x x 
1995 r= .124, p= .000 r= .106, p= .006 r= .116, p= .007 r= .117, p= .028 r= .105, p= .074 
2005 r= .187, p= .000 r= .129, p= .046 r= .177, p= .001 r= .261, p= .000 r= .126, p= .067 
2012 r= .192, p= .000 r= .261, p= .000 r= .140, p= .034 r= .170, p= .001 r= .247, p= .001 
 
Appendix 524 
Correlations between “having a higher level of formal education” and “Not believing in the importance of children 
learning thrift” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 x x x x x 
1995 r= .088, p= .000 x r= .074, p= .086 r= .131, p= .014 r= .104, p= .077 
2005 r= .132, p= .000 r= .209, p= .001 r= .193, p= .000 r= .117, p= .027 x 
2012 r= .175, p= .000 r= .260, p= .000 r= .140, p= .035 r= .109, p= .039 r= .285, p= .000 
 
Appendix 525 
Correlations between “having a higher level of formal education” and “Not believing in the importance of children 
learning hard work” 





 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 x x x x x 
1995 r= .044, p= .050 x r= .087, p= .044 x x 
2005 r= .085, p= .003 x r= .103, p= .054 r= .098, p= .064 x 
2012 r= .146, p= .000 r= .152, p= .041 r= .144, p= .030 r= .131, p= .013 r= .171, p= .019 
 
Appendix 526 
Correlations between “having a higher level of formal education” and “Not being proud to be Australian” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 r= .077, p= .089 x x x x 
1995 r= .123, p= .000 r= .113, p= .004 r= .089, p= .039 r= .097, p= .069 r= .170, p= .004 
2005 r= .090, p= .002 x r= .111, p= .036 r= .116, p= .029 x 
2012 r= .164, p= .000 x r= .121, p= .067 r= .161, p= .002 r= .246, p= .001 
 
Appendix 527 
Correlations between “having a higher level of formal education” and “believing that accepting bribes in the course of 
one’s duties is justifiable” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 x x x x x 
1995 r= -.042, p= .062 x x x r= -.098, p= .097 
2005 r= -.062, p= .034 x x r= -.138, p= .010 x 
2012 x r= .130, p= .083 x x x 
 
Appendix 528 
Correlations between “having a higher level of formal education” and “believing that buying something you knew was 
stolen is justifiable” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 x x x x r= -.301, p= .047 
1995 r= -.058, p= .010 x x x x 
 
Appendix 529 
Correlations between “having a higher level of formal education” and “believing that cheating on taxes if you have a 
chance is justifiable” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 x x x x x 
1995 x x x x r= -.101, p= .085 
2005 x x x x x 
2012 x r= .142, p= .058 x x x 
 
Appendix 530 





Correlations between “having a higher level of formal education” and “believing that avoiding a fare on public transport is 
justifiable” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 x x x x r= -.333, p= .027 
1995 x x x x x 
2005 x x x x r= .119, p= .084 
2012 r= .109, p= .001 r= .142, p= .057 x r= .144, p= .006 x 
 
Appendix 531 
Correlations between “having a higher level of formal education” and “believing that claiming government benefits to 
which you are not entitled is justifiable” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 x x x x x 
1995 r= -.089, p= .000 x r= -.124, p= .004 x r= -.099, p= .092 
2005 x x x x x 
2012 x x x x x 
 
Appendix 532 
Correlations between “having a higher level of formal education” and “believing that stealing property is justifiable” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
2012 r= .109, p= .001 r= .143, p= .056 x r= .172, p= .001 x 
 
Appendix 533 
Correlations between “having a higher level of formal education” and “having attended peaceful demonstrations in the 
previous five years” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
2005 r= .133, p= .000 r= .122, p= .060 r= .156, p= .003 r= .126, p= .018 x 
2012 x x r= -.272, p= .067 x x 
 
Appendix 534 
Correlations between “having a higher level of formal education” and “having joined in boycotts in the previous five 
years” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
2005 r= .133, p= .000 x r= .152, p= .004 r= .117, p= .028 r= .196, p= .005 
2012 r= -.133, p= .088 x x x x 
 
Appendix 535 
Correlations between “having a higher level of formal education” and “having signed petitions in the previous five years” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
2005 r= .125, p= .000 x r= .094, p= .077 r= .158, p= .003 r= .126, p= .066 





2012 x x x x x 
 
Appendix 536 
Correlations between “having a higher level of formal education” and “having less confidence in the UN” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1995 x x x r= .106, p= .051 x 
2005 r= -.068, p= .019 r= -.148, p= .022 x x x 
2012 r= -.064, p= .047 x x r= -.093, p= .082 x 
 
Appendix 537 
Correlations between “having a higher level of formal education” and “having less confidence in the civil service” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 x r= .122, p= .077 x x x 
1995 x x r= -.089, p= .043 x x 
2005 r= -.069, p= .017 x x x r= -.142, p= .040 
2012 r= -.156, p= .000 x r= -.144, p= .030 r= -.218, p= .000 x 
 
Appendix 538 
Correlations between “having a higher level of formal education” and “having less confidence in parliament” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 x x x x x 
1995 r= -.148, p= .000 r= -.161, p= .000 r= -.231, p= .000 r= -.110, p= .041 r= -.123, p= .038 
2005 r= -.145, p= .000 r= -.164, p= .000 x r= -.112, p= .034 r= -.290, p= .000 
2012 r= -.189, p= .000 r= -.230, p= .002 r= -.205, p= .002 r= -.209, p= .000 x 
 
Appendix 539 
Correlations between “having a higher level of formal education” and “having less confidence in political parties” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1995 r= -.056, p= .015 r= -.139, p= .000 r= -.098, p= .025 x x 
2005 r= -.059, p= .042 r= -.116, p= .071 x x r= -.136, p= .050 
2012 r= -.088, p= .006 x x r= -.098, p= .069 x 
 
Appendix 540 
Correlations between “having a higher level of formal education” and “having less confidence in the national 
government” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1995 r= -.102, p= .000 r= -.180, p= .000 r= -.183, p= .000 x x 
2005 x x x x r= -.119, p= .088 
2012 r= -.160, p= .000 x r= -.227, p= .001 r= -.194, p= .000 x 
 
Appendix 541 





Correlations between “having a higher level of formal education” and “having less confidence in police” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 x r= .138, p= .043 x x x 
1995 r= .074, p= .001 x x r= .195, p= .000 r= .114, p= .054 
2005 r= .057, p= .051 x r= .105, p= .049 x x 
2012 r= .116, p= .000 x x r= .125, p= .019 r= .220, p= .003 
 
Appendix 542 
Correlations between “having a higher level of formal education” and “having less confidence in labour unions” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 x r= -.146, p= .033 x r= .240, p= .027 x 
1995 r= -.041, p= .073 x r= -.137, p= .002 x x 
2005 r= -.064, p= .028 x r= -.090, p= .094 r= -.128, p= .015 x 
2012 r= -.054, p= .097 x x r= -.108, p= .045 x 
 
Appendix 543 
Correlations between “having a higher level of formal education” and “having less confidence in TV” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1995 r= .107, p= .000 x x r= .102, p= .059 r= .154, p= .009 
2005 r= .106, p= .000 x r= .139, p= .009 r= .143, p= .007 x 
2012 x x r= .152, p= .022 x x 
 
Appendix 544 
Correlations between “having a higher level of formal education” and “having less confidence in the press” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 x x r= -.143, p= .095 r= .243, p= .026 x 
1995 x r= -.080, p= .038 x x x 
2005 x x x x x 
2012 x r= -.150, p= .045 x r= -.132, p= .013 x 
 
Appendix 545 
Correlations between “having a higher level of formal education” and “having less confidence in the legal system” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 x x x x x 
1995 r= -.047, p= .040 r= -.093, p= .016 r= -.090, p= .039 x x 
2005 r= -.082, p= .005 r= -.134, p= .037 x r= -.088, p= .095 x 
2012 r= -.147, p= .000 r= -.192, p= .010 r= -.253, p= .000 r= -.127, p= .018 x 
 
Appendix 546 
Correlations between “having a higher level of formal education” and “having less confidence in the Armed forces” 





 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 r= .163, p= .000 r= .256, p= .000 x x x 
1995 r= .086, p= .000 x r= .119, p= .006 r= .161, p= .003 x 
2005 r= .119, p= .000 x r= .105, p= .049 r= .155, p= .003 x 
2012 r= .148, p= .000 x x r= .137, p= .010 r= .205, p= .005 
 
Appendix 547 
Correlations between “having a higher level of formal education” and “having less confidence in churches” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 x x x x r= .251, p= .096 
1995 x x x r= .100, p= .063 x 
2005 x x x r= .096, p= .069 x 
2012 x x x x x 
 
Appendix 548 
Correlations between “having a higher level of formal education” and “having less confidence in charitable/humanitarian 
organisations” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
2005 r= -.086, p= .003 x r= -.102, p= .057 r= -.135, p= .011 x 
2012 r= -.131, p= .000 x r= -.179, p= .007 r= -.173, p= .001 r= -.147, p= .046 
 
Appendix 549 
Correlations between “having a higher level of formal education” and “having less confidence in the environmental 
protection movement” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
2005 r= -.065, p= .025 x r= -.109, p= .041 r= -.132, p= .012 x 
2012 r= -.110, p= .001 x x r= -.165, p= .002 x 
 
Appendix 550 
Correlations between “having a higher level of formal education” and “having less confidence in banks” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
2012 x x x x x 
 
Appendix 551 
Correlations between “having a higher level of formal education” and “being less involved in charitable organisations” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 r= -.093, p= .032 r= -.236, p= .000 x x x 
1995 r= -.067, p= .003 x r= -.078, p= .071 x x 
2005 r= .121, p= .000 x x r= .108, p= .048 r= .191, p= .007 
2012 r= .100, p= .002 r= .138, p= .064 x x x 
 






Correlations between “having a higher level of formal education” and “being less involved in professional associations” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 r= -.309, p= .000 r= -.333, p= .000 r= -.350, p= .000 x x 
1995 r= -.292, p= .000 r= -.227, p= .000 r= -.333, p= .000 r= -.311, p= .000 r= -.275, p= .000 
2005 r= .203, p= .000 x r= .170, p= .002 r= .236, p= .000 r= .177, p= .017 
2012 r= .334, p= .000 r= .340, p= .000 r= .326, p= .000 r= .339, p= .000 r= .269, p= .000 
 
Appendix 553 
Correlations between “having a higher level of formal education” and “being less involved in environmental 
organisations” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 r= -.076, p= .083 x x x x 
1995 r= -.104, p= .000 x r= -156, p= .000 r= -.195, p= .000 x 
2005 r= .099, p= .001 x r= .118, p= .028 r= .098, p= .074 r= .126, p= .088 
2012 r= .105, p= .001 r= .192, p= .010 x r= .088, p= .097 x 
 
Appendix 554 
Correlations between “having a higher level of formal education” and “being less involved in political parties” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 r= -.081, p= .063 x r= -.210, p= .013 x x 
1995 r= -.090, p= .000 x r= -.164, p= .000 x x 
2005 x x x x x 
2012 x x x x x 
 
Appendix 555 
Correlations between “having a higher level of formal education” and “being less involved in labour unions” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 x x x x x 
1995 x x x x x 
2005 r= .062, p= .037 x x r= .149, p= .006 x 
2012 r= .069, p= .034 x x r= .123, p= .021 x 
 
Appendix 556 
Correlations between “having a higher level of formal education” and “being less involved in art, music and educational 
organisations” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 r= -.152, p= .000 x r= -.254, p= .002 x x 
1995 r= -.207, p= .000 r= -.188, p= .000 r= -.320, p= .000 r= -.216, p= .000 r= -.207, p= .000 
2005 r= .211, p= .000 x r= .202, p= .000 r= .259, p= .000 r= .259, p= .000 





2012 r= .238, p= .000 r= .283, p= .000 r= .232, p= .000 r= .232, p= .000 r= .256, p= .001 
 
Appendix 557 
Correlations between “having a higher level of formal education” and “being less involved in sport/recreational 
organisations” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1995 r= -.041, p= .071 r= -.082, p= .032 r= -.075, p= .083 x x 
2005 x x x x r= .118, p= .098 
2012 r= .094, p= .004 x r= .194, p= .003 r= .104, p= .049 x 
 
Appendix 558 
Correlations between “having a higher level of formal education” and “being less involved in church/religious 
organisations” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 x x x x x 
1995 x x x x r= -.100, p= .090 
2005 x x x x x 
2012 x x r= -.119, p= .074 x x 
 
Appendix 559 
Correlations between “having a higher level of formal education” and “being less involved in church/religious 
organisations when religious service attendance is not a control variable” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 r= -.085, p= .015 r= -.112, p= .032 x x x 
1995 r= -.054, p= .015 r= -.109, p= .005 x x x 
2005 r= .058, p= .048 x x x x 
2012 r= .145, p= .000 x x r= .147, p= .006 r= .258, p= .000 
 
Appendix 560 
Correlations between “having a higher level of formal education” and “being less involved in consumer organisations” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
2005 x x x x x 
2012 x x x x x 
 
Appendix 561 
Correlations between “having a higher level of formal education” and “unhappiness” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 x r= -.190, p= .005 x x x 
1995 x x x x r= -.111, p= .059 
2005 r= -.064, p= .027 x r= -.113, p= .033 x x 





2012 x x x x x 
 
Appendix 562 
Correlations between “having a higher level of formal education” and “Life Satisfaction” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 x x x x x 
1995 x x x x x 
2005 r= .051, p= .079 x x x x 
2012 x x x x x 
 
Appendix 563 
% of Australian WVS participants within different age groups who rated their “feelings of autonomy” between 1 and 7 out of 
10 i.e. feeling less autonomous 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 49.1 48.7 49.6 46.3 46.3 
1995 41.3 42.8 43.1 41.3 33.8 
2005 39.8 40.1 43.0 39.1 36.1 
2012 34.5 36.1 35.7 35.5 30.9 
 
Appendix 564 
% of Australian WVS participants within different age groups who believed it was important for children to learn thrift 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 15.5 12.6 13.7 19.0 25.2 
1995 18.5 18.2 14.1 20.2 24.0 
2005 33.5 26.3 29.9 37.4 38.9 
2012 30.7 26.3 24.8 35.3 32.0 
 
Appendix 565 
Correlations between “watching more TV” and “believing that most people ‘cannot’ be trusted” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1995 x x x x x 
 
Appendix 566 
% of Australian WVS participants within different age groups who attended religious/church services at least once a month 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
1981 39.6 41.4 35.9 39.2 39.8 
1995 24.6 19.7 23.6 25.1 32.4 
2005 20.9 12.4 15.0 20.0 36.8 
2012 19.2 16.7 14.6 15.4 29.1 
 
Appendix 567 





Correlations between “women being housewives (as opposed to working part-time)” and “believing that one’s country is 
run for the benefit of all people, rather than for a few big interests” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 





Political participation and conflict avoidance: how network homogeneity affects the electoral and party engagement of 
Australian youth 
Q1: What is your survey participation code number?  
Q2: What is your date of birth 
Q3: Which of the following best represents your ethnic heritage? 
White/Caucasian;     Australian Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander;      
Black/Sub-Saharan African;     Latino or Hispanic;     East Asian;      
South Asian/Indian Subcontinent;     North African,     Middle Eastern or Arab;      
First Nations of USA, Canada or Greenland;     Maori or Pacific Islander 
Q4: Which of the following best represent your ancestry? 
British; Irish; Italian; French, Greek; German; Chinese; Vietnamese;  
other please specify …………………… 
Q5: In which country were you born?  
Q6: If you were born overseas, in what year did you first arrive in Australia to live here for one year or more? 
Q7: In which country was your mother born? 
Q8: In which country was your father born?  
Q9: Is English the language you spoke first? 
Q10: Do you speak a language other than English? 
Q11: There is a difference between tolerance and agreement. You may disagree with beliefs and practices but tolerate them 
because you believe they are within the realm of legitimate/morally permissible views and behaviours. To what extent do 
you believe you are tolerant of people holding political views with which you disagree (i.e. how broad is your conception of 
the realm of legitimate beliefs and practices)? 
Extremely tolerant;     Very tolerant;     Somewhat tolerant;     Less tolerant than most;     Very intolerant;     Extremely 
intolerant 
Q12: What is your Marital Status?  
In a De facto relationship lasting more than two years;     Never married;      
Widowed;     Divorced;     Separated but not divorced; 
Q13: In what city, suburb or town do you reside?  
Q14: What is the postcode of your home address? 
Q15: When was the last time your usual living address changed? 
Q16: What is the approximate distance between your current/usual living address and your last? 
Within: 
10 minutes walking distance;     10 minutes driving distance;      
30 minutes driving distance;      
1 hours driving distance;     more than 1 hours driving distance;      





Reasonably a plane or long train journey is required; 
Q17: How many children do you have (including adopted, foster and step children)? 
Q18: How many siblings do you have (including adopted, foster and step siblings)? 
Q19: Where would you place your mother on the following class scale at the time when you were 12 years old? 
Unemployed or part-time-employed welfare recipient  
Working class (Factory workers, clerical workers, retail sales, low paid crafts people) 
Lower middle class (Semi-professionals and lower managers, craftspeople) 
Upper middle class (Professionals and upper managers) 
Upper class (Executives of large corporations and very wealthy investors) 
 
Q20: Where would you place your father on the following class scale at the time when you were 12 years old? 
Unemployed or part-time-employed welfare recipient  
Working class (Factory workers, clerical workers, retail sales, low paid crafts people) 
Lower middle class (Semi-professionals and lower managers, craftspeople) 
Upper middle class (Professionals and upper managers) 
Upper class (Executives of large corporations and very wealthy investors) 
 
Q21: At that time what was the status of your parents’ relationship? 
Married;     in a De Facto relationship;     Separated or divorced;     Widowed; 
    Other ……………………. (specify) 
Q22: Where would you place yourself on the following class scale? 
Married;     in a De Facto relationship;     Separated or divorced;     Widowed; 
    Other ……………………. (specify) 
Q23: Where would you have placed yourself on this class scale seven years ago? 
Married;     in a De Facto relationship;     Separated or divorced;     Widowed; 
    Other ……………………. (specify) 
Q24: What is your occupation?  
Q25: How many hours per week do you work (includes any additional hours you work for home)?  
Q26: What percentage of this time do you work from home?  
Q27: To what extent does your work require you work in a team or group? 
Always;    Nearly always;     Often;     Occasionally;     Rarely;     Hardly ever;     Never 
Q28: How often do you converse with others in your work environment?  
Constantly;     Often;     Occasionally;     Rarely;     Hardly ever;     Never 
Q29: How many other people live at your address?  
Q30: On average, approximately how many hours do you spend each week looking at screens (TV, phone, computer, tablet 
and cinema) outside of working hours? 
Q31: On average, approximately how many hours do you spend each week listening to music (or other audio) using a single 
person listening device (eg smartphone, ipod, walkman)? 
Q32: On average, approximately how many hours do you spend each week communicating with people using the internet 
(e.g. sending and receiving emails, social media messages/posts and voice and video calls) outside of work hours? 
Q33: Approximately what percentage of this time are you communicating with people who:  





- you are unable to see in person on a regular basis due to geographical constraints/distance? 
- you first met online? 
Q34: What percentage of your close friends have you met initially online? 
Q35: If you are currently in a romantic/long term committed relationship did you initially meet your partner online? 
Q36: How often each year do you attend a religious service (excluding baptisms, marriages, and funerals)? 
Q37: Approximately how many close friends, close work colleagues, close family members and close others do you have 
these days? Write numbers, not names, in the boxes below. These are people with whom you feel comfortable talking to 
about serious and private matters and who you can call on for help. Indicate at least 3 but no more than 15 of these people 
in total. (Write the names of these people on a separate piece of paper. This is for your benefit only. Do not submit this 
piece of paper with the survey. This list will assist you to answer questions later in the survey)  
- Close friends  
- Close work colleagues  
- Close family members  
- other 
Q38: If you suddenly needed a small amount of money [RURAL: enough to pay for expenses for your household for one 
week; URBAN: equal to about one week’s wages], how many people beyond your immediate household could you turn to 
who would be willing to provide this money? 
Q39: If you suddenly had to go away for a day or two, could you count on your neighbours to take care of your children? (If 
you do not have young children imagine you did). 
Q40: If you suddenly faced a long-term emergency such as the death of a breadwinner or [RURAL: harvest failure; URBAN: 
job loss], how many people beyond your immediate household could you turn to who would be willing to assist you? 
Q41: In the past 12 months, how many people, close to you, with a significant personal problem have turned to you for 
assistance in the form of money or shelter? 
Q42: In general, do you agree or disagree with the following statements?  
- Most people can be trusted.  
- You can't be too careful in your dealings with other people.  
Q43: How much do you trust the people in these categories?  
1. To a very small extent 
2. To a small extent 
3. Neither small nor great extent 
4. To a great extent 
5. To a very great extent 
 
People from your ethnic or linguistic group:  
People from other ethnic or linguistic groups: 
Shopkeepers:  
Local government officials:  
State government officials:  
Federal government officials:  
Police: 






Nurses and doctors:  
Strangers:  
Post office staff:  
Judges and staff of courts:  
Staff of NGOs:  
Q44: In the last twelve months did you contribute any time or money to a voluntary charity which does not directly benefit 
you?  
- Time hrs: 
- Money $: 
Q45: Suppose something unfortunate happened to someone in your town/neighbourhood, such as a serious illness, or the 
death of a parent. How likely is it that some people in the community would get together to help them? 
1. Very likely 
2. Somewhat likely 
3. Neither likely or unlikely 
4. Somewhat unlikely 
5. Very unlikely 
Q46: How many times in the last month have you read a newspaper, political/news journal or magazine or had one read to 
you? 
Q47: What are your THREE most important sources of information concerning government policy and implementation? 
1. Relatives, friends and neighbours  9. Business or work associates 
2. Community bulletin board   10. Political associates 
3. Local market    11. Community leaders 
4. Community or local newspaper  12. An agent of the government  
5. National newspaper   13. NGOs 
6. Radio     14. Internet 
7. Television     15. Political/news Journal or Magazine  
8. Groups and associates 
 
Q48: In the last month, how many times have you met with people (outside your immediate family) in a public place either 
to talk or to have food or drinks? 
Q49: In the last month, how many times have people (outside your immediate family) visited you in your home? 
Q50: In the last month, how many times have you visited people (outside your immediate family) in their home? 
Q51: Were the people you met and visited with mostly 
Yes/No  
Of different ethnic or linguistic group:  
Of different economic status:  
Of different social status:  
Of different religious group:  
Q52: In the last THREE months, how many times have you gotten together with people (outside your immediate family) to 
play games, sports, or other recreational activities? 





Q53: How many times in the past TWELVE months did you participate in a family/friends/community/town/neighbourhood 
festival or ceremony (wedding, funeral, religious festival, ANZAC day march etc.)? 
Q54: In your opinion, is your town/neighbourhood generally peaceful or marked by violence? 
1. Very peaceful 
2. Moderately peaceful 
3. Neither peaceful nor violent 
4. Moderately violent 
5. Very violent 
Q55: How safe do you feel when walking down your street alone after dark? 
1. Very safe 
2. Moderately safe 
3. Neither safe nor unsafe 
4. Moderately unsafe 
5. Very unsafe 
Q56: In the past 12 months, have you or anyone in your household been the victim of a violent crime, such as assault or 
mugging? Yes/No 
Q57: If "Yes". How many times?  
Q58: In the past 12 months, has your house been burglarized or vandalized? Yes/No 
Q59: If "Yes". How many times?  
Q60: In general, how happy do you consider yourself to be? 
1. Very happy 
2. Moderately happy 
3. Neither happy nor unhappy 
4. Moderately unhappy 
5. Very unhappy 
Q61: How much control do you feel you have in making decisions that affect you and your life course? Do you have … 
1. No control 
2. Control over very few decisions 
3. Control over some decisions 
4. Control over most decisions 
5. Control over all decisions 
Q62: Generally speaking most people and politicians know and agree what has to be done. Most political debate, 
negotiation and compromise are therefore unnecessary, distract people and politicians from the big picture and 
slows/waters down widely accepted policy positions. To what extent do you agree? 
1. Strongly agree      2. Mildly agree      3. Depends       
4. Mildly disagree       5. Strongly disagree 
Q63: There is little to be learnt or achieved by discussing politics informally with people who strongly disagree with your 
views. It’s unpleasant and neither side is likely to change their mind. To what extent do you agree? 
1. Strongly agree      2. Mildly agree      3. Depends       
4. Mildly disagree       5. Strongly disagree 
Q64: Formal politics is a win-lose zero-sum game between competing interests. Compromise is ultimately a loss for all 
parties involved. To what extent do you agree? 





1. Strongly agree      2. Mildly agree      3. Depends       
4. Mildly disagree       5. Strongly disagree 
Q65: Some people say that no matter who people vote for, it won’t make any difference to what happens. Others say that 
who people vote for can make a big difference to what happens. Where would you place yourself? 
6. Can make an enormous difference 
7. Can make a significant difference 
8. Can make some difference 
9. Will make little difference  
10. Won’t make any difference 
Q66: To what extent are you able to persuade other people, with different political views from your own, of the merits of 
your political arguments? 
1. A great extent      2. Some extent       3. Depends 
 4. Hardly ever       5. Never 
Q67: How many times in the past month have you discussed and debated political issues with people who disagreed with 
your views regarding the issue(s) discussed? 
Q68: Is voting at Federal and State elections worthwhile? 
- Yes definitely 
- Probably 
- Not Sure 
- Probably not 
- Not at all 
Q69: Would you say that local, state and federal governments are run by a few big interests looking out for themselves, or 
that they are run for the benefit of all the people?  
1. Entirely run for the big interests 
2. Mostly run for the big interests 
3. About half and half 
4. Mostly run for the benefit of all 




Q70: To what extent do local, state and federal governments and politicians take into account concerns voiced by you and 




Q71: In the past 12 months, how many times have you done the following?  
- Attended a town/neighbourhood council meeting, public hearing, or public discussion group  
- Organised or signed a written or online petition  





- Met with a politician, called him/her, or sent a letter/email  
- Participated in a protest or demonstration  
- Participated in an information or election campaign  
- Alerted newspaper, radio or TV to a local problem  
- Notified police or court about a local problem  
Q72: To what extent do you believe these attempts at political influence, by others, are effective? 
Somewhat effective 
Q73: To what extent do you believe your own such attempts at political influence are (or would be) effective? 
1. Very effective 
2. Somewhat effective 
3. usually ineffective 
4. Not effective at all 
 
Q74: How many different products have you bought or boycotted for moral or political reasons (excluding those you bought 
or boycotted because they were, or were not, Australian) in the past 12 months? 
Q75: Generally speaking, how much interest do you usually have in what’s going on in politics? 
- A good deal 
- Some 
- Not much 
- None 
Q76: Would you have voted in the last federal election if voting had not been compulsory? 
Definitely would have voted 
Probably would have voted 
Possibly 
Probably would not have voted 
Definitely would not have voted 




Q78: Did you cast ‘formal votes’ (ballots that were correctly marked and would thus have been counted) at the last House of 
Assembly (lower house) and Legislative council (upper house) state elections? (If you reside in Queensland, the NT or the 
ACT write N/A under Legislative Council) Yes, No or N/A  
- House of Assembly 
- Legislative Council 
Q79: If you intentionally cast an informal vote at the last state election, why and what form did it take? 
Q80: Did you cast ‘formal votes’ (ballots that were correctly marked and would thus have been counted) at the last House of 
Representatives (lower house) and Senate (upper house) federal elections? Yes or No  
- House of Representatives 






Q81: If you intentionally cast an informal vote at the last federal election, why and what form did it take? 
Q82: Have your voting patterns (the parties you’ve voted for) in the House of Representatives changed over the last 10 years 
(for those younger than 28 since you began voting)? 
1. Yes, both my ‘primary vote’ (first preference) and my ‘two party preferred vote’ (the major party, liberal or labor, I 
ranked higher) changed. 
2. Yes, my primary vote changed but my two-party preferred vote stayed the same. 
3. Yes, my two-party preferred vote changed but my primary vote staged the same. 
4. No, neither my two-party preferred nor primary vote has changed. 
5. I have not voted 
6. I have not cast a formal/valid vote 
Q83: Do you normally vote for minor parties and/or independents in senate elections?  
1. Yes        2. No        3. Don’t vote       4. Don’t vote formally (cast a valid vote) 
Q84: Do you normally vote ‘1’ above the line, or number all candidates below the line, on senate ballots? 
 1. Vote above the line          2. Vote below the line            3. Don’t vote 
 4. Don’t vote formally (cast a valid vote) 
Q85: Would you ever vote for a candidate who was not from your ethnic or linguistic group/race/caste/tribe? Yes/No 
Q86: Which do you think is better – when the Federal Government has a majority in both the House of Representatives and 
the Senate, OR when the Federal Government in the House of Representatives does not control the Senate? 
6. Much better when Government controls both 
7. Better when Government controls both 
8. Neither / doesn’t matter 
9. Better when Government does not control the Senate 
10. Much better when Government does not control the Senate 
Q87: On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way democracy 
works in Australia? 
Q88: Would you support changing the electoral system in the House of Representatives from The Alternative Vote: 
preferential voting in single member electorates in which a candidate must receive a majority (50% plus one) of the votes in 
a constituency to be elected to parliament. Voters do not have the choice of voting between members of the same party 
and the share of votes parties’ receive in elections do not match the share of seats they win. Voters must rank order all 
candidates to cast a valid vote. The system tends to produce majority government (one party possessing a majority of seats). 
TO 
The Hare Clark system: preferential voting in multi member electorates (best between 5 and 7 per electorate) in which 
candidates must receive a quota (approx. 16.7% in 5 member electorates, 14.3% in 6 member electorates and 12.5% in 7 
member electorates) of votes in a constituency to be elected to parliament. Voters have the choice of voting between 
members of the same as well as different parties and the share of votes parties’ receive in elections better match the share 
of seats they win. Voters must rank order at least as many candidates as there are seats to fill in that electorate, but may 
rank order more or all if they wish. The system tends to produce coalition or minority government in which a government 
either is formed from multiple parties or must negotiate with other parties and independents to pass legislation. 





Q89: To what extent do you trust Australian federal and state government institutions and processes to be fair and 
effective? 
- I have no trust  
- I have little trust  
- It depends 
- I have some trust  
- I have a great deal of trust 
Q90: I would like to know more about the groups or organisations, networks, associations to which you belong. These could 
be formally organised groups of just groups of people who get together regularly to do an activity or talk about things. 
Please indicate in the table below the number of groups (in each category) to which you belong, and how actively you 
participate in their decision making. If you indicated more than one group in any one category indicate how actively you 
participate in the decision making of the group you participate in the most. If you do not participate in any group within a 
category leave it blank.. Number of Organisations and Groups How actively do you participate in this group’s decision 
making?  
I would like to know more about the groups or organisations, networks, associations to which you belong. These could be 
formally organised groups of just groups of people who get together regularly to do an activity or talk about things. 
Please indicate in the table below the name of these groups and how actively you participate in their decision 
making. 
Type of Organisation or Group Number of Organisations and 
Groups 
How actively do you participate in 
this group’s decision making? 
1 = Leader 
2 = Very Active 
3 = Somewhat Active 
4 = Does not participate in decision 
making 
A. Political party, group or 
movement 
  
B. Farmer/Fisherman group or 
cooperative 
  
C. Other production group   
D. Traders or Business Association   
E. Professional Association (doctors, 
Teachers, veterans) 
  
F. Trade or Labour Union   
G. Neighbourhood/Town Committee   
H. Religious or spiritual group (e.g. 
church, mosque, temple, informal 
religious group, religious study 
group) 
  
I. Cultural group or association (e.g. 
arts, music, theatre, film) 
  





J. Festival society   
K. Finance, credit or savings group   
L. Education group (e.g. parent-
teacher association, school 
committee) 
  
M. Health group   
N. Water and waste management 
group 
  
O. Sports group   
P. Youth group   
Q. NGO or civic group (e.g. Rotary 
Club, Red Cross) 
  
R. Ethnic-based community group   
S. Other groups   
 
Q91: If you did not indicate belonging to any group in the previous set of questions skip to question 103. If you indicated 
belonging to at least one group continue. Of all the groups to which you belong, which two are the most important to you?  
Group 1 …………………… Group 2 ……………………. 
Q92: How many hours of work have you given to this group in the past 12 months e.g. by attending meetings, doing group 
work or volunteering as a member of this group? 
Group 1 …………………… Group 2 ……………………. 
Q93: How much money or goods have you contributed to this group in the past 12 months? Write the value in Australian 
dollars. If you are not comfortable answering this question skip it. 
Group 1 …………………… Group 2 ……………………. 
Q94: What is the main benefit from joining this group?  
1. Improves my or my household’s current livelihood or access to services 
2. Important in times of emergency/in future 
3. Benefits the community 
4. Enjoyment/Recreation 
5. Spiritual, social status, self-esteem 
6. Other (specify) 
Group 1 …………………… Group 2 ……………………. 
Q95: Thinking about the membership of your most important group, are most of them of the same … Yes/No  
A. Neighbourhood/Town  
B. Family or Kin group  
C. Religion  
D. Gender  
E. Age  
F. Ethnic or linguistic group  
 
Q96: Do members mostly have the same … 






- Occupation  
- Educational background or level  
Q97: Are members mostly of the same political viewpoint or belong to the same political party? Yes/No  
- Group 1 ……. 
- Group 2…….. 
Q98: Are some members richer or poorer than others, or do they all have mostly the same income level? Answers - Mixed 
rich/poor, Mostly the same, N/A 
Group 1 ……………. 
Group 2…………….. 
Q99: In the past five years*, has membership in the group declined, remained the same, or increased?[*TIME PERIOD CAN 
BE CLARIFIED BY SITUATING IT BEFORE/AFTER MAJOR EVENT] Answers  
1. Declined 
2. Remained the same 
3. Increased 
Group 1 …………………… Group 2 ……………………. 
 
Q100: When there is a decision to be made in the group, how does this usually come about? Answers  
1. Decision is imposed from outside 
2. The leader decides and informs the other group members 
3. The leader asks group members what they think and then decides 
4. The group members hold a discussion and decide together 
5. Other (specify) ……………………… 
Group 1 …………………… Group 2 ……………………. 
Q101: How are leaders in this group selected? Answers  
1. By an outside person or entity 
2. Each leader chooses his/her successor 
3. By a small group of members 
4. By decision/vote of all members 
5. Other (specify)  
Group 1 …………………… Group 2 ……………………. 
Q102: Overall, how effective is the group’s leadership? Answers  
1. Very effective 
2. Somewhat effective 
3. Not effective 
Group 1 …………………… Group 2 ……………………. 
Q103-116 : In question 38 of the “Survey Monkey” component of this survey you were asked to write down the names of 
close friends, close work colleagues, close family members and close others on a separate piece of paper.  For each 
question in the table below indicate which category best applies to you (Y) and those which best apply to your 
close friends (Fri), work colleagues (WC), family members (Fa) and others (Oth).  
 





Below is an example of how to answer the first question on “Age” indicating that the respondent was aged 25-29 and had six 
people close to them in their life: 
- Three close friends (one aged 18 - 24 and the other two aged 25-29) 
- One close Work Colleague ages 60 -79 
- Two close Family members both aged 45 – 59 
The person had no other people close to them in their life. 
Question Category Y Fri WC Fa Oth 
Age 13 - 17      
18 - 24  1    
25 - 29 1 2    
30 - 44      
45 - 59    2  
60 - 79   1   
80+      
Definitely do not know      
 
 
Question Category Y Fri WC Fa Oth 
Q: 103 
Age 
13 - 17      
18 - 24      
25 - 29      
30 - 44      
45 - 59      
60 - 79      
80+      
Definitely do not know      
Question Category Y Fri WC Fa Oth 
Q: 104 
Gender 
Male      
Female      
Transgender or Other      
Definitely do not know      
Question Category Y Fri WC Fa Oth 
Q: 105 
Sexuality 
Exclusively Heterosexual      
Exclusively Same Sex Attracted      
Bisexual or Pansexual      
Other      
Don’t know      
Would prefer not to answer      
Question Category Y Fri WC Fa Oth 
Q: 106 Born in Australia.      





Country of birth Born in an English speaking country outside of 
Australia. 
     
Born in a Non-English speaking country.      
Definitely do not know      
Question Category Fri WC Fa Oth 
Q107: 
Are these members of your 
close social network also 
members of your ethnic or 
linguistic group 
Yes     
No     
Definitely do not know     
Question Category Y Fri WC Fa Oth 
Q:108 
English Language Proficiency 
Speak English very well      
Speak English well      
Speak English not well      
Speak English not well at all      
Definitely do not know      
Question Category Y Fri WC Fa Oth 
Q: 109 
Can speak another language 
other than English? 
Yes      
No      
Definitely do not know      
Question Category Y Fri WC Fa Oth 
Q: 110 
Have or had a parent born in 
another country? 
Yes, one or both parents born in an English 
speaking country outside Australia 
     
Yes, one or both parents born in Non-English 
speaking country 
     
No, both parents born in Australia      
Definitely do not know      
Question Category Y Fri WC Fa Oth 
Q: 111 
What is the level of the highest 
qualification completed? 
No qualification.      
Year 12 (High school)      
Certificate I or II      
Trade Certificate or  
Certificate III or IV 
     
Diploma      
Advanced Diploma or 
Associate Degree 
     
Bachelor Degree      
Bachelor Honours Degree 
Graduate Certificate 
Graduate Diploma 
     
Masters Degree      





Doctoral Degree      
Definitely do not know      
Question Category Y Fri WC Fa Oth 
Q: 112 
Main area of study for 
person’s highest qualification 
completed 
Creative and Performing Arts      
Trade      
Humanities and Social Science      
Health Science      
Hard, Computer and Mathematical Sciences, 
Engineering, and  Aviation 
     
Teaching      
Law      
Business       
Agriculture      
Other      
Definitely do not know      
Question Category Y Fri WC Fa Oth 
Q: 113 
Socio-economic status 
Unemployed or part-time-employed welfare 
recipient 
     
Working class (Factory workers, clerical workers, 
retail sales, low paid crafts people) 
     
Lower middle class (Semi-professionals and lower 
managers, craftspeople) 
     
Upper middle class (Professionals and upper 
managers) 
     
Upper class (Executives of large corporations and 
very wealthy investors) 
     
Student      
Definitely do not know      
Question Category Y Fri WC Fa Oth 
Q: 114 
Religion 
Roman Catholic       
Orthodox Christianity      
Anglican       
Evangelical/Pentecostal Christianity      
Non-Anglican and Non-Evangelical/Pentecostal 
Protestant 
     
Judaism       
Islam      
Buddhist      
Hindu      
No religion      





Other      
Definitely do not know      
Question Answer Y Fri WC Fa Oth 
Q: 115 
How important is religion to 
you and members of your 
close social network 
Very important      
Important      
Somewhat important      
Not at all important      
No religion      
Definitely do not know      
Question Answer Y Fri WC Fa Oth 
Q: 116 
How prepared are you and 
members of your close social 
network to discuss politics 
with others? 
Try to avoid getting into political discussions 
because they can be unpleasant. 
     
Enjoy discussing politics even though it sometimes 
leads to arguments. 
     
Somewhere in between previous two answers.      
Definitely do not know      
 
Q.117-146 Answer the following set of questions about your political views and those of your close friends, close 
work colleagues, close family members and close others (the same as you used in the previous set of questions).  
For every question in the table below indicate with which answer you most agree using a “1”, and with an “X” 
indicate which views you deem society should not tolerate in public debate about these issues (remember there is 
a difference between tolerating views in public debate and agreeing with them). Also, indicate with which answer 
each of those close to you are most likely to agree, given what you know about them and their politics.  
 
Below is an example of how to answer the first question on “Abortion.” It indicates that the respondent most supports the 
answer “Ban after the first trimester unless there is a significant danger to the mother or child’s health” and believes the 
answers “Pro-choice, no matter the circumstances or stage of the pregnancy” and “Pro-life, from conception, no matter the 
circumstances” should not be tolerated in public debate. This answer also indicates that the respondent had six people close 
to them in their life: 
- Three close friends (one who the respondents believes would most support “Ban after the first trimester 
unless there is a significant danger to the mother or child’s health”, another who the respondent believes 
would most support “Pro-life, but allow in cases of rape, incest, or danger to the mother or child's health”, 
and another who the respondent believes would most support “Pro-choice, I don't agree with it but it's not 
my right or the government's to ban abortion”) 
- One close Work Colleague who the respondent believes would most support “Pro-choice, I don't agree with it 
but it's not my right or the government's to ban abortion”. 
- Two close Family members who the respondent believes would both most support “Ban after the first 
trimester unless there is a significant danger to the mother or child’s health”. 
The person had no other people close to them in their life. 
Question Answers Y Fri WC Fa Oth 





What is your stance on 
abortion? 
Pro-choice, no matter the circumstances or stage of 
the pregnancy 
X     
Pro-life, from conception, no matter the 
circumstances 
X     
Ban after the first trimester unless there is a 
significant danger to the mother or child’s health 
1 1  2  
Pro-life, but allow in cases of rape, incest, or danger 
to the mother or child's health 
 1    
Pro-choice, I don't agree with it but it's not my right 
or the government's to ban abortion 
 1 1   
Definitely do not know      
 
 
Question Answers Y Fri WC Fa Oth 
Q: 117 
What is your stance on 
abortion? 
Pro-choice, no matter the circumstances or stage of 
the pregnancy 
     
Pro-life, from conception, no matter the 
circumstances 
     
Ban after the first trimester unless there is a 
significant danger to the mother or child’s health 
     
Pro-life, but allow in cases of rape, incest, or danger 
to the mother or child's health 
     
Pro-choice, I don't agree with it but it's not my right 
or the government's to ban abortion 
     
 Definitely do not know      
Question Answers Y Fri WC Fa Oth 
Q: 118 
Should section 18C of the 
Racial Discrimination Act be 
repealed or amended to 
protect freedom of speech. 
Yes, people should have the right to say and publish 
offensive words and ideas. Freedom of expression 
is an essential component of a liberal democratic 
society in which ideas, including mainstream and 
conservative ideas, can be challenged. 
     
No, there are rightly limitations on free speech and 
expression and the limitations prescribed in 18C are 
necessary and justified in a multicultural, 
multiethnic society. 
     
Definitely do not know      
Question Answers Y Fri WC Fa Oth 
Q: 119 
Should Australia allow same 
sex marriage? 
Yes, and obligate churches to marry homosexual 
couples 
     
Yes, but allow churches the right to refuse gay 
marriage ceremonies 
     





No, allow civil unions for same-sex couples but 
don't call it marriage 
     
No      
Take the government out of marriage and the 
recognition of marriage and instead allow religious 
and private institutions decide who they marry and 
recognise as married 
     
 Definitely do not know      
Question Answers Y Fri WC Fa Oth 
Q:120 
Should parental leave 
payments increase based on 
the mother's wage? 
Yes      
No, there should be no paid parental leave      
No, all mothers should get paid the same amount      
No, but increase the equal pay amount and 
duration of leave 
     
Definitely do not know      
Question Answers Y Fri WC Fa Oth 
Q:121 
Should terminally ill patients 
be allowed to end their lives 
via lethal injection? 
Yes      
Yes, but only after a psychological examination to 
prove they are in a sound mental state 
     
No      
No, but they should be able to refuse artificial life 
support 
     
Definitely do not know      
Question Answers Y Fri WC Fa Oth 
Q: 122 
Should the government make 
it mandatory for both the 
public sector and private 
corporations to meet quotas 
for employing women, and 
people of aboriginal descent, 
in senior positions? 
Yes, women and indigenous people remain 
discriminated against in the job market and are 
grossly underrepresented in senior management 
and corporate boards. Only affirmative action can 
bring about meaningful change. 
     
There should only be such quotas for public sector 
positions. Even though Australia is a federation, 
government/the public sector is largely 
monopolistic and should therefore not be allowed 
to discriminate. However, private corporations 
must compete not only in the consumer but also in 
the labour market. If a group is being “unfairly” 
discriminated against in the job market by certain 
corporations others are likely to make use of this 
under-tapped resource. 
     
There should be no such quotas. People should 
always be employed on merit. 
     





 Definitely do not know      
Question Answers Y Fri WC Fa Oth 
Q: 123 
Should Australia set a price 
on carbon emissions? 
No      
No, we should instead Provide a tax break for 
companies who fund and apply R&D into reducing 
their carbon footprint  
     
Yes, a Carbon Tax with a fixed price      
Yes, an Emissions Trading Scheme with a floating 
price 
     
Definitely do not know      
Question Answers Y Fri WC Fa Oth 
Q: 124 
Should the government allow 
the mining and export of 
Uranium? 
Yes      
No      
Yes, but only if exports go to countries which have 
signed the nuclear non-proliferation treaty 
     
Definitely do not know      
Question Answers Y Fri WC Fa Oth 
Q: 125 
Should the Australian 
government invest billions of 
dollars into the development 
of the National Broadband 
Network? 
Yes, a national high-speed fibre optic network is 
crucial for the future of Australia's economy 
     
No, there should be no government investment in 
this area. It should be entirely private 
     
No, focus on a wireless solution instead      
No, a more cost effective solution should be 
developed such as fibre to the node 
     
Definitely do not know      
Question Answers Y Fri WC Fa Oth 
Q: 126 
Should Australia raise taxes 
on the rich to increase 
spending on social services? 
Yes, but only on the rich      
No, lower taxes on all income brackets      
Reform to a flat tax      
Reform to a flat tax of 25% and grant each adult 
citizen the same refundable income tax credit equal 
to 25% of the average income per capita (i.e. 
provide those with lower (than average), and no, 
incomes with an income subsidy known as a 
Negative Income Tax). Then broaden and raise the 
GST. This scheme would help simplify both the tax 
and welfare systems. 
     
No, but lower taxes for the poor      
No, keep the current tax structure      
Yes, and raise taxes on all income brackets      
Abolish the income tax, disallow all deductions and      





increase the GST 
Lower income tax rates and remove all existing tax 
loopholes for large corporations 
     
Definitely do not know      
Question Answers Y Fri WC Fa Oth 
Q: 127 
Should the government 
deregulate the labour 
markets to increase 
employment, productivity 
and flexibility 
Yes, bring back ‘Work Choices’      
Yes, replace the minimum wage and collective 
bargaining with an income subsidy/minimum 
income in the form of a Negative Income Tax, like 
the one described in the fourth option to the 
previous question. 
     
No, it is better to have relatively higher 
unemployment but higher wages for the many, 
than to have lower unemployment and reduced 
wages for the many. 
     
No, increase industrial relations regulations to raise 
minimum wages and conditions for those who 
retain their jobs and hours. 
     
 Definitely do not know      
Question Answers Y Fri WC Fa Oth 
Q: 128 
Should the government 
always aim to achieve 
balanced budgets even in a 
recession? 
Yes, because governments which stimulate the 
economy through fiscal policy cannot be trusted to 
reduce/eliminate national debt in times of healthy 
economic growth. 
     
Yes, because fiscal stimulus raises inflation and 
interest rates 
     
Yes, instead governments should rely entirely on 
market forces and supply side stimulus (such as 
labour market deregulation) 
     
No, governments should spend more than they 
raise in taxes during recessions and spend less than 
they raise in taxes during booms 
     
No, governments should primarily rely on market 
forces and supply side stimulus (such as labour 
market deregulation) but should on rare occasions 
pursue fiscal stimulus in the face of a major 
recession. 
     
Definitely do not know      
Question Answers Y Fri WC Fa Oth 
Q: 129 
Should able-bodied, mentally 
Yes, adults who receive government benefits 
should be required to work 
     





capable adults who receive 
welfare be required to work? 
No, "workfare" is a form of slave labour      
No, but their benefits should expire after two years 
of unemployment 
     
No, but in order to receive benefits they should be 
looking for a job or enrolled in education and job 
training programs 
     
No, the unemployed and people with low incomes 
should be entitled to a minimum income/income-
subsidy in the form of a negative income tax. 
     
Definitely do not know      
Question Answers Y Fri WC Fa Oth 
Q: 130 
Should the federal 
government regulate the 
internet? 
No, do not censor or monitor data      
Yes, but only to prevent child pornography and 
copyright infringement 
     
Yes, but allow citizens the option to use a 
government funded internet filter and do not 
require ISPs to retain data 
     
Yes, maintain a blacklist of censored websites and 
require ISPs to retain data for two years for police 
investigations 
     
Definitely do not know      
Question Answers Y Fri WC Fa Oth 
Q: 131 
Should the government allow 
the export of live animals to 
foreign countries? 
Yes, live exports are crucial to the farming industry      
Yes, allow exports to countries which enforce 
animal cruelty laws 
     
No, ban all live exports      
Definitely do not know      




funding for mental health 
research and treatment? 
No, we cannot afford this right now      
No, this funding is not needed      
Yes,  this additional funding is needed and should 
be a priority 
     
Definitely do not know      
Question Answers Y Fri WC Fa Oth 
Q: 133 
Should marijuana be legalized 
in Australia? 
Yes      
No      
Yes, but only for medical use      
Yes, and immediately free all citizens jailed for drug 
offenses 
     





Yes. Legalize, tax, and regulate marijuana instead of 
criminalizing it 
     
No, and increase penalties for all non-violent drug 
offenders 
     
Definitely do not know      
Question Answers Y Fri WC Fa Oth 
Q: 134 
Should the government 
introduce a $7 GP co-
payment to help bring the 
budget back into surplus? 
Yes, people generally should be expected to 
contribute some money to their medical costs so 
long as there are exemptions (and limits on the 
number of co-payments a person shall be obliged 
to pay per year) for the elderly and people with 
chronic medical conditions. 
     
No, even a small co-payment undermines the 
fundamental principle of Medicare. There are far 
more fair and equitable ways to raise money. 
     
Definitely do not know      
Question Answers Y Fri WC Fa Oth 
Q: 135 
Australia currently spends 
$26.2B on military spending 
per year, roughly 1.5% of the 
world share, and 1.7% of 
GDP. Should the government 
increase military spending?  
Yes      
No      
No, reduce military spending      
Definitely do not know      
Question Answers Y Fri WC Fa Oth 
Q: 136 
Australia currently gives 
$5.44B in aid per year, ranked 
#8 in the world. Should the 
government increase foreign 
aid spending?  
No, maintain current level of foreign aid spending      
No, reduce foreign aid spending      
No, abolish foreign aid spending      
Yes      
Definitely do not know      
Question Answers Y Fri WC Fa Oth 
Q: 137 
Should Australia accept 
asylum-seeking boat 
immigrants? 
Yes, do not turn back boats and process them 
onshore 
     
Yes, they should be treated the same as those 
arriving by air 
     
No, turn the boats back at sea and process them 
offshore with hard security checks and temporary 
protection visas 
     
No, turn the boats back at sea and process them 
offshore with hard security checks and no 
     





temporary protection visas 
Definitely do not know      
Question Answers Y Fri WC Fa Oth 
Q: 138 
Should all primary and 
secondary schools be 
privatised and parents 
granted education vouchers 
to spend in the education 
market. 
Yes, such a system would increase competition 
between education providers and enable greater 
diversity in the school system so as to better cater 
for the diverse needs and potential of Australian 
school children. 
     
No, this would increase the number of children 
attending religious schools. We are a secular 
country. 
     
Yes, so long as there is a skeletal framework to 
protect children from discrimination based on 
religion and sexual orientation and to ensure the 
quality of the education provided. 
     
No, all children should have the same quality 
education. Ban private schools. 
     
No, for other reasons      
 Definitely do not know      
Question Answers Y Fri WC Fa Oth 
Q: 139 
Should voting be compulsory 
Yes      
No      
Definitely do not know      
Question Answers Y Fri WC Fa Oth 
Q: 140 
Regardless of where you and those close to you 
sit on these matters, how important are 
economic policy issues? (tax, welfare, industrial 
relations etc) 
Extremely important      
Quite important      
Not very important      
Definitely do not know      
Question Answers Y Fri WC Fa Oth 
Q: 141 
Regardless of where you and those close to you 
sit on these matters, how important are social 
policy issues? (same sex marriage, voluntary 
euthanasia, treatment of animals etc) 
Extremely important      
Quite important      
Not very important      
Definitely do not know      
Question Answers Y Fri WC Fa Oth 
Q: 142 
Regardless of where you and those close to you 
sit on these matters, how important are symbolic 
issues? (the Rudd government’s apology to the 
stolen generation, an Australian republic, 
Extremely important      
Quite important      
Not very important      
Definitely do not know      





changing the flag etc) 
Question Answers Y Fri WC Fa Oth 
Q: 143 
Regardless of where you and those close to you 
sit on these matters, how important are 
environmental issues? (climate change, 
management of the Murray-Darling basin, 
recycling etc)  
Extremely important      
Quite important      
Not very important      
Definitely do not know      
Question Answers Y Fri WC Fa Oth 
Q: 144 
Regardless of where you and those close to you 
sit on these matters, how important are national 
security and foreign affairs issues? 
Extremely important      
Quite important      
Not very important      
Definitely do not know      
Question Answers Y Fri WC Fa Oth 
Q: 145 
Regardless of where you and those close to you 
sit on these matters, how important are 
democracy and civil liberties issues? (electoral 
reform, internet filtering, compulsory voting, 
freedom of speech and assembly) 
Extremely important      
Quite important      
Not very important      
Definitely do not know      
Question Answers Y Fri WC Fa Oth 
Q: 146 
Regardless of their chance of 
winning, which political party 
has the best philosophy and 
policies for Australia’s future? 
Liberal Party of Australia      
Australian Labor Party (ALP)      
National Party      
Australian Democrats      
Australian Greens      
Liberal Democratic Party (Libertarians)      
Family First Party      
Democratic Labor Party (economically 
interventionist social conservatives) 
     
One Nation      
Palmer United Party      
Socialist Alliance      
Katter’s Australian Party      
Nick Xenophon Team      
Definitely do not know      
 
Q147-149:  
 Q: 147 
Regardless of their chance 
of winning, rank order “all” 
Q: 148 
Please rate each party 
on a scale from 0 to 20, 
Q: 149/150 
Simply place an “F” in the box 
below corresponding to the 





these parties placing a “1” 
in the box corresponding to 
the party you believe has 
the best philosophy and 
policies for Australia’s 
future, then a “2” for your 
second choice etc 
where 0 means you 
strongly dislike that 
party and 20 means 
that you strongly like 
that party. You may 
give multiple parties 
the same rating. 
party you know/think your 
father voted for at the last 
federal election and an “M” 
in the box below 
corresponding to the party 
you know/think your mother 
voted for at the last federal 
election. 
Liberal Party of Australia    
Australian Labor Party (ALP)    
National Party    
Australian Democrats    
Australian Greens    
Liberal Democratic Party 
(Libertarians) 
   
Family First Party    
Democratic Labor Party 
(economically interventionist 
social conservatives) 
   
One Nation    
Palmer United Party    
Socialist Alliance    
Katter’s Australian Party    
Nick Xenophon Team    
 
Below are definitions of some ultimate political values. You may need to refer to these as you answer the next several 
questions. 
Tolerance: the acceptance of individuals and communities being free from external/cultural/government restraint to the 
extent that they do not limit the same freedoms of others within society. Individuals must also be able to voluntarily leave 
communities within society if they wish. 
Autonomy: the possession of the power and resources to pursue one’s own goals and fulfill one's own potential. Depending 
on the context this may, or may not, include government social and/or economic intervention. For example, mandating that 
all girls, regardless of social or cultural background, attend school is an example of individual empowerment through 
government intervention. The same is true of redistributing some wealth, from rich to poor, to increase the aggregate 
amount of power that individuals within a society have to shape their own lives. Autonomy may also be served by reducing 
the sphere of government intervention; for example abolishing the discriminatory aspects of the marriage act enhances the 
autonomy of individuals. 
 Tradition: beliefs, practices, institutions, norms and behaviors passed down within a group or society with symbolic meaning 
or special significance with origins in the past. 
Equality of outcome: People having the same or similar quality and quantity of the central and valuable things in life e.g. 
approximately the same or similar rights, material wealth and economic conditions. 





Equality of opportunity: a political ideal that opposes limitation on social mobility based on race, gender, sexual orientation, 
parentage (the effect of parents’ economic status, education, values and decision making on a person’s upbringing) and 
other accidents of birth over which a person cannot reasonably have control.  
Security: resistance to, or protection from, harm. 
Utility: the greatest happiness for the greatest number 
Community: A social unit of any size which shares common values and is based on social networks between individuals as 
well as the trust, shared norms and reciprocities that underpin and in turn arise from such connections. 
National identity/sovereignty: identifying oneself as belonging, and having a special social and political allegiance, to a large 
group of people who share a common language, culture, ethnicity, descent or history.   
Sustainability: the endurance of systems and processes. The organizing principle for sustainability is sustainable 
development, which includes four interconnected domains: ecology, economics, politics and culture 
Turn page 
  





Q151:  Individuals will prioritize each one of these ultimate values over others in at least some contexts/situations, at 
least some of the time. In the table below you are asked to distribute 40 points between 10 such ultimate values 
based on how many political contexts you, as an individual, tend to prioritize each of these values over others, 
relative to the average Australian. You must give each individual value at least 1 point but no more than 7 points. If 
the average Australian would distribute their 40 points by placing a 4 in the cell corresponding to each ultimate 
value, how would you distribute your 40 points? 
 
 Distribute your 40 points between the ultimate values 




Stability/Tradition (particularly your own 
community’s/culture’s traditions) 
 
Equality of outcome  




National Identity/Sovereignty  
Sustainability  
 
Q152:  Now indicate how you would distribute the 40 points of each of those close to you based on what you know of 
their politics (the same people you used to answer questions 3.1, and 3.2). The easiest way to do this is with a tally 
e.g. \, \\, \\\, \\\\, \\\\, \\\\ \, etc. Determine the distribution of each person’s points on a separate piece of paper 
before you begin the tally (make it clear and legible). 
Below is an example answer to the first value in the table (tolerance). It indicates that the respondent: 
- has six people close to them.  
- believes one of those six people should be given 3 points for tolerance 
- believes five of those six people should be given 7 points for tolerance 
 1 point 2 points 3 points 4 points 5 points 6 points 7 points 
Tolerance   \    \\\\ 
 
 1 point 2 points 3 points 4 points 5 points 6 points 7 points 
Tolerance 
 
       
Autonomy 
 
       
Tradition/stability 
 
       





Equality of Outcome 
 
       
Equality of opportunity        
Security 
 
       
Utility 
 
       
Community 
 
       
National 
Identity/sovereignty 
       
Sustainability 
 
       
 
 
Q153: Do you have ambitions to become a politician? No  
Q154: For participants who are not a member of a political party skip to question 161. Question 147 asked you to rank order 
a list of 13 parties according to those you believe have the best philosophy and policies for Australia’s future. If the party to 
which you are a member is not the party you ranked first in question 147, explain why that is in a few sentences. If there is 
no discrepancy skip to question 157.  
Q155: If there is a discrepancy between the party to which you are a member and the party you ranked first in question 147 
what would make you more inclined to join the party you ranked first? For example, would you be more likely to consider 
joining the party you ranked first if 
a) - the electoral system was changed to increase the likelihood that your most preferred party won a share of the seats in 
parliament equal to its share of votes?  
b) that party allowed each of its members an equal vote for the party leader and equal votes for candidate selection and 
policy making decisions? 
c) – some other reason(s)  
 
Q156: How actively do you participate in party campaigning and fundraising? 
Q157: Do you feel you’re making a real and positive difference to the governance in this country through membership of, 
and involvement in, a party? 
Q158: How difficult is it to have a real say in your party’s policy and decision making? 
Q159: Is there a lot of conflict and hostility between competing factions and interests in your party? 
Q160: To what extent do you agree with the following quote regarding life in a political party? “Every action and every word 
that will affect the perceptions of other active members is possessed with colossal significance, must be premeditated and 
pondered, and the political landscape scrutinised with as much care and for as long as possible. … Every situation is political. 
You only tell people things if there is a reason to do so, … You think carefully in particular about how people will react. 
Political success above all else is about managing relationships with other people and managing perceptions. Will they be 
supportive, hostile or disinterested?”802  
                                                          
802 Page, John, Hyde. (2006) The Education of a Young Liberal, p.97 





Q161: Would you ever consider becoming a member of a political party? Why? 
Q162: If the party you ranked first in question 147 is a minor party, would you be more likely to consider joining if the 
electoral system was changed to make it more likely for that party to win a share of the seats in parliament equal to its share 
of votes? 
Q163: If the party you ranked first in question 147 allowed each of its members to have an equal vote for the party leader 
and equal votes for candidate selection and policy making decisions would you be more likely to consider joining? 
Q164: If you were to become a member of a party would you have enough time to be involved in party activities? 
Q165: Do you think it is possible for you to make a real and positive difference to the governance in this country through 
membership of and involvement in a party? 
Q166: How difficult do you think it is to have a real say in a political party’s policy and decision making? 
Q167: Do you imagine there would be a lot of conflict and hostility between competing factions and interests in a political 
party? 
Q168: To what extent do you believe you would have to self-censor what you say and the thoughts you expressed to have 




Methodology for calculating participants’ Ideological Social Network Difference Scores (ISNDSs). 
Relevant survey questions: 117-146 
- survey questions regarding economic policy issues: 120, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129 & 134 
- survey questions regarding social policy issues: 117, 119, 121, 122, 131, 132, 133 & 138 
- survey question regarding environmental issues: 123 
- survey questions regarding national security and foreign affairs issues: 124, 135, 136 & 137 
- survey questions regarding democracy and civil liberties issues: 118, 130 & 139 
- survey questions regarding emphases placed on policy areas: 140-145 
- survey question regarding party preferences: 146 
Step 1 – counted were the number of members of a participant’s close social network that the participant thought would 
have a different political party preference (question 146) to the participant. 
Step 2 - this area of possible political disagreement suggests the likelihood of other areas of significant political difference. 
Additionally, views pertaining to electoral preferences and the reasons for them are particularly important because they 
influence electoral and policy outcomes. Consequently, discussion about different electoral preferences with members of 
one’s close social network is likely to prompt more extensive discussion concerning values and policy. Hence, the numbers 
counted in Step 1 were multiplied by four. These numbers were added to participants’ ISNDSs. More figures will be added to 
participants’ ISNDSs in subsequent steps. 
Step 3 – counted were the number of members of participants’ close social networks that the participant thought would 
emphasise/prioritise policy areas differently to the participant. This was done for each policy area (questions 140-145) and 
the sums were added to participants’ ISNDSs. 
Step 4 – counted were the number of members of participants’ close social network that the participant thought would have 
different views to the participant on economic policy issues. This was done for each economic policy issue (questions 120, 
125, 126, 127, 128, 129 & 134). These numbers were multiplied by the importance participants placed on economic policy 
issues (question 140). That is, if ‘Extremely important’ they were multiplied by three, if ‘Quite important’ they were 
multiplied by two and if ‘Not very important’ they were multiplied by one. These figures were added to participants’ ISNDSs. 





Step 5 - Step 4 was repeated for social, environmental, national security and foreign affairs and democracy and civil liberties 
issues (using relevant responses to relevant survey questions). 
Below is a table of the Participation Code Numbers (PCNs) as well as the ISNDSs of the participants that answered the 



























Methodology for calculating participants’ Average Ideological Social Network Difference Scores (AISNDSs). 
Participants’ AISNDSs were determined by dividing their ISNDSs (discussed in the previous appendix) by the number of close 
social network members whose positions participants indicated in their responses to questions 117-146. Participants were 
asked to consider the same close social network members when responding to each of these questions. If they did not know 
and could not guess the positions of one or more of their close social network members regarding an issue they were asked 
to place them in the ‘Definitely do not know’ category. However, not all participants indicated the same number of positions 
held by their close social network members from question to question. This variation was very minor for all but one of these 
participants. Their AISNDSs were determined by dividing their ISNDSs by the number of close social network members they 
considered in a ‘majority’ of the relevant questions (questions 117 to 146). The one participant who responded to the 
relevant questions but was extremely inconsistent regarding the number of close social network members they considered 





in each question was not given an AISNDS. Neither were those participants who failed to indicate any policy position held by 
any member of their close social network. 
Below is a table of participants’ PCNs,803 ISNDSs,804 AISNDSs and number of close social network members. 
PCNs ISNDSs Network Size AISNDSs 
0069 21 26 0.81 
0074 43 17 2.53 
0078 238 14 17 
0073 281 No consistency - 
0066 104 11 9.45 
0083 238 11 21.64 
0080 74 15 4.93 
0068 65 24 2.71 
0016 105 19 5.53 
0042 105 6 17.5 
0058 129 13 9.92 
0054 0 2 0.00 
0049 78 6 13.00 
0037 119 5 23.8 
0035 279 15 18.6 
0024 222 7 31.71 
0009 203 17 11.94 
0017 417 33 12.64 
0008 222 7 31.71 
0007 87 15 5.80 
0006 151 15 10.07 
0001 127 7 18.14 
0000 401 8 50.13 
 
Appendix 571 
Methodology for calculating participants’ Average Structural Social Network Difference Scores (ASSNDSs) 
Relevant survey questions: 103 – 115. 
Responses to these questions were used to assess the degree to which members of participants’ networks were structurally 
(as opposed ideologically/politically) unlike the participant. Structural variables considered included age, gender, sexuality, 
country of birth, ethnicity, English/foreign language proficiency, education, socio-economic status, religion and religiosity. 
Step 1 - For each of the relevant questions (questions 103 – 115) the number of members of participants’ close social 
networks that the participant had indicated had different structural traits/characteristics to the participant were counted. 
The sum of these numbers became the participants’ Structural Social Network Difference Scores (SSNDSs). 
Step 2 – Participants’ SSNDSs were divided by the number of close social network members whose structural 
traits/characteristics the participants indicated in their responses to questions 103 – 1115. Participants were asked to 
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consider the same number of social network members when responding to each of these questions. If they did not know 
and could not guess the traits/characteristics of one or more of their close social network members regarding a structural 
variable they were asked to place them in the ‘Definitely do not know’ category. However, not all participants indicated the 
same number of mutually exclusive traits/characteristics for their close social network members from question to question. 
This variation was very minor for all but one of the participants. Their ASSNDSs were determined by dividing their SSNDSs by 
the number of close social network members they considered when responding to a majority of the relevant questions 
(questions 103-115). The one participant who responded to the relevant questions but was extremely inconsistent regarding 
the number of close social network members they considered when answering each question was not given an ASSNDS. 
Below is a table of the Participants’ PCNs,805 SSNDSs, and ASSNDSs as well as the number of close social network members 
considered by participants. 
PCNs SSNDSs Network Size ASSNDSs 
0069 64 26 2.46 
0074 103 17 6.06 
0078 84 14 6.00 
0073 93 No consistency - 
0066 48 11 4.36 
0083 51 11 4.64 
0080 46 15 3.07 
0084 69 24 2.88 
0068 110 24 4.58 
0016 36 19 1.89 
0042 44 6 7.33 
0058 54 13 4.15 
0044 29 8 3.63 
0054 7 2 3.50 
0049 38 6 6.33 
0045 15 4 3.75 
0037 29 5 5.80 
0035 92 15 6.13 
0024 68 7 9.71 
0009 53 18 2.94 
0017 159 33 4.82 
0008 26 7 3.71 
0007 61 15 4.07 
0006 76 15 5.07 
0001 42 7 6.00 
0000 34 8 4.25 
 
Appendix 572 
Methodology for calculating participants’ Average Value Social Network Difference Scores (AVSNDSs) 
                                                          
805 Defined in Appendix 569 





Relevant survey questions: 151/152 
Question 151 asked participants to distribute 40 points between 10 ultimate values (values that are not derived from other 
values); giving no one value more than seven points or less than one point. Participants were asked to distribute these points 
based on how many political contexts they, as individuals, tend to prioritise each of these values over others, relative to the 
average Australian. It was stated that the average Australian would distribute their 40 points by placing a 4 in each cell 
corresponding to each ultimate value. 
Question 152 asked participants to indicate how they would distribute the 40 points of each member of their close network 
based on what they know of their politics (the same people they used to answer questions 103-146). 
Step 1 - The difference between ‘the number of points participants indicated represented their own overall level of 
emphasis on a value’ and ‘the numbers of points participants indicated was representative of the overall level of emphasis 
placed on this value by each member of their close social network’ was added to participants’ Value Social Network 
Difference Scores (VSNDSs). 
Step 2 - This was repeated for each value. 
Step 3 – Participants VSNDSs were divided by the number of close social network members whose value emphases the 
participants indicated in their responses to question 152. Participants were asked to consider the value emphases of the 
same close social network members per value. However, not all participants indicated the same number of value emphases 
per value. Therefore, AVSNDSs were determined by dividing VSNDSs by the number of value emphases considered for at 
least five of the 10 values. Again, as discussed in the previous two appendices one participant (with PCN 0073) who 
responded to the relevant questions but was extremely inconsistent regarding the number of close social network members 
they considered when answering questions 103 – 146, and 152 was not given an AVSNDS. 
Below is a table of participants’ PCNs,806 VSNDSs and AVSNDSs of participants as well as the number of close social network 
members whose value emphases participants considered. 
PCN VSNDSs Network Size AVSNDSs 
0074 190 17 11.18 
0078 179 14 12.79 
0066 66 11 6.00 
0080 64 15 4.27 
0042 106 6 17.67 
0044 77 10 7.70 
0054 0 2 0.00 
0049 0 6 0.00 
0045 18 1 18.00 
0037 0 5 0.00 
0035 196 15 13.07 
0024 161 7 23.00 
0017 416 33 12.61 
0008 72 7 10.29 
0007 15 15 1.00 
0006 234 13 18.00 
0001 119 7 17.00 
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0000 124 8 15.50 
 
Appendix 573 
Methodology for calculating participants’ Frequency of Meeting Informally with Members of their Social Networks. 
Relevant survey questions: 48, 49 and 50. 
The sums of the figures given by each participant in response to questions 48 to 50 are used to gauge the frequency of their 
informal meetings with members of their social networks. 
Below is a table of participants’ PCNs807 and the frequencies of their informal meetings with members of their social 
networks over the months prior to their participation in my survey. 
PCNs Frequency of informal meetings with members of 
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Methodology for calculating participants’ Formal Organisational Engagement Score 
Relevant survey question: 90 
Question 90 asked participants to indicate the number of groups (per category of group) to which they belonged as well as 
how actively they were involved in the decision-making of the groups they most participated in per category. 
They could choose between for levels of decision-making: 
- leader (four points) 
- very active (three points) 
- somewhat active (two points), and 
- does not participate in decision-making (one point). 
The number of organisations/groups to which participants belonged per category was multiplied by the corresponding level 
of decision-making involvement participants had per category. The sum of these figures became each participant’s Formal 
Organisational Engagement Score. 
Below is a table of participants’ PCNs808 and their Formal Organisational Engagement Scores. 
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Methodology for calculating the relative membership growth of the two most important formal groups in which participants 
are involved. 
Relevant survey question: 99 
Question 99 asked participants to indicate whether membership in each of (what they deemed to be) their two most 
important formal groups had declined (one point), remained the same (two points), or increased (three points) in the 
previous five years. 
Below are two tables. The first shows the relative membership growth scores of participants two most important formal 
groups in which participants are involved in separate columns. The second table presents the relative membership growth 
scores of the two most important formal groups in the same column. 
PCNs Relative membership growth Scores 
of Participants’ most important formal 
groups 
Relative membership growth Scores 
of Participants’ second most 
important formal groups 
0069 3 - 
0074 3 - 
0078 2 2 
0073 3 2 
0066 2 2 
0083 2 2 
0080 2 - 
0084 1 1 
0068 2 - 
0042 3 3 
0045 2 1 
0037 1 2 
0035 2 3 
0024 3 2 
0009 2 3 





0017 3 2 
0006 - 3 
0001 3 3 
0003 1 2 
0072 2 2 
 
PCNs Relative membership growth Scores of Participants’ two 











































Methodology for calculating the degree to which participants’ most important formal groups (in which they are involved) 
have egalitarian decision-making processes. 
Relevant survey question: 100 
Question 100 asked participants to indicate how decisions are usually made in their most important formal groups. The 
options were: 
- decisions are imposed from outside the group (one point) 
- the leader decides and informs other group members (two points) 
- the leader asks group members what they think, then decides (three points) 
- the group members hold a discussion and decide together (four points). 
The more egalitarian the decision-making process of the group, the greater the number of points. 
Below is a table of participants’ PCNs809 and the number of points indicating the extent to which participants’ most 
important formal groups had egalitarian decision-making processes. 
PCNs Extent to which participants’ most important formal 
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Methodology for calculating the degree to which participants’ two most important formal groups (in which they are 
involved) have egalitarian decision-making processes. 
Relevant survey question: 100 
Question 100 asked participants not only to indicate how decisions are usually made in their most important formal groups, 
but also how they are usually made in their second most important formal groups (if they had one). 
The same procedure used to determine the degree to which participants’ most important formal groups have egalitarian 
decision-making processes (discussed in Appendix 576) was employed to assess the extent to which participants’ second 
most important formal groups have egalitarian decision-making processes. 
Below is a table of participants’ PCNs810 and the number of points indicating the extent to which participants’ two most 
important formal groups had egalitarian the decision-making processes. 
PCNs Extent to which participants’ two most important formal 
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Methodology for calculating the degree to which participants’ most important formal groups (in which they are involved) 
have egalitarian leadership selection processes. 
Relevant survey question: 101 
Question 101 asked participants to indicate how leaders are usually selected in their most important formal groups. The 
options were: 
- by an outside person or entity (one point) 
- each leader chooses his/her successor (two points) 
- by a small group of members (three points) 
- by decision/vote of all members (four points) 
The more egalitarian the leadership selection procedure of the group, the greater the number of points. 
Below is a table of participants’ PCNs811 and the number of points indicating the extent to which participants’ most 
important formal groups had egalitarian leadership selection procedures. 
PCNs Extent to which participants’ most important formal 
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Methodology for calculating the degree to which participants’ two most important formal groups (in which they are 
involved) have egalitarian leadership selection procedures. 
Relevant survey question: 101 
Question 101 asked participants not only to indicate how leaders are usually selected in their most important formal groups, 
but also how leaders are usually selected in their second most important formal groups (if they had one). 
The same procedure used to determine the degree to which participants’ most important formal groups have egalitarian 
leadership selection processes (discussed in Appendix 578) was employed to assess the extent to which participants second 
most important formal groups have egalitarian leadership selection processes. 
Below is a table of participants’ PCNs812 and the number of points indicating the extent to which participants’ two most 
important formal groups had egalitarian leadership selection processes. 
PCNs Extent to which participants’ two most important formal 
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Methodology for calculating the degree to which participants’ informal social networks (outside the immediate family) are 
structurally (ethnically/linguistically, economically, socially and religiously) diverse. 
Relevant survey questions: 51A - 51D 
Questions 48 to 50 asked participants about the number of times they had met/visited informally with people outside their 
immediate families over the previous month. Questions 51A to 51D asked participants whether these people were mostly of 
a different (or different): 
- ethnic/linguistic group(s) (51A),  
- economic status (51B),  
- social status (51C), and/or  
- religious group(s) (51D)  
to the participant. To gauge the extent to which each participant’s informal social network was structurally diverse the sum 
of the number of times they responded yes to these yes/no questions became their overall informal network structural 
diversity score. The lowest possible score was zero and the highest was four. 





Below is a table of participants’ PCNs813 and the number of points measuring the extent to which participants’ informal 
social networks (outside the immediate family) are structurally unlike the participants. This second variable is usually a good 
indication of the degree to which a network is structurally diverse. 
PCNs Extent to which participants’ informal social networks 
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Methodology for calculating the degree to which the members of the most important formal organisations in which 
participants are involved have similar incomes/wealth. 
Relevant survey question: 98 
- participants who indicated that the two most important formal groups in which they were involved had a mix of 
rich and poor members were given one point; 
- Participants who indicated belonging to only a single formal group which had a mix of rich and poor members 
were also given one point; 
- participants who indicated that one of the two most important formal groups in which they were involved had a 
mix of rich and poor members but that the other group had members with mostly the same level of 
income/wealth were given one and half points; 
- participants who indicated that their only or two most important group(s) in which they were involved had 
members with mostly the same level of income/wealth were given two points. 
These points indicate the degree to which members of the most important formal groups in which participants were 
involved had similar levels of income/wealth. 
Below is a table of participants’ PCNs814 and the number of points gauging the extent to which the members of the most 
important formal groups in which participants are involved have similar levels of income/wealth. 
PCNs Extent to which the members of the most important 
formal groups in which participants are involved have 
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Methodology for calculating ‘membership of / willingness to join, a political party.’ 
Relevant survey questions: 156, 157 and 161 
Questions 156 and 157 asked participants about their engagement in political parties. Non-party-members were asked to 
skip ahead. Therefore, those participants who skipped ahead were assumed to be non-party-members. Question 161 asked 
if participants would ever consider becoming a member of a political party. 
- Party members were given two points 
- Non-party-members who might consider becoming a political party member were given one point 
- Those who were not presently nor would ever consider becoming a political party member received zero points 
These points indicate that the degree to which participants are willing to join a political party. Obviously, those who were 
already party members were the most willing. 
Below is a table of participants’ PCNs815 and the number of points indicating the extent to which participants are willing to 
join a political party. 
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Methodology for calculating non-party-member participants’ willingness to join a political party 
Relevant survey question: 161 
Question 161 asked if participants would ever consider becoming a member of a political party. Participants that were 
already party members were asked to skip this question. 
Non-party-member participants who indicated that they may consider joining a political party were given one point. 
Non-party-member participants who indicated that they would never consider joining a political party were given zero 
points. 
Below is a table of non-party-member participants’ PCNs and their number of points indicating the willingness to join a 
political party in the future. 
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Correlations between “women being part (as opposed to full) time employed” and “Not discussing politics with friends 
and work colleagues” 
 All 18-34 35-49 50-64 
1981 x x x x 
1995 x x x r= .306, p= .015 
2005 x r= .234, p= .013 x x 
2012 x x x x 
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